


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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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JUN 21 1945



G-2

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18 MAY 1945

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
APO 958

I N T E L L I G E N C E B U L L E T I N

No 16 - 18 May 45

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NOTE: Material in this Bulletin which is based on PW interrogations should be appraised accordingly.

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COVER PAGE:- See next page
for explanatory text.

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COVER PAGE:- 20-ton Amtank destroyed by Jap mine
on IIE SHIMA.

This is a photo of a US Amtank made just after it hit a 500 pound mine on the first day of the operation on IIE SHIMA. The remains of a Jeep, which was travelling beside the tank can be seen on the left. Seven were killed in the Amtank and two in the jeep. The almost unbelievable destructive power of the mine is graphically portrayed in this end-over-end somersault of the 40,000 pound armor-plated vehicle. Note the manner in which the floor of the tank has been torn as though made of paper.

An M18 Tank Destroyer, carrying the photographer of this picture, passed over this same section of the road just a few minutes before the Amtank came along. Just after the picture was taken sniper fire was received in the area.

Official US Army Photo via 1st Info & Hist Svce.

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Jap Artillery Tactics on Okinawa

This article was written on the basis of information received through 4 May 45.

(1) While information concerning Japanese artillery methods being employed in the defense of OKINAWA is still too meager to allow definite conclusions to be drawn as to methods of target designation, fire direction, observation, and systems of prearranged fires concentrations and barrages, certain characteristics of the fire that have been reported indicate that the basic methods of employment of artillery by the Jap in this operation have been greatly improved. The volume and effectiveness of the enemy's artillery fire are a reflection of his growing realization of its true worth.

(2) There seems to be little doubt that the Jap is coordinating the fires of more than one battery and perhaps more than one battalion. This is indicated by the number of rounds reported received by our troops in relatively short periods of time. One of the heaviest concentrations reported was in a 3 hour period on the night of 23/24 April when a total of 4,500 rounds of artillery fire was received by the 7th Division. The caliber of this fire was not reported. This is more than equal to the fire of a battalion of 3 firing batteries of 4 guns each firing at a sustained rate of fire of 2 rounds per gun per minute. Reports received since this writing indicate that 11,000 to 12,000 rounds of artillery were fired in preparation for Jap counter-attack of 4 May. Period of time required for this preparation was not stated. This coordination of fires is, in effect, massing of fires. However, it is considered doubtful if this is being accomplished by the use of a battalions fire direction center. Rather it is probable that such a tying together of batteries and perhaps battalions is being accomplished by the retention of operational control of artillery by artillery hqs, and by the coordination by this hqs the prearranged fires of its subordinate units.

(3) No reports of the rapidity of transfer of fire have been received. The lack of such reports, considering the prominent part being played by artillery in this operation, is some indication that rapid transfer of fire is not an outstanding feature, which it probably would be were the enemy using fire direction centers.

(4) On the other hand there are reports which indicate that the enemy has been skillful in his employment of artillery against targets of opportunity. The use of artillery fire against our troop concentrations and against our attacks has been reported.

(5) Reports have stated also that whenever our troops moved in certain areas they received accurate artillery fire immediately. This could indicate rapid and accurate fire control by a fire direction center, but more probably it indicates that the enemy had prepared barrages for certain areas which could be brought down whenever our troops were observed in these areas.

(6) Recognition by the enemy of the value of artillery as preparation for counter-attacks has been demonstrated by his employment of artillery in this role on several occasions, notably on the night of 12/13 April. Attention is invited to note in paragraph (2) re use of 11,000 to 12,000 rounds as preparation for counter-attack of 4 May.

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JAP ARTILLERY TACTICS ON OKINAWA (CONTD)

(7) The only indications of the use of aerial observation for artillery are several reports of unidentified cub planes being sighted. These aircraft were never positively identified as enemy. It is known that the Jap is capable of this type of observation for artillery and an enemy aircraft of the cub type was recently captured on LUZON.

(8) A captured map showing enemy artillery position areas has been reported. This map affirms that the enemy has a well organized plan for the use of his artillery and artillery mortars. Overlapping fields of fire have been provided and the bulk of his medium and long range artillery units are grouped centrally in his defense zone. His groupings are located in such a manner as to be able to deliver reinforcing fires against attacks made on the position from all possible avenues of approach. The extensive night fires of the enemy also indicate an extensive plan of prearranged fire.

(9) The lack of discovery of field artillery emplacements in the area early captured indicates that the Japs have had their artillery in its present position for a considerable period of time and had prepared a well organized plan for its employment.

(10) It has been reported that there is strong evidence of the use by the enemy of sound and flash ranging units for counter-battery fire. The enemy's early morning counter-battery fires suggest that he locates our batteries from their night fires and then delivers observed counter-battery fire in the morning. In this connection it is significant that the 1st Artillery Intelligence Regiment has been located on OKINAWA.

(11) The enemy is again using caves as protection for his artillery pieces on OKINAWA. They are very difficult to locate and destroy.

(12) The large percentage of duds which continues to be reported is notable. In view of the other features of Jap artillery employment in this operation which seem to indicate well trained personnel, the large number of duds probably indicates faulty ammunition.

(13) CONCLUSION:

(a) Preliminary reports indicate that the effectiveness of Jap artillery on OKINAWA may be ascribed to a combination of the following factors:

1. Centralized control of artillery making possible the coordination of the fire of 2 or more batteries.
2. A greater appreciation of capabilities and value of artillery employed as artillery than he has had heretofore.
3. Thorough pre-planning and preparation of fires.
4. Skillful observation (perhaps aerial observation to some extent).
5. An accurate target designation system.
6. Greater artillery strength than has previously been met in the Pacific Ocean Areas.
7. Probable use of sound and flash ranging technique for counter-battery fire.

JAP ARTILLERY TACTICS ON OKINAWA (CONTD)

(b) While it is possible that the enemy may be using fire direction centers to mass the fires of two or more batteries, it is more probable that each battery is figuring its own firing data for each mission and the fires are being coordinated by a higher headquarters which designates targets for the batteries and coordinates their fire.

Fable of Japan

(From Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 84, 18 Apr 45)

One of the greatest seeming paradoxes of the present war is the complete cooperation of the Jap PW in aiding the destruction of his erstwhile comrades in arms. We have always accepted, and correctly so, that the principal reason why the Jap PW gave information so freely was that he had never been taught otherwise. We know, moreover, that many PsW have volunteered to fight with our troops.

One of the most interesting explanations of this enigmatic behavior is contained in a letter which recently was written voluntarily by a PW. He wrote, in part:

"Turning back to Japanese history we are acquainted with the story that BENKEI and USHIWAKAMURA were common enemies. BENKEI challenged USHIWAKAMURA to a fight from which USHIWAKAMURA emerged victorious. Henceforth, BENKEI became the devoted and loyal retainer of USHIWAKAMURA.

