


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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

N-4398.3

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JUN 21 1965



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by *Richard Keller*
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Maj., Inf.
Custodian

17 NOV 1947

G-2
USAFPOA

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1 JAN 1945

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
APO 958

I N T E L L I G E N C E B U L L E T I N

No. 7 - 1 Jan 1945

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JUN 21 1963

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A. W. Tyson
A. W. TYSON
Colonel GSC
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NOTE: - Material in this Bulletin which is based on PW interrogations should be appraised accordingly.

COVER PAGE - 115 Centimeter seacoast search-light position near AGINGAN Point, SAIPAN.

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Power Plant Locator

(From Intell Bull No 21, 15 Nov 1944
Office, Director of Intelligence, Hq, ASF)

A direction finder to locate power plants is being used by the Japanese in BURMA. This extremely well built piece of equipment breaks down into four separate man loads with pack straps to facilitate transportation by a four-man team.

This direction finder, Type 98, is designed to locate power plants producing AC electric power ranging from 20 to 100 cycles per second. It is believed that its maximum range, under ideal conditions, would not exceed two miles, and that its accuracy would be less than one degree. The Japanese are using these units to locate our power installations near the front. Three of the devices were captured recently in BURMA.

Light Foot-Bridge

(From Intell Bull No 21, 15 Nov 1944
Office, Director of Intelligence, Hq, ASF)

A bridge, so strong that it will support a steady stream of men advancing at ordinary intervals and so light that two men can carry five nine-foot sections, was captured on BLK Island.

This bridge is made of light, steel tubing with welded joints and has the appearance of a standard commercial welded steel truss joist. The end sections are eleven feet, five and a half inches long, the intermediate sections are nine feet long. Each section is composed of two sets of trussed members, about $9\frac{1}{2}$ inches thick. The wooden treadways are composed of two half-inch boards laid side by side. The overall width of the bridge is one foot five and a half inches. The actual weight of two end sections and one intermediate section, each laid parallel, will support light field artillery and vehicles such as jeeps.

Watch Your Step, Soldier!

(From G-2 Periodic Report #23, Hq
1st Cav Div)

"Our patrols on SAMAR have received information through friendly civilians that the Japs in the vicinity of HINBAGAN have installed 'pig traps' in front of their MG and mortar fire positions. The concealed traps have long sharp spears in pits to impale anyone falling into them. The traps are well camouflaged and hard to detect." (Refer to G-2, USFPO., Bulletin No 6, 17 Dec 44 for more detailed description of these Jap Traps.)

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New Type Jap Army Aircraft

(From Translation Report SE ASIA Translation and
Interrogation Center Report No. 54)

"(Mimeographed sheets)

"(Signed:) KITAKAWA, Masao (or AKIO, Sakao)

"TSUWIMONO 10114 Intelligence Report No. 83.



"Notification with reference to the entry into service
of a new type Japanese army aircraft 25 April 1944.

"To Officers Commanding each unit of TSUWIMONO 10114 unit.


"The main points notified below are to be used as material
for training and information.

"Attention is to be paid to the identification of the new
type army aircraft which is shortly to appear as a new type fighter
in the BURMA area.

"NOTE: This aircraft differs from those hitherto at the
front; as it is equipped with a liquid-cooled motor, its shape and
sound are entirely different; note that it has a rather close re-
semblance to the enemy P-51."



NOTE: Compared with the P-51,
the wing tips are more angular.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Leyte Paratroop Attack of Six December

Confusion and chaos were to be spread everywhere. If all went well for the Japs, not a single American plane would be able to fly on the following day, and thus an important convoy containing a whole brigade of sorely needed reinforcements would be able to anchor and unload at ORMOC without interference.

Actually, only about 200 to 300 paratroops reached the ground alive in the Jap attack. Of one flight of 51 planes, comprising transports, bombers and fighters, AA gunners claim to have shot down 18 planes. Some of the transports also evidently lost their way, for reports were received of paratroop landings at remote localities. The bulk, however, comprising probably 20 planeloads, descended in the vicinity of SAN PABLO and BURI airstrip. By actual count, 124 parachutes, compactly grouped, were located along a north-south line just west of SAN PABLO field, while about 80 paratroops descended on BURI. At SAN PABLO, the dropping was preceded by bombing and the laying of a smoke screen.

Documents taken from enemy dead indicate the planned scale of the attack upon our LEYTE air installations by airborne Japanese. A total of 69 planes and 843 men were scheduled to land or parachute in the attack, which was planned through four phases and three waves. Apparently the entire operation never progressed beyond Phase One. The attacks on DULAG and TACLOBAN strips completely miscarried. One enemy plane flew low over DULAG airfield, dropping 2-5 parachutists; it later crashed in flames in the sea. One Jap of this group was killed as he attempted to set up a machine gun along the BURAUE-DULAG road. Another plane crashed 4500 yards northeast of DULAG field. That was the extent of the attack on this strip.

At TACLOBAN, two converted Betty bombers approached the strip in the normal landing pattern, with flaps and wheels lowered. One was shot down in the sea, the other crashed near the strip.

A Jap first lieutenant, leader of the TACLOBAN attack, was fished out of SAN PEDRO Bay. He stated he had 30 men under his command; they had taken off in three converted bombers. He had been given orders to attack either TACLOBAN or DULAG airfield, depending upon the 'ferocity' of the AA defense. He chose TACLOBAN and his plane was to land there followed by the other two planes. If conditions were such that they could not take off on completion of the mission, the pilots were to burn their planes. The men were to disperse in groups of two or three if planes were few on the strip, or singly if planes were numerous. They were to disregard defense against enemy fire and concentrate on igniting as many Allied planes as possible before they were killed. They had no expectation of survival.

Unfortunately for the Jap plan, and whether by accident or design, the bulk of the paratroops dropped at the unserviceable and non-operational SAN PABLO and BURI strips, where the only planes present were a few L-5s. According to a small group of the 11th A/B division, who were on SAN PABLO strip when the descent was made there, the Jap paratroops came down the runway acting as if they were drunk or had been drugged. They were singing, yelling, and three of them were playing musical instruments, a jewsharp, harmonica and small horn. They shouted "Hello! Hello! Where are your machine guns?" and other irrelevant comments. Their work of destruction had neither rhyme nor reason. Two or three L-5s were burned, but other planes of the same type standing nearby were left unmolested. Large ammunition dumps, CP

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LEYTE PARATROOP ATTACK (CONTD)

areas, and other important installations were not disturbed, while the Japs shot holes in washstands, burned up a jeep, and overturned a truck. Flares were discharged promiscuously.

On the following day, the paratroops were driven off the SAN PABLO strip. They retreated northward to a pocket near the BURI strip, where they held out against all attacks for several days. There they were joined by remnants of the 16th Division who had early in the morning of the sixth infiltrated from the west into the BURAUEN-BURI area.

According to prisoners, about 500 of the remaining troops of the 16th Division were assembled west of BURAUEN on 2 December, and were told by their officers that after a few days' rest, they would attack towards the airfields in conjunction with an airborne invasion. Artillery fire and the action dispersed all but about 200 of them; the remainder launched an attack on the morning of the 6th; the apparent mis-timing was due, according to the prisoners, to the failure of the paratroops to land as originally scheduled. In corroboration of this statement, some of the captured documents do indicate the airborne phase was supposed to have occurred on the night of the 5th. Bad timing and lack of coordination may have been a reason for the abruptly abortive nature of the entire Jap operation, as all indications point to a larger attack than actually took place. It is apparent that coordination was intended between the landings, the ground infiltrations in the BURI and the SAN PABLO areas and the 14-ship convoy reported en route towards LEYTE on 6 December. A battalion of the 13th, Ind Inf Regt of the 26th Division was likewise to cooperate in the attack, by moving on the BURI and BAYUG airfields from the south. In this case there was a complete lack of coordination; this battalion did not attack until the night of 10 December, after the paratroops had already been liquidated.

