


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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

N-4398.2

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JUN 21 1965



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by *Richard Keller*

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Maj., Inf.

Custodian

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PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
APO 958

I N T E L L I G E N C E B U L L E T I N

No. 6 - 17 Dec 1944

JUN 21 1965

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Kendall J. Fielder
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ARE IN EXCESS OF REQUIREMENTS.

NOTE: - Material in this Bulletin which is based on PW
interrogations should be appraised accordingly.

COVER PAGE - Three Jap fourteen centimeter
coast defense guns on flat cars at TANAPAG.

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Jap Division Replacements

(From SWPA Military Intelligence Bulletin No. 961
8-9 Nov 1944)

A Sergeant-Major PW, 1 Company, 1 Battalion 33 Infantry Regiments, 16 Division stated:

"Usually one group of 1,000 replacements a year were sent to a Division. Now that Koreans have been conscripted, there will be two groups of a thousand each per annum."

Japanese Army Reorganization

(From SWPA Military Intelligence Bulletin No. 957
4-5 Nov 1944)

A 2d Lieutenant, 2 Army HQ, PW stated:

"During 1943, machinery for vast expansion and reorganization of the Jap Army was set up. The number of men available for training during 1944 and 1945 was to be doubled by the induction of 19-20 year old men. This class was to be inducted Dec 1944, Jan 1945 and Apr 1945 for a minimum of three years service. The number of officers training was increased by 100%, mainly regular officers, and training period was increased from eight months to 10 months. The period of training for irregular officers was maintained at six months, but intensified. Soldiers who had served three years in MANCHURIA automatically returned to their homes in JAPAN but after a short period were recalled to the colors and sent to divisions overseas. PW gave as an example: an ex-member who had served in 1 division in MANCHURIA would be recalled to 101, 149, or 157 Infantry Regiments in TOKYO and sent to 101 Division in CHINA.

"The Jap Army hoped that the new call-up would supply sufficient manpower to enable districts fully to maintain their regiments in the field. The plan was to increase regimental strength to 5,000 - 6,000, streamline the regiments by inclusion of supporting arms, and that divisions, when moving overseas would carry their first reinforcements or replacements with them. PW first heard of this reorganization when under-going officer training in MANCHURIA, in Oct 1943, and experienced its first effect when at MANOKWARI, in Dec 1943. At that time the personnel department of the 2 Army HQ received an order from Imperial HQ through 2 Area Army HQ to send all 19 year old civilian employees under their command back to JAPAN for induction.

Air Corps Recruiting And Training

(From Military Intelligence Service Report
No 44, 27 Sept 1944)

Following is information based on interrogation of Japanese
PsW captured during Feb and Mar, 1944.

A cooperative friendly Lance Cpl of the 751st Air Unit, a voluble talker, reported the following details concerning recruiting procedures in the Air Corps. Navy flyers are supposed to be the "cream of the crop" of the available man-power pool. Youths who volunteer for the Air Force are usually selected at the age of 15 when they become Class "B" Air Cadets. At 17, after finishing their middle schooling they are put in Class "A" Air Cadets. After serving in the Air Corps for $1\frac{1}{2}$ years, they become regular pilots, in the capacity of Non-Coms, until they are commissioned. Even ordinary privates may pilot planes. When PW was at RABUL in Nov, 1943, he noticed 20 pilots who were only privates. "A" and "B" class pilots can rise to the rank of Colonel, Group and Flight Commanders must be college graduates.

When fliers go on missions, they don't expect to come back alive. If they do, they feel very fortunate. They prefer to attack destroyers and cruisers rather than fighter planes. According to PW this helps to build up the spirit of competition among pilots. PW stated that fliers have very little spare time. He knew of one pilot who had participated in the CHINA Campaign who boasted that he had 7,000 hours in the air to his credit. Commenting upon this he added that "There are still some pilots left to tell the story."

While taking basic training, fliers were in the air all day, weather permitting, taking off right after breakfast, carrying their luncheon with them. They were particularly trained to simulate attacks at dawn. PW claimed that the average Japanese has better eyesight than the American. When he was at NEW CALEDONIA in a PW stockade, he could spot the small lights off the tip of the wing of an American reconnaissance plane whereas the American MP's were not able to spot these. PW thought his eyesight was just average. Just before going into actual combat, flight training becomes extremely intensive and Japanese pilots frequently take several meals up in the air.

Food for flying personnel is usually rich in vitamins; in addition to eggs, milk, rice and vegetables, they receive vitamin pills also. Candy and wine are available (the latter is non-intoxicating and made from grapes which contain vitamins.) They also obtain sake that is enriched with vitamins. As a rule Japanese air-men take some liquid before going into combat. The excellent food given to air personnel is a strong morale-builder in the Japanese Air Force.

Notes on Leyte

(From XXIV Corps G-2 Summary No 1
20 Oct - 5 Nov, 1944)

To combat our tanks, the Japanese were reported using Anti-tank mines tied to bamboo poles. The Japs would hide along the road and push the mines under the tanks as they passed. It was also reported that the enemy used sticks and poles in an attempt to throw the tracks on our tanks without success.

Mines have been reported all along the Corps front. 96th Infantry Division reported mines being placed on enemy dead. Cuts in telephone lines were found booby trapped. 75mm shells have also been reported being used as mines along roads and bridges. Many of these improvised mines have never been armed.

As pictured by all evidence available the enemy had intended to defend at the beach and to employ his reserves to drive our forces back into the sea. Our naval and air bombardment was of such intensity that he was forced to abandon his beach positions about A-1. There is good evidence that the Japs suffered heavily in these early bombardments although few enemy dead were found on or near the beaches. The absence of enemy dead is explained by the fact that the Japs have throughout the campaign evacuated their dead whenever possible.

It is believed the forced evacuation of the beaches and the rapid advance of our forces did much to disorganize the enemy. Further disorganization resulted by the attack of the 7th Division west of the DULAG-BURAUEN Road which split the 20th Infantry forcing part to the southwest and the remainder to the west. It is estimated that it was 8 to 10 days before the remnants of this regiment were assembled again. The sharp actions around KILING and TABONTABON probably were the result of attempts to escape rather than deliberate attacks or delaying actions. This is borne out by the identification of enemy dead in these areas from the 9th Infantry and the SNLP.

Within the Corps Beachhead, the roads have followed the less swampy ground. The enemy has taken full advantage of this fact by fighting a continuing delaying action along the DULAG-BURAUEN-DAGAMI Road and the TANAUAN-DAGAMI Road. He has made maximum use of mortars and machine guns to delay and force time consuming flanking movements.

In general the fight has been almost wholly an infantry delaying action. The enemy's tanks were not effective or effectively employed. His artillery was insufficient for the task at hand and his method of employing it as accompanying guns further reduced its effectiveness.

The close of the period finds the remnants of the 9th Infantry, the 20th Infantry, the 3d Bn 33d Infantry and some service and air base troops driven into the mountains west of DAGAMI where the enemy is no doubt reorganizing and regrouping for further action.

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NOTES ON LAYTE (CONT'D)

Captured Equipment: - Listed below are items of Jap equipment taken on LEYTE by EEIST:

Ordnance

1. One tank, modified, about 12 tons
2. Two high speed artillery Prime Movers about six tons each with altogether new features.
3. One bomb, approximately 2,000 pounds.
4. Several 8-inch rockets.
5. 20mm AA gun, Model 98
6. 37mm Aircraft cannon (may be modification of known model)

Chemical Warfare

1. Type 97 Toxic Smoke Pots, contents not analyzed, but not previously seen or reported.
2. Army Gas Mask, modification of Type 99 (six found). Dated 1944.

Signal

1. Vehicle Transmitter and Receiver with Motor Generator; 1st model - Jan 1944, Model M7, Type 1367.

Engineer

1. Land Mines of Three types;
Improvised Box Mine with 99 Grenades as igniter
Improvised Box Mine with conical well (fittings for igniter, but none attached)
Round clay Land Mines, non-magnetic, with plastic fittings.

Jap Mines As Hand Grenades

(From Intelligence Bulletin No 20, 31 Oct 1944
Office Dir of Intel ASF)

"An infantry Pfc, who served in a Mine Platoon, states that the Japanese 93 mine was sometimes used like a hand grenade; thrown at tanks and stuck to them by four magnetic prongs. At other times the Japs used bamboo poles - about ten feet long and an inch in diameter and reached from the roadside to place the 93 mines under passing tanks. This mine will blow a hole in a light tank or stop its tracks.