"Thus BENKEI, who devoted his entire life to his master, exemplifies the true spirit of Japanese BUSHIDO. Once a warrior serves a master, he becomes his faithful subject and follower until death. We who have been raised and indoctrinated in this code of life firmly believe that death is the ultimate glory of battle.

"With this belief in mind, we perform our military duties. I don't believe there is one Japanese who would serve the enemy as long as he were alive. However, if a soldier fails to achieve his mission and falls into enemy hands, his life as a Japanese soldier ceases to exist. Consequently, as in the case of BENKEI, we are considered as being born again. Therefore, we are obligated to serve America."

BRIEFS

RATIONING IN JAPAN

PW reported on rationing in JAPAN in 1944, stating that meat was limited to 21 ounces per month per person, eggs were limited to one per person per month (except for hospital patients and sick people) milk was reserved for hospital patients and children, cheese was not rationed but was unprocurable and gasoline was unprocurable except through black market.

(SWPA, ATIS Interrogation Report No 708, 4 May 45)(CONFIDENTIAL)

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Japanese Volkssturm

(From WD MID Bulletin No 10, 14 Mar 45)

According to one of its members captured in the PHILIPPINES, the 2d Provisional Infantry Battalion was one of three such units hastily organized in the PHILIPPINES by conscripting male civilians (presumably Japanese residents) and combining them with the remnants of various miscellaneous units. The unit, organized by the MANILA Defense Unit Hq, contained many older men, received very little training, and performed mainly guard duty.

This is the first clear example of the actual use of the Japanese equivalent of the German Volkssturm, but various reports of plans to use Japanese civilians for local defense in other areas serve as an indication of what to expect in the future. On SAIPAN, (the only Japanese-held area invaded before the PHILIPPINES to contain a sizeable number of Japanese civilians), plans to employ civilians in local defense aborted and general confusion resulted. In overseas areas where enough Japanese reside, the local defense headquarters appear to be registering all Japanese males of military age and in some instances to be giving them some military training. In the PALAUS, for example, nearly 4000 reservists were summoned in Aug 1944, when invasion seemed imminent, and some of them were sent to ANGAUR for speedy one-month training. Along the coast of CHINA - in the AMOY, CANTON, HONGKONG and SHANGHAI areas - reports indicate similar plans to employ Japanese civilians in local defense. On FORMOSA, the mobilization of 150000 reservists for local defense was to be completed by the end of Dec 1944. In JAPAN proper, broadcasts have emphasized (since early in 1944) the training of civilians for coastal and other local defense. The bulwark of this Volkssturm in JAPAN Proper is the Second National Army, which in peacetime consists of a large group of untrained males of military age. With the small amount of training now being given this group and with the formal registering on its rolls of all 17 and 18 year olds since November 1944, the use of civilians in the defense of the Japanese homeland begins to assume increasing military importance.

BRIEFS

FRENCH INDO-CHINA MORALE

Japanese morale in French Indo-China seemed to be exceedingly good. Both officers and men appeared happy and contented with their lot. They seemed well fed, unusually well dressed, neat and clean. Training of the troops was continuous; invariably conducted in small groups of from 7-8 men, and supervised by an officer.
(WD MID Rpt, 26 Mar 45) (SECRET)

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CIC Operations on Okinawa

Unofficial reporting has indicated that the civilians on OKINAWA caused little or no trouble to military operations, with no instances at all reported of civilians attempting to aid the enemy behind our lines. Evidently, the Okinawans had for so long been subjugated by the Japs that they were willing to obey any source of instructions.

The problem of locating soldiers posing as civilians was simplified by the fact that there were very few young males to be found, the Japs having apparently taken nearly all of them for defense or construction work.

Contact was made with a number of civilian informants who had spent many years in the Hawaiian Islands, many of these claiming US citizenship. These civilians were eager to help and were able to be of considerable assistance. In some instances they went back through enemy lines and returned with information and other civilians.

The problem of language was a very real one. Many persons were encountered who spoke only Okinawa dialect and knew no Japanese. It was felt that the need of having language personnel attached to the various CIC detachments was a "must." The amount of work that could be done by a detachment was almost in direct ratio to the number of language personnel available to it.

BRIEF

SMOKELESS FLAME FIRE GRENADE

The 77th Infantry Division operating on IE SHIM reports enemy using fire grenade which throws smokeless flame about 10 yards with no fragmentation.
(Navy Dispatch (SECRET))

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(over)

New Type Suicide Plane

(From US Forces China Theatre G-2 Periodic Report
No 78, 12 Apr 45, and 14 AF Intelsum, 18 Apr 45)

At LAN TIEN CHANG Airfield, PEIPING, a new model suicide aircraft is being manufactured. Named V-1, the plane is said to be operating from carriers with shipping its primary target. This aircraft resembles the TOJO in size and the P-51 in appearance but with small differences between each individual plane.

Detonators are carried in the wings and spinner with 500 to 1000 lbs of explosives located in the nose. There are no instruments, armament, or parachutes carried. The 450 horsepower engine is located back of the pilot. The landing gear is dropped after the plane is airborne. Pilots do not volunteer, but are assigned to duty. Formations of fighters are followed by these planes to the target.

COMMENT: The information regarding the 450 HP engine appears questionable, in view of the plane's size. All other data however, is considered reliable. Source had a very complete technical knowledge of certain types of Japanese aircraft, and claimed to have worked on the type described here.


Fourteenth Air Force Intelligence Summary dated 18 Apr 45 carries a description and sketch of the V-1 or "FLASH" suicide plane. The sketch is based on the recollection of a Chinese puppet pilot who alleged that many of these planes are constructed from a new basic design. Hence, they may differ somewhat in appearance, one from another. This source stated that the explosive carried in the nose varied from 500 to 2000 pounds. Electric impact switches in the nose and in each wing are connected to a detonator at the rear of the charge. The main landing gear is stated to be jettisoned automatically when the plane leaves the ground. A steerable tail skid is fitted in lieu of a wheel.

Tactically, these "FLASHES" are said to be escorted by covering fighters. Fuel sufficient for only a one-way trip is carried. Pilots are not necessarily volunteers but are conscripted for this duty. Six months training in fighters is given in preparation for the final flight. During the training, the trainees are given the best of everything (including, feminine companionship furnished). As the pilots take off on the last mission, high ranking officers and the families of the pilots are usually on hand to render the last salute to the departing heroes. Government pensions for life are promised the surviving families.

When the pilots of this informant's class were informed of their status as "reserve" suicide pilots, some cried, but most simply expressed a desire to be relieved of this great honor.

Although primarily designed for use against naval vessels, it was stated that a smaller version of this plane is being produced for use in diving attacks against the B-29s.

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FLASH V-1 SUICIDE PLANE

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Jap Surrenders on Guam

(From Hq GUAM Island Command Summary of Enemy Operations No 10
6 May 45.)

