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No. 8 - 14 Jan 1945

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NOTE: Material in this Bulletin which is based on PW interrogations should be appraised accordingly.

COVER PAGE - Japanese 13.2 mm heavy machine gun in emplacement north of TANAPAG, SAIPAN

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Jap Commandos

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(From SWPA Military Intelligence Bulletin No. 965
12-13 Nov 1944)

A letter dated 20 June 1944, addressed to Maj. Kawashima, Commanding Officer 2nd Commando (Diversiónary) Unit at MANILA, written by Capt Shibamura of this unit, presumably from Second Army Hq, MANADO, states;

"As the entire situation has changed, the situation at HAL-MAHERA cannot be estimated at the time of arrival. I have consulted with KADOMATSU and Col YAMAMOTO, staff Officers of the Second Army, regarding the mission of our unit, but their opinion was that it was 'too late'. Depending on the situation, the unit may be used in the PHILIPPINES."

Following is extract from a file entitled "NI Raiding Commando (Diversiónary) Tactics" issued by Eastern 33d Force (u/i 1944, Most Secret.)

"The purpose of diversionary tactics is to infiltrate deep into enemy territory following plans laid out by a senior officer, and attack enemy headquarters, airfields, supply lines and other military installations, thus creating confusion and chaos in the enemy rear."

"One of the most effective means of carrying out diversionary tactics is to use natives. We must utilize them as we do our arms and legs."

"Enemy territory can be penetrated by air, sea or land."

"Concealed Attack: If the objective is troops, the principal method for their disposal is by the use of drugs, bacteria and time bombs."

"When attacking an enemy hq, opportunities often arise where the CO and other high ranking personnel (staff officers) can be killed or important enemy documents captured. If one is to kill a CO or staff officer, attack their automobiles or quarters where there is apt to be less security for them, or take advantage of their daily tours. Results can be obtained by contaminating their food and drink with bacteria."

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American Propaganda Leaflets

(From MIS Bulletin 30 November 1944)

A Superior Private stated that after the Americans had landed on SAIPAN, a comrade had picked up some propaganda leaflets, commenting that he thought "they are childish," and that "Japanese soldiers won't fall for such naive propaganda." PW did not see any soldiers surrender after having read these pamphlets. However, he did observe civilians surrendering after having listened to loud-speakers. PW consoled himself by thinking "The civilians during the actual battle for SAIPAN stood only in the soldiers' way so that it was only to the Japanese soldiers' advantage if civilians gave up to the enemy." PW added that the Japanese who spoke over the American loud-speaker sounded very well. He thought that a Nisei could have been the speaker. PW recalled the broadcast as follows:

"Soldiers of the Japanese Army, lay down your weapons, put up your arms and surrender". We have lots of good things to eat and to drink."

Even though the text of the broadcast was generally naive, PW admitted that the mentioning of food and drink at that particular time was a clever idea. Summarizing his experiences on SAIPAN, he did not think that Japanese soldiers would ever surrender on account of American propaganda, because "The very thought of surrender is contrary to their teachings and training." As for civilians, propaganda broadcasts seem to produce certain of the desired results.

A graduate of the Nippon University heard about American propaganda leaflets from some soldiers who had picked them up, laughing at their contents. Their main reaction to the leaflets was that "surrender was out of the question."

On SAIPAN, PW heard loud-speaker broadcasts, culminating in the following message to the besieged Japanese soldiers: "We'll give you five minutes to come out and surrender, otherwise naval bombardments will start." This message, according to PW, was repeated over and over again, causing only hilarity among the troops. Towards evening the speaker concluded his broadcast by saying: "This is the end but we'll be back tomorrow morning." This to him sounded like a radio broadcast and was very funny. No one surrendered. PW thought to himself that the Americans believed that they were going to be victorious and therefore did not mind having some fun over their loud-speakers; he was amazed that they indicated in their broadcasts when they were going to start their action and what they were going to do. Thus he found the broadcasts helpful to know in advance when the American attack was going to begin. His conclusion about loud-speaker broadcasts is that Japanese soldiers would never believe American propaganda. He added that broadcasts were being made only when one side was absolutely certain that it is going to be victorious. Japanese troops used the same method on BATAAN.

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Japanese Non-Poisonous Smoke Candles

(From ATIS Bulletin #1659, 23 Dec 1944)

An interesting item revealing the toxic qualities of Japanese "non-poisonous" smoke candles in a confined space is contained in a captured document published in ATIS Bulletin #1659 of 23 Dec 1944. Although the toxic effect of this smoke would be greatly lessened in the open, exposure over an extended period without gas masks would probably produce casualties. A reproduction of the translation follows:

"On 22 March 44, at a certain test of EASTERN (force), three non-poisonous smoke candles were lit in a covered trench measuring 50 square meters. Of the number of soldiers who were made to pass through this without gas masks, 27 fell ill, and of the 20 persons hospitalized, two died.

"In the extremely dense smoke of the smoke candles, a poisonous amount of phosgene and a small amount of chlorine were found.

"In small areas the smoke from smoke candles is extremely dense and becomes dangerous without a gas mask. It will produce casualties identical to those from phosgene gas. The Army Medical school will quickly decide if smoke candles emit enough phosgene to be considered toxic."

Method of Attacking Pillboxes

(From ATIS Bulletin, No. 1610, 9 Dec 1944)

Presented here is a description of a mimeographed pamphlet, origin and date unknown, taken at HOLLANDIA, 24 Apr 1944.

The attack unit is generally composed of infantry and engineer troops, with total strength not exceeding an infantry platoon. The unit organization lists assault, support, obstacle and reserve squads. A special 24cm howitzer is considered the best suited weapon. Extracts follow:

Section I. Outline of Attack

Essential Rules

- Item 1. Preparation for Attack
- Item 2. Execution of Attack

Section II. Close Attack by Pillbox Attack Unit

Essential Rules

- Item 1. Organization and Distribution
- Item 2. Preparation for Attack
- Item 3. Execution of Attack

Section III. Night Attack

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METHOD OF ATTACKING PILLBOXES (CONTD)

Section IV. Attack by Heavy Artillery

Essential Rules

Item 1. Preparation for Attack

Item 2. Execution of Attack

Art. 1. This pamphlet contains matters requiring special considerations in regard to attacking a "special position" (a field position founded around a pill-box) and has been compiled with reference to Volume IV of Field Service Regulations - Operations.

Art. 37. A pill-box attack unit is ordinarily organized with infantry and engineer troops after considering the structure of the pill-box to be attacked, the surrounding terrain, the degree of visibility, etc. Depending on the situation, it is organized with only infantry troops.

A pill-box attack unit is commanded by a selected infantry or engineer officer, and its strength is not greater than that of an infantry platoon. Depending on the situation, it may be composed of only several men including an NCO. Its organization and mission must be decided as early as possible and ample time given for preparation. It is advisable that the men be lightly equipped.

Art. 38. The leader of the pill-box attack unit makes the plan of attack based on the mission. The unit is divided, if its size permits, into an assault squad, a support squad, an obstacle squad, and a reserve squad. The number of squads may be decreased by assigning more than one mission to a squad.

Art. 58. Since the destructive power and the effective range of the special 24 cm howitzer are great, this weapon is especially suited for the destruction of strong and distant pill-boxes. In comparison with the special 24 cm howitzer, the special 24 cm howitzer (long) is greater in accuracy and destructive power. The 24 cm howitzer can also be suitably employed against strong pill-boxes due to its great destructive power.