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Leyte Liaison

(G-2, USAFPOA)

The following is based upon an interview with a G-5 representative of POA whose task it has been to establish and maintain liaison with guerilla troops on LEYTE. The account is in no sense an official report, and is presented for the interest and value it may have for future similar operations.

Background: - After the fall of BATAAN in April 1942, guerilla forces were formed and gradually organized and enlarged. At first, on LEYTE, there were two leaders: Capt Erphy in the south, a former sergeant in the US Army of the PHILIPPINES, commissioned after the outbreak of hostilities; and Gordon Lang, a Navy yeoman before the war, now a Navy Lieutenant.

At this point, Col Kangleon, a Colonel in the Army of the PHILIPPINES entered into the picture. Kangleon, a resident of LEYTE, had been captured by the Japs and imprisoned on MINDANAO. Money was raised by guerillas on LEYTE and a party was commissioned to go to MINDANAO to effect his release. His escape was engineered through bribery of a Korean guide and the help of natives and their sailing canoes. His arrival on LEYTE resulted in friction among the now three leaders. Lang persisted in maintaining his own command, and Kangleon retired to the south, where he induced Erphy to join forces with him. Shortly after, however, Lang relented and also joined forces with Kangleon, who thereupon became commander of all the guerilla forces on LEYTE, with Erphy becoming the Adj Gen of the USAFIP.

From comparative chaos, Col Kangleon brought order. The guerillas led a completely independent life, moving their entire families out into the hills to positions completely cut off from their former surroundings. Their early function was principally one of survival. The PHILIPPINE Volunteer Guards were formed whose function was solely to secure food and other necessary supplies for the guerillas. Through gradual improvement in organization and technique, the guerillas soon were able to indulge in ambush and harassing tactics against the Japs. In their early days, the guerillas in many cases conducted their attacks on the enemy armed only with bolos, (see illustration) with which they did effective work. Demolitions also were extensively used. At first, many sorties had a minimum of success because of the emotional nature of the attacks on the enemy. Under Kangleon, the emotions of the Filipinos were curbed and the degree of success of the missions was increased greatly, through the use of definite plans for operations. Later they armed themselves with home-made shotguns, rifles and home-made grenades, etc, until January 1944, when Gen MacArthur sent in a submarine with supplies. Throughout the intervening time, it must be remembered that supply of everything was scant and inflation was drastic.

In this connection, it was found necessary to print money. This was approached wisely, the approval of Col Kangleon and the President of the Commonwealth of the PHILIPPINES being required for the printing. This supervision was maintained in order that this improvised currency would retain value after the Japanese had been driven out.

It was possible to effect some contact with US through one radio capable of receiving broadcasts.

LEYTE LIAISON (CONTD)

Invasion: - One Liaison Officer of the invading troops organizationally was attached to 24th Corps Staff. His mission was to accomplish liaison with the guerillas in the sector under the jurisdiction of the Corps.

At about 4-5, an Officer was landed to make contact with the guerillas and arrange for evacuation of the local civilian populace to places of safety. Information of military nature obtained by this officer was quite complete, but too late to be of maximum value. For example, maps prepared by the guerillas were vastly superior to those in the hands of our forces prior to and immediately after landing.

Guerrilla agents (operatives) were in every town and village gathering intelligence. Agents even included aged women. Also, many former members of the loyal PHILIPPINE Constabulary worked into the Jap controlled Bureau of Constabulary, and obtained valuable information.

The guerillas had controlled the APJYAG-BAYBAY Road for six months prior to A-Day, and were as prepared as could be for that event, though they had no heavy weapons and only a few MGs captured from the Japs. They did have Enfields, Mls, 45s, Tommy-guns and hand grenades, as well as a few BARs.

After invasion, the 6th Army took control of the guerillas under G-2 jurisdiction, and the guerillas became part of the US Forces in the PHILIPPINES. Front line units used guides which in a few cases turned out to be unreliable civilians posing as guerillas. The Japs had given orders to have some of their troops, dressed in civilian clothes, infiltrate to our lines and try to join our forces as guides and scouts. The Liaison Officer conferred with Col Kanglaon to work out a system to detect these spies and to pass all orders to guerillas through Col Kanglaon. Confusion had existed among the guerillas at the many sources of orders to them.

The 6th Army ordered the guerilla forces proper to remain in the mountains and harass the enemy and report Jap activities. They were assigned sectors for which they were responsible.

ON FACING PAGE

#1 - LEYTE Guerillas gathered about their Headquarters established by American Liaison Officer. Identified in the picture are Jap Rifles (Type 38), American M-1's, Jap LMG's (Type 99 or 96), Jap ammunition pouch, Jap helmet, Jap hand grenades and Jap grenade discharger shells.

#2 - Home made shot-gun, devised by LEYTE guerillas, and Bolo knife with sheath.

#3 - Breech of home-made shot-gun. The hinging device is a strip of metal, the flexibility of which allows the barrel to rise from the stock sufficiently to insert the shell.


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Guerilla money, printed and issued by LEYTE guerillas.


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


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LEYTE LIAISON (CONTD)

It is believed that while some units of the guerrillas were at first attached to the US divisions they were later to have reverted to the 92d guerrilla Division, upon the arrival and establishment of its headquarters in the vicinity of the 6th Army.

For supplies, front line units requisitioned from G-4 for the guerrillas as needed by them. Actually supplies for the guerrillas were very limited. There were none specifically set aside for their use until about A-18.

The Liaison Officer acted as coordinator between Corps, Army and the guerrillas. He established a small headquarters at KULAG, so that messages could come in from guerrillas to a definite center. Intelligence sometimes came to regiments through divisions to Corps, so that lower echelons could act immediately upon the information. Communications, and the problem of collecting and disseminating information were very slow, mostly on foot, and one of the guerrillas' greatest needs in the field was for radio.

Organizationally, it proved advantageous for intelligence purposes to have guerrillas work with division; for tactical purposes, they should work with regiment.

Appraisal of the guerrillas: - Division used guerrillas for intelligence purposes and on reconnaissance patrols only with American troops. The reason for this is that American soldiers had better training and background (superior ability in sketching, etc.) It must be borne in mind that the average guerrilla was not a soldier before the war and subsequent to the war his training was practically nil. From a military point of view, guerrilla tactics do not require the training deemed necessary for the regular soldier.

The guerrillas were most valuable for their knowledge of the country, particularly the trails, which could not be detected from aerial photos, hidden as they many times are, by dense foliage. Our soldiers were better trained to observe and obtain intelligence, making it desirable for guerrillas and soldiers to work together.

The cooperation of the guerrillas was excellent. They were willing to undertake any assignment although they were handicapped by lack of clothing, equipment and weapons.

Their lack of proper training in organized warfare made it inadvisable to use guerrillas in massed attacks.

Recommendations: - Hereafter, effort should be made to establish contact with the guerrillas in an earlier date; perhaps as early as A-60. Maps for use in the disposition of our troops, etc., should be obtained and sent to the task force. These maps would be of inestimable value since they would be based on actual ground study of the terrain.

This early liaison should set up groups to act as guides and scouts ready for immediate use upon the landing of our force; approx one man per squad (300 per Division). These guides and scouts should be fully organized (leaders, etc.) Those not used as guides and scouts should be controlled by Army.

Army should have a section set aside devoted to coordination of guerrilla activity (3 officers, 1 or 2 EM and 2 $\frac{1}{4}$ ton trucks).

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LEYTE LIAISON (CONTD)

Trusted guerillas should be given maximum information regarding the proposed operation consistent with security, at the earliest practicable date.

Arrangements should be made to have clothing, supplies, equipment and weapons landed on A Day or as close thereto as practical for use of guerrillas.

On about A-10 an American Officer should be sent in with up-to-date information. He should know points of landings so he could, by devious means, make most advantageous dispositions of guerilla troops, guides, scouts, etc, without divulging vital information.

Each guerilla should be properly identified by a card on his person. These cards as well as typewriters for their writing, should be sent in prior to A day. Only regimental commanders should be authorized to sign these cards, making it easier for MPs to check their authenticity. Passes should not be easy to duplicate, and MPs should be given specimens. In this connection, on LEYTE it was A plus 18 before identification of the majority of bona fide guerrillas could be accomplished with any certainty.

Guerillas should operate almost exclusively behind the enemy lines, employing infiltration tactics, etc. Later, they could be brought out of hills, uniformed and trained and assigned the task of mopping up after organized resistance has ceased.