By 12 December, the combined air-ground attack was eliminated; the three airfields in the BURAUEN area were cleared of enemy; a total of 215 dead Japs had been counted in the BURI area, of which one-third were paratroops, and 125 dead were counted at SAN PABLO all of whom were paratroops.

The paratroops were picked fanatics, all of whom had volunteered from various branches of the Japanese Army for a suicide mission the nature of which was not specified when they joined. The body of a Jap sergeant recovered from one of the transports which crashed on the coast south of DULAG carried among other documents, an overnight pass dated 3 December, which gave him permission to visit KAGI, FORMOSA. His dog tags identified the unit as 12039 MIURA BUTAI. Other captured documents from a different source stated that the paratroopers were to take off at 1404H on the 6th (place not given) and jump at 1740H. This information indicates that the mission possibly was initiated at KAGI and that the planes staged through airfields in the CLARK and/or MANILA areas. The document which gave the take off time, etc., gave the unit identification of SUZUKI, which is believed to be the Second Airborne Unit. Other documents mention the KATSURA Unit and Warrant Officer VENO. Information taken at SAN PABLO identifies the Unit SORA 9948, which is believed to be the 4th Paratroop Regiment and the Unit ROHO 5B. Photos taken 16 November of Allied Airdromes on LEYTE were also captured.

They were superbly equipped. For example, one typical paratrooper had on his person the following: an 8mm tommy gun of new type; an 8mm pistol; 8 M-97 grenades; 2 smoke candles, a bayonet; a case with tommy gun clips; a case containing two Molotov cocktails; one magnetic mine and case with spare parts; a parachute; a set of waterproof clothing; pieces of rope; sack of rations; and canteen. Others carried radios, demolition equipment of new and unusual types, folding-type rifles, and other special equipment. Elaborate

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LEYTE PARATROOP ATTACK (CONTD)

plans for deception were not overlooked. Seven dead Japs removed from the TICLOBAN plane were found to have either American or civilian clothes under their regular uniforms.

Captured orders indicate that the plans for destruction of airfield installations were thorough and detailed. Paratroop leaders were furnished with aerial photographs of the airfields, with annotations showing the location of main installations. All were thoroughly briefed beforehand on the general plan, and some carried out a rehearsal at their home base. The work of destruction was to proceed in phases, with airplanes naturally being the prime target; after them AA positions, gas dumps, radio installations and bridges were to receive attention. Assembly areas for use before and after the assault were carefully pinpointed.

A document from one of the planes contained a list of phrases in Japanese and English which the commander had evidently thought would prove useful. The English phrases are reproduced here exactly as written:

- "1. Kill a Yankee!
2. Go to Hell, Beast!
3. Have done, all the resistance (struggle)!
4. Lay down arms (surrender) quickly!
5. If don't, shall die (shall be shoot dead)!
6. Hold up!
7. Where is the (General) Headquarters?
8. How many airplanes are there?
Consolidated B-24 (Liberator)
P-38
(Warlike) Material Warehouse
the powder magazine
gasoline tank
the mine zone
(mortar) car
9. Come along! Draw map!
10. Go ahead!

"All the Japanese Army has done great attack for enemy from tonight. And the other airdrome of DORAG, BRACUEN, SAN PABRO has been taken already.

"It is resistless, so that get away from here in this night, do what I say, must help your life. If don't, shall die all these captives."

Another similar list concluded with the following statement:


"I am the chief commander of the Japanese Desant Parchuter Army (Division). And I have three Divisions here. All the airdrome of has been taken tonight, by Japanese Army. It is resistless so that must surrender; answer yes or no!

"All the Japanese Army has done great attack."

Although the attack had caused damage and some dislocation, it had completely failed in its main objective - the crippling of Allied LEYTE-based air power. Nevertheless, as long as the enemy still had more transport planes and an apparently inexhaustible supply of zealots, he could be depended upon to attempt similar exploits in the future.

(Sources of the foregoing are the following: HQ Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report No. 68, SWPA Summary 7/8 Dec., 1944, XXIV Corps G-2 Periodic Report, 1 Dec. 1944, HQ SWPA MIS Daily Intel Sum No. 985, 6/7 Dec., 1944, ATIS Items 167, 168 and 170, HQ XXIV Corps G-2 Summary No. 5, 12 Dec. 1944.)

Extracted from
XXIV CORPS
OVERLAY
to accompany
G-2 SUMMARY No.5
for period
DEC 2-12, 1944
Map Ref.
LEYTE 1/50,000



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Propaganda At War

Unusual examples of both pro and con propaganda are afforded by a consideration of magazines and leaflets recovered on LEYTE. Although much of the opinion-moulding material devoted to furthering the cause of the Allies may rightly be considered extra-curricular as far as Intelligence work is concerned, the contrast afforded by the promulgation of ideas, both the enemy's and ours, is worthy of note.

Among the magazines found on LEYTE, were the following: SHIN SEIKI (New Era), carrying its title in Japanese, Tagalog and English, and being a kind of cross between our TIME magazine and movie magazine; SAKURA (Cherry Blossom) possibly the Jap version of our FORTUNE mag, and a splendid vehicle for portraying the power and modernity of JAPAN; numerous tracts including "VOICE OF THE NEW PHILIPPINES" and "ANO ANG KALIBAPI?" (What is the Kalibapi?); and a music book, containing songs in praise of the Japanese Army, the Japanese Navy, The Neighborhood Association and the cradle. The Japs have also distributed among the Filipinos children's picture books, on the order of our comic strip books, vividly colored, and showing Utopian scenes, modern, neat and clean in the extreme, illustrative of the new life of Greater East Asia, and plentifully sprinkled with rising sun flags. The artist, in one small picture had managed to include no fewer than eleven Jap flags, adequately making the point, that however independent the Japs planned the Filipinos to be, they themselves did not plan to be absent.

Other material published by the Japanese in the Philippines indicates that their propagandizing has used both stage and screen in promoting the ideas of Japanese beneficence and Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity. Playlets were written and presented to the populace upon such occasions as the "LEYTE Agricultural and Industrial Fair Coincident with the Town Fiesta of Tacloban." The themes are invariably cooperation with the Japs, and to emphasize the point, the plays have been printed in booklet form.

The extent of pamphleteering by the Japs is not known, but Fig. A. illustrates the type of leaflet distributed to the Filipinos. The aforementioned booklet "ANO ANG KALIBAPI?" bears down heavily upon any mind waiting to be convinced, making its points in both English and TAGALOG. A few excerpts follow:

"Everywhere, people are starting to realize JAPAN's noble and sacred war aims. Much of the skepticism and downright hostility, which met the efforts of our leaders who realized early the true intentions of JAPAN have vanished like early morning mists before the bright glare of the noonday sun. Fence-sitting, which used to be so popular a fad, is fast losing its glamor and more of our intellectuals who have hitherto refused to give even a thought of collaboration are now ardent proselytes to the Sacred Cause.

"No more notable evidence of this mental turn-about can be offered than the fast-increasing voluntary surrender of guerrilla units from the self-contained North to the traditionally-intransigent South. Every day, in increasing numbers, remnants of the USAFFE, victims of American propaganda and believers of American invincibility, come out of their mountain haunts, give themselves up and offer to do their bit in the reconstruction of the New Philippines.

"What is behind such a marvelous transformation?"

- 7 -
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(over)

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PROPAGANDA AT WAR (CONT'D)

"First and foremost is the pledge of early independence given by no less a personage than Premier General Hideki TOZYO (sic). Filipinos may have many foibles, may lack national discipline, may be a little too much imbued with the pernicious spirit of materialism, but they are not behind any other people in their love of country. Philippine history is nothing more than the continuous attempts of our people to throw off the yoke of foreign domination and serve for themselves their rightful destiny under the principle of self-determination.