The 28 cm howitzer cannot be matched with the 24 cm howitzer in regard to destructive power and effective range; therefore, it is suited for the destruction of somewhat firm pill-boxes at close range.

Although the 15 cm gun lacks sufficient destructive power, it can be used for the neutralization or destruction of weaker pill-boxes.

Art. 64. The organization of heavy artillery positions is usually carried out at night. Normally, the number of nights required for the various types of artillery to take up positions is as follows:

Special 24 cm howitzer -- 3 to 4 nights
Special 24 cm howitzer (long) -- 4 to 5 nights
24 cm howitzer and 15 cm gun (mounted on (TN: illegible). --
2 nights)
24 cm howitzer and 15 cm gun (mounted on wheels) -- 1 night
28 cm howitzer --- 3 to 4 nights.

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CIC Operations On Leyte

(From Hq Sixth Army Weekly Report No. 69, 20 Dec 44)

For the first time in SWPA operations, LEYTE presented an opportunity for CIC to operate in the manner for which it was designed. To perform its share of the counterintelligence mission CIC had detachments with division, corps, and many headquarters, plus an additional "area" detachment under the army detachment commander. In contrast to comparatively primitive and scattered peoples previously encountered, LEYTE's population of approximately a million intelligent and civilized inhabitants, influenced by several years of Japanese administration and propaganda, offered real problems of collaboration and potential subversive activity. To cope with this situation was in itself a full time task for CIC detachments; in addition, there was greater need than ever before to assist G-2s through the interrogation of guerrillas and civilians for tactical information. The summary given below illustrates in part the changed complexion and increased scope of CIC activities which may be expected to continue throughout the PHILIPPINE campaign.

In past landings CIC interest in securing documents has been chiefly to assist in the expeditious collection of tactical information. On LEYTE, however, there was urgent need to search for and secure documents of counterintelligence importance. Records of the Japanese dominated Bureau of Constabulary, of the local police, of Japanese "trading" organizations used as fronts for espionage and "pacification" and of the Kempei Tai or Jap Military Police, while without tactical significance, are potential sources of information regarding enemy agents. The division CIC detachment entering TACLOBAN with advanced troops, for example, took immediate steps to search and secure the most important enemy and civil installations. The proper guarding of key buildings was difficult since troops were not available for the purpose; Filipinos pressed into service required constant supervision to see that they held their posts and prevented the entry of looters. Although coverage could not be complete, it enabled the acquisition of many documents of both tactical and counterintelligence value.

On entering towns CIC detachments invariably were met with a disorganized and bewildered populace. In cases where PCAU had not yet arrived, CIC had to establish immediate contact with responsible local citizens and do whatever was possible to assist in the re-establishment of order. Guerrillas, some bona fide and some self-styled, were usually on hand with elaborate lists of "spies" and "collaborators". In not a few cases the unfortunate suspects themselves, ranging in ages from 15 to 50, were brought in by zealous vigilantes at rifle's point. Previously compiled lists of personalities were naturally insufficient to provide immediate confirmation or denial of the allegations made by these volunteer peace officers, who were themselves the sole available witnesses and of unknown reliability. In the initial and most confused phases decisions could be based only on commonsense evaluation and close interrogation of the informant. It was soon found that the average Filipino must be pressed for specific details of when, where, how and against whom the alleged offense was committed. Later experience showed that by requesting sworn affidavits many extravagant accusations could be eliminated.

Filipinos have been detained by CIC only when believed dangerous to the security of our forces; that is willing and able to be of

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CIC OPERATIONS ON LEYTE (CONTD)

active assistance to the enemy, through espionage, sabotage or other subversive activity. The tactical situation has been an important factor in determining the degree of risk presented by a suspect. In forward areas it was often necessary to detain persons on meager evidence, subject to later investigation. As operations progressed and conditions in an area became more stable the necessity for physical detention diminished and more complete investigations could be made. Persons who, although wholehearted collaborators, were physically incapable, indisposed or otherwise unlikely to act as agents for the enemy could be released under restrictions after the critical phase had passed. Generally those were ordered to remain in their own barrios and to report periodically to the local police or CIC.

There was also, however, the problem of unofficial justice and "kangaroo courts" to be met. After the long Japanese occupation it was natural that those who had been fighting the Japs in the hills should be bitter towards those who had worked with the Japs in the barrios. As a typical illustration, once several armed guerrillas reported to a CIC office, saluting smartly. Asked their business, they produced a letter which began "You are hereby directed to liquidate the following traitors". On another occasion a CIC agent, the sole CIC representative in a small municipality, was presented with an unexpected emergency when a local guerrilla leader with a band of eager and well-armed followers arrived in town and commenced loading some fifty-odd terrified civilians aboard two captured trucks. Considerable diplomacy, much argument and several bottles of "tuba" were necessary before the guerrilla officer's demands could be revised downwards to three arch collaborators, these to be delivered to the nearest MP stockade and not whisked off to the hills. Until law and order could be firmly re-established and the local police re-organized, it was not surprising that quite a few civilians of guilty conscience should present themselves to CIC and ask to be locked up for their own protection.

It has proved a far from simple task to establish sufficient evidence to detain or release a suspect. Political and personal jealousies colored the opinions and even the sworn statements of many informants. Those who had suffered under the occupation suspected the worst of those who had not. Townspeople were suspicious of the farmers, and vice versa; for, during Jap rule movement between Jap and guerrilla zones of influence was generally difficult and sometimes dangerous. The town dweller who wandered out into the country ran the risk of being picked up and closely interrogated by the guerrillas as a potential agent of the Japs, while the farmer straggling into town had a good chance of being beaten up by the Kompei Tai as a guerrilla spy. Therefore, few people know a great deal of what went on in other localities except through rumor. From the guerrilla point of view those who had not actively aided them, or those who had somehow offended them, were often a priori collaborationists. Opinions and hearsay evidence were as plentiful as facts were elusive.

For this reason the early establishment of an informant system was an obvious essential. The most reliable and reasonable representatives of the loyal factions, town and guerrilla, were sought. Wherever possible contact was established with responsible guerrilla officers familiar with the locality and capable of separating spiteful allegations from those which were serious. In the towns, likely informants included the priest, town officials prior to the surrender, particularly the justice of the peace, school teachers, business men and others with intelligence, a sense of civic responsibility, and close

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CIC OPERATIONS ON LEYTE (CONT'D)

contact with local affairs. Once this preliminary groundwork had been accomplished, names of suspects could be submitted to the members of this informal "panel" in turn. If they had personal knowledge of a suspect's activities during the occupation and cleared him of the charges, the need for an exhaustive investigation was obviated.

"Collaborator" and "Pro-Japanese" were terms applied so indiscriminately by informants to those whom they distrusted or disliked that they had little counterintelligence meaning. A BC who had betrayed and tortured guerrillas was a collaborator, but so was the woman who cooked for the Kempei Tai, the man appointed by the Japs to a minor position, the girl who lived with a Jap officer. Many cases reported to CIC consisted of petty crimes committed without interference from the military, such as stealing from the house of a guerrilla. Many were suspect ex-officio: the BC, the mayor, the city official. Many were opportunists, working with the Japs for money or position. CIC was concerned only when the degree and character of association, together with collateral information, suggested that persons might continue to serve the enemy if given the opportunity. The investigation and disposition of collaborationists, as such, have been left to the appropriate agencies of the Philippine Commonwealth Government.