Precautions should be taken to do as little as possible to upset the organization of the guerilla units, as confusion easily results when orders emanate from varied and unfamiliar sources. On LEYTE, there was no language difficulty, as all officers, most non-coms and a good percentage of guerilla troops spoke English. Of course this will not hold true on other fronts where English has not been so extensively used and taught as in the P.I.

Information supplied to our forces by guerillas was very valuable, but slow owing to communication by foot. Radio would have made tremendous differences (walkie-talkie, for instance).

Guerillas suffered heavily from our artillery. Steps should be taken to supply them with some means of identifying themselves to our aerial artillery observers. (Smoke grenades, etc.). This was accomplished on LEYTE at about A+23.

It would be helpful to assign technicians to work with the guerillas (radio, etc.). If feasible, these should land early, A-60, if possible.

The Japanese Prepare for Gas

(From ATIS XXIV Corps Advanced Echelon Report 14 Nov 1944)

The following information is from an Operations Order of the 16th Division covering the period 15 Jan 1944 to 11 Sept 1944. Taken at DAGAMI by the 96th Infantry Regiment, it was classified TOP SECRET.

From KAKI OpOrd No 609, 14 Feb. LOS BANOS 16th Div Order.

- "1. In consideration of the use of gas by the enemy, the Div will step up its program of preparing for chemical warfare.
- "2. All unit and element commanders will commence chemical warfare preparations, basing their work on the annexed 'Outline of Chemical Warfare Preparations.'
- "3. In view of the influence exerted by chemical warfare over warfare in general, precautionary measures to maintain secrecy are of extraordinary importance. Extreme precautions will be taken, therefore, so as not to give the enemy incentive to develop his chemical warfare resources.

(Div Comdr, OBA, Shihei)

"Distribution: 9th Inf Regt, 20th Inf Regt, 33d Inf Regt, 16th Cav Regt, 22d FA Regt, 16th Engr Regt, Div Sig Unit, 16th Tpt Regt, Ord Service Unit, Med Detachment, 1st, 2d and 4th Fd Hospitals, Horse (Army) Depot, Water Purification Unit, and other units.

Translation of the Annex referred to follows:

"Units will be organized for gas defense and use of smoke as follows: Units will have as much training as possible.

- "a. Div Gas Control Unit.
 1. Two (2) Plats.
 2. Duties, 1st Plat, Gas decontamination (TN: SHODOKU), use of poison gas and smoke.
2d Plat, Gas removal (TN: JODOKU), and use of poison gas and smoke.
- "b. Inf Work (TN: SAGYO) unit (from each Inf Unit).
 1. One Plat.
 2. Duties; gas control and use of poison gas and smoke.
- "c. Engr Work Unit.
Two Plats (subordinate soldiers) from within the Engr Regt will be assigned to usage of poison gas and smoke.

"Use of Chemical Warfare equipment in attacks will depend upon Army orders."

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Topics For PW Interrogation

(From ATIS Enemy Publications No. 225, 15 Nov 1944)

Memorandum on the gathering of material for foreign propaganda from Prisoners of War.

"When a PW is captured, an immediate investigation will be made in accordance with what follows, and a prompt report will be made.

"A. The name (in ROMAJI), unit and family (or friend's) address of an important, newly captured PW will be reported immediately by wire.

"B. Following are examples of the sort of propaganda material useful for spreading disunity between AMERICAN and AUSTRALIAN forces and breaking down their will to fight:-

"1. Doubts cast upon the war aims of AMERICAN and AUSTRALIAN forces.

"2. Dissension and friction between AMERICAN and AUSTRALIAN troops in the field.

"3. Discrimination against natives; CHINESE, NISEI and Native troops.

"4. Enemy losses, especially personnel losses.

"5. Current situation as regards ships sunk and aircraft destroyed.

"6. Supply situation, causes of illness and condition of sick. Also situation regarding relief of front line troops.

"7. Enemy opinion of JAPANESE night attacks and jungle warfare.

"8. Fighting spirit of enemy troops.

"9. Enemy opinion of battle action of JAPANESE Air Force and Fleet.

"10. Activities of PW up to time of capture.

"11. Extent of interception of field broadcasts.

"12. Effect of our propaganda, especially in regard to dissension between AMERICAN and AUSTRALIAN troops, native revolts and the extent to which all types of homefront unrest in AMERICA (or AUSTRALIA) has affected the front line troops.

"13. Sad plight of nurses and the women's auxiliary army."

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Valuable Formosa

(From OSS Report 13 Nov 1944)

Strategic and economic importance to JAPAN: - When liberation of the PHILIPPINES has been completed, JAPAN's most important southern outpost will be FORMOSA. Even if the EAST INDIES and INDO CHINA remain in Japanese hands for a time, their economic value to JAPAN will be sharply curtailed by naval blockade. Both militarily and economically, JAPAN will continue to make important use of FORMOSA until this island or the waters around it are brought under the domination of US forces.

Strategic position: - The strategic location of FORMOSA - 150 mi. east of the CHINA coast and the same distance west of the LIU-CHI (Ryu-kyu) islands; somewhat more than 200 mi. to the north of LUZON; half-way between JAPAN and INDO CHINA and half-way between HONGKONG and SHANGHAI; loses some of its value with US reoccupation of the PHILIPPINES. From FORMOSA's harbors, the Japanese have assembled convoys for shipments of troops and material to the war fronts. TAKAO, near the southern end of the island and KIIRUN, in the north, have been considered among the busiest ports in the Far East. The two naval bases at MAKO, in the PESCADORES Islands west of FORMOSA, and at TAKAO were important operational ports for units of the Japanese fleet. Airfields at OKAYAMA, HEITO and SHINCHIKU were used as staging bases from which aircraft were flown to combat areas. At OKAYAMA, the Japanese developed a large aircraft repair and assembly center. Similar, but smaller, plants were built at HEITO and SHINCHIKU.

Place in JAPAN'S Economy: - FORMOSA, taken by JAPAN from CHINA in 1895 and developed by Japanese capitalists and militarists, is now of primary importance to JAPAN as a source of food. Seventy percent of its population of 6,500,000 is dependent upon agriculture. Under Japanese exploitation, FORMOSA farms supplied JAPAN in the late 1930's with 20,000,000 bushels of rice annually (6% of Japanese rice consumption) and 1,800,000,000 pounds of refined sugar (the bulk of Japanese needs) as well as significant quantities of tea, fruits and vegetables.

The industrial development of FORMOSA came chiefly in the late 1930's when JAPAN was mobilizing for war. The most important strategic industry has been the manufacture of alumina. Blockade of the South CHINA Sea, by cutting off FORMOSA and JAPAN from the principal source of Bauxite near SINGAPORE, will throw JAPAN back upon the use of substitute clays and ores found in North CHINA, MANCHURIA and KOREA. So long as bauxite has been available, its processing in FORMOSA has saved valuable shipping space. The TAKAO Plant of Nippon Aluminum KK has an estimated annual capacity of 150,000 metric tons of alumina, 30 percent of the Japanese Empire total. A part of the product has been further converted to aluminum within FORMOSA. Plants of TAKAO and at KARENKO (on the east coast) together have an estimated aluminum production capacity of 28,000 tons annually.

Formosan copper smelters, with estimated annual capacities of nearly 20,000 metric tons of copper, have also processed ores from sources farther to the south. Some ores from the LEPANTO mines in the PHILIPPINES are believed to have been smelted in FORMOSA. The Kinkaseki Mine in FORMOSA itself produces 10,000 metric tons of copper annually, $7\frac{1}{2}$ percent of the total available to JAPAN.

CONFIDENTIAL

VALUABLE FORMOSA (CONTD)

An important industrial development in FORMOSA, dating back to the 1920's and earlier has been the production of industrial alcohol from cane sugar molasses.

Other industrial developments in FORMOSA are believed to include large ammonium sulphate plants at SHINCHIKU, at KARENKO and possibly at TAKAO. These furnish fertilizer for the island's agriculture and may also be associated with munitions manufacture on a limited scale. Ferro-silicon, manganese, nickel, cobalt, magnesium and calcium carbide have also been produced in FORMOSA, in part from raw materials imported from MANCHURIA and the CELEBES. These and other industries depend on ample hydro-electric power resources. The Jitsugetsutan development, in the center of the island, has a 143,500 kilowatt capacity. By the end of 1945 the Japanese planned to have a total electric power capacity of 650,000 kilowatts in FORMOSA, more than two-thirds of which would represent the capacity of plants completed since 1938.