"It was to show the whole world that the Asians are as good as any other race that JAPAN launched the Greater East Asia War. And indeed there is no valid reason why, throughout all the ages, the white people have always looked down upon the yellow, the brown and the black races with open contempt.

"To enable us to re-discover our national soul, JAPAN, through the Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Japanese Forces in the PHILIPPINES, has encouraged us to evolve a distinctively Philippine culture, a culture based on Philippine surroundings, history and traditions and in keeping with our racial relations."

Less crass in tone but no less powerful in its potential influence is the pounding home in the Philippine mind by word and picture of the invincible might of NIPPON. Fig. G herewith is a reproduction of a page from the slick magazine SAKURA, and its message is obvious.

Fig. D is from the same magazine, and shows Philippine students learning Japanese culture at SHONAN medical University. The Japs sent a carefully selected group of young Filipinos to JAPAN and to SINGAPORE for indoctrination in the culture and mores of the Nipponese. The selection for such education was of course played up throughout the PHILIPPINES as a signal honor. In the picture, the legend reads "SHONAN - The students at the university are studying in Japanese." On the pillar at the left is seen "SHONAN Medical University."

Figs. E are from the child's picture book. These little characters run all through the book, which in addition to its pictures, has the phonetic pronunciations of the Jap KANA characters, the GO JU ON, or "Table of 50 Sounds."

Fig. F is one of many such advertisements to be found in the April issue, year 2603 (1943) of SHIN SEIKI (Bagong Araw) (New Era).

In opposition to all selling being done by the Japs are Figs. B and C, which are pamphlets put out by Philippine guerrillas. Not much is known about the distribution of these, or their effectiveness, but the fact that they exist serves to stress the fact that the Jap-produced propaganda has not been swallowed whole by the Filipinos. Translations of their texts follow:

Fig. B " It Flies In Peace and Freedom

"Alone, the flag of our country shall float in the breeze. Even today, it flies in defiance against the rule of Japan demanding respect for our honor.

This flag tells of our heroic historic past; our fights against the rules of kings; of our struggles against invaders; it tells of the sufferings of our people and of those who fought, suffered, and died for it not so long ago and for the dear Motherland. It tells the world of our national honor; of our love and respect for rights, justice and charity; it tells of our

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What are you doing there,
in Devil Sam's vacuum of hope?
Break that glass! Don't be a dupe!
Breathe Filipinas' FREE air!




FIG.A

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HIGH-ANGLE BATTERIES

THE importance of air battles characterizes the present World War. As long as the war is being carried on over a boundless expanse, the speed, performance, and attacking power of aircraft count for a very great deal. It stands to reason that aircraft likewise assume a position of paramount importance on the first line of defense of Nippon's vast construction sphere in Greater East Asia. At the same time, anti-aircraft appliances and choice troops manning them are just as important. As long as they maintain an airtight air defense, no enemy can successfully carry out effective raids. The photograph shows high-angle batteries at a Nippon base in the Southwest Pacific.

コーシャホー コレワヒコーキ オ
 ウチオトス タイホー デス。ニッポン
 ワ コノヨーナ タイホー オ タクサン
 ソロエテ ミナミ ノ クニグニ オ マモッテ
 イルノデス。 ヒコーキ ガ キテモ
 ミナ ウチ オトサレル バカリ デス。

FIG. G

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FIG. D



FIG. E



FIG. E

**OUR SINCERE
FELICITATION**

TO HIS
IMPERIAL MAJESTY
THE
EMPEROR OF NIPPON
ON HIS
43RD BIRTHDAY
ANNIVERSARY
2064

APRIL

29

1944

**Taiwan Denryoku
Kabusiki Kaisha**

134 San Marcelino ● New Philippines

FIG. F

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HAKADAYUNAN MAMAMALAYPAKAY!

Makausa pa makikita naman naton an bandera han aton nasud nga mamamalaypakay ha butnga han hoyobhoyob han hangin. Tigaman ini nga an hingpit nga kaluasan aton na nian. An kolor han bandera han aton nasud nabúklad o nabítad tongud han malolooyon nga kagamhanan han Administracion Militar han Hapon. Ini nga ira tubyan haaton nag papahayag han tancud nga pag bati o pag tahud nira han aton guin hihiningyap nga katalwasan.

Ini nga bandera natindug han ngatanan nga aton mga guinagui-an; an uaray katapusan nga pakig bugno batoc hadton mga magtalumpigos nga mga domoroong; an kinasingkasing nga pangato naton hadton mga nag sacup ha aton; an diri maarantos nga mga kakuri-an han aton mga guinikanan nga nangato ug nag pakamatay tongud la han pag ikinakaplagan han kaluasan o katalwasan han aton iroy nga tuna. Ini nga bandera nag papahayag man han aton mga guin lalauman; han pagtoo han katadungan; han maupáy nga mga gawi o pamatasan ngan han labao nga Magboroot; Sugad man nag papakilala han aton pag kaurusa; han aton mag upay nga katolinan ngan han diri mapapara nga pag kalitolito han pilipinhon. Ini nga bandera nag papasabutman han dako ngan palaran nga nasud ug tongud hini mayada kita nian pag burut-an pag himo hin nasud sulsug han aton guin huhunahuna-an.

ATON INI BANDERA; UPUD AN PAG TAHUD; PAGPASINDUNGUG; PAG UGUP!

3702 BIPS -H2--(Samar-Leyte)—1

FIG.B

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IKAW PILIPINHON

An katalwasan han aton himigugma nga nasud hahani han aton mga kamot. Katalwasan nga hingpit ug bug-os. Aada ha aton mga pilipinhon an pag himo han aton katalwasan nga matu-ud ngan uaray katapusan, tangkud ug minahal nga bunga han mga halad han aton mga sangyao nga mga kaapoyan ug mga kabug-toan nga nag ula han tulin tikang ha Mactan ngadto ha Bataan.

An aton katalwasan matutuman sulsog han aton karuyag himo-on. Sanglit kita ngatanan an pilipinhon kasorok-an bomaya han tagsatagsa nga kabido-an ug kadorumtan mahatongud han toloohan, han kahimtangan hin panginabuhi, hunahuna ha politika ug himolsanan han kaorhi-an, kinahanglan nga magka orusa, mag boroblig, ug mag guitabangtabang pag ugop han aton Iroy nga Tuna.

AN IM NASUD NAMUMULAT HA IMO. KADI NGAN BULIG HA AMON!

3694-BIPS-H1-(Samar-Leyte)

FIG. 6
NOTED

PROPAGANDA AT WAR (CONTD)

national unity that will never die. It tells that we are a people capable to build and control our destiny.

"To our flag, we give complete devotion, our honor, and defense in battle."

Fig. C "You Are a Filipino"

"The freedom of our beloved country rests in our hands,--true and complete freedom. It is for us Filipinos to win and protect this freedom for ourselves and for the generations to come and for the honor of those who died in the battles of Mactan and Bataan.

"The realization of our freedom depends on our united efforts. Since we are all Filipinos, each living in his own way according to his belief, politics, conscience and religion; it becomes imperative for us to unite, and to render assistance to our Beloved Mother (Beloved Country).

"The Country awaits you. Give us help."

Note: Iroy = Mother; Tuna = Beloved (literally) But in this sense, it is figuratively used meaning, Beloved Country. Mactar = a small island near Cebu City where Magellan was killed by the Cebuans.

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
The Japs Fight Tanks

(From ATIS Bulletin No. 1576, 25 Nov 1944)

A bound mimeographed file taken at LONIU 2 April 1944 contained Japanese anti-tank methods. Extracts follow:

"Hand thrown anti-tank demolition charge. This is most practical and has great effect.


A rope - either of hemp or of the kind used to wrap packages, 3.5 to 4 m long. (11.5 to 13 feet)



A weight of about 500 grams (17.6 oz), whether a wooden block or weight, easy to hold.