Although cooperation with the Japs prior to our arrival has not been considered grounds in itself for detention, it should obviously be held a bar to civic office. CIC has accordingly worked closely with PCAU in the re-establishment of civil government. Persons tentatively selected for municipal positions are first referred to CIC for clearance, which is normally accomplished through the informant panel. The early organization of police agencies is of particular concern to counterintelligence. The general procedure has been for the chief of municipal police, selected with CIC approval, to nominate police personnel who will in turn be screened. Former BC members have been avoided. The Philippine Constabulary, being the equivalent of a state police force, was re-activated by the provincial government in a similar manner. Once functioning, these agencies proved of great assistance in implementing security measures.

To guard against the attempt of enemy agents to enter or leave our lines, security controls were instituted on both the northeast and west coasts of LEYTE. On the west coast Filipino beach controls interrogated all persons arriving by water and restricted those of unknown loyalty coming from CEBU or other enemy occupied areas. In SAN JUANICO STRAITS CIC cooperated with the US Navy and Philippine Army personnel in the establishment of a water patrol to check all civilian craft crossing into LEYTE.

CIC with forward elements screened refugees entering our lines as thoroughly as the situation would permit. Persons with tactical information of value to the immediate command were interrogated on the spot, the results being forwarded at once to the G-2. Those whose knowledge comprised areas farther advanced were passed back wherever possible to the headquarters concerned. In this manner much valuable information of immediate and future operational areas was obtained. At the same time suspicious individuals discovered coming into US controlled areas were detained pending investigation. Guerrilla representatives greatly facilitated the interrogation and classification of suspects.

As a result of CIC's close contact with civilians and guerrillas, the function of liaison with guerrilla units was delegated by many division G-2s to their CIC detachments. In all cases CIC worked closely with those who coordinated guerrilla affairs, a cooperation which proved mutually beneficial. As previously observed, guerrilla blacklists

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CIC OPERATIONS ON LEYTE (CONTD)

cannot be taken at face value; personal conversation with guerrilla leaders, however, has produced much definite information concerning enemy and collaborationist personalities and organizations.

Japanese intelligence agencies existing on LEYTE at the time of our landing appear to have been principally concerned with anti-guerrilla measures. Japanese trading firms were used for this purpose, as were the Bureau of Constabulary detachments throughout the island. In addition to these, the Kempei Tai established its own informer system, known locally as the Ju Tai. Composed largely of boys too young to realize the seriousness of their actions, this organization acted as the eyes and ears of the Jap MPs, informing them when guerrillas came into the towns and acting as guides on mopping up operations.

Among the more interesting cases handled by CIC to date is that of a prominent police officer of pre-war days who was continued in office by the Japs. To the guerrillas and other loyal factions he explained that he kept his job to act as a buffer between them and the military administration. Throughout the occupation he managed to please both sides, gaining the confidence of the guerrillas as well as a promotion from the Japs. After our landing he was selected to retain his office, including his Jap-conferred promotion. His energy, military bearing and organizational ability marked him as an efficient leader and executive.

While keeping him under close but unobtrusive observation, CIC investigation uncovered considerable confirmation of these qualities, if not of the officer's loyalty. The division CIC detachment which first entered the town had prudently secured all records from the police headquarters. Censorship uncovered further correspondence of his department. These records disclosed the existence of an elaborate organization of "secret agents", each of whom reported by number on guerrilla and pro-American activities. This was not in itself conclusive, for if the officer had expurgated the reports of his agents he would have been keeping his promise to assist the guerrillas. The discovery of further documents, however, enabled a comparison of reports received from agents and those submitted by the officer to the Japanese; nothing had been omitted. With the reports as foundation, interrogation of the agents themselves added further evidence of his duplicity. Before the investigation was completed it was found that he had dismissed operatives for failure to apprehend a high guerrilla leader who had personally vouched for the officer's loyalty. So confident was the officer of his position that when he suddenly found himself incarcerated in his own jail he had neglected to destroy further damaging evidence in the form of diaries and personal records.

All these activities emphasized the need for CIC detachments to be mobile and flexible. Whereas in earlier operations CIC personnel were allocated to regimental, division and corps CPs, now the innumerable problems connected with the civilian population required that sub-offices be established in principal towns. Messing arrangements were improvised to enable the bulk of CIC personnel to operate where the need was greatest. When division detachments had to displace forward on short notice as the command itself advanced, corps detachment commanders had to be ready to take over and continue to operate the offices established by divisions. Similarly, the army detachment, using its own personnel or the area personnel attached to it, relieved corps detachments of responsibility in rear areas. Experience gained in keeping up-to-date files of reports, suspects and informants made it possible to effect these transfers without interrupting the flow of activity.

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CIC OPERATIONS ON LEYTE (CONTD)

LEYTE has given CIC its biggest job to date in this theater, but bigger tasks are yet to come. It is perhaps fortunate that our initial landing in the PHILIPPINES was made here, rather than in MINDANAO or LUZON with their greater populations and large numbers of Japanese civilians; for all the experience gained on LEYTE will be needed to accomplish the CIC mission in future operations.

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Jap Sticky Type Mine

(From Pacific MIRS Weekly Report No. 3, 28 Dec 44)

The following is information taken from a document entitled "A Guide to Land-Warfare," being a training guide to land-warfare tactics. The document was captured June-July 1944, place unknown.

TN: In a section discussing, presumably, the M 93 Anti-tank Land Mine the following sentences occur which apply to a method of converting the mine into a "sticky type mine." This portion of the document is classified as Secret.

"Glue (KOCHAKUSAI) (TN: No further description of the glue is given) is placed over the wire mesh with the finger tips, taking care to make the mesh air tight.

"Exposure to sunlight causes the glue to harden and to decrease its adhesiveness. Hence the mines should be stored in pairs and pulled apart just before they are to be used. The adhesiveness should be tested with the fingertips before using.

"The procedure in sticking this mine to a tank is similar to that used with the armor piercing mine (HAKOBAKURAI). Since permitting it to fall to the ground and to pick up dirt renders it ineffective, thorough training in the art of throwing it is required.

(TN: the following paragraphs are entitled "Sticky Mine" and do not pertain to the mine mentioned above.) The Sticky Mine is employed for the same purpose as the AP Mine (TN: M 99 AP Mine) since it will adhere to the armor plate of tanks, etc. The powder charge and effective power are the same as that of the AP Mine. It is identical in structure and characteristics with the exception that glue is placed on the metal mesh which is sewn to one side of the mine.

"Precautions in handling: The adhesive is ineffective where there is any moisture on the armor plate. For this reason the mine is not suitable for use in rainy weather".

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Jap Raiding Party Equipment

(From SE ASIA Translation & Interrogation Center
Report No. 66, 6 Dec 1944)

Taken on the SALWEEN front in Oct 1944 are two photostats of documents, being examples of organization and equipment of a long range raiding party of five - infantrymen or engineers. Excerpts having to do with special equipment follow:

"Commander:

Luminous compass	Special type dagger (TOKUSHU-TOBANTO)
Flashlight(with colored lenses)	Luminous paint
Watch	Rope - 30m(98.4 ft)
Climbing irons	Bacteria-if necessary
Handflags	(lit - Tr)

"First Pair:

1. Sickle	
Luminous Compass	
2. Hatchet	Wire-cutters
Luminous compass	Special whistle (lit-Tr)
Flashlight	Rope- 30m(98.4 ft)

"Second Pair:

3. Sickle	Portable rangefinder
Kerosene oil	Rope - 30 meters
Luminous compass	
4. Hatchet	Wire cutters
Saw	Special whistle
Luminous compass	Altometer
Flashlight	

"Rations and Medical Supplies: all ranks

Ten days' concentrated rations:
(?) Vitamin foods (EIYOSHOKU)
Dried Bonito
Saccharine
'TEN--' (?)
Extract of plums (Pickled plums)
Powdered Soy
Salt tablets (15)

First-aid Kit

Quinine tablets
Water-purification powder
'RIMA--N' (?-Tr)
Medicated adhesive tape (instead of elastic bandage)
Tincture of iodine
Potassium Cyanide (for committing suicide)
Toilet articles"

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Attacking Tanks With Explosives

(From ATIS Bulletin 1559, 14 Nov. 1944)

Important sections from the mimeographed pamphlet entitled "Attack Regulations of 'A' Operation, Appendix No. 3 - Reference on Attacking Tanks with Explosives" are presented here. The document was issued by Hq. MO Force (TN 18 Army), 5 May 1944, though date and place of capture are unknown.