The extent to which FORMOSA's aircraft assembly plants at OKAYAMA and HEITO, and harbor and industrial facilities at TAKAO have been damaged by recent operations must await reports of photo reconnaissance. It is apparent that FORMOSA's value to JAPAN will decrease as American operations in and about the island increase. The loss of FORMOSA's economic resources will be serious for JAPAN'S war effort, but will not result in an appreciable shortening of the war. JAPAN'S loss of Formosan foodstuffs will be met by more stringent rationing, by drawing upon existing stocks, and by increased imports of other foodstuffs from MANCHURIA and KOREA. FORMOSA'S industrial production can be replaced in most part by stockpiles and the utilization of excess capacity and substitute materials in KOREA, MANCHURIA and JAPAN proper.

Bamboo Spike Jungle Traps

(From AMFWIR No. 120, 10-17 Nov., 1944)


Panjis:- Bamboo spikes sharpened to a needle point are formidable weapons. They were first employed in jungle warfare by the hill tribes of the Indian province of ASSAM, and now have been adopted by certain United Nations forces for use as jungle traps against the Japanese. It is also reliably reported that the Japanese themselves are employing panjis.

Ordinary panjis will penetrate thick uniforms or the upper part of a shoe. When the point of a panji has been hardened in fire, it is even more effective, and can easily penetrate the sole of any shoe issued by the Japanese. Although panji wounds are not necessarily fatal, they are in any case extremely painful and do not heal readily. (It is possible that the healing process is delayed by a natural acid in the bamboo). Blood poisoning has been known to result from panji wounds, particularly in cases where jungle tribesmen have placed spoiled meat on the needle point of the panji.

Here are a few of the ways in which panjis are used:

SECRET

PANJI PIT



BAMBOO WHIP



TRAP SET



TRAP SPRUNG

SECRET

BAMBOO SPIKE JUNGLE TRAPS (CONTD)

Panji Pits:- A pit four to six feet deep, four to six feet long, and three to four feet wide is dug in the middle of a jungle trail or at a stream crossing. A number of long sharp panjis are placed upright in this pit, with their fire-hardened points slightly below ground level (preceding page). The pit is concealed by a flimsy lid which is nothing more than a bamboo lattice covered with a few bamboo creepers. Last of all, a natural camouflage garnish of mud or leaves is applied, to blend with the surrounding terrain. Anyone falling into the pit is instantly impaled on the spikes.

Similarly, a slit trench can be so placed that attacking Japanese will be likely to utilize it. Like the cover of the panji pit, the bottom of this trench is false, and underneath it there are sharp panjis, which will pierce the shoes of the Japanese when they jump into the trench.

Bamboo Whip:- A three-inch bamboo pole can be bent back across a jungle path in such a way that when it is released, the force of the blow will kill a man walking along the path. To ensure effective results, panjispiques can be attached at the end of the whip, as illustrated on preceding page. The whip is held in position by a bamboo creeper or by wire, with a peg at the end of the wire pressing against two horizontal sticks. Contact with a trip wire across the path withdraws the lower stick, allowing the heavy bamboo to whip forcefully across the path. If the trip wire is covered with leaves, and if the bamboo whip is concealed by branches, the Japanese are much less likely to detect the trap.

Camp Defense:- For the purposes of local defense, a camp in the jungle is sometimes built in the form of a triangle, with a large tree at each apex. The perimeter of the camp is surrounded by a panji wall, six feet in depth and varying from four inches to six feet in height. The blunt ends of the bamboo are pushed into the ground with the panji points outward. Gates are protected with bamboo sharpened at each end, bent in a U-shape, and so placed that the sharp ends point outward. Slit trenches, to be occupied in case of attack, are dug along the inner side of the fence. Lookouts posted in the trees at the apices of the triangle act as snipers in case of attack.

Other Panji Traps:- Panji placed under water in a river or at a beach, with the points two inches below the surface, will rule out swimming as an enemy mode of travel and will puncture the bottoms of ordinary native river boats.

Sometimes a bamboo knife, pointing downward, is attached to the far side (from the expected enemy approach) of a low limb overhanging a jungle trail. A man bending low to pass beneath the limb will receive a severe wound in the back when he straightens up.

Panjis may also be prepared by snipers lying in wait to ambush hostile patrols. Along the sides of the trail that a hostile patrol is likely to use, sharpened bamboo spikes, 18 inches long, are placed at intervals of about one foot and are pointed toward the trail at an angle of 45 degrees. When the hostile patrol appears, it is fired upon by hidden snipers. On hearing the first shots, the instinctive reaction of the members of the patrol is to seek cover. If they dart into the growth beside the trail, they are impaled on the bamboo spikes.

NOTE:- A section at the south end of a LEYTE Landing Beach was protected by sharpened bamboo stakes extending three feet above the ground. These were set close together, at an angle of 60° to the horizontal.

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Attitude of Japanese Troops

(From Military Intelligence Service Report
No 44, 27 Sept 1944)

Interrogations obtained in the USA of Japanese prisoners taken during Feb and Mar 1944 revealed the following opinions on the war and Americans.

There were several PsW who claimed that they had no idea of the "cause" that prompted JAPAN to take up arms against the Allies. The slogan "ASIA for the Asiatic People" is expressed in the following words:

"JAPAN wages the present war in the interests of all Asiatic peoples who should get along with each other under JAPAN's leadership. JAPAN does not want any Chinese territory but desires to make the Chinese realize that it is best for all Asiatic people to cooperate.

"Every nation should mind its own business. ENGLAND and the USA planned to expand economically in the Orient. ENGLAND's move on CHINA's economic markets made slaves of the Chinese.

"JAPAN, being the only power in ASIA capable of stopping AMERICA's ambitions in the Orient, was forced to defend the honor of all Asiatic people."

An 18-year old Superior Seaman, who appears to be thoroughly indoctrinated in JAPAN's ideology, believes that the reasons for JAPAN's war are: 1. USA's Immigration Law of 1924, 2. Threats against JAPAN by USA's fortifications of the outer defense islands near JAPAN, 3. Concentration of the Asiatic Fleet at PEARL HARBOR.

A Civil Engineer serving the Navy, who is strongly anti-military ascribed the following frequently cited reasons for the propaganda spread by the TOJO cabinet; "This is a war between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' with AMERICA taking the lead in choking JAPAN's economic markets as well as JAPAN itself. After JAPAN is worn out by her struggle against CHINA, AMERICA will step in to control JAPAN. JAPAN did not want war but was threatened and therefore had to defend herself." PW claimed that the average person in JAPAN does not know the real facts nor JAPAN's war-aims. Japanese government propaganda usually ends with the words: "This war will decide whether JAPAN is going to become a nation of slaves or whether she will survive. Everyone must put all his own efforts behind the war in order to avoid disaster."

A civilian conscripted for labor in the Army believes that JAPAN started this war to control ASIA and to supervise the Asiatic races. He does not know what else JAPAN could be fighting for, adding that the people have no idea about the "cause" of this war. Before the outbreak of hostilities, people in JAPAN liked democracy; this was particularly true among the women. Therefore at the beginning of the war many of them sent flowers to captured American PsW. Although told by the government (which oppressed civil liberties) that the war was a glorious adventure, people in JAPAN wish to live peacefully. While at heart they are set against the government, they accept government orders because they have been taught to accept regimentation, fearing to be executed whenever they voiced anything that is opposed to the plan of the government. "Japanese like the USA he said and Japanese who have visited AMERICA returned to JAPAN with nothing but praise for AMERICA."

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ATTITUDE OF JAPANESE TROOPS (CONTD)

Opinions About Americans: - A Navy employee (civilian) of better than average education (1 year of University) thought that what he experienced in AMERICA, coincided with what he was taught at school about Americans. He thinks Americans are one of the most civilized and scientifically-minded people in the world, possessing wealth and natural resources. Although he knew that Americans were friendly and broad-minded, he was really surprised over the kind treatment which he received after his capture. If both nations could have exchanged goods and ideas the war would have been avoided. Japanese militarists rather than the Emperor wanted this war.

A 2d Class Private, very cooperative and friendly, stated that he likes Americans, having no hostile feelings whatsoever towards them. He asserted that before the start of the war Japanese women in the bigger cities were westernized. Half of the motion pictures shown in OSAKA were American. He believed Americans to be fair, intelligent and civilized.