A most striking instance of the effectiveness of psychological warfare in inducing Japs to surrender was the result of propaganda unit operations in the south of GUAM. This area had been "worked over" before with almost no success; the unit had been working in the north with moderate success, particularly in the YIGO area. Acting on the advice of a PW who surrendered on the 19th (April) with twelve others at UMATAC, the sound-truck moved to the south and began operations, sending out previously-captured PsW to contact their friends and persuade them to surrender. The stream of surrenders culminated in a record-breaking group of 32 on the 30th of the month, the largest group of military prisoners yet to surrender on GUAM. Since these Japs had been fairly safe and well-supplied with food, their readiness to surrender may be taken as a highly encouraging proof of the effectiveness of the personal-contact method of influencing the surrender of fugitives. POACOMMENT: Issue No 15 of the G-2 USAFPOA Intelligence Bulletin discusses the effectiveness of this method of inducing surrender, as used on IWO JIMA and TINIAN.

Gas By Parachute

(From SWPA, ATIS Bulletin No 1983, 22 Apr 45)

Captured at LEYTE in Oct 1944 was a handwritten notebook containing sketch of a parachute-dropped gas dispersion cylinder (SANPUTO). The notebook was dated January-August but the year not stated. The notebook was kept by members of the 1st Squad, 1st Section, unidentified rifle and artillery unit.

Extracts:

"Methods of gas dispersion:

1. Spraying devices
2. Bombs
3. Dispersion cylinder"



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Nipponese Odyssey

(From Hq Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No 80, 21 Mar 45)

A PW sergeant of a heavy artillery battalion, who seems to have personally gone through a large part of the travels and troubles of the Japanese during the SWPA campaign, was recently captured and interrogated by XIV Corps (XIV CAEI 0060).

Inducted at OSAKA in 1942, Sgt OSADA was assigned to the 21st Ind Mixed Brigade, and was sent to FRENCH INDO-CHINA, then to BURMA. In late 1942 he and his unit went to PALAU. En route from PALAU to RABAU, PW's ship was sunk by a US submarine and two-thirds of the personnel were lost. Picked up by a Jap submarine he finally reached RABAU 24 Nov 42. In early March of 1943, he was on the ill-fated BISMARCK SEA convoy which was completely smashed by Allied airplanes. PW's ship was sunk, but again he and a few other survivors were rescued by a Jap submarine and taken back to RABAU. In late June, a second convoy in which OSADA was a passenger succeeded in reaching LAE. PW took part in the battles of SALAMAU and LAE, whereupon his unit retreated to WEWAK. There he was hospitalized for a long time with malaria and received his promotion to lance corporal. At the end of 1943, he left WEWAK on a hospital ship and debarked in MANILA. After a series of uneventful tours of duty and transfers of station on LUZON, he found himself in late December 1944 moved to ANTIPOLLO. When the Japanese decided to kill all Filipinos in ANTIPOLLO in late February of this year because of guerrilla activity and food-stealing, he bitterly opposed this as he had many Filipino friends, and he therefore determined to desert. On 7 Mar, his wanderings finally came to an end; he was captured at TERESA, dressed in civilian clothes, while in the act of aiding in the escape of some Filipino friends.

As a veteran of the NEW GUINEA campaign, OSADA had some very sharp things to say about the lax morale of Jap troops in the PHILIPPINES;

PW claimed morale to be very low, a result not only of having become aware of Allied air and fire-power superiority, but also a natural outgrowth of the lax, undisciplined, and even frivolous behavior of the troops of the P.I. Upon first coming to the PHILIPPINES, PW was appalled to see how undisciplined were the actions of the men, and in particular, the officers. Contrast was heightened in that PW had just come from NEW GUINEA where troops were undergoing great hardships. He said that at that time he was convinced that the war was lost.

PW was bitter about the apparent lack of restrictions of any form on the conduct of officers. He claimed that he had lost much of his respect for all officers in the Jap Army. Other NCOs shared this opinion, hence the breakdown in the effectiveness of command, and the resultant weakening of the combat potential in all units.

--- continued next page ---

BRIEFS

TREE BLAZING

A report from NEW DELHI stated that the Japs marked the locations of ammunition dumps by slash marks on trees along the road. The trees so marked would bear the Jap character for tree, followed by a number. Captured through this means of location, was one dump which contained 2000 rounds of artillery ammunition including 8 Spigot Mortar 32cm projectiles. (NEW DELHI Dispatch) (SECRET)

On the oft-reported wearing of civilian clothes by Japanese, the PW stated that since coming to LUZON he had found that no restrictions were placed on the wearing of civilian clothes. In fact, at various supply depots, items of civilian clothing were available upon request. Previous to US landings, the wearing of civilian clothes was a common practice with men on pass.

In the ANTIPOLLO area MPs and even sentries wore civilian clothes to avoid being recognized from a distance.

PW claimed there was a shortage of uniforms and some soldiers were unable to replace items which had become unserviceable. Hence, they resorted to the wearing of civilian clothes.

Model 98 Dual Purpose Naval Gun

(From ASFEEIST Ordnance Intelligence Report, IWO JIMA, 20 Apr 45)

Reported in issue No 13 of the USAFPOA G-2 Intelligence Bulletin, dated 6 April 1945 was the Jap Model 98 Dual Purpose Twin Mount 10cm, 65 caliber Naval Gun. Prior to the IWO JIMA operation, no specimens of the gun had been captured, though ammunition for the gun had been found in the MARLINAS.

Of the guns found, two of the twin mounts were in the process of being emplaced and were incomplete, in addition to being badly damaged due to their exposed position. The only off-carriage equipment present was a 4.5 meter (14' 9") height finder which was totally destroyed. One mount had been fired (approximately 20 rounds) but had been manually controlled and operated for that firing. A total of twelve rounds of ammunition was recovered.

Several views of this gun are shown on the facing page.

BRIEFS

"... WHAT THE LEFT HAND DOETH"



At about the beginning of 1942 an announcement was made to the men of the Third Infiltration Unit that corporal punishment was forbidden by regulations. After that date, officers never struck the men, and noncommissioned officers and long-service soldiers never struck them in the presence of officers.

(SWPA, ATIS Interrogation Report No 705, 27 Apr 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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KI 93 Antitank Assault Plane

An indication that the Japs have not overlooked the anti-tank capabilities of aircraft is contained in a captured notebook containing notes on aircraft and armament. The notebook is dated 10 May 41 and extracts are published in ATIS Bulletin No 1978.

This document contains a note referring to the KI 93 as an "Anti-tank Assault Plane," and gives the information that this aircraft is armed with a 57mm gun, HO 402.

Another undated notebook containing lecture notes, published in ATIS Bulletin No 1728, also contains the information that this aircraft is armed with a 57mm gun, and gives additional information. According to this document the plane in addition to the 57mm gun, which is mounted in the lower part of the nose of the fuselage, is armed with 3 - 20 mm automatic cannons, one in each wing between the fuselage and engine, and one in the tail position.