Pole Type Anti-Tank demolition charge

Bamboo stick, 2.5 to 3.5 m long. (8.2 to 11.5 ft)



Methods of Operation:

1. Pole type anti-tank demolition charge.

After igniting, charge from the right (left) holding the pole in the right (left) hand.

Upon reaching the tank which is the target, hang the hooked wires on the gun barrel or the MG barrel, release the rope and withdraw and take cover.

The bamboo handle comes off easily.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

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THE JAPS FIGHT TANKS

2. Hand thrown anti-tank demolition charge

Ignite the fuze.

Hold the explosive, with the rope set, in the right (left) hand and the weight in the left (right) hand.

Approach the tank which is the target and throw the explosive over the gun barrel and in front of the turret. At this time do not fail to hold on to the weight in the left hand.

Pull the rope which you hold in the left hand and after the explosive is securely on the tank, release the rope.

*

Sakurai Butai No Nichinichi Meirei

(From SEA Translation Report No. 59, 4 Nov 1944)

Captured at BIRI CHAUNG area (ARAKAN), 9 Oct, 1944, were cyclostyed sheets containing "Order of the Day," issued by SAKURAI Tokutaro, OC SAKURAI Detached force (Shitei) on 1 Oct. The text follows:

"During the two years and more that have elapsed since the occupation of BURMA, the Imperial Army has been locked in battle with the British-Indian forces on the Indo-Burmese border. Here, in the ARAKAN, we have smashed superior forces of the enemy, both in operation No. 21 and again, later, in Operation "HA" (can also be read '8' -Tr.). In achieving these glorious successes, officers and men of peerless valor laid down their lives. On the MAYU Range, along the BUTHIDAUNG-MAUNDAW road and especially in the SINZWEYA Basin, Regimental commander DOI Battalion Commanders MATSUKIDAIRA and YANO and others of the Infantry Group shed their blood, and though their bodies now lie there buried in the soil, their spirits endure as an inspiration to the Imperial Army in the accomplishment of its mission. That mission is to destroy the British-Indian forces, to guarantee BURMA its independence and to secure for India a real self-government.

"Officers and men of the Infantry Group, I am now leading you again into battle, to invade and pull down the enemy strongholds and capture their leaders.

* SAKURAI Unit's Order of the Day.

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* SAKURAI BUTAI NO NICHINICHI MEIREI

"To destroy the enemy, we must surprise them by a sudden attack and get right in to close quarters immediately. We shall do this by concealing our plans and disguising our preparations, by launching our attack at night when they are asleep and by penetrating from the rear into their very midst. Then exerting every ounce of our energies, we shall completely overrun the enemy and occupy the strategic points which have been indicated to you. Making a show of great strength in the hills surrounding the enemy strong points, we shall strike terror into their hearts and put them to disorderly flight, by hand-to-hand encounters, by spasmodic bursts of fire from every kind of weapon and by feint attacks.

"Following up the night attack, we must descend upon the enemy like an avalanche, and by our savage and headlong onslaught, overwhelm and annihilate them. As it is well-nigh impossible to secure complete success in broken ground by night operations, you must ensure that success by mopping up thoroughly throughout the day following. On no account permit yourselves to be caught like rats in a trap.

"Don't forget our tactics of 'parties of three' and 'two reserve positions.' Don't attack prepared positions. When circumstances render such an attack unavoidable, direct it from three sides upon the enemy's flanks and rear.

"When the enemy strong points have been overwhelmed, we shall destroy their forces on the West bank of the KALAPINZIN and carry our attack forward towards TLUNG BAZAR. Prisoners and captured materials will be dealt with by breaking through to the river and using enemy boats.

"Officers and men, if you master these combat instructions thoroughly and carry them out to the letter by a death-defying resolute attack, the enemy will inevitably be crushed. The spirits in Heaven will look down upon us and march with us, so be confident of certain victory. These are my orders, officers and men, and I pray that you will discharge your duties to the full, according to the eternal martial traditions."

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Jap 20 Centimeter Mortar

(From SWPA Bulletin No 963, 10-11 Nov 1944)

A PW from the Signal Section, 2d Army Hq stated that from March 1942 to Jan 1943 he was attached to 1st Border Garrison Unit in MANCHURIA where he assisted in the construction of 20 centimeter mortar positions along the MANCHURIAN-SIBERIAN border, and gave the following description of the weapon:

"The 20 centimeter mortar, called medium mortar CHU HAKUGEKI HO, is a copy of a captured Russian model. It is a smooth bore, muzzle loading weapon which can be fired from fixed emplacements using bipod and base plate, or, on wheel and carriage. In fixed emplacement the mortar is fired by dropping the mortar shell down the muzzle on the firing pin. On the wheel and carriage, the mortar shell is fired by the use of a lanyard.

"The tube assembly consists of tube and breech assembly, the latter being constructed with a reinforced nib which fits onto the base plate. The tube is approximately 5' 6" in length.

"Loading: With a two handled, four pronged clamp the shell is hoisted by Nos 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the mortar crew to the muzzle of the mortar, fin first. No 5 grasps the shell near the fin and guides it into the muzzle. In this manner the shell is lowered half the length of the shell down the tube. No 6, 7, 8, and 9 then release the prong and crouch below the muzzle of the mortar. No 5 then grasps the shell clasp with his right hand, keeping the rest of his body well below the muzzle and at a given signal releases the shell from the clamp with a downward sweep of his hand. This releases the shell down the tube, fins first.

"Rate of fire: Normal - 4 rounds per minute. Maximum- 6 rounds per minute.

"Range: 1000 meters the most accurate and effective range. PW states greater range can be obtained.

"Crew: Nine men and one Section leader."

Japanese Army Units

(From PW Interrogation Report MIS 28 Oct 1944)

Japanese Airfield Construction Battalion:- The PW know no details of the organization of the "2404th Battalion" but claimed that it was formed from small groups of men from various units (just as he himself was sent from the 70th Ind Transport Battalion in MANCHURIA). The "2404th Battalion" had a strength of about 700 men, divided into three companies. Each company was allotted the following equipment:

5 trucks (capacity 2 to 3 tons)

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JAPANESE ARMY UNITS (CONTD)

- 2 caterpillar-drawn scrapers
- 1 bull-dozer
- 1 diesel-engine shovel
- 1 air compressor (for jack-hammers)
- a concrete mixer
- 1 gas-operated electric generator
- many drills and busters.

PW claims that this Battalion was the first airfield construction unit equipped with such modern machinery, and that such machinery is now being manufactured in JAPAN, using as models American equipment, presumably captured at GUAM in 1941.

Pill-Box Destroying Unit: In 1943 a new Pill-Box destroying Unit (Tokkaten Kogekitai) was organized and trained in AOMORI Prefecture as part of the North 16 Unit. (Infantry Regiment) PW claims that this unit operated in the South Pacific Theater.

Organization:

Platoon: 47 to 50 men, including platoon leader.

1. Destroying Section, 8 men, including Sec Leader
 - a. Wire-cutter Unit, 2 men
 - b. Destroying-tube Unit, 1 man
 - c. Scaling Unit, 2 men
 - d. Hand-grenade Unit, 2 men
2. Assault Section, 8 men including Sec Leader
 - a. Flame thrower Unit, 2 men
 - b. Adhesion Mine Unit, 2 men
 - c. Stick Mine Unit, 2 men
 - d. Pill-Box Sealing Unit, 1 Man
3. Assault Support Section, 15 men including Sec Leader
 - a. Heavy Machine Gun Unit (1 Gun) 6 men
 - b. Light Machine Gun Unit (2 Guns) 8 men
4. Reserve Section composed of 16 men.

Suicide Mine Unit: When necessary, volunteers are organized into a suicide mine unit which is used for destroying tanks at close range. The members usually work alone with the mine attached to the body, and conceal themselves until the approach of the tank, at which time, they rush into the path of the tank, destroying it as well as themselves.