In the same way a cooperative Superior Private stated that Americans were the most intelligent most civilized people he had met. They are easy to make friends with because they are very broad-minded. PW wondered why he had been so often interrogated and why so many different questions have been asked; also why he was guarded so closely, he had never had any hostile sentiments towards Americans, believing they were a cultured race which he respected. When war broke out AMERICA was considered the "enemy" and he simply had to fight. PW heard that when Major Gen DOOLITTLE bombed TOKYO, most of the citizens when first seeing the planes thought they were Japanese; children were waving their handkerchiefs to the "planes"; however, the attacking aircraft swooped down and machine-gunned them. From this incident, the Japanese concluded the Americans did not want to destroy military installations but harmless civilians and children. This made them fighting mad.

The change in morale and sentiments towards the Americans, that took place in a 21-year old before and after his capture (on TOROKINA in Mar 1944) is characteristic of many PsW. He is a typical youth of average education and intelligence; very observant and cooperative. Being a Kendo (japanese Fencing) expert he stressed his Bushido spirit. At the beginning of the war he was working for the Manchurian Colonization Corporation as a laborer but as the war progressed, he felt a strong sense of responsibility to participate more actively; therefore he decided to return to JAPAN where he volunteered for the Army and was accepted as a reservist. On completion of his basic training he requested an overseas assignment, however his request was refused. He repeated it by writing a letter in his own blood to his company commander who was greatly impressed by the soldier's action and subsequently granted his request. When leaving JAPAN, he was high-spirited, hoping to die for the fatherland in a just cause. He participated in the battle for TOROKINA, with the Akira Unit (part of the 6th Division) until his capture. During the battle he volunteered for three suicidal missions but returned with only minor injuries, showing remarkable courage and the typical Japanese fighting spirit in the face of death and certain defeat.

After his capture he expected to be killed by the enemy and was surprised when instead the Americans treated him kindly. Before being captured PW regretted his inability to die for his country but since then his sentiments on patriotism have changed. Now he feels let down by his officers who had told their men before the battle that the Japanese "fighting spirit" would defeat the enemy's superior weapons.

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ATTITUDE OF JAPANESE TROOPS (CONTD)

He also felt let down by the authorities at home who had described conditions in the USA as unbearable for he found them quite acceptable; and at present he is convinced that the quality and quantity of American weapons will undoubtedly overwhelm the Japanese fighting spirit.

Before being captured it was common talk among soldiers that they must expect the worst from the Americans, that the wounded would be burned after oil had been poured upon them and that all prisoners would meet horrible deaths. Now, he realizes that this was all propaganda.

American Propaganda Leaflets: - PW read several American propaganda leaflets, distributed on BOUGAINVILLE in February and March 1944, which contained maps of territories conquered by the Allies. He stated that the Japanese welcome this information and they considered it of military importance because it made them realize the possible object of the next attack. The American propaganda leaflets contained more military information than was released by their Information Service. The pamphlets were considered complete failures as arguments for surrender because they were written from the American rather than the Japanese point of view. These leaflets circulated freely among the troops who considered them primarily as sources of information. After reading them, they burned the leaflets. PW remarks that the only effect they had was to incite the Japanese soldiers to fight harder in order to avoid capture! The style in which the pamphlets were written was not very good, though understandable. Main fault: the circulars used "big words" and the construction of sentences was poor. On the whole the American propaganda leaflets made interesting reading because of the military information they contained.

Japanese Propaganda: - A sincere, observant and cooperative PW states that the radio, newspapers, magazines and leaflets are all part of an enormous propaganda machine which operates to incite the Japanese against the Americans and to spread false information which in turn serves to raise the fighting spirit of the people. TOJO's propaganda bureau led the Japanese people into believing that AMERICA was responsible for the war, claiming that the USA was secretly aiming at the final domination of all Asiatic people by strengthening her economic markets in ASIA. They blamed AMERICA for prolonging the "CHINA Incident" by sending munitions and fuel to the Chinese. It told the people that for years AMERICA had been preparing for war against JAPAN by fortifying her far-flung possessions in the PACIFIC and increasing her Asiatic Fleet. Japanese propaganda is frequently reflected in pictorial magazines. For instance, PW saw in a magazine a photograph of a congested traffic line of vehicles in CHICAGO with the caption: "Due to the gas shortage, these cars are unable to move." Other photographs depicted, strikes, racial discriminations and luxurious living conditions of the American people. On his arrival in this country, PW had a chance to glance at one of the American cities and he was amazed to see the number of cars which were running in the streets; then and there he decided that JAPAN would never be in a position to win, realizing that Japanese propaganda had erroneously led him as well as the rest of the Japanese people to believe that the Americans are weaklings. He also recognized the mistake of the militarists who were responsible for planning this war. "Japanese production can never be compared with American. This belief was strengthened in PW when he heard that modern construction methods enable the Americans to build a ship within 48 hours, whereas it took over one year to build a second-class cruiser in JAPAN.

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Suggestions for Future Propaganda Leaflets: - It is suggested that advantage be taken in future propaganda of such statements as the following from PsW: - "The food I received on the DD after being captured was comparable to a feast," or "I was amazed at the kind treatment I received by the American Medics," etc. In order to appeal to the Japanese minds, the Japanese used in our pamphlets should be freed from clumsy expressions and foreign-sounding idioms. Most PsW interrogated about the subject found fault with the terms used in our circulars. Although they could understand their meaning they urged that more colloquial Japanese be used and that the composition be free from typical American mistakes.

Another suggestion which might be capitalized takes advantage of the fact that there is a strong rift between the civilian employees on some of the Southwest PACIFIC Islands (such as KWAJALEIN, etc.) and the Military. The well-founded complaints are usually based upon the fact that the Military authorities had:

1. Broken their word.
2. Lured civilian construction workers into dangerous assignments (at time of conscription no reference was made of the fact that they would be sent to places where there was fighting).
3. Not given them any weapons with which to defend themselves.
4. Promised that they would be sent back to JAPAN upon the expiration of their contracts for one year service, whereas they were forced to stay on indefinitely.
5. Treated them like inferior human beings.

American propaganda pamphlets containing such information might even be dropped over the Japanese mainland proper, so as to acquaint the Japanese civilians with these true facts.

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Amphibious Assault and Infiltration Unit

(G-2 USAFPQA)

A document presumed to have been captured on PELELIU I, PALAU, translated and published as CINCPAC-CINCPQA Item #11,801, gives the organization and equipment of an "Amphibious Assault and Infiltration Unit".

The strength of this unit appears to be about 180 men. It is organized into a command section and 5 platoons. The first 3 platoons are apparently rifle platoons, while the 4th platoon is a machine gun platoon and the fifth platoon is a mortar platoon. It will immediately be apparent that this organization is the same as the organization of a company of an amphibious regiment of a South Sea Division.

The basic weapons of the rifle platoons of this unit are not indicated in the document, but it is assumed that they correspond to the weapons of a normal rifle platoon. The machine gun platoon has 2 machine guns, probably 7.7mm HMG, and the mortar platoon has 2 "Lt Infantry Mortars." These mortars are probably 81mm, although the term "Light Infantry Mortar" is properly applied to the 90mm mortar.

In addition to its basic weapons, this unit is equipped with a preponderance of explosives and demolition materials, Molotov cocktails, hand grenades, anti-tank mines and smoke candles. The third platoon is equipped with rafts, small cargo tubes and water-proof bags.

The organization and equipment of this unit indicates that it is probably an amphibious version of the TEISHIN TAI or Raiding Unit, with the mission of raiding our artillery, CPs, supply dumps and other rear installations.

While this "Amphibious Assault and Infiltration Unit" may be an independent unit especially organized with the specific mission outlined above, it is considered likely that one or more companies of the amphibious regiments of the South Seas divisions may be trained and equipped to carry out an independent raiding mission as outlined in this document, in view of the similarity in organization, and the emphasis placed upon such tactics in Japanese tactical doctrine.

Plastic Jap Mine

(From Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit #4
Report 24 November 1944)

Taken on LEYTE was a land mine (Japanese Type 3) which is herewith described.

The mine case is circular in shape and is constructed of a non-metallic ceramic material known as terra-cotta. The outer surface is unglazed and earthen in color. The interior is smooth and coated with a thin coat of lacquer. The top of the case has a two-inch circular opening through which the mine can be filled with the

[REDACTED]

PLASTIC JAP MINE (CONTD)

explosive charge. A hard rubber bushing is inserted in this opening. Threads are cut in the center of the bushing to receive the threaded base of the fuze.