The plane has 2 engines and apparently is copied from the German Messerschmitt 410. The speed is given as 600 (presumably km per hour.) (Approx 370 miles per hour.) and is noted that the plane is armored, though no details are given.

No information is available concerning the HO 402 57mm gun with which this plane is armed. However, it may be assumed that this gun is a later model of the HO 401, information of which was contained in ATIS Current Translations No. 153 dated 1 Mar 45. According to this document the HO 401 has a rate of fire of 120 rounds per minute, a muzzle velocity of 560 m (1835 feet) per second, and weighs 160 kg (352 lb.)

This aircraft is thought to be in an experimental stage. No information, other than from captured documents, has been received concerning it. If the Japs do succeed in producing the KI 93 it might be an effective anti-armor aircraft.

BRIEFS

JAP BACTERIOLOGICAL GAS

In PALAU in 1943, PW heard from a soldier that an unidentified water purification unit in HSINKING, MANCHURIA was carrying out experiments with a gas containing bacteria. On one occasion, the gas was sprayed from the air, and when first released, looked like a fog, but gradually faded away. Gelatin was set out in trays to test the amount of bacteria that had fallen. The gas was odorless and tasteless.

(SWPA, ATIS Interrogation Report No 707, 26 Apr 45)(CONFIDENTIAL)

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Employment of the Jap Rocket Launcher

(From V Amphib Corps in the field letter 19 Mar 45,
subject: Information of Japanese rocket launcher
for the 250 kg bomb.)

The use of the large rocket on IWO JIMA by the enemy was typically Japanese. Employed as a harassing fire, it became well recognized by sound because of its flight along the length of the island from the northern part toward the MOUNT SURIBACHI target area. While heavy barrages were not used, the rocket fire was endured almost nightly until shortly before the island was secured. These rockets were fired singly and with intervals of several minutes between rounds, with the target being the densely crowded neck of land between the eastern and western beaches immediately northeast of SURIBACHI. While Japanese observation undoubtedly spotted both Corps Headquarters and the artillery concentration in their rocket target area, and attempted to center their rockets on that area, accuracy was very poor. The nearest hit to the center of the impact area was approximately 600 yards. Maximum dispersal covered an area of at least 4500 yards long by 1200 yards wide, with by far the greater number far over the target. From sightings, trajectory and rate-of-fire, it is believed that not more than two launchers were used during any period of delivery fire.

The complete rocket and launcher were not recovered on IWO JIMA. It appears all projectiles were fired, and the launchers either destroyed by the enemy or reduced to unrecognizable rubble by our own fire.

Reconstruction of fragments was attempted and a description of the rocket was put together prior to the recovery of the manual. Overall dimensions and range are more than was anticipated, and the following data is submitted.

Fuze	Bomb Fuze A-3(a), Instantaneous
Range	Maximum noted - 7500 yards
Flight	Erratic, affected greatly by air currents.
Sound of Flight	A bubbling whistle, caused by the construction of the propellant sticks and a fluctuating pressure in the propellant chamber.
Propellant	Very slow burning in comparison to US rockets. This propellant appears to be still burning at a range of approximately four thousand yards. NOTE: This would add to the dispersion in a target area.
Fragmentation	Excellent, excepting the tail and venturi assembly, and the rear part of the motor. These may sometimes be found almost intact.
Blast	That of the 250 kg (550 lb) bomb minus tail cone assembly.

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EMPLOYMENT OF THE JAP ROCKET LAUNCHER (CONTD)

Trajectory In flight this rocket seems to have a flatter trajectory than the average of other rockets, and some impacts were apparently at 50-60 degrees from the horizontal.

Rate of fire (per launcher) Maximum rate with an experienced crew and all projectiles assembled would be four rounds per hour with the present method in use.

Weight Complete (ready for firing) weight is not given in the descriptive manual but it will fall between 900 and 950 pounds with either the type 98 No 25 land bomb or the Type 99 No. 25 ordinary bomb. Variations in weight will be found in the different bomb bodies, explosive fillers and adapters.

Possible Launcher at Kanoya Airfield

(From XXI Bomcom Special Report No 16, 26 Apr 45)

Of interest on KANOYA Airfield is a large circular revetment containing an 80' pivot arm capable of describing an arc of 210°. A small track leads from the apron in the hangar area to the installation.

This possible launcher is visible on a mosaic attached to XX Bomber Command PI Report No. A/F-7, 26 Jan 45. The mosaic is made from photos dated 26 Dec 44. An annotation refers to the site (it is not mentioned in the report) as "unidentified."

Subsequent XXI Bomber Command photos have revealed no noticeable activity and no change except for the appearance of a bomb crater in the triangle formed by tracks immediately north of the site.

The 210° turning arc, the narrowness of the pivot arm and the presence of the track make it unlikely that the installation is a compass swinging base.

If this is a launcher, it appears that some weapon other than a rocket is launched from this site. No burn scars are visible around the revetment.

A similar installation has been seen at MIKATAGAHARA Army Airfield, north of HAMAMATSU. Though slightly smaller, and limited to 122° of turn, it is virtually the same as the KANOYA installations.

Jap Intra-Service Antagonism

(From SWPA, ATIS Research Report No 122, 19 Apr 45)

An analysis conducted by SWPA, ATIS of the relationship existing between Japanese officers, commissioned and non-commissioned and enlisted men considers evidence contained in captured documents and statements by prisoners of war, and arrives at conclusions briefly presented here.

"Abandonment of defeated troops by some of their officers has a seriously depressing effect on morale. Such abandonment may represent a planned policy of the high command to preserve better officers of units 'written off.'"

"Evidence from every part of the South West Pacific area where Japanese troops are hard-pressed for food shows instances of antagonism and even hatred directed against officers for appropriating more than a just share of rations.

"An indication of the breakdown of discipline among hungry troops is the prevalence of theft of rations without regard to the suffering of other members of the unit.

"Accusations of cowardice on the part of the officers, especially during air raids, are made by enlisted men and even by officers. The high requirements for personal valor of the samurai code made such charges, in Japanese eyes, exceptionally damning.

"Cruelty on the part of officers toward lower ranks, as exemplified in the widespread practice of physical punishment, has generated resentments culminating in desertion, surrender or plans for revenge. Efforts by higher military authorities to restrain this traditional practice have so far had a limited success.

"Officers are accused by higher command and by the troops of flagrant neglect of duty and of ignoring the welfare of their men. Overstressing of the distinctions of rank is censured.

"The Japanese type of feudalism, based on rank and privilege exacting respect and obedience from below, is maintained by unremitting indoctrination. As a result, there is little evidence of the sense of comradeship which sustains Western armies and peoples in critical periods. In areas distant from JAPAN, the rigidity of relationship between officers and men in the Japanese forces often fails to stand the strain of cumulative reverses.