"Chap. 1. Enemy methods of employing tanks and importance of close-combat training: - When penetrating the enemy position, the difficulties encountered by the attacking troops are the enemy fire cutting them off from their reserve and the counterattack within the position by tanks.

"Chap. 2. Materials used in close combat against tanks and importance of close combat training with explosives: - The material mainly used in close combat against tanks are AP mines, anti-tank mines, frangible incendiary grenades and explosives. The AP mines are effective against tanks with armor 25mm (.97 in.). Against tanks of 60 mm (2.34 in.), they are ineffective. The frangible incendiary grenades and anti-tank mines alone cannot completely incapacitate the tanks. Therefore, under the present situation, the only method which can destroy a tank is by using bundled explosives.

"Chap. 3. Essence of close quarter combat and secrets to success.

"Chap. 4. Amount of explosives required for destruction of enemy tanks and methods of destruction: - At least 6 kg (13.23 lbs.) of yellow powder are required to destroy the upper portion of tanks and about 10 kg (22.05 lbs.) to destroy the sides.

"Against a moving tank, explosives are fastened on both ends of a rope and thrown at the tank. The weight of the explosive at one end is approximately 3 kg (6.6 lbs.).

"Chap. 5. Summary of raids on tanks: - The raiding party is divided into one covering squad and several destruction squads.

"The duties of the covering squad are to guard and protect the operation and to cover the destruction squads after the raid has been made. Each team is assigned the destruction of one tank.

"In order to attack hostile tanks in action, remote control mines must be installed on the route of advance. As soon as the enemy tanks or the covering infantry approach the mined area, the mines are ignited and in the following period of confusion, the tanks are attacked by the destruction squad which is waiting nearby.

"Chap. 6. Anti-tank action during night attack of all friendly forces.

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ATTACKING TANKS WITH EXPLOSIVES (CONTD)

"Chap 7. Essentials of anti-tank action during daylight:-
A close quarter combat unit used against tanks is composed mainly of infantry and engineer troops. It is divided into several land mine squads (firing squads) and destruction squads, one reserve squad and, if necessary, a covering squad. According to the situation, this anti-tank close quarter combat unit is divided into several attack squads and reserve squads. Each attack squad is divided into one land mine and one destruction team.

"The land mine squad plants the mines along the possible approach of enemy tanks and attacks the hostile covering infantry. It separates the latter from the tanks or creates opportunities for the destruction squads by rendering a blow to the tanks. The squad consists of ten men with an NCO as its leader. One among them is the igniter.

"The firing squad creates opportunities for the destruction squad by surprising the enemy with its fire. It is equipped with two or three light machine guns.

"The destruction squad destroys enemy tanks by using AP mines, tank mines and explosives. It is composed of several men with a NCO as its leader.

"The reserve squad acts as the reserve of the land mine squad and the destruction squads and performs, whenever necessary, their duties.

"The covering squad protects the actions of the land mine and destruction squads. When a covering squad is not formed, the first line anti-tank close quarter combat unit will perform its duties."

NOTE:- Document also includes a chart showing data on AMERICAN and BRITISH tanks employed at present.

Note On Bacterice

(From ATIS Publication No. 249, 20 Dec 1944)

Captured at HOLLANDIA, 25 April 1944 were 27 pages of handwritten notes undated, concerning demolitions and sabotage. A brief notation under the heading "Bacteria," reads:

"In fish and vegetable markets and kitchens, use a contagious disease which has been prevalent".

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Hold That MG Fire!

(From Army War College letter "Defense of a Beachhead", 8 December 1944)

"Machine guns (ours) opened fire too soon on some occasions. The Japanese always try to get them out of action as early as possible. To do this, they may deliberately expose small groups. Most of these can be wiped out with mortars, rifles, carbines or grenades; thereby keeping the location of the machine guns concealed until the real attack is launched. When repeated assaults are made, the enemy would send individuals with knives and grenades forward with the mission of getting the machine guns which had repelled the last assault. Late in the night of 3-4 March, the enemy did succeed in putting out of action most of the machine guns in one sector. This was blamed upon premature firing, excessive firing and failure to move to alternate positions often enough. If these weapons are kept concealed until the real attack is launched they can achieve mass slaughter."

Attack Behavior

(From Army War College letter "Defense of a Beachhead", 8 December 1944)

"The first assaults were stopped with no penetration of the position. However, they were repeated at intervals throughout the night. Those in the southwestern sector became less violent and penetration was limited to individuals and small groups. In the northwestern sector they became more severe and on occasions were quite unorthodox. One such was the advance in column by about twenty enemy down the road from PORLAKA, while singing "DEEF IN THE HEART OF TEXAS." They were annihilated. Examination of their bodies the next morning indicated that they were not under the influence of alcohol or narcotics."

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Japanese Method of Employing Tanks

That the Japanese are thoroughly familiar with the modern concept of the employment of armor is brought out in ATIS Bulletin No. 1568. Herein are stressed the accepted doctrines of employment of mass, exploitation of surprise by mobility and cooperation with infantry, artillery and engineers. To date, in the POA, the Japanese have not so used their armor. We have witnessed piecemeal employment, attacks by tanks without supporting infantry, tanks immobilized and used as pillboxes. Following are presented excerpts from ATIS Bulletin No. 1568, contrasted with observations from a Report of Intelligence activities of the 27th Infantry Division on SAIPAN. Reasons for the enemy not practicing what he preaches may perhaps be found in SAIPAN's rugged terrain and the almost complete severance of Jap communications due to our devastating fire superiority.

We cannot count on Jap armor being employed in this manner which the Jap himself knows to be unorthodox. The Jap knows his armor; its use and its limitations.

Captured Document

"General principle of methods of employing tanks. - The Divisional CG should concentrate as much attached tanks in the important area as possible, and they should be in close cooperation with the infantry. Also they should make a surprise attack on the enemy at proper times, and should be employed so that quick and thorough annihilation of the enemy can be made. For this reason, the tanks should be attached to the infantry at the proper time and depending upon the situation, a portion, or all of the tanks should be employed directly in support of the infantry.

"In order to display the maximum power of the tank at proper times, it is necessary at times, to have the support of the Infantry, Artillery, Engineers and airplanes for clearing the route of advance, neutralization of the anti-tank fire of the enemy, air cover, and screening from the enemy.

"The divisional CG, at times in the aforementioned situation, if necessary, should concentrate various types of armored vehicles attached to the division and should commit these in an urgent locality."