New Units: (Bicycle Unit and Super Speed Unit.) PW who had been a member of N-16 Infantry Regiment from May to July 1943 heard that bicycle and super speed units were being organized to be used in the South Pacific as well as in the Central Pacific. This latter group were to be equipped with automobiles, tanks, (all types) and armored cars.

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Leyte Mine Fields and Booby Traps


(From Hq Sixth Army G-2 Weekly Report
22 Nov 1944)

Decided effort by the Japanese in setting up defensive harassing measures has been obvious since our landings on LEYTE. Practical use of mine fields and booby traps has been extensive.

The incapacitation of one of our tanks on A-Day revealed that TACLOBAN airstrip had been mined. Description of this mine field is as follows:

1. Types: Principally used were 63-kg bombs dug into the earth with the nose pointing upward. The attached fuzes were approximately level with the ground. One 100-kg bomb was found on the southern end of the strip.



2. Pattern: Bombs were placed in groups of three directly down the center of the strip obviously intended to destroy landing aircraft. Found along the shore line were six bombs spaced for the destruction of amphibious landing craft or vehicles utilizing the shore line as a roadway.



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LEYTE MINE FIELDS AND BOOBY TRAPS (CONTD)


A similar pattern was used on the DULAG airstrip. There also fuzeed bombs, camouflaged by the grass, were merely laid on the ground along the edge of roadways. The brushing of truck wheels against the nose fuze would suffice to detonate the bombs.



Considerable numbers of mines are being found rigged as booby traps in buildings and planted along roads as anti-vehicle mines.


Beside the standard Type 93, "Tape Measure Mine" and the Type 99, Magnetic Mine (armor piercing), improvised mines of many types have been found both in position and stored in ammunition dumps.

By utilizing the shell of a coconut and imbedding a hand grenade in black powder within, the Japanese have contrived a natural camouflaged mine. The fuze for the hand grenade is of the strictly pressure type with 4 to 5 second delay before detonation; therefore, its primary use has been for pressure type booby trapping. Possibly it was intended also to use this device to roll down hillsides.




LEYTE MINE FIELDS AND BOOBY TRAPS (CONTD)

Crude Box Type Mine employing the same principle as the coconut mine are exceptionally common. They have been found in the grass along roads and rigged up beneath staircases and floors of buildings containing ammunition



Many different sizes of wooden boxes have been constructed for electrical or time fuze detonation. Electric caps found with mines are similar to our standard types. Explosive charge has been either picric acid or black powder. An attempt to blow a bridge over the MAINTEZ River was made by the retreating Japs by hooking eight of these boxes electrically with 21 cases of 75mm shells placed on and around the boxes. When found, one box had burned but not detonated.



BOX MINE

(for electrical detonation)

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Organization - Armored Division

(From G-2 Weekly Report, HQ, 6th Army
No. 64, 15 Nov. 1944)

The organization of a Japanese armored division, such as the 2d, recently identified in LUZON, is believed to be as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Vehicles</u>	<u>Armament</u>	<u>Strength</u>
Division	16 Passenger Cars	7 Medium Tanks	500
Headquarters	41 Motor Trucks	2 Light Tanks 1 HMG (Type 92)	
Tank Bgd with Bgd HQ (80)	4 Passenger Cars 8 Motor Trucks	5 Medium Tanks 2 Light Tanks	2810
3 Tank Rgts. 910 ea.	11 Passenger Cars 62 Trucks 7 Repair Trucks	50 Medium Tanks 31 Light Tanks 3 HMGs (Type 92)	
Mech. Inf Regt.	48 Passenger Cars 227 Trucks 12 Repair Trucks 14 Armd Personnel Carriers	9 Light Tanks 18 47mm AT Guns 6 75 mm Inf Guns 39 HMGs (Type 92)	2870
Mech Arty Regt.	39 Passenger Cars 114 Trucks 8 Repair Trucks 11 Scout Cars	12 75mm Guns 16 105mm Hows 7 AT Guns (37mm ?)	1200
Rcn Unit	8 Passenger Cars 41 Trucks 4 Repair Trucks	10 Medium Tanks 31 Light Tanks	530
AT Gun Bn	12 Passenger Cars 33 Trucks 4 Repair Trucks 16 4-ton Tractors	16 47mm AT Guns 4 HMGs (Type 92)	530
A/A Arty Unit (No available information)			
Engr Unit	19 Passenger Cars 6 Armd Pers. Carriers 116 Motor Trucks 6 Repair Trucks	6 AT Guns (37mm ?) 6 HMGs (Type 92)	1030

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ORGANIZATION - ARMORED DIVISION (CONTD)

Maintenance Unit	12 Passenger Cars 54 Motor Trucks 30 Repair Trucks	3 Medium Tanks 3 Light Tanks	615
Transport Unit	31 Passenger Cars 228 Trucks 10 Repair Trucks	4 AT Guns (.37mm ?) 8 HMGs (Type 92)	680
Medical Unit	3 Passenger Cars 40 Trucks	2 HMGs (Type 92)	290
Field Hospital	2 Passenger Cars 25 Trucks	1 HMG (Type 92)	225
DIVISION TOTAL (Less AA unit)			11,200

Battle Instructions For First Division

(From G-2 Weekly Report HQ, 6th Army
No. 64, 15 Nov 1944)

Whether by accident or design, when General YAMASHITA (hero of the MALAYAN campaign), the newly-appointed "coach" of Japanese forces in the PHILIPPINES came down from MANCHURIA, he brought some outstanding members of his "first" team with him. Notable among these are the 2d Armored and 8th Infantry Divisions on LUZON, and the 1st Infantry Division, which arrived at LEYTE on the convoy of 1 and 2 November.

Reputed to be a "crack" outfit, during the 1943 maneuvers in MANCHURIA, the 1st Division (according to PW) marched 25 miles per day for 15 consecutive days, and then engaged in exercises against another division.

While the 1st Division was enroute to LEYTE, the division commander issued what amounted to a pre-game "pep-talk", excerpts of which are reproduced as follows:

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"BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS" FOR FIRST DIVISION (CONT'D)

ESSENTIAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DECISIVE BATTLE

Fundamentals: "As we go forth into the battlefield to engage the enemy in the decisive battle, the TAMA group (1st Division) is given the unprecedented opportunity of proving its worth and of living up to the standards that have been laid down in its glorious history and tradition.

"With the determination to annihilate the enemy, officers and men with one accord will carry out the mission which his Imperial Majesty has so graciously given to us.

"In combat we find the most Spartan elements of training. Initiative and new tactics can only be developed if combat leaders unceasingly guide their subordinates. These instructions are given only to lay down the general principles of such tactics. All commanding officers will exert themselves in the establishing of more efficient methods through which they may serve His Majesty, the Emperor.

"Emphasis in the tactics of this Group will be placed on surprise attacks, creation of confusion and the destruction of tanks."

Outline of Tactics: (Surprise Attacks) - "Immediately upon arriving at the scene of battle, the Group will attack the enemy even before the main decisive battle starts. The purpose of these preliminary attacks will be so to disorganize the enemy that they will be exhausted by relentless and unflagging deceptive thrusts. We must undermine the morale of the enemy which is based solely on material power.

"The attacks described above will be carried out by organizing Penetration Units (KIRIKOMI TAI) and Close-Attack Units (NIKKO) composed of a small number of picked men. The main objectives will be enemy HQ, Artillery, Fuel and Ammunition dumps, Airfields and Tanks.

"As shown below, each unit will organize within itself, Penetration and Close-Attack Units so that it can frustrate the enemy upon arriving at the scene of battle. By the time of arrival, these units will have been organized. The necessary equipment will have been assembled prior to embarkation. Depending upon the importance of the mission, an officer, an NCO or a Lance Corporal will be in charge of the group. On the average, three men will make up a group.