"Alleged refusal of senior officers, for reasons of personal prestige, to withdraw their troops when an opportunity was offered by higher headquarters, has been reported as a cause for bitterness and low morale among the troops concerned.

Jap Control by Rumor

(From SWPA, ATIS Research Report No 123, 20 Apr 45)

Rumor has always been rife in the armed forces of every belligerent, fostered by the uncertainty of war and the necessity for security. In one significant respect, however, the circulation of rumors in the Japanese armed forces is unique. While a large percentage of rumors undoubtedly originates spontaneously among the troops themselves, reflecting their anxieties and hopes, evidence indicates that some proportion of them is officially concocted and disseminated through official agencies to bolster morale. This practice is a logical consequence of the rigid Japanese "thought control" maintained in peacetime, which is tightened up to the uttermost limit in wartime. Realizing both the inevitability and the potency of rumors, Japanese military authorities have endeavored to initiate and control them, thus supplementing the open and official propaganda or instruction directed at the troops.

Most Japanese soldiers believe that if taken alive they would be executed with or without preliminary torture. The widespread prevalence of this belief is the product of official propaganda, embellished and strengthened by rumor. It may be presumed that some of these rumors were officially concocted and disseminated to supplement the open campaign of "terror propaganda."

Jap Operations Order

(From SWPA, ATIS Bulletin No 1957, 15 Apr 45)

Captured on LUZON, the following Operations Order of the Central Force, Ultra Secret, dated 21 Feb 45 is in the best BUSHIDO tradition.

"1. Those in each unit who are wounded and sick and are unable to engage in combat will carry two days rations to the corner of the fortress on or about the 21st and will commit mass suicide.

"2. Each unit CO will put a responsible man in charge to witness their deaths.

"3. Freedom of meditation for a day and a night will be granted prior to suicide so that each man may attain for himself the determination of gladly sacrificing himself for the country."

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Japs Maneuvres for Position

Another indication of Jap Army officials preparing a blameless place for themselves at the time of JAPAN's ultimate defeat and at the same time placing the responsibility for defeat on other shoulders is observed in statements made by Maj General OBA, foremost Japanese Military commentator..

On 9 May 45, Major OBA stated that GERMANY fell for want of aircraft which were the key to this war. He compared the European situation to the OKINAWA battle, and put the responsibility for the successful defense of OKINAWA on the aircraft producers, or on the ordinary citizens of JAPAN. He warned of increased Allied air attacks and Naval forays but said that JAPAN had nothing to fear from American and British troops as our shortage of shipping would not permit us to bring European troops to the PACIFIC Theater within a year.

Japs Eat Human Flesh

(From SWPA, ATIS Interrogation Report No 692, 26 Apr 45)

A Jap prisoner of war captured by Australian troops near AITAPE, 25 Dec 44 recounted the following:

On 1 Nov 44, in a speech to his troops, Maj Gen AOTU, 41st Division Infantry Group commander, stated that troops must fight the Allies even to the extent of eating them.

On 10 Dec 44, an order was issued from 18 Army Headquarters that troops were permitted to eat the flesh of Allied dead but must not eat their own dead. At the time rumors were prevalent that troops were eating their own dead. 15 Dec 44, four men were executed by order of Maj MORIMOTO, commanding officer of 2d Battalion for disobeying this order.

While wandering in the jungle, prisoner came across four men of his unit whose bodies had been stripped of flesh. As there were no troops other than Japanese in the area he presumed the flesh was eaten by them.

In mid-Dec 44, prisoner was shown some meat by his commanding officer who said it was human flesh and that anything that looked like it was not to be eaten.

On 21 Dec 44, at MARUJIPPU, Maj MORIMOTO shared out to his troops the flesh of two Australian soldiers who had been killed in the action and joined them in eating it. As PW was ill, he was unable to obtain a share.

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Defense Against Amphibious Operations

(From WD MID Bulletin No 10, 14 Mar 45)

The Japanese former 16th Infantry Division (destroyed in Central PHILIPPINES) published a report which gives additional evidence that Japanese tactics concerning defense against amphibious operations have undergone considerable change since the campaign at TARAWA Atoll. They admit that the Allied landing at TINIAN was a total surprise to the defending garrison since we chose as a beach an area where the shore was precipitous and rocky. This coupled with the fact that Allied naval units anchored off shore and delivered almost point blank fire resulted in a still further demoralization of the Japanese coastal defense system on the island.

In order to defend against what the Japanese term "the overwhelming material superiority of the enemy," the garrisons of the coast defense positions along the water's edge should capture and inflict damage on the enemy's weak points at the time of the landing. However, it will often be too dangerous to remain constantly on these positions during the preliminary naval bombardment. It is therefore paramount that deep zones of resistance and key points for purposes of counterattack be prepared. The tendency to have a thin line of positions instead of strong points, organized in depth, must be guarded against. Fortifications, especially heavy artillery emplacements, must be covered, equipment must be kept mobile, and communications must be such as will function properly despite heavy bombing and bombardment.

The devastating effects of Allied pre-landing aerial and naval bombardment usually has resulted in the neutralization or destruction of many of the Japanese defense positions which were situated at or along the water's edge. This report, captured on LEYTE, is the first Japanese document received which definitely proscribes that coastal defense systems should be organized in depth. The doctrine of perimeter defense, of which TARAWA is the classic example, has to all intents and purposes, been abandoned. This revision of island defense tactics is best exemplified by the defensive system at IWO JIMA.

BRIEFS

BOX MINES ON OKINAWA

Wooden box mines in quantity have been found on OKINAWA. They are of various sizes and are loaded with various explosives. Picric, dynamite, TNT and Type 88 explosive have been found. The Stick Type Fragmentation Grenade has been found to be used as the igniter of the wooden box mine. This grenade has also been found in the center of bundles of dynamite. Although its use as such has not been reported, this arrangement would make an excellent booby trap.

(JICPOA-EEIST B-2 Bulletin No 1, 13 Apr 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

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Jap 57 mm Type 97 Tank Gun

(From Twenty Fourth Corps G-2 Summary No 8, 14 Feb 45)

On two different occasions during the LEYTE-SAMAR-CAMOTES campaign, type 97 (1937) 57mm tank guns were found mounted on stationary ground mounts. One gun was located on a beach position in the ORMOC sector and the other was in a cave on PORO Island of the CAMOTES group. The mantlet had been removed and the guns were mounted on the regular navy 25mm pedestal mount by means of an improvised bracket welded to the pedestal and drilled for the trunnions on the gun. The type of ammunition found with the guns indicates that their primary purpose was for use against ground troops. Approximately two rounds of Type 90 (1930) HE were found for every one round of Type 90 (1930) APHE. The low muzzle velocity of this gun makes it rather ineffective against armored vehicles. The light weight of the Type 97 gun made it possible for the Japs on PORO Island to carry it into the mountains and set it up in a cave where it was used extensively and effectively against our troops advancing up the mountain.