The mine case is manufactured in two sizes. The small mine is the only round now held by this unit; measurements and weights follow:

1. Dimensions

Diameter	8 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches
Height	3 $\frac{1}{2}$ inches
Thickness of wall	7/16 inches

2. Weight

Empty case	6 pounds
Filled case	10 $\frac{1}{2}$ pounds

The fuze body, cover, plunger and striker support are made of bakelite. The body is of two piece construction, the lower body being threaded internally to receive the upper body. The upper body houses the plunger assembly. A shoulder on the lower portion of the plunger engages on shoulder in the upper body and is prevented from moving upward. Surrounding the lower part of the plunger assembly is the compression spring.

The plunger is bored to two diameters to receive the striker and striker spring. In the cocked position the striker protrudes above the cut-out portion of the plunger head. It is held in position by a steel wire release fork which engages a circumferential groove on the upper portion of the striker.

A safety pin is inserted in the plunger at right angles to and directly above the release fork. When in position the safety pin prevents withdrawal of the release fork and movement of the plunger.

A needle type firing pin is suspended in a thin disc of bakelite, threaded on its periphery to fit into the threaded receiver in the lower fuze body.

The base of the fuze is threaded internally with left hand threads to fit the fuze to the hard rubber bushing or fuze seat.


Operation: After the safety pin has been removed the fuze is in an armed condition and may be fired by applying pressure to the head of the plunger or by pulling the release fork with an attached trip wire.

Translations:- A translation of the label on the fuze container gives the following instructions for placing the fuze in the mine when screwing fuze into bushing. "Moisten with saliva to make installation easier."

Conclusions:- The non-metallic construction of the mine case and fuze makes detection of the mine by the standard electric detector difficult.

The fuze is a highly sensitive firing device as it incorporates a cocked striker which is fully armed as soon as the safety pin is withdrawn. A pressure of 20-25 pounds on the plunger or a pull of 22 pounds on the release fork will fire the fuze when armed.

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PLASTIC JAP MINE (CONTD)

The mine, according to a captured document, is considered effective against tanks and armored vehicles. It is further stated that the effective anti-personnel radius is approximately 26 feet.

It is believed that this mine has not been put to use by the enemy. It may, however, be set either as a land mine or used as a booby trap device.

If the mine is encountered in the armed position, but with the striker engaged by the release fork, replacing the safety pin and removing the fuze will render the mine safe. If on examination, however, it is found that the striker has been released from the release fork, the fuze should be considered in a dangerous condition. It is suggested that a method of removing the fuze and rubber bushing from a distance be devised. One method that might be used is as follows: Gently place the loop of a running noose around the fuze body, then from a safe distance or from shelter pull the line. This will pull the fuze with its rubber bushing completely out of the mine. The gain of the fuze is short enough to clear the edge of the opening in the top of the mine as it and the bushing are tipped out of the mine together.

On actual test a quick jerk gave better results than a steady pull. The latter tends to upset the mine. In using either technique, the slack should be taken out of the line first. The foregoing operation is to be accepted only as a suggestion and not as an approved method of disposal.


The 20 Nov 1944 G-2 Report from the INDIA BURMA Theatre adds information about this mine, as translated from a captured document. According to the translation, the fuze may be functioned by a pressure of $4\frac{1}{2}$ pounds on its head, or by 22 pounds pull on the trip wire. It is further stated that the fuze is interchangeable with standard Japanese mortar and artillery fuzes. This affords many possibilities for the use of mortar and artillery projectiles as booby traps or land mines.

PLASTIC MINE DIAGRAM (Facing Page)	
1. Pressure piece	7. Pressure spring
2. Safety pin	8. Fuze body-lower
3. Release fork	9. Striker
4. Firing Spring	10. Priming comp.
5. Hammer	11. Lead azide
6. Fuze body-upper	12. Tetryl
	13. Gaine body

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


JAPANESE

TYPE 3

LAND MINE

FUZE



CONFIDENTIAL

Fuze And Incendiary Notes

(From ATIS Bulletin No 1581, 15 Nov 1944)

Following are extracts from the notebook of 2d Lt HORIUCHI, NI Force, dated 4 April, year not stated, containing notes on incendiaries from a lecture by Major BAN.

Summary and Extracts


Types of incendiary compounds

1. Oil
2. Elektron
3. Yellow Phosphorous
4. Potassium chlorate (IN: sic)

Time Fuze Mk I (Carried by NI Force)

This fuze is used in bombs and employs chemical reaction. The fuze is moisture proof.

Construction - The solution corrodes the wire and releases the striker. The striker then strikes the detonator.



Precautions for use: - When the fuze is to be used, remove the safety sleeve. See that the striker is fixed, pour in the chemical solution up to the fixed plate. Enlarge the hole in the 1 milligram demolition cylinder and insert the gaine. Tie them together with a hemp string.

Temperature has a great effect. (If employing a chemical reaction)


TEMPERATURE	REQUIRED TIME	ERROR
20°	1.33 min	±1 min
30°	1.20 min	±1 min
35°	1.12 min	±2 min
40°	1.05 min	±2 min

The delay may be adjusted by varying the size of the wire and the type of solution used.

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FUZE AND INCENDIARY NOTES (CONTD)

Time Fuze Mk 2.



Precautions for handling: -

When filling with the solution, insert the syringe to the bottom and fill gently (to prevent bubbles.)

The delay may be adjusted by changing the amount of celluloid (1 mm)

The powder train requires seven seconds to burn.

If the solution (gasoline) is below the red line, put in some other chemical to bring it up to the red line. (For cooling).

10°	Approximately	2.35		Variations in purity
20°	"	2.00	35% error	of the solution.
25°	"	1.30		Changes in quality
30°	"	1.00		of the celluloid plate.

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Nipponese Conversations

(From Military Intelligence Service Report
No. 46, 17 October 1944)

The following material has been selected because of its significance in revealing personal attitudes toward the conduct of the war and its outcome, from statements of ninety-three Japanese POW, made during September in the U.S.A. to Army, Navy and Air interrogators. About three quarters of the total captured were Merchant Seamen. Some of these had been conscripted as seamen whose ships had been sunk, to help the Navy transport supplies and equipment to the South Sea Islands; others had been assigned by the Japanese Military authorities on the islands to emergency military duty as specialists to build airfields, gun emplacements or other defenses on the atolls of the area. Nearly one-third of this group was captured during the KWAJALEIN occupation in February 1944; another third was taken in SAIPAN in June - July 1944; and the others were captured in other parts of the Pacific sometime between 3 February and 22 July 1944.

KWAJALEIN DEFENDERS DESCRIBE THE ALLIED INVASION.

"The Battle of KWAJALEIN was really an attempt to hold off the enemy as long as possible as everyone knew from the start that it was going to be a losing fight."

"While we were patrolling the beaches at sundown, American landing barges appeared off the South Fort. The cry went up, 'The enemy is going to land!' Everyone was excited, and all turned pale. Men and arms were concentrated at the anticipated landing points; but then suddenly the American naval guns roared on the opposite side of the island and we discovered later that the barges which we had seen, and were preparing to meet, were only dummies sent to draw our attention away from the actual landing point."

"Each man was given 2 hand grenades and ordered to approach the landing point and throw these. It was a very dangerous mission and every man nervously fingered the firing pin."

"When we came near the water's edge, none of the Americans had landed; but the naval guns opened up and we scattered like frightened spiders and suffered many casualties. The gun fire was terrific. While I was in the air raid shelter the Medical Supply Depot was blown up. During the night the task force shifted its position."

"The American battleships were in the strait between two islands. We saw them move in but could not tell whether they were ours or the enemy's. We signalled with green and red lights to the ships, but received no reply. During the night we hear that fire had started in the torpedo assembly shop. As we patrolled the landing point, we showed a green light as a signal that the enemy was going to land; but the ships did not fire until the next day. Then I ran into a dugout."

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NIPPONESE CONVERSATIONS (CONTD)

"The South Fort was bombarded by naval guns. It was hell! We heard the blasts as one after another of the ammunition dumps blow up. The North Fort, however, held out to the end."

"What weapons the Americans had at KWAJALEIN! If the people of JAPAN could see these they would surely be discouraged in the outcome of the war. The Japanese Government should feel ashamed of the fact that it has provided such inadequate arms."

POSSIBILITY OF ALLIED LANDINGS IN JAPAN PROPER EXPLORED.