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"BATTLE INSTRUCTIONS" FOR FIRST DIVISION (CONTD)

Each unit will make preparations to send out the following Penetration or Close-Attack Units daily:

- a. Inf Regt - One group with an officer in charge.
Inf Bn - One group with an NCO in charge.
Two groups with an EM in charge.
- b. FA Regt - One group with an officer or NCO in charge.
FA Bn - One group with an NCO in charge.
- c. Rcn, Engr & Trans Units - One group with an officer or NCO in charge.
One group with an EM in charge.
- d. Other Ind Units - One group with an officer, NCO or EM in charge.

Each group of a Penetration and Close-Attack Unit will be supplied and equipped so that it may carry on for several days and nights until its mission has been accomplished.

Destruction of Tanks: While the Penetration and Close-Attack parties are operating, the TAMA Groups (TN 1st Div) will assemble for the decisive battle. Preparations will be made for the attack and supply channels organized. The weak points in the enemy line which have been created by the Penetration and Close-Attack Units will then be hit and the enemy destroyed with one crushing blow.

It is anticipated that the attacks of the raiding parties will be made at night. However, if the situation warrants, reserves may be called upon to make daylight attacks in force. The decisive battle of the Group will consist of an attack against a powerful enemy with heavy tanks.

The tactics of each unit will be based upon the principles outlined above. To the last man there must be a determination to fight as though he were a member of one of the Close-Attack Units (NIKKO TAI).

The emphasis placed upon infiltration attacks in the above-quoted document was repeated in later orders issued by this division. For example, on 6 Nov., an order for a general attack included a provision that the three infantry regiments would each send three suicide squads out per day with the mission of destroying Allied artillery and tanks. Strangely enough, the division artillery regiment was also ordered to organize suicide units to attack our artillery; the explanation for this mission, unusual for an artillery unit, is possibly to be found in the fact that the 1st Division failed to bring some of its weapons to LEYTE.

However, despite the great importance placed by the 1st Division upon infiltration attacks upon our rear installations, only two instances of such attacks have been recorded since its arrival on LEYTE during the period 1 - 14 November.

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Jap Experimental Hand Thrown Mine

(From AMFWIR Review No. 115, 6-13 Oct 1944)

A captured printed booklet entitled "Manual on Experimental Hand Thrown Mine" dated Aug 42 issued by Army Technical Department HQ, has been translated and is reproduced for information and identification. Its primary use is stated to be for the destruction of tanks and, as the name implies, is thrown by hand at armored force vehicles from close range.

Characteristics

Shape	Spherical
Diameter	120 mm (4.7 in.) approx.
Height plus fuze and protective cap	138mm (5.4 in.) approx.
Height of protective cap	25mm (.98 in.) approx.
Total weight	1.6 Kg (3.5 lb.) approx.
Weight of filling	1.4 Kg (3 lb.) approx.
Type of filling	Mk 2 TANOYAKU (presumably a mixture of TNT, Cyclonite and Tetryl.)
Throwing distance	10 m (32.8 ft)
Effect	Destroys 20mm (.79 in.) bullet-proof steel plate
Color	Presumably black
Packing	10 mines packed in shallow wooden case - fuzes packed separately in tins at one end. Overall weight 42 lbs, approx.

Description: The mine consists of the main body, bursting charge, fuze, fuze container and packing case.

The main body is spherical in shape and constructed of aluminum. It is fitted with a carrying strap, fuze cavity and protective cap. The filling consists of Mk 2 TANOYAKU, which is presumably a mixture of TNT, Cyclonite and Tetryl.


The fuze is universal, instantaneous type and consists of the body, striker, hammer, detonator chamber, spring, detonator and safety pin. It is carried separately packed in a tin container. The action of the fuze is instantaneous and detonation bursts the main body.

Assembly: Remove the protective cap and the fuze from the container. Ensure that no foreign matter is present in the fuze cavity and gently insert the fuze. Replace protective cap.

Dis-assembly is carried out in reverse order.

Instructions stress that the fuse and detonator are not to be separated, and when the safety pin has been removed, the mine must not be dropped on any hard surface or jolted in any way. These warnings signify that the fuse and detonator must be very sensitive.

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Use: Remove protective cap and fuse safety pin immediately prior to use. Advance within 10 meters (32.8 feet) and hurl mine forcefully against target. The mine is not to be held by the carrying strap when thrown.

If the mine is not used after removal of safety pin the latter must be retained and replaced in the following manner:

Remove the fuse and align safety pin holes in fuse body B and striker. Gently insert safety pin and bind safety pin with cord.

The effective radius of concussion and fragmentation at the point and time of burst is approximately 10 meters (32.8 feet) (sic). It is necessary therefore, for the mine to be thrown from a distance of more than 30 feet, going to ground and taking advantage of natural cover in order to escape injury from blast and fragmentation.

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Commando Raiding Unit Tactics

(From ATIS Enemy Publications Bulletin No. 226, 18 Nov 1944)

Following are extracts from a bound mimeographed file with hand-written revisions, notes and sketches, entitled "NI Commando Raiding Unit Tactics" issued 1944 by Eastern 33 Force, and captured at MOROTAI, 24 Sept 1944.

This document consists of two parts: a mimeographed manual (with hand-written revisions) on commando raiding unit tactics and a file of mimeographed plans for maneuvers (with hand-written notes and sketches), consisting of field problems in commando raiding unit tactics, scheduled to be held in Feb- Mar 1944 in the vicinity of TOKYO.

PART I; ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES

(TN "Essential" is crossed out and "General" is substituted.)

"1. The object of commando operations is to penetrate the enemy lines and remain in their midst for a considerable period of time, inflicting serious damage and throwing into confusion enemy HQ, airfields, important military installations, ships and rear supplies.

(TN: The above paragraph has been amended to read: "The object of commando tactics is to penetrate deep within the enemy lines, according to the plans of the high command, and to launch a surprise attack upon enemy HQ, airfields, supply lines and other important military installations. In short the main duties are to employ feint attacks and other various types of tactics so as to threaten the enemy's rear and confuse him, thereby facilitating the operations of our army.

"2. In view of the special nature of commando units, their members must be men of genuine loyalty and patriotism and of deep-seated martial ardor, who will maintain the strictest discipline and display spontaneous co-operation and esprit-de-corps. They must be men who have the will to endure the hardships and privations consequent upon a prolonged stay within the enemy lines, and who will persevere until their mission is fully accomplished.

(TN: After the words "within the enemy lines," the following words are inserted in handwriting; "who are daring, sharp, resolute and have in full measure the aggressive spirit."

"3. The methods employed in commando operations are legion, and have countless ramifications, but the three basic principles are concealment, mobility and sudden attack. Sudden attacks may be based either upon power or secrecy and surprise, but it is essential that as far as possible the method of secrecy and surprise be adopted; whereby the enemy is taken off his guard and finds troops appearing as if from nowhere and disappearing again as suddenly, so that he is at a loss to devise a counterplan.

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COMMANDO RAIDING UNIT TACTICS (CONTD)

(TN: All the above paragraph is crossed out and the following substituted: "The essential feature of the activities of commando units lies in sudden attack. A thorough plan of operations must be drawn up before-hand, and when enemy territory has been penetrated this must be quite concealed, so that strength may be concentrated or dispersed as required and precise movements and resolute attacks may be carried out, while the enemy is unable to devise suitable countermeasures."

"4. The essentials of 'secrecy and surprise' tactics involve not only the strict concealment of plans and movements, but also the employment of every manner of artifice to delude the enemy and take him off his guard. To do this a lively ingenuity and inventiveness must be exercised even in the minutest particulars, and the enemy must be given no leisure to devise a counterplan."