Characteristics:

Caliber	57mm (2.24 in)
Approximate weight (less mantlet)	250 lbs
Length of tube	3 feet 1.6 inches
Length of chamber	5.1 inches
Number of lands and grooves	20
Recoil mechanism	Hydro-spring
Maximum length of recoil	11 inches
Type breechlock	Vertical sliding
Traverse	360 degrees
Elevation (Approx)	15 degrees
Depression (Approx)	10 degrees
Sighting (telescope sight)	direct fire
Type of ammunition	HE and APHE

BRIEFS

JAP DIARIST

Increasingly characteristic, though too atrocious to become common is the following note from a captured Jap diary: "At 1500 hours we killed 41 prisoners with bayonets. Some died instantly, some kept groaning SAYA MATEI or some called their children's name for a long time. At first I couldn't bear the thought of killing, but after killing one I found myself accustomed to it."

(SWPA, ATIS Bulletin No 1977, 24 Apr 45)(CONFIDENTIAL)

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Use of Aerial Crash Tactics

(From SWPA, ATIS No 159, 23 Mar 45)

Following are extracts from a mimeographed pamphlet entitled "Views on the Use of Crash Tactics in Aerial Protection of Vital Defense Areas, No 2." Captured in the STOTSENBURG area, LUZON, 2 Feb 45, the document was issued by the AKENO Army Flying Branch School, and was dated 11 Feb 44. It is interesting to note that No.1 of these pamphlets was also captured, and that No.2 is in effect based on the precepts of No.1. One outstanding difference between the two is that the first treatment of this subject, dated 28 Jan 44, assumes that the pilot of the crash plane will make an effort to escape, stating, "The canopy and the area around the pilot's seat must be so arranged that by the operation of a simple mechanism they fall apart, thus enabling the pilot to make his escape." and "After crashing into the enemy airplane, the pilot will bail out by parachute."

In No 2, from which extracts are given here, a scheme for developing crash tactics is expounded based on the thesis that all airplanes will be destroyed without any chance of survival.

"The story of the raids of the American and British air armies on the vital defense areas of our ally GERMANY has been one of ever increasing ferocity. Large forces have been directed against HAMBURG, important towns in the RUHR Area, and even against the capital itself, with the design of laying them in ruins."

POA COMMENT: - Jap attention to the progress of the Allied Air warfare against GERMANY since the publication date of this document (11 Feb 44) may have been one motivating factor in adopting so desperate a device as the suicide crash.

"Now the enemy is speeding up the mass production of powerful, extra-large bombers like the B-29 and the B-32, and boasting of his intentions to bomb vital areas of our empire. It is therefore, a most vital and urgent task to thwart these plans by establishing some counter-policy.

"To achieve this end, there is no lack of measures to be taken such as perfecting radar devices and increasing air defense strength, particularly as regards air defense fighter units. But the question of utmost urgency and importance is to decide upon a method of attacking bombers.

"We are now in a situation where we can demand nothing better than crash tactics, which insure the destruction of an enemy airplane at one fell swoop, thus striking terror into his heart and rendering his powerfully armed and well equipped airplanes valueless, by the sacrifice of one of our fighters.

"The adoption of crash tactics involves numerical losses equal to those of the enemy. If, however, one of our fighters can involve in a common ruin one of the large type enemy airplanes which are so elaborate and difficult to produce and which require such a large and highly trained crew, it would be a great mistake to hold the view that this method does not pay, especially as it would have the

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USE OF AERIAL CRASH TACTICS

further advantage of disposing of the enemy before he had had a chance to carry out any of his bombing plans.

"Furthermore, this method is exceedingly simple to put into operation, and air crews would not require such an elaborate training as would be necessary if other combat methods were adopted. This would simplify the problem of the organization of forces and of replacements. It would therefore constitute a factor of decisive importance in a war of attrition and supply.

"At this juncture where we have no sure method of destroying several airplanes at the cost of one, if by technical research and improvement of equipment we are able to develop crash tactics into an exclusively Japanese combat method, our American and British enemies, who are so afraid of personnel losses, will receive a severe shock to their morale, and will be timid about engaging in combat.

"This will greatly facilitate air defense and greatly improve our strength for the air defense of the homeland.

"Crash tactics have already been practiced on a number of occasions, but as yet they have failed to overcome the enemy. This is because they have not been resolutely carried out on a large scale.

"It is essential for success that all ranks should appreciate the significance and value of these tactics, and of their own accord make the decision to put them to practical use, endeavoring to simplify the task by encouraging research in organization and training and problems of tactics and equipment."

Unusual Aircraft on Kanoya Airfield

(From XXI BomCom a/c Report No3, 24 Apr 45)

Four small unidentified aircraft were visible on KANOYA Airfield on 11 Apr 45. These planes have the long fuselage and stubby wing design of the VIPER, but are larger.

The span is 23' (plus or minus 1') and the length is 25' (plus or minus 1').

Although tailless, the aircraft resemble VIPERS (or BAKA). Small units in front of each may be either carriages or detached empennages. The planes are parked in a building area south of the runways.

BRIEFS

USE OF SINGLE HORNED BOAT MINE

Extensive use of this mine on OKINAWA as an anti-vehicular mine was discovered. Its use was effective and it accounted for a number of light and medium tanks and wheeled vehicles.
(JICPOA-EEIST G-2 Bull No I, 13 Apr 45) (CONFIDENTIAL)

Understanding the Jap Mind

(From Hq USF CHINA Theater Wkly Intell Sum, 14 Mar 45)

LACK OF PROPORTION: - The completeness of Japanese integration, the firmness of their indoctrination that they are a Divine Race waging a Holy War, is an immediate source of strength for the purpose of conquest. In the long run, it is potentially a weakness. The result is a lack of that sense of proportion, of balance, which operates as a steadying factor in the conduct of modern war and, even more important, in the successful occupation of conquered territories.

The Japanese leaders have integrated the lives of the people in false premises concerning their origin, spirit, and place in the world, which are at complete variance with reality. Facts continually arise which naturally conflict with these premises. The characteristic Japanese reaction is to deny their existence, to suppress as far as possible all reference to them. Necessarily, an all-pervading atmosphere of hypocrisy is created. Even higher commands may be deceived by lower. This procedure causes little apparent damage in victory; in defeat, it heightens existing strains.

A further consequence of this aspect of Japanese psychology is a persistent inability to understand other peoples. In dealing with the nations of conquered areas this blind spot has had serious consequences. Even elements which originally welcomed Japanese occupation are alienated by the disregard of individual rights and personal dignity characteristic of Japanese treatment.

PROMINENT FACTORS IN JAPANESE MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY: - This lack of perspective, of a sense of proportion, is further exemplified in the humorlessness characteristic of many Japanese. This trait also plays a part in the brutal treatment inflicted by Japanese on conquered peoples. The tension of war seems to increase this humorlessness. In peacetime, the knock-about buffoonery of the lower class music halls was a favorite recreation of many Japanese. But when war comes in the door humor goes out the window, for the duration. A general study of the hundreds of diaries and notebooks now in Allied hands is the best evidence of this characteristic. These diaries express many emotions - exultation, rage, determination, despair - but no ray of humor creeps in.