"If the same tactics are used on JAPAN proper as were used on SAIPAN, I am sure you Americans will land quickly; but it must be remembered that many Japanese are convinced that JAPAN is the land of the gods and that any enemy that attacks these home islands will suffer defeat, just as Genghis Khan did when only three of his 100,000 survived when he tried to invade Japan."

"Landings would be very difficult, if not impossible, because all important points along the shoreline are heavily fortified with large coastal guns and all are well guarded. The Americans might be able to bomb the cities but they would have to wipe out vital positions by landing infantry and mechanized units in order to win a decisive victory."

"If the Allies take the PHILIPPINES and the outlying islands and start bombing JAPAN, it is doubtful whether the people can hold out. If it comes to that, JAPAN'S last stand would be taken in MANCHURIA. If they land in JAPAN proper that would be the end."

"In discussing this subject, consideration must be given to the fact that AMERICA has a long supply line and that they must take PALAU before they can take the PHILIPPINES, and so even though SAIPAN and TRUK fall, the PHILIPPINES will be safe in our hands."

ATTITUDE TOWARD AMERICA AND AMERICANS.

"If it had not been for AMERICA, RUSSIA would have taken JAPAN during the RUSSO-JAPANESE war. JAPAN is therefore indebted to AMERICA for this and for the trade which she gave JAPAN in later years. Almost half of JAPAN'S population got its livelihood out of that trade. Come to think about it, JAPAN has been a miserable country since she became a world power - she's been fighting someone almost continuously."

"I bet there are more 'higher ups' in AMERICA than in JAPAN, who wish this war was over. If JAPAN settles down to a realization that this will be a long war, AMERICA will then be the first to ask for peace. From what I have observed, American soldiers on the whole have no stomach for this war. They are more concerned about their wages and their future status than about winning the war."

CHIANG-KAI-SHEK

"CHIANG-KAI-SHEK is a great and an intelligent leader. He made two great mistakes, however, - e.g. first he tried to rule CHINA without Japanese support; and second he failed to destroy the Communist Party in CHINA".

NIPPONESE CONVERSATIONS (CONTD)

SOCIO-POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN JAPAN.

"The fall of the TOJO Cabinet right in the midst of the war is something I cannot understand. I doubt if that means that JAPAN is on the verge of collapse yet".

"It was disgusting at home to have to wait in line in order to buy essential foodstuffs. Vegetables were so scarce that even the vendors' families do not have enough to eat. The ration system is very tedious and is not working the way it was planned to work, - the customers who come first get more than those who come later. An inflationary period is definitely underway."

"In order to make up for the shortage of rice at home, JAPAN is now importing a tremendous amount of this".

"Prostitutes now prefer commodities to money".

"There are fellows running around with rice and candy playing with the wives of men overseas and with those of men who are away working all day".

NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES.

"I doubt at times whether JAPAN has enough natural resources, such as iron and oil in order to carry forward the war".

"There is a plentiful supply of necessary resources to the south to meet all needs; and by transporting these materials close in to the CHINA coast their safe arrival at processing centers is assured. Furthermore, over-land transportation routes are already under construction on the mainland and over these Japanese industry will continually receive these resources".

"The leaders of JAPAN have repeatedly said that we have enough resources to continue the war for years and win ultimatelyI wonder!"

"At the HONGKONG docks they are now building many large ships and torpedo boats. The Asosan Maru, a ship of from 8/12,000 tons was constructed at HONGKONG".

"Men of 30-40 years of age have all been taken into industry but since they are untrained it will take a long time to make them efficient producers. If this war is to be effectively waged, these things should have been taken care of a long time ago".

"While I was at a shipyard in KOBE, I noticed that the workmen were without ambition and many loafed. Victory cannot be ours when these so-called essential workers do not take the war seriously".

"JAPAN does not have the machinery to make machinery".

"I believe we are losing the war on the production line. It certainly takes a long time to increase the production of planes, for example".

"JAPAN surely has grown weak".

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NIPPONESE CONVERSATIONS (CONTD)

THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVY.

"Where is the great undefeated Japanese Fleet, the Navy boasted of"?

"I wonder where JAPAN'S combined fleet is. I heard that a great sea battle took place in the vicinity of TAIWAN (FORMOSA) just before the battle of SAIPAN and the Commander-in-Chief was killed. "Who won"? "We must have lost this battle, otherwise you could not have landed as you did".

"If the Japanese Navy would always take the offensive, we could believe in the possibility of an invasion of the U.S. Alas! the Navy hasn't yet come out".

"One should not even try to compare Japanese transports with those of AMERICA. Our transports are small wooden ships, slow in speed and armed only with LMGs, whereas yours are steel and armed with cannon and with more than a dozen AA guns. I was in a shipyard in KOBE where twelve 800-ton ships had just been built for the Navy. Only three of these were of the type that could be taken out on the open sea; and, if I'm not mistaken, eight were standing idle in port, - and this in the face of shipping shortages".

MORALE CONDITIONS AMONG TROOPS

Officers evacuated. "The fact that at ENGEBI, GUAM and on NEW GUINEA officers were evacuated by airplane did not help the morale".

Rations. "Canned goods were distributed to everybody at PALEMBANG. At first we didn't know what the contents were because a blackout had to be maintained; but when we felt them we knew they were rice cakes. There were ten in each can. By immersing those in boiling water from 5 to 10 minutes they taste like fresh cakes and are very delicious. The Air Corps has rations which are more tasty. These are bottled and among the ten unit contents are chocolate flavored caramels. The submarine crews get even better rations".

"Year before last we had plenty of good things to eat, including fresh fish - mostly tuna. For sometime we ate nothing but raw tuna. Schools of this tuna were caught off the TRUK Islands".

"Last year we had red snapper, which cost about ¥ 15 each in JAPAN".

"We got sweets on rare occasions in the battle area. They really made us happy".

"The rations we received overseas were not much different from those we received in JAPAN. This goes to show that the Japanese Government considers its armed forces first in everything".

Entertainment. "We were entertained by a group of actresses. There were two shows daily. The stage was improvised in one of the hangars and was decorated with shrubs and palms and equipped with amplifiers. The manager gave a 'pep' talk before the show

NIPPONESE CONVERSATIONS (CONTD)

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telling how the ship on which they sailed from JAPAN was sunk, how two of the troupe were killed, and how all their equipment was lost; but, how with borrowed make-shift equipment they were carrying on".

POSSIBILITY OF PsW RETURNING TO JAPAN.

"If the Emperor orders us to return to JAPAN, saying that it is not a disgrace to be a PW, and that our families are waiting to welcome us, then we can go back. But if an arrangement is made between governments then I shall protest when they try to send me back, because my neighbors who have lost sons and brothers, will look upon us PsW as traitors and cowards, and generally make our lives miserable".

"Even if JAPAN wins, the attitude towards PsW will not be any different than it now is. We will probably be killed if we are returned. If JAPAN loses, PsW will then have a chance, for the people at home will also then have become PsW."

"After the declaration of peace, if the U.S. doesn't kill us, and if the Japanese permit our return to JAPAN, there is the possibility of our regaining a footing again by migrating to MAN-CHURIA or to some South Sea island."

REFLECTIONS ON BEING A PW.

"When I came to the PsW collection center there were about 500 Japanese there. I was surprised to see so many healthy looking Japanese soldiers among them".

"I am worried about my family. If I am reported dead, the government will support my family, and the neighbors will look after them. If, however, they learn that I am a PW, my family will be held in contempt. Wouldn't it have been better that I had died than that I have been made a prisoner?"

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Revised Code Names for Jap Aircraft

(From Technical Air Intelligence Center Summary No 2
"Revision of Allied Code names for Japanese Aircraft")

Documentary confirmation of the Japanese Army-Navy method for designating aircraft according to a "Model/Type" system makes a revision advisable in Allied nomenclature for Japanese aircraft. At the same time, by using the proposed new system, advantage can be taken of the evidence also available on the introduction of new types, and code most of these new aircraft in advance, obviating the confusion which has hitherto existed when code-naming awaited actual crash investigation.

The use of "Mark Numbers" following code names has been dropped and code names based on the actual "Model/Type" designations employed by the Japanese will be used. As well as being accurate, this method will allow the development of a basic model to be followed. In addition, it will enable performance or recognition changes to be more clearly indicated and permit the dissemination of information on new aircraft at an earlier date than has previously been possible.