From Report of 27th Division

"Tanks. - Best estimates place the number of Japanese tanks on SAIPAN at 101, the majority of which were medium tanks. Included among these were a number of amphibious tanks. Although the principal Japanese tank unit (9th Tank Regt) contained a number of veterans of tank fighting in MANCHURIA, they showed no improvement in tank tactics. Tanks employed against the Division were used piecemeal, in night attacks and from camouflaged positions from which they emerged and commenced firing just before our troops came upon them; or fired from the rear if our troops passed them by. The 27th Division claims credit for knocking out 41-47 enemy tanks."

The captured document continues:

"The Divisional CG, usually employs tanks in the decisive battle of the Infantry in the main direction of attack.

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JAPANESE METHOD OF EMPLOYING TANKS (CONTD)

"Such actions as capturing the strong points, confusing the development of the enemy, or executing a surprise attack on artillery and headquarters will be the turning point of the combat. Thus, it is advantageous to dispatch powerful tanks ahead to take advantage of such opportunities.

"The strength of the tanks that are participating in the decisive action of the infantry at times is divided into two groups, namely tanks which cooperate directly and which are dispatched ahead.

"There are many times when it is necessary first to destroy the activities of the enemy tanks. Also, it is necessary to have the cooperation of the artillery and airplanes.

"When dispatching powerful tanks far ahead of the units at times it is advantageous to attach mobile forces for support."

From Report of 27th Division

"Near the conclusion of the operation, the enemy frequently used his tanks in concealed locations and they did not open fire until our troops were almost on them. This action was frequently reported as 'immobile tanks being used as pill boxes.'"

Captured Document

"Method of employing tanks in a defense.- Usually tanks are used in a counter-attack. At the beginning, when the area where they will be used is determined, the tanks which are under the direct control of the divisional CG and in reserve, will be attached to the first line unit of the said area."

From Report of 27th Division

"The 106th and 165th Infantry Regiments advanced against slight opposition. There appeared to be no organized defenses. The 106th Infantry encountered five enemy medium tanks which were immobile and used as pillboxes. These tanks were overcome early in the day."

Captured Document

"Methods of employing tanks in withdrawal. - When the pressure of the enemy becomes intense or advancing recklessly, in counter-attacking the enemy, it is advantageous to employ tanks.

"Method of employing tanks in position warfare. - Necessary tanks are attached to the first line division of main direction of attack. It is of vital importance to carry out surprise attacks on the enemy by concentration of tanks. A very detailed combat plan must be made."

From Report of 27th Division

"An unknown number of tanks were reported by air observer at 0830. Artillery fire was put on these and it reported that one was destroyed. During the morning, the 106th Infantry captured five medium tanks. These were camouflaged and immobile but not emplaced. This action of enemy tanks has been observed several times before. In some cases the enemy has kept the tanks camouflaged and has not opened fire until our troops had advanced past them."

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Japanese Submarines

(From ATIS Bulletin No. 1579, 23 Nov. 1944)

Following are extracts from a captured mimeographed book entitled "Characteristics of Submarines and Anti-Submarine Operations." The issuing authority and date are not given, but thought to be later than August 1942.

"The present situation in regard to JAPANESE Submarines.

"1. Classification

"A. First class submarines (I Class). Submarines which have a displacement of 1,000 tons and above. There are cruiser submarines which have a displacement of 2,000 to 3,000 tons and above. (The weight is two or more times that of a destroyer). *I-100 submarines operate in areas where there are decisive battles involving capital ships. Their attacking power and speed are great and at times they carry out the function of a cruiser submarine.

"B. Second class submarines (RO Class). This class of submarine has a displacement of 1,000 tons or less and is used to guard important places along the coast. There are many 500 to 600 ton submarines, and GERMANY has almost all of this type.

"C. Mine Laying Submarines. These submarines are used in laying mines. JAPAN had four of this type but lost one. Although she used them in this activity, at present they are temporarily being used for other important duties.

"2. Important points

"A. Speed. There are submarines which are capable of a speed of 23 to 24 knots on the surface. 24 knots is unusual and generally the surface speed is from 18 to 20 knots. When submerged, submarines have a maximum speed of about 8 knots, but usually it is 3 knots.

"B. Offensive power. Submarines usually have six torpedo tubes and 20 to 25 torpedoes. Against battleships, etc, they fire all six tubes at the same time. The newest battleships will not sink even when they receive hits from three torpedoes. Cruiser submarines carry two 14 and some anti-aircraft MG's. Cruiser submarines carry airplanes.

"3. Strong Points. Fighting power is increased by economizing on the equipment of living quarters. Moreover, generally JAPANESE submarines have a larger complement of men than foreign submarines.

* Fleet Type Submarine

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Jap Propaganda On Samar

(From G-2 Periodic Report No. 28 Hq 1st Cavalry Division)

A Jap propaganda letter, captured by a patrol in SAMAR, shows strong Jap attempts to turn both civil populace and guerrillas against the American Army. A document, signed by Cmdr KONNO, warns against false (i.e. American) propaganda, urges all Filipinos to remain at home rather than go to the hills as we advised. KONNO, seeking to organize guerrillas for active resistance, compares "Jap ideal of a free, independent and happy PHILIPPINES" with "American intention to make the PHILIPPINES a permanent colony of the UNITED STATES." It is admitted by KONNO that the Americans landed in the PHILIPPINES, but he goes on to state that Jap forces have surrounded us and gives staggering figures of US losses in ships and planes (38 aircraft carriers, 73 transports, 1500 planes, etc.), and points to the fact that "American planes no longer fly over SAMAR and no more leaflets are dropped."

Japan Looks At The Mediterranean

(From S.E. ASIA Translation & Interrogation
Publication No. 3, 30 Nov 1944)

Following is a translated excerpt from a small printed pamphlet issued by the Imperial Headquarters of the Japanese Army, entitled Battle Training Report No. 1. It is believed that such instructional pamphlets, embodying the lessons of the war as seen by Imperial Headquarters, have not previously been published. The first part of this captured document is presented here, "The Reduction of Pantellaria by US and British Forces," a subject which must be of no mean interest to an island empire such as JAPAN.

"General outline of the reduction of PANTELLARIA".

"PANTELLARIA is an island thirty-two square miles in area. Its population was about 12,000, and it was garrisoned by about 10,000 men.

"For a period of one month the enemy subjected the island to heavy bombardment from the air and intensive naval bombardment, destroying many of the defensive gun positions and the water supply installation.

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JAPAN LOOKS AT THE MEDITERRANEAN (CONT'D)

"As a result, the garrison was deprived of bread and water, and a few days later the senior military and naval commander was wounded in a large scale attack by 1,300 aircraft on June 10th. Further, the population was discontented and demoralized, and finally they surrendered on the next day, the 11th, in accordance with orders from the High Command, before a landing was made by the enemy.

"(There is a report to the effect that in the attack mentioned above the ratio of aerial bombing to naval bombardment was 8 to 2.)

"Although it is not clear what forces the enemy had ready to make a landing, judging by the number of transport convoys, they were fairly large units, and it is estimated that the initial landing force would have consisted of three or four battalions.

"On the small, flat island of LAMPEDUSA, where there were virtually no installations, etc., the garrison of about 3,000 to 4,000 men, having no protection against enemy air attack, was overwhelmed by it, and was forced to surrender on the night of June 12th.

"Lessons:

"This is a rare example in which an adversary has been forced to surrender by means of bombing and shelling, and, although such a thing is unthinkable of the Japanese Army, it should be regarded as one of the aspects of modern warfare.