While this humorlessness sustains and makes possible Japanese fanaticism in victory, it may well prove a drawback in defeat. The emotional range of the Japanese is violent, from exultation to the blackest despair. A sense of humor has served as a shock-absorber to individuals and to other nations in tiding them over grim times. Of all modern peoples, this quality is more conspicuously absent in the Japanese. If the Japanese seldom genuinely laugh, they dread being laughed at. Their fear of ridicule is one of the most powerful controls in everyday conduct and in public affairs.

Japanese dignity is hypersensitive, founded upon an inferiority complex. The immense discrepancy between their concept of themselves as descended from the Gods and the opinion of other peoples on this point, had made them at once uneasy and aggressive.

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UNDERSTANDING THE JAP MIND (CONTD)

Consciousness of ancient borrowing from CHINA of nearly every element of their culture, and of modern borrowing from the west of scientific techniques, of military and political and financial organization, has only increased this defiant belligerence. Caught between the east and the west, the Japanese have generated an explosive inferiority complex, and both worlds are suffering the blast of the explosion.

Limitations on individual thinking and responsibility on the battlefield do not necessarily represent the general official attitude of Japanese Army leaders. They are noteworthy however, as coming from the Commanding General of 18 Army, Lieutenant General ADACHI, in his Combat Instructions to 18 Army, dated 24 January 1943.

"Read the training manual thoroughly, observe strictly the battle regulations, and never do things your own way. The training manual is a guide which is to be followed strictly whatever the enemy or terrain may be, and there is no need to make any change in it.

"On being assigned to a duty, first of all open the regulations, turn to the pertinent sections and read what they have to teach, then proceed with the execution of the duty. After the battle go over the training regulations step by step and consider what are your own faults and mistakes. You should know that the training manual is the magic charm of the Force."

THOUGHT CONTROL: - The Japanese have lived under a series of military dictatorships for nearly seven centuries. These dictators maintained themselves in power partly through networks of spies and through the system of "neighborhood associations." Each member of small groups of five families, would be made to share the responsibility for the good behavior of all other members of the group. If any member failed to report any lapse or even criticism of the existing government all members of that family would be punished. Based on the experience of centuries of feudal discipline Japanese logic seeks to maintain order by controlling the thoughts of the populace. While such a purpose may be implicit in various agencies existing in other countries, it is explicit in JAPAN. In 1923 a law against "dangerous thoughts" was passed in JAPAN. Though primarily designed to suppress communism it was generally applied. The State Secrets Defense Act of 1941 further strengthened control over the populace.

It should not be overlooked that there is a material as well as a spiritual inducement to fight to the finish. Bonuses for families of men killed in action, amounting in Japanese eyes to a small fortune, are not overlooked in the calculations of the frugal, poverty-ridden Japanese peasant or worker to whom his family's welfare is considerably more important than his own.

BACKGROUND FOR BELIEF: - The suppression or distortion of disagreeable facts is essential in the routine of maintaining the Japanese spirit untarnished. Controllers of Japanese opinion have been even more successful than their German rivals in this negative phase of indoctrination. The critical and analytical heritage which GERMANY shares with the other inheritors of the Greco-European tradition could not be blotted out by the Nazis in 10 brief years. No such background of scepticism ancient or modern, hinders the usually unquestioning acceptance accorded by Japanese to official statements. Contradictions and reversions do little to shake this implicit trust. Frontline experience of starvation and defeat is the brutal fact that cannot be readily concealed or explained away. Steps are taken however, to quarantine such truth, to prevent other troops or the home population from being infected by it. Manipulation of reality begins early.

FALSIFICATION OF FACTS: -- The determination to distort reality to fit the ideal pattern demanded by the military code takes many and sometimes startling forms.

Defeat may be a bitter fact in Japanese experience, but it should not rear its ugly head in the vocabulary of the Japanese soldier.

The preoccupation with finding satisfactory words to conceal disagreeable necessities is an aspect of "saving face" deeply ingrained in Japanese thought. An act which is inconceivable when one phrase is employed becomes acceptable if the proper verbal formula can be found.

Defeat is not to be mentioned, even if sustained in the past. Presumably, the idea that what happened before might happen again must not be allowed to dull the keen edge of fighting fanaticism.

Instances occur of falsification in official records of the manner of death of a soldier. The apparent intent is to glorify the individual concerned, and his unit, since death in battle, not in bed, is the ideal.

Jap Use of Proximity Fuzes

(From WD, MID, "Non-Radio Proximity," 8 May 45)

There is some evidence that the Japanese are employing a special type of fuze to obtain air-burst of large bombs. Observers reported that during a Japanese night air raid on SAIPAN, in March 1945, each of three bombs seen to fall from enemy planes could be traced in flight from the plane to the ground because of a small light on the bomb. No craters were found, although detonations occurred. One bomb had exploded over a cane field permitting its center of impact to be determined, and there was evidence of ~~extremely widespread~~ fragmentation damage. The bombs were identified as the Type 3, Mark 31 Land Bomb, weighing 800 kilograms (760 pounds).

It is remotely possible that the lights observed on these bombs were part of a photo-electric application for fuzing the bombs, but the evidence is inconclusive on this point. It can only be stated that air-burst of bombs was accomplished, possibly by means of a proximity fuze, the nature and operation of which are unknown.

The possibility that the Japanese may have been employing proximity fuzes in air to air bombing has been examined by the XXI Bomber Command. Records of XXI Bomber Command on air to air bomb attacks encountered on missions, from October 1944 through April 1945, reveal no evidence whatsoever of the use of proximity fuzes. The records show that in nearly 100 attacks experienced in the course of 65 missions, 98% of the bombs exploded far out of range and were completely ineffective.

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Japanese Type 97 (1937) 15cm Mortar

(From ASFEEIST letter, 4 May 45, Subject:
Firing data and interchangeability of US
and Japanese mortars and ammunition.)

Firing tests have been conducted with the Japanese type 97 (1937) 15 cm mortar. The minimum range obtained in the tests was 380 yards and the maximum range was 4650 yards. Enough firing was conducted to give data for tentative firing tables. In almost all instances only one round was fired at each range. Therefore, the ranges given may be in error by the full value of the dispersion. The mortar was found to be stable in firing.

Firing tests:- The actual firings were conducted by a Chemical Mortar Battalion. The ranges were taken by a Sound and Flash Ranging Platoon of a Field Artillery Observation Battalion. The firing was conducted over water. Four observation points were set up along the beach. These observation points were 500 yards apart. One observation point was located at the mortar position, two were located on the right of the mortar position, and the fourth was located on the left of the mortar position. Elevations were obtained by means of the mortar sight. These elevations were checked with a US Gunner's Quadrant, M-1. There was a slight discrepancy between the sight and the quadrant, and, consequently, allowance was made for the sight as the quadrant was known to be in perfect adjustment.