One incomplete answer as yet is the "Model/Type" designation for the blunt-wing version of OSCAR Model 2, and whether or not any model change is made for the fitting of additional fuel tanks. However, the proper OSCAR nomenclature will be clarified as soon as determined. Of the new aircraft assigned code names, it is believed that JACK 11, GEORGE 11, REX 11, NORM 11, FRANCES 11, and TABBY 22 and 32 are in production. SAM 11 and FRANK 1 are possibly in production. The remainder are in advanced stages of experimental development, or possibly, in limited production.

It will be appreciated that the Japanese Air Forces are undergoing a complete metamorphosis that, on the surface at any rate, seems to constitute a potential threat.

For the purpose of consistency, the future code names will be selected by Technical Air Intelligence Center on the following broad basis:

Male Names

1. Army and Navy fighters, both single and twin-engine, will be given male names.
2. Navy reconnaissance float planes will be given male names.

Female Names

1. Army and Navy reconnaissance planes, land or carrier-based, both single and twin engine, will be given female names.
2. Navy torpedo bombers will be given female names.
3. Navy dive bombers will be given female names.
4. Army and Navy twin-engine and four engine light, medium or heavy bombers will be given female names.
5. Navy flying boats will be given female names.
6. Army and Navy transports will be given female names starting with the letter "T".

Code names for future planes will be established on the basis of the primary function of the plane in cases where dual purposes may exist. At the present time, there are several inconsistencies on the code list, particularly in the case of JUDY and IRVING. The multi-use to which these two planes are put causes them to be listed twice.

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Current Allied Code Name	Former Code Name	Recognition Type	Japanese Description	Model Type Symbols	Comments
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NAVY FIGHTERS (CONTD)

IRVING 11		2E-F	"Gekko" night fighter, Model 11 (13 Experimental 2-engine land fighter)	J1N1-S	See also "Navy reconnaissance". In use as night fighter, possibly with new engines. Originally listed with Sakae 21 & 22 (22 reduction gear affects opposite prop. rotation).
JACK * 11		1E-F	"Raiden" fighter (14 Experimental interceptor fighter, modified)	J2M2	J2M1 was the experimental version, and J2M2 is now in production, with 4-blade prop and heavier armament.
GEORGE * 11		1E-F	"Shiden" fighter (15 Experimental interceptor fighter)	N1J2-J	In production. N1K1-J was the experimental version. N1J2-J has modified fuselage and additional armament.
REX * 11		1E-FFP	"Kyofu" fighter seaplane, Model 11 (15 Experimental fighter seaplane)	N1K1	In production. Possible replacement for RUFE.
LUKE * 11		F	17 Experimental interceptor fighter.	J4M1	Reported to have 35-40mm. fuselage guns.

NAVY RECONNAISSANCE

BABS 11	Babs	1E-R	Type 98 land reconnaissance plane, Model 11	C5M1	Obsolete. BABS was used by both JAAF & JNAF. One of 2 planes known to be used by both services, the Army's DINAH, being the other.
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* Denotes newly coded aircraft

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REF ID: A66000
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Current Allied Code Name	Former Code Name	Recognition Type	Japanese		Comments
			Description	Model Type Symbols	

NAVY RECONNAISSANCE (CONTD)

BABS 12	Babs	1E-R	Type 98 land recce plane, Model 12	C5M2	Obsolete.
JUDY 11	Judy	1E-R	Type 2 Carrier- borne recce plane Model 11 (13 Exper- imental carrier bomber)	D4Y1- C	See also "Navy Dive Bombers". Experimental version had DB 600 G AE2A engine.
JUDY 12	Judy	1E-R	Type 2 Carrier- borne recce plane Model 12	D4Y2- R	Coverted to use 2-K8 cameras.
JUDY 22	Judy	1E-R	Type 2 Carrier- borne recce land Model 22		No information.
SLIM 11	Slim	1E- RFP	Type 96 small recce sea- plane, Model 11	E9W1 or E9N1	Obsolete. Used as submarine-borne recce.
JAKE 11	Jake	1E- RFP	Type 0 recce sea- plane Model 11 (12 Exper- imental 3- seater recce seaplane)	E13A1	
GLEN 11	Glen	1E- RFP	Type 0 small seaplane Model 11	E14Y1	Used as submarine borne recce.

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Current		Japanese			Comments
Allied	Former	Recogni-	Descrip-	Model	
Code	Code	tion	tion	Type	
Name	Name	Type		Symbols	

NAVY RECONNAISSANCE (CONTD)

NORM *		1E-	"Shiun"	EL5K1	Scheduled for production at end of 1943.
11		RFP	high-speed recco sea-plane, Model 11 (14 Experimental high-speed recco sea-plane)		
PAUL *		1E-	"Zuiun"	EL6A1	Kinsei 54 has MG synchronizer. Can be used as dive bomber. In production.
11		2S-RFP	2-seater recco sea-plane, Model 11 (14 Experimental recco sea-plane 2-seater)		
PETE	Peto	1E-	Type 0	FLM2	FLM1 & FLA1 were the experimental versions.
11		OFF	Observation plane, Model 11		
IRVING		2E-R	Type 2	J1N1	See also "Navy Fighters".
11			land-recco plane, Model 11 (13 Experimental land fighter)		

NAVY TORPEDO PLANES

KATE	Kate	1E-TB	Type 97	B5N1	Obsolete.
11	Mk 1		Carrier-borne attack plane, Model 11		
KATE	Kate	1E-TB	Type 97	B5M1	Obsolete. Also listed as "B5N1 modified".
61	Mk 2		Carrier-borne attack plane, Model 61		

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Current		Japanese		Model	Comments
Allied	Former	Recogni-	Descrip-		
Code	Code	tion	tion	Type	
Name	Name	Type		Symbols	

NAVY TORPEDO PLANES (CONTD)

KATE 12	Kate Mk 3	1E-TB	Type 97 Carrier- borne attack plane, Model 12	B5N2	Obsolescent. Being replaced by JILL.
JILL 11	Jill	1E-TB	"Tenzan" Carrier- borne attack plane, Model 11 (14 Exper- imental carrier- borne attack plane)	B6N1	First version of JILL. Still being produced but less than B6N2.
JILL 12	Jill	1E-TB	"Tenzan" Carrier- borne attack plane, Model 12	B6N2	Principal torpedo plane now in pro- duction.
GRACE 11	*	1E-TB	"Ryusei" 16 Exper- imental carrier- borne attack plane	B7A1	Possible replace- ment of Aichi's KATE.

NAVY DIVE BOMBERS

VAL 11	Val Mk 1	1E-TB	Type 99 Carrier- borne bomber, Model 11	D3A1	Obsolete.
VAL 22	Val Mk 2	1E-DB	Type 99 Carrier- borne bomber Model 22	D3A2	Still operational Being converted to trainer.

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Current Allied Code	Former Code Name	Recognition Type	Japanese		Comments
			Description	Model Type Symbols	
Name					
<u>NAVY FIGHTERS</u>					
CLAUDE 14	Claude	1E-F	Type 96 Carrier-borne fighter, Model 14	A5M4	Obsolete, but reported in operations recently. May have Kotobuki 42 engine.
ZEKE 11	Zeke Mk 1	1E-F	Type 0 Carrier-borne fighter, Model 11	A6M1	Obsolete. Fixed wing tips.
ZEKE 21	Zeke Mk 1	1E-F	Type 0 Carrier-borne fighter, Model 21	A6M2	Still fully operational. Folding wing tips. 142 U.S. gals. fuel.
ZEKE 22	Zeke Mk 2	1E-F	Type 0 Carrier-borne fighter, Model 22	A6M3 Modified	Still fully operational. Folding wing tips. 156 U.S. gals. fuel.
ZEKE 32 (Hamp)	Hamp	1E-F	Type 0 Carrier-borne fighter, Model 32	A6M3	Out of production. Blunt wing tips. 137 U.S. gals. fuel.
ZEKE 52		1E-F	Type 0 Carrier-borne fighter, Model 52	A6M5	Blunt, rounded wing tips. 156 U.S. gals. fuel. Same span as ZEKE 32.
RUFE 11	Rufe	1E-FFP	Type 2 fighter seaplane Model 11	A6M2 N	Obsolescent.
RUFE 12	Rufe	1E-FFP	Type 2 fighter seaplane Model 12	A6M3-S1	Identification not confirmed.
SAM* 11		1E-F	17 Experimental carrier-based fighter	A7M1	Scheduled for production April 44. Reported to have 25-30 mm. wing guns.

* Denotes newly coded aircraft

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Current			Japanese		Comments
Allied	Former	Recogn-	Descrip-	Model	
Code	Code	nition	tion	Type	