"It is essential that anti-aircraft defenses be prepared and fighter aircraft maintained thoroughly as a defense against the enemy's crushing, large scale air attacks.

"It is necessary that on the island there should be plentiful supplies of water, food, munitions, etc., and it is most important that transport and signal communications with the mainland should be maintained.

"The evacuation of the civilian population of PANTELLARIA was begun immediately before the surrender, yet not more than a few hundred people were evacuated by aircraft and by ships. It was because the entire civilian population could not be evacuated that the order to surrender was given. Therefore, when dealing with a civilian population of an island terrified by enemy attacks, it is important that thorough consideration and preparation should be completed beforehand for promoting understanding between the military and the population, fostering the will to fight, and concerning the advisability, time, method, etc. of evacuation."

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Japanese Attitudes Towards Surrender

(From OSS General Information Report, 16 Oct 1944)

The Navy has recently announced that 224 Japanese prisoners were taken as against 12,211 dead in the PALAUS in the period between 15 Sept to 7 Oct. This belies the hopes raised on the ARAKAN front in May 1944, when it was reported that Japanese were surrendering in unprecedented numbers. (POA Comment: - The two situations are scarcely comparable. The Pacific island campaigns are of such comparatively short duration, that hardships, feelings of frustration and abandonment and other motivating factors towards surrender have not been fully developed.)

Prisoner of war interrogations and captured documents provide some basis for an attempt to discover to what degree Japanese unwillingness to surrender is the consequence of direct army indoctrination supported by threats of future punishment of those who allow themselves to be taken prisoner, and to what extent it is the consequence of "BUSHIDO" so thoroughly inculcated in the Japanese from earliest childhood that conformity to its concepts has become second nature and requires no reinforcement from a specific army indoctrination program.

Army Indoctrination: A document, recently captured in the IMPHAL-KOHIMA area lends some support to the theory that Japanese soldiers are conditioned in their attitudes toward surrender by threats of punishment should they be recaptured or succeed in returning to their own lines. This document, dated 14 Aug 1942, was addressed from the War Ministry to the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in CHINA. The order called for immediate inquiries into the cases of those who had returned to the Japanese lines after having been prisoners of war. Those who were considered innocent, presumably those able to prove that the circumstances of their capture had made suicide impossible, were to undergo severe "corrective punishment" and after serving their sentences might be sent to training units for further discipline. To safeguard their future, arrangements were to be made for them to live in countries outside JAPAN. No mention was made of the fate of those unable to "prove their innocence."

Statements made by prisoners of war have in some cases indicated that direct indoctrination has occurred in some units. One prisoner of war stated that, in lectures given by officers, the men had been told that under military law, prisoners of war would be hanged upon their return to JAPAN. Another prisoner, a Navy Air Force observer, declared that they had been told by an officer that when prisoners were exchanged, Japanese prisoners as a punishment for being alive would be subjected to six months penal servitude after which they would be sent to JAPAN's colonies as laborers.

Still other prisoners, while not instructed as to their ultimate fate, should they allow themselves to be captured, reported that they had been told to kill themselves; one such prisoner stating that his officers had described various methods of suicide. A prisoner of war, formerly with a Japanese medical unit on the KOHIMA front, declared that official instructions had been issued to kill all wounded if capture seemed inevitable, and a similar story was told by a Japanese prisoner with reference to an army hospital.

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JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARDS SURRENDER (CONTD)

The great majority of interrogations received, however, do not support the theory that a uniform policy of indoctrination against surrender has been adopted by the Japanese army. Most interrogations indicate that soldiers receive no instructions as to capture and that as one prisoner put it, the correct Japanese course of action "seems to be understood by each soldier," or that, as another prisoner said, "his officers had not discussed surrender, but he knew that they expected no one to give himself up." On the basis of the interrogations received, it would appear that while in some cases instructions have been given, most Japanese soldiers "know" that they must not surrender, they can never return to JAPAN if they do, and, in consequence, that their choice of death to surrender is an almost automatic response based on a lifetime of training in correct behavior and conformity.

Sample of Enemy Propaganda on Leyte

(From G-2 Report of 7th Infantry Division)

The following message addressed to the citizens of ALBUERA was taken from a dead Jap in a skirmish north of TABGAS, 13 Nov 44. A 32d Inf officer in the area reports that the message was distributed to the citizens of ALBUERA, and was received by them with scorn and laughter.

"To the dearest inhabitants of this village --

"To the inhabitants of this village - Today we were given the chance to talk with this man whom we've handed some money for some of your dearest pigs and hens. We thought it very sorry to kill some of your treasures, but it's impossible to buy our food in the field, as you know well.

"You Filipinos are not our real foe at all. Don't run away when you come across with a Japanese soldier! It causes misunderstanding for there are so many bad, foolish Filipinos among you and to our great sorry we cannot tell who is good and who is bad. Don't try to attack us! If you try, then we must kill all of you. It's miserable to fight, Japanese and Filipinos, originally the same race. Don't you really think so? We are going to remove to some other place soon. Then don't try to let us get angry.

"Japanese Imperial Forces"

NOTE: The message was signed by a Lt. then crossed out so that it is partly illegible.

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Japanese Transport Units

(From AMFWIR No. 120, 10-17 Ncv.1944)

The Japanese use of transport in the NEW GUINEA-SOLOMONS area has been severely restricted by the difficult terrain. When used, trucks have suffered from frequent breakdowns, and horses do not survive long due to the climatic conditions. A number of Transport Units have operated with a reduced scale of equipment, but generally all transport other than local transport in base areas, has been done by carriers. However, in the areas now being invaded by Allied forces, the terrain and the development of some roads make the use of wheeled transport more practicable. The following Staff Table shows the strength and equipment of these units.

UNIT	Strength	Pistols	Rifles	Trucks	Cars
Field Transport Hq	27	4	17	2	4
<u>MOTOR TRANSPORT</u>					
Indep. MT Battalion	805	91	675	182	22
Battalion Hq	27	10	14	1	3
4 Companies (each)	176	19	153	45	4
Supply Depot	74	5	49	1	3
Indep MT Company	183	20	139	46	4
<u>HORSE TRANSPORT</u>					
Indep Tpt Bn (A) (Draft)	2428	61	617	<u>Carts</u> 1440	1
Bn Hq	64	13	35	12	1
6 Companies (each)	384	8	97	238	
Indep Tpt Bn (A)(Pack)	2633	61	662	<u>Horses</u> 1843	1
Bn Hq	75	13	38	25	1
6 Companies (each)	428	8	104	303	
Indep Transport Company (Pack)	428	9	138	303	
Indep Transport Company (Draft)	396	7	134	<u>Carts</u> 238	
Bridge Bldg Material Company (Mtz)	408	5	392	<u>Trucks</u> 141	5
Bridge Bldg Material Company (Pack)	678	8	82		
River Crossing Material Company (Mtz)	225	5	199	65	2

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JAPANESE TRANSPORT UNITS (CONTD)

Where a number of transport units may be located in one area, these generally come under command of a Field Transport Hq. Thus, in BURMA, 2 Field Transport Hq was divided into six Transport Units, each including Horse Crossing Material Units. Independent Transport Units are frequently attached to Divisions, as many Japanese Infantry Divisions bring little organic transport with them to forward areas.

The Japanese Army Mobilization Plan for 1944 lists a number of Ordnance Tables for Horse and Motor Transport Units, and from these tables the unit strengths have been estimated.