(TN: Alongside the above is written: "A very important method of assuring the success of commando operations is to make full use of the friendly feelings of the natives. The practice of making use of their services with a brotherly love must be adopted. Consequently, all who take part in commando operations must be thoroughly versed in all the tricks of 'secrecy and surprise' warfare, particularly intelligence by indirect methods and fifth column activities."

"5. One of the secrets of success of commando operations is careful preparation. The more thorough the preparation the greater the success. This is a particular feature of operations of this type. Hence, those taking part in commando operations should be in every way prepared for gathering and preparing materials, intensive training, proper planning and making complete preparations so that they may undertake their mission with every confidence in their ability to succeed."

(TN: Beside this paragraph is written a paraphrase of paragraph 7. At the head of the paragraph is a note in pencil: "Attention to liaison. How about the shortcomings of the company in this respect?"

"6. Since winning over and making use of the natives plays a considerable part in the success of "secret and surprise" operations, emphasis is laid on the desirability of having them act as 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' on our behalf."

(TN: Besides the above paragraph, paragraph 8 is paraphrased in handwriting.)

"7. (TN: Crossed out.) The special nature of a commando unit involves not only independent penetration deep into the enemy lines, but also frequently entails operations requiring dispersal or concentration of troops so that liaison can be carried out as anticipated. Hence there are many occasions when independent judgment and action are necessary, but commanding officers of all grades must be continually alert and endeavor to use every means of liaison."

"However, in order that plans may not be exposed to the enemy during liaison, it is essential that special consideration should be given to the time and method of liaison, besides confining oneself to the methods of 'secrecy and surprise' warfare."

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COMMANDO RAIDING UNIT TACTICS (CONTD)

"8. (TN: Crossed out.) It is characteristic of the special nature of commando units that ample materials and a smooth system of supply cannot be counted upon. It is an axiom that as far as possible one must live off the enemy's territory, and CO's of all grades must make every endeavor to procure supplies, and to preserve fighting strength.

"9. (TN: Changed to 7.) In areas infested with tropical diseases, health precautions are of great importance to the success of commando units for their neglect will lead to considerable loss of effective strength and combat power. Adequate means must therefore be devised to control infectious diseases and malaria.

(TN: A summary of paragraph 5 appears alongside the above in handwriting.

NOTE: In summary, but from a different source, more information is presented on Commando Tactics. Place of capture and nature of information contained renders the two documents mutually supporting as evidence of the Japs interest in Commando warfare.

Following are extracts from a bound mimeographed pamphlet on elementary "Lessons and Rules for Commando Warfare," issued by the KAGAYAKI Group Hq, and captured at MOROTAI 26 Oct, 1944. (From ATIS Bulletin No. 1601, 30 Nov 1944).

These lessons and rules are based on the experiences of 1st Lt HIROSE, leader of a Northern NEW GUINEA expeditionary party.

"General Principles

"The principal work of a commando unit lies in making a surprise attack on the enemy with a few troops. The purpose of commando warfare is in general, to make a surprise attack on enemy higher Hq, airfields, advanced bases and supply lines, and by inflicting damage and casualties to make it easy for the army to gain a quick victory.

"These lessons and rules pertain to commando warfare in the uncivilized area of NEW GUINEA and indicate points which should be borne in mind.

"Organization and Equipment

"Men should be strictly selected and there should be thirty or less in a unit.

"Equipment should be light and capable of inflicting heavy casualties. During action individual equipment should not exceed 20 kg (44.1 lbs). While travelling in the jungle, equipment should be complete.

"The commando unit should always have at its command natives equal to the number of men in the unit.

"Warfare

A spy net of natives will be set up in the operation area.

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COMMANDO RAIDING UNIT TACTICS (CONTD)

"Daily advance for attacks will be eight to ten km (5-6 mi) and the radius of operation from the base will be 30 to 40 km (19-25 mi).

"If necessary and depending on conditions, two or three advanced bases may be set up between the base and the point of attack.

"A point of assembly must be decided on between the advanced base and the point of attack. It should have natural protection and, in order that the enemy may not easily approach, should not be near rivers or roads.

"While it will differ according to conditions, the attack will generally begin about 100 m (328 ft) in front of the enemy.

"Preparations will be made during the day and attack will be carried out at dusk, night or dawn.

"During a night attack care must be taken with the GARERA trees (which attract fireflies).

"An attack may be made during a torrential rain or gale, but escape afterward is difficult.

"In a night attack fine cord would be used, if necessary, to indicate the direction.

"Whenever circumstances permit, an effort should be made to capture the enemy's codes, new weapons and documents. But the opportunity to escape and participate in future action should not be lost.

"Liaison with the higher force should be made by runners or wireless. Communicate with friendly airplanes by smoke candles or fire smoke.

"Supply and Provisions

"When supplies are carried by men on land, 15 km (9.3 mi) or less a day are covered. By native boat, generally 20 km (12.4 mi) a day are covered upstream and 50 km (31 mi) downstream.

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Leyte SOP

(From HQ XXIV Corps G-2 Summary, 20 Nov)

Following is a complete translation of a document captured by the 96th Infantry Division.

"Intelligence SOP for Northern LEYTE Defense Unit."

I. Policy:

"A. In order to facilitate both the preparations of this unit for operations and the conduct of these operations, we must have full knowledge of the enemy's attack plans, particularly in reference to indications that he is ready to move. We must gather material relative to his battle tactics and must acquire information which will give us an estimate of his actual battle strength."

"B. Of prime importance will be the searching out and noting down of those localities of military importance on expected battlefields (within the Defense Unit's area) which will be affected immediately by the fighting. This will be true especially of those localities offering tank barriers. Their effectiveness, as such, will be determined immediately."

"C. After the enemy has attacked, information necessary for the conduct of operations will be gathered."

II. Principal Items to be Collected:

"A. Indications as to changes in enemy situation.

1. Appearance of enemy planes and the enemy fleet; reconnaissance and types of raids.
2. Guerrilla forces incited by and led by the enemy; their secret agents and their activities particularly in reference to land-sea liaison; plans to repel and changes of those plans.
3. Shifts in public sentiment, particularly whether they are shifts against JAPAN or against the US."

"B. Actual battle strength of the enemy and his combat material:

1. Increase or decrease in enemy strength; organization and equipment.
2. Conditions within the enemy forces; quality, discipline, morale and standard of training.
3. Enemy tactics, especially in reference to land-sea-air cooperation. Also his projected battlefields, plans for the conduct of his operations, and the weak and strong points of those plans.

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"C. Terrain of Military importance:

1. Airfields and areas suitable for airfields which will be likely enemy targets; terrain on which airplane landings can be made, their distribution and condition.
2. Nature of ground; general terrain features of anticipated battlefields.
3. Areas suitable for sea-to-shore landings; coastline; areas on the sea ideally suited for maneuvers of enemy ships.
4. Swamps and rivers; areas offering general barriers to movement of friendly and enemy tanks; their degree of effectiveness and value.
5. Distribution of cocoanut groves, conditions therein, and their value as sites for long range guns.
6. Condition of roads, particularly those running north and south and towards the sea; the ease or difficulty of their use during troop movements. Conditions of supply routes from supply dumps to points on the shoreline.
7. The condition of hilly areas and whether or not movements can be made easily in these areas.
8. Water communication routes; rivers and streams which are navigable by small boats. Condition of installations and boats that can be acquired and utilized.
9. General evaluation of terrain from the standpoint of gas warfare and gas defense.
10. Overall evaluation of terrain and special characteristics of terrain from the standpoint of their influence on signal communications.
11. Special atmospheric conditions, particularly conditions affecting the use of gas; rainy seasons; conditions influencing movements of warships.
12. Distribution of natural water supplies; their condition, quality and amount of flow.
13. Special characteristics of terrain from the standpoint of bacillus tactics. Field sanitation, and sanitation in regards to animals used by the army.
14. Material available for operations; distribution of natural resources available for self-sufficiency; whether or not these resources can be cultivated.
15. Areas which can be used by the Defense Unit for its preparations and for all types of work. Distribution of manpower and all types of material; whether these can be acquired and utilized.