Out of 35 rounds fired on water, only one fuze failed to function on impact. The fuzes used were the type 100 combination instantaneous-delay type mortar fuze. Of the igniting cartridges used only one primer failed to function. However, considerable difficulty was experienced in inserting the igniting cartridges in the stem of the rounds. This was due to the fact that moisture had caused the cardboard cartridge cases to swell. The fragmentation of the projectiles appeared to be excellent. Splashes from shell fragmentation could be seen ranging out to a radius of approximately 100 feet around the projectile before the large cone of water was thrown up by the force of the explosion. An estimated 50 to 100 of these fragment splashes could be seen on almost every round that was near enough to shore to make them discernible with the naked eye. It appears that the fuze functioned instantaneously as the small splashes could be seen an instant before the cone of water was thrown up by the combined blast and fragmentation effect of the projectile.

During the first half dozen rounds fired, it was noted that the mortar base plate shifted to the rear. After the first few rounds had been fired, the base plate settled firmly into the ground and no further shifting was noted. The propelling charge is almost entirely smokeless. However, a muzzle flash varying from 2 to 3 inches to approximately three feet long could be seen, the length of the flash depending on the number of increments used.

Tentative Firing Tables:- The following tentative firing tables were obtained by firing only one round at each charge and angle of elevation:

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JAPANESE TYPE 97 (1937) 15 CENTIMETER MORTAR (CONTD)

ZONE 0
(Igniting cartridge only)

RANGE (Yards)	ELEVATION (Mils)
#440	1200
460	1100
575	1000
620	900
690	800

(# A second round fired at 1200 mils gave a range of 380 yards. This is well within the rectangle of dispersion that would be expected.)

ZONE 1
(Igniting cartridge and one increment)

RANGE (Yards)	ELEVATION (Mils)
840	1200
940	1100
1080	1000
1160	900
1040	800

ZONE 2
(Igniting cartridge and two increments)

RANGE (Yards)	ELEVATION (Mils)
1205	1200
1430	1100
1675	1000
1720	900
1760	800

ZONE 3
(Igniting cartridge and three increments)

RANGE (Yards)	ELEVATION (Mils)
1680	1200
1920	1100
2200	1000
2240	900
2280	800

ZONE 4
(Igniting cartridge and four increments)

RANGE (Yards)	ELEVATION (Mils)
2110	1200
2360	1100
2710	1000
2940	900
2980	800

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JAPANESE TYPE 97 (1937) 15 CENTIMETER MORTAR (CONTD)

ZONE 5
(Igniting cartridge and five increments)

RANGE (Yards)	ELEVATION (Mils)
2620	1200
2950	1100
3290	1000
3490	900
3680	800

ZONE 6
(Igniting cartridge and six increments)

RANGE (Yards)	ELEVATION (Mils)
3060	1200
3400	1100
4040	1000
4250	900
4650	800
4160	700

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JICPOA, -attn: O in C, Bulletin	1	CG, 3d Amphib Corps, % FPO, S.F. Cal	1
CG, HAMAC	8	CG, 5th Amphib Corps, % FPO, S.F., Cal	1
CG, HSAC	3	CG, 1st Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
G-2 WPBC, APO 244	1	CG, 2d Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
G-2, CPBC, APO 956	2	CG, 3d Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
G-2, SPBC, APO 502	10	CG, 4th Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
G-2 Sixth Army, APO 442	1	CG, 5th Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
Hq Tenth Army, APO 357	3	CG, 6th Mar Div, % FPO, S.F., Cal	5
CG, XXIV Corps, APO 235	1	CG, Corps Arty, 3d Amphib Corps,	
CG, XXIV Corps Arty, APO 235	1	% FPO, S.F., Cal	1
CG, IX Corps, APO 309	10	CG, Corps Arty, 5th Amphib Corps,	
Australian Mil Forces, % Allied Land		% FPO, S.F., Cal	1
Forces, SWPA, APO 500	2	CG, Troop Tng Unit, Amphib Tng Comd,	
CG, AAF/POA, APO 234	3	Pacific Flt, Camp Elliott, San	
AAF Evaluation Board % AAF/POA, APO		Diego 44, Cal	1
953	1	Commandant, C & GS Sch,	
Deputy Comdr, Hq AAF/POA (Admin),		Ft Leavenworth, Kansas	2
APO 953	1	Commandant, Inf Sch, Ft Benning,	
CG, Seventh Air Force, APO 244	5	Georgia	1
The Mil Intell Tng Ctr Camp Ritchie, Md	2	Commandant, FA Sch, Ft Sill, Okla	1
Combat Tng Command, APO 957	5	Commandant, Mar Corps Sch, Quantico	
CO, 4th Armored Gp, APO 957	10	Virginia	1
CG, 7th Div APO 7	10	CG, Tng Center, Flt Mar Force,	
CG, 27th Div, APO 27	10	San Diego Area, Camp Joseph H	
CG, 77th Div, APO 77	10	Fendleton, Oceanside, Cal	1
CG, 81st Div, APO 81	10	Director of Safety, Safety &	
CG, 96th Div, APO 96	10	Security Div, Office of Chief of	
CG, 98th Div, APO 98	10	Ordnance, Chicago, Ill	1
CG, AGF, APO 86	2	G-2 USAFFE, APO 501	2
CO, AGF, APO 241	2	DMI War Office (M.I. 2) Whitehall	
CO, AGF, APO 245	1	London, via US H/A, London	2
CO, AGF, APO 246	2	USAF, GHQ Southeast Asia Theater,	
CO, AGF, APO 247	2	APO 432, % PM, N.Y., N.Y.	2
CG, AGF, APO 248	2	CO, PO Box 651, Tracy, Cal	1
CG, AGF, APO 331	1	O in C, Advance Intelligence Center	
CG, AGF, APO 457	1	CINCPAC Advance Hq, % FPO, S.F. Cal	3
CG, AGF, APO 458	1	G-1 USAFPOA, attn: Mil Govt Div	1
CO, AGF, APO 960	2	Chief of Combined Operations Rep,	
CO, AGF, APO 961	2	British Joint Staff Mission,	
CO, AGF, APO 962	2	Wash, DC	2
CG, AP & SC, APO 455	2	Hq, AGF, Army War College, Wash, DC,	
G-2 Alaskan Dept, APO 948	2	attn: AC of S, G-2	3
G-2 WDC, SF, Cal	2	Hq, First Allied Airborne Army,	
G-2 S.F. POE Ft Mason, Cal, attn:	2	APO 740, US Army, attn: AC of S, G-2	2
Lt Col C T Harris	2	Provisional Engr Shop Bn, APO 957	1

NOTE:- When this list has been perused please destroy by burning.

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