Poison Gas

(From SWPA Daily G-2 Summary No. 988, 9/10 Dec 1944)

A PW, 1st Cl Pvt, 72 Airfield Battalion stated:

"Heard a rumor that the Japs intended to use Poison Gas if there was a fear of their being beaten in this war. If they become desperate they intended to use it. It was said that JAPAN had some super fine type of liquid gas and would use it if the Allies started using gas. It was supposed to be far superior to anything the Allies had. In fact it was said that Japs were very anxious to use their new type of poison gas and were disappointed because her enemies had not resorted to gas warfare, so as to give them the opportunity of using their secret weapon."

The 14th Area Army operations Order A-931, 6 Feb 1944, MANILA, includes the following:

"The Imperial GHQ Army Directive No. 1822 issued.

"The army will make preparations for gas warfare in consideration of use of gas by the enemy.

"Following preparations will be made in anticipation of retaliatory use of Special Smoke and Special Shells (Tokushu En Tokushu Dan):

"Use of Special Smoke and Special Shells will be by Army Orders.

"Use Mainly in operations on vital islands. Emphasis on use by planes. Types to be generally used: 'KII' (Blister gas), 'CHA' (TN Presumably Hydrocyanic acid or choking gas), 'AKA' (TN Sneezing gas). Other types may be used with these.

"Ammunition and materiel - To keep plans concealed, ammunition and materiel will be stored in MANILA until this spring.

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Jap Paratroop Equipment

(From Hq Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No. 68, 13 Dec 1944)

The 1 January issue of the USAFPOA G-2 Intelligence Bulletin described the Jap airborne landings on LEYTE, and treated briefly the subject of the equipment carried by some of the paratroopers. There follows here a more detailed description of the equipment issued to this branch of their service, as learned principally from examination of enemy dead on LEYTE.

Clothing: - The usual variety of clothing and clothing combinations being worn by the average ground soldier were also worn by the Japanese paratroopers. It is apparent that Japanese troops in the field wear mixed uniforms to suit their individual tastes much as our own soldiers do. Clothing worn was practically new. The most common uniform observed on the enemy dead was a new type green cotton outfit. Shirts are made of a soft, loose woven fabric and have long sleeves. Breeches are of close woven cotton twill. The helmet worn is a special shock protecting helmet, much like the type worn by our tank crews. The regulation Japanese Army wool, wrap leggings, and canvas rubber "tabi" (footgear) round out the complete uniform.

Equipment: - Packs found were of a variety of shapes and sizes. Bodies taken from crashed planes were draped everywhere with canvas bags and harnesses. Designed apparently only for paratroopers are canvas carriers capable of being strapped to the outer portion of the thigh and leg. Two of these can be worn by each paratrooper; one on each side. Other bags, resembling our canvas dispatch cases and our standard Lightweight Gas Mask Carriers, were utilized extensively.

Not all paratroopers carried identical equipment, but the following were typical.

The special carrier, strapped to the leg, usually contained:

- One Model 89, 50mm Grenade Discharger with canvas cover.
- One Pickmattox
- Two Model 94, Smoke Candles (small)
- Four Model 89, 50mm Grenades
- Two Anti-tank Grenades (conical shaped)

In the other carrier would commonly be found:

- One Model 2, 7.7mm Paratrooper's Rifle
- One Bayonet
- Four Model 89, 50mm Grenades
- Two Model 97 Hand Grenades
- Thirty rounds 7.7mm Rifle Ammunition

A smaller canvas bag was filled with demolition materials, usually including the following:

- Three Model 99 Magnetic Mines (with magnets removed)
- Six Demolition Blocks, prepared by tying together two small picric acid charges approximately $2\frac{1}{2}$ " x $2\frac{1}{2}$ " x 1". These were fitted with nonelectric caps and about four inches of fuze cord.

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JAP PARATROOP EQUIPMENT

A second bag generally contained a variety of canned and concentrated rations, extra socks, an extra shirt, first aid pouch, and a piece of rope.

The paratroopers' cartridge belts are new combination pistol holsters and ammunition-carriers. All were equipped with Model 94 (1934) 8mm, semi-automatic pistols. Cartridge pouches were filled with pistol and rifle ammunition and occasionally one or two Model 97 hand grenades.

Canteens were universally carried on a strap over the shoulder. Some had gas masks of the latest type but many were without any at all.

The model 2, 7.7mm, paratrooper's rifle, carried by many of the invaders, is a modified version of the Model 99 rifle. Its main feature, distinguishing it from its prototype, is the fact that it breaks down into two sections, separating the barrel groups from the receiver and butt groups, enabling it to be packed into a small unit. It weighs 9 pounds, 13 ounces, as compared to the 8 pounds, 4 ounces of the Model 99. The heavier weight is due to the additional steel required to form the joining components of the two main sections.

Those not armed with a rifle carried a Model 100, 8mm sub-machine gun. This weapon, also, has never before been recovered. A soldier armed with this MG and an 8mm pistol had the advantage of only having to carry the one type of ammunition.

Parachutes:- The Japanese parachute is of a design similar to the British and German makes. Characteristic of these chutes are the single suspension cord or riser and the quick release clasp. The American parachute employs two risers, providing a better balance and enabling the parachutist to maintain a higher degree of control in descent.

The quick release clasp acts as a catch for the converging shoulder and body harness. To free oneself from the chute, only this one clasp need be released. Our own paratroopers have three clasps to release before being freed from the chute.

The canopy appears to be of a high quality, white silk, while ours are made of nylon. Twenty-four panels are employed and the chute opens to about a diameter of twenty-eight feet.

An aluminum back plate is used in the Jap chute forming a base for the chute carrier. The harness straps and carrier reinforcements are of a dark green, canvas web.

The chute is of good material and is well constructed, but professional opinion, as expressed by American paratroopers, qualifies it as being "not as good as ours."

Signal Equipment: - Besides physically carrying huge quantities of equipment, additional supplies were dropped by smaller supply chutes. Additional ammunition, demolition, and signal equipment were the main articles supplied in that manner.

Signal equipment recovered included radio transmitters, receivers, power units, antenna equipment, spare parts, and walkie-talkie sets.

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
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DEMOLITION MATERIEL


CARRIED BY JAP PARATROOPS
IN ATTACK ON LEYTE AIRFIELDS

6 DEC. 1944

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The above picture displays two of the types of prepared demolition charges carried by the Jap Paratroops. Fig. # 1 points to the fuze cord with the friction type fuze igniter attached. Shown separately (fig. # 2) is the igniter with the pull type cap removed. The non-electric cap (fig. # 3) is fastened to the other end of the fuze cord and inserted into the holes provided in the high explosive charges. The outer casing of the prepared charges (fig. # 4) is of metal, preventing deterioration of the explosives held within. Two sizes have been found, the larger being approximately 2 x 3 x 6½ inches and the smaller charge measuring 1½ x 2 x 5½ inches



Above photo shows the quantity of demolitions contained in two canvas carriers, one of which is also shown. Eleven (11) assembled fuze cords, igniters, and caps, (fig. # 5) for the same number of prepared charges are shown. Also five (5) Model 99 Magnetic Mines (with magnets removed) (fig. # 6) and the fuze required for detonation are displayed.

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Sufficient equipment to furnish a communication system for a battalion headquarters was found in one location.

It is estimated that this set would be capable of communicating up to 200 miles, depending on the frequency used. Japanese signal equipment is generally of good workmanship, but definitely not modern.

Had these troops managed to land and organize more successfully, a formidable force, well equipped and eager to die for their Emperor could have undoubtedly caused many more casualties to our men and more serious damage to our equipment before being eradicated.