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"D. Battlefield Intelligence:

1. Enemy intentions, strength, movements. In general, his reconnaissance objectives.
2. All items under heading II. Immediately, in detail and in full.
3. Activity, or lack of it, in chemical warfare.

"E. Peacetime Intelligence:

1. Probable battlefields and their surroundings; in particular, airfield areas and important supply routes; establishments which will be likely enemy targets. Maneuver plans of guerrillas in different localities.
2. Movement and activities of officials and citizens of the PHILIPPINES.
3. Activity of probable enemy radio stations; in particular, their locations and movements.

III. Principles of Execution:

Intelligence units will use every opportunity to gather and classify information that will facilitate operations and battles.

"A. Classify and utilize pertinent intelligence from higher headquarters."

"B. Utilize intelligence reports from adjacent units and from Navy."

"C. Reconnaissance:

1. Establishment of an aerial and sea observation network.
 - a. Each Area Unit will place at least two (2) observers at important terrain points. Units under direct command (TN: of Div) will place at least one (1) observer at vital points.
 - b. So that individual observers will lose no time in relaying information gathered to Regtl Hq, necessary signal communications will be established.
2. Aerial reconnaissance:

Units will requisition aerial photographs of battlefields and other important areas. These will be scanned and interpreted. Information particularly of militarily vital terrain will be gathered.
3. During battle (when situation is grave).
 - a. Get results by using observation network.
 - b. During battle, units will reconnoiter following the principles given in the "Manual of Field Tactics" (TN: SAKUYO). The following matters will be reported as quickly as possible: specially organized enemy units, special enemy equipment and unusual tactics.

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In addition, estimates on combat strength of the enemy.

- c. Div will dispatch an Officer patrol (TN: SHOKO SEKKO) to CATMON Hill and to Height 305.
- d. If the situation requires, units will get intelligence information from higher headquarters and/or airforce and Navy.

"D. Acquisition of secret information:

1. Within the area under a unit's control, the unit will use both the administrative organization of the PHILIPPINE Government and the police organization. Units will use their spies to acquire information vital to operations.
2. Prisoners, confiscated documents and other material captured during anti-guerrilla operations will be used as sources of information.
3. Units will utilize all general documents and local inhabitants to aid in surveys of areas involved."

"E. Secret information on the battlefield:

1. All units will organize Field Intelligence sections. Sections will gather information of immediate importance to the conduct of the battle from prisoners of war, captured materiel and other sources. This will be done speedily, the information thus obtained will be fitted into the general battle plan, and the prisoners or captured materiel will be forwarded to Regt Hq without loss of time.
2. Upon receiving prisoners, or captured materiel, the Intelligence section of Regtl Hq will investigate these further and in greater detail. The section will get that information of assistance to the conduct of the battle and of importance to the operations of Div. It will then forward captives and materiel to Div Hq.
3. All units will employ attached spies and other personnel, getting information of importance to the fighting."

"F. Carrying out investigations of militarily vital terrain.

1. In carrying out investigations of militarily vital terrain, units will always take the tactical situation into consideration and will conduct their investigations so as to cover vital areas in their order of importance.
2. Units will make efforts to utilize intelligence gathered as directed under heading III, 1, 2 and 3.
3. Units will survey areas under their supervision. Terrain maps thus obtained will be collected by the Regt.
4. Units will make use of available meteorological observations, and in the event of a change in weather conditions, will carry out observations on the spot.

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5. Units will make surveys of ocean conditions.

"G. Peacetime Intelligence:

1. Special organizations will not be used to gather peacetime intelligence; rather, as much as possible, police and security establishments will be used.
2. As an aid to reconnaissance and security, detached units such as observation posts will collect information in their immediate areas.
3. All units will gather intelligence during peacetime on garrison and maneuver areas."

IV. Duties of Individual Units:

"A. Regtl Hq:

1. Regt Hq will conduct and supervise overall collection of intelligence; a unit (within Hq) will supervise collection of information.
2. It will collect, appraise and classify information.
3. It will compile and distribute intelligence files of units.
4. It will carry on liaison with other intelligence units.
5. Individual sections within Hqs will conduct a part of the investigations of military importance that are relevant to operations.
 - a. 2d Lt SWADA and Intendance Capt KAKIDA will investigate the condition and distribution of all types of operational material and whether or not they are available in the immediate area.
 - b. Intendance Capt KAKIDA will investigate to determine whether resources to make units self-supporting are available for cultivation or not.
 - c. MO Capt TANAKA and Vet Capt OTAKE will investigate in part matters related to sanitation (both of men and of animals), and will supervise the investigations of subordinate units. Vet Capt OTAKE will investigate the use of horses and water buffaloes in the area."

"B. Individual Area Units

1. Area Units will be assigned the command of aerial and sea lookout posts within their respective areas.
2. They will carry out investigations of military importance within their respective areas.
3. During battle, they will reconnoiter and collect battle-field intelligence.
4. They will collect essential peacetime intelligence within their respective areas.

5. They will, in particular, collect essentials of intelligence as ordered.

"C. Units under direct control (of Div).

1. In relation to air defense reports, these units will conform to the procedure of Area Units.
2. In addition, they will conform to the procedure followed by Area Units in the collection of information concerning garrison and maneuver areas.
3. They will, in particular, collect essentials of intelligence as ordered."

V. Intelligence Training:

"A. Important intelligence training subject matter will be distributed, so that intelligence personnel will be well informed, particularly about US forces."

"B. Personnel will receive training in collection of information from Intelligence Bulletins, etc. Depending upon the necessity for doing so, chief officials will be dispatched to various units to direct the training of intelligence personnel."

"C. Units will take the initiative in training personnel in the speedy transmission of reports."

VI. Interpreters:

"A. Taking into consideration the number of intelligence personnel available, Regtl and Bn Hqs will retain at least one (1) person fluent in the use of English."

"B. In order to survey terrain of military importance and to gather peacetime intelligence, units will retain persons well versed in VISAYAN and in ENGLISH."

"C. Depending upon the necessity, natives will be employed and trained (in spying). However, care will be exercised to guard against counter-intelligence."

VII. Intelligence Reports:

"A. Telegrams:

1. Urgent and important matters.
2. Units having no other facilities to send urgent messages (will use telegrams).
3. 3 Alarms will be broadcast as already stipulated."

"B. Documents (TN: Classification of)

1. Special reports.

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- a. Important reports and reports of great value.
- b. Reports which greatly differ from previous reports.
- c. Newly discovered (information).
- d. Reports of special maneuvers at the time they terminate.

2. Ordinary reports.

General intelligence files.

3. Emergency reports.

Essentials will be sent by urgent report (TN: KYUHO) without delay."

"C. Telephone:

Although telephone communications will be used in reporting, special care will be exercised to guard against counter intelligence measures of the enemy i.e. wiretapping."

"D. Wireless and wire communications will be suspended if the situation so requires."

"E. In re accuracy of reports, place of origin and estimates.

1. Accuracy

- a. Class A: things which are accurate and beyond question.
- b. Class B: things which are questionable.
- c. Class C: things which are still more questionable but which can be used for reference.

2. In making reports, always make the place of origin clear.

3. Besides sending actual facts, enclose estimate."

"F. Number of reports to be submitted...One (TN: KAKU ICHIBU)."

"G. Form to be followed:

Date, subject, essentials (place of origin), body of report, estimate. There will be no deviations from this form."

"H. Dispatches:

1. Dispatches will be sent to adjacent units and units concerned.
2. Recipients of dispatches will be indicated clearly to avoid duplication."

"I. During battle, sending of intelligence reports will follow principles outlined in "Manual on Field Tactics". This will be done to take advantage of every opportunity that presents itself during battle."

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