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Japanese Booby Traps

(From Australian Military Forces Weekly
Intelligence Review No. 116)

Two booby traps set up in dumps have been encountered in the HANSA Bay area. In both cases the enemy has incorporated US 23 pound parafrag bombs with nose bomb fuze AN-M120.

In one case four parafrag bombs were covered with a sheet of galvanized iron. It relied on the sensitivity of the AN-M120 fuze so that any careless movement of the iron would initiate it.

The second booby trap had three US parafrag bombs incorporated as well as a Japanese 50 kg HE bomb. The 50 kg HE bomb was concealed in a cordage dump. From this, a length of cordox type instantaneous fuze was taken and this in turn had a detonator non-electric type 3 with a length of safety fuze to which a black type igniter was fastened. A trip wire ran from the igniter and was attached to a coil of cordage. Three branch lines ran from the main length of the instantaneous fuze, each to one parafrag bomb.

The following conclusions were arrived at after examination:

1. In the first case the trap would most likely have caught souvenir hunters but the trap was quickly recognized as such by RAE personnel.
2. The second case was recognized by the badly concealed instantaneous fuze. It is doubtful if the instantaneous fuze would have detonated the parafrag bombs but the sudden shock may have caused the sensitive AN-M120 fuze to function.

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Letter From A Japanese

(From SE ASIA Translation & Interrogation Center
Report No. 60, 8 Nov 1944)

Following is a first draft of a letter scribbled on the back of an interrogation report. The paper is one of a number of miscellaneous documents captured at MYITKYINA, in August 1944. It is a propaganda letter, urging the idea of surrender upon the commander of the 150 Regiment, a Chinese Regiment operating against the Japs in the area.

POACOMMENT: - This letter consistently embodies many of the characteristics which Jap PW have repeatedly stated are desirable but lacking in our own propaganda and surrender leaflets aimed at the Japs. It is written by a Japanese to a Chinese, and accordingly represents the Oriental point of view from both the writer's and the recipient's standpoint: what is thought would appeal to the Asiatic mind, in phrasing conceived by the Asiatic mind. It is a careful bit of writing, and in many respects might provide suggestion for the composing of our own surrender leaflets.

The letter follows:

"Commander of 150 Regiment-

"Amid the ceaseless rain, day after day, of Northern BURMA, you and the officers of your regiment have been struggling bravely; and I have been truly impressed by the great efforts to break into MYITKYINA, which your regiment has been making since the fighting began. I have never met you, but I trust you will forgive my abruptness in writing to you.

"I am just a Japanese, who has in the past lived in your country in NANKING, SHANGHAI, CHINAN, TENSHIN and elsewhere; and since the CHINA incident I have been devoting myself to the building-up of the New CHINA. In March of last year, under Army orders, I came to HUNAN and North BURMA on a visit of inspection, and it was while I was staying in MYITKYINA that this operation began. Seeing clearly, as I do now, the world situation, and every move of your armies in INDIA and BURMA, I cannot restrain myself from setting forth in this letter a few of my thoughts which I should like to offer for your consideration.

"However much aid you may receive from ENGLAND and AMERICA, the Japanese army will never be defeated.

"Your army is of considerable numbers, and I think that it was your intention to seize MYITKYINA within the space of one week. But now a month has passed and what is the situation? The losses of your regiment since the fighting began, and especially in the last few days, have, I think not been light. I do not know what victorious picture the Americans have been painting in their propaganda; all I know is that Japanese reinforcements, food supplies and ammunition are arriving regularly in MYITKYINA. If on the second day of this operation you had been able to fight your way forward another

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LETTER FROM A JAPANESE (CONTD)

foot, we might have suffered an honorable death. But from the third day onwards, if your army has ever thought it was winning it was no more than a misleading dream. If the Chinese-American armies think they are going to win anything, on any sector in North BURMA, it is a mere fancy of the American devils.

"Points for your Excellency's close consideration:

"The position as regards the construction of the New CHINA, and the progress of the Far Eastern War, is already known to you. And you know too the inside facts of CHUNGKING policy; that owing to the progress of JAPAN's basic policy towards CHINA since January of last year, the CHUNGKING war of resistance has lost its point; and that all soldiers from SZECHUANG are being sent to INDIA. I will not go into details. What I should like to hear is with what feelings you can take part in this war which makes you the puppets of the Yankee fiends. In truth it is with difficulty that I can restrain my grief. Are we not both equally Asiatics? If both sides were to get together, surely it would not be impossible for a formula acceptable to both to be found. Your Excellency must not regard this communication as merely another propaganda letter. We are ready with all our hearts to make self-sacrifices in the interests of the CHINA problem. Even now it is not too late. If you should be favorably inclined, I shall be delighted if you will condescend to answer this.

"The Japanese army will never refuse mediation on any subject."

NOTE:- There follows a translation into Chinese of this letter - Tr.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Jap Use of Window

(From Hq 14th Air Force, letter 30 Nov 1944)

The Japanese broke a precedent by using Window for the first time in the CHINA Theater of war during the small raid on CHENGKUNG on the night of 24 Nov 1944 at 1923 local time.

As a result of the above mentioned raid, strips and fragments of Window used by the attacking aircraft (thought to have been 2 planes) have been recovered, analyzed and deductions have been made as to its tactical employment. Also certain countermeasures can be employed at least partially to nullify the use of Window by the Japanese in subsequent raids. These points will be brought out later in this discussion, the remainder of this paragraph will be confined to the technical description of the recovered Window.

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JAP USE OF WINDOW (CONTD)

It is believed only one complete strip (length to which strip originally was cut) was recovered, all the rest were fragments of a whole strip evidently broken up by the slipstream of the aircraft upon release or upon alighting on the ground. Measurements of the complete strip are given:

Length - 23.9 inches (60.7 cms.)
Width - 2.1 inches (5.33 cms.)
Thickness- .003 inches to .004 inches

Several interesting points are evident from an examination of the strips, the material is very flimsy tinfoil with sateen finish, the ratio of length to width is very small compared to US Window. The length above indicates the response or resonant frequency of the complete strip to be 226 megacycles although the low ratio of length to width makes effective anything between 198 and 254 megacycles. The strips, broken into haphazard fragmentary lengths upon launching, (although probably unintentional) are capable in sufficient quantities of causing interference to radar sets operating on much higher frequencies than indicated above.

It is believed that only one attacking aircraft released Window at approximately 1000 feet from the point of bomb release. The aircraft was approximately 1000 feet above the ground at the point of Window release. The method of launching is unknown but very probably it was launched through a convenient opening by hand. The strips apparently were in oval rolls which were to unravel to full length upon release. The intent in releasing Window probably was to confuse ground radar gun laying crews. If the intent had been to confuse early warning radar operators, the strips would have been released some odd 15 to 30 miles distant from the target.

The following points are evident:

- a. The enemy had not determined by Ferret search that no radar was used for defense at CHENGKUNG.
- b. The aircraft crew had been improperly briefed, or improperly carried out briefing orders involving correct release points for the Window.
- c. Enemy ground intelligence regarding radar location and employment is not effective.
- d. The Window used is very flimsy rendering it extremely difficult to launch intact.
- e. Properly employed, the Window is capable of causing serious interference to ground radar sets used to vector night fighters.
- f. Fragments of Window strips may cause some interference to night fighter radar operating on 3000 megacycles.
- g. Enemy use of Window in CHINA at present is crude, but improvement can be expected.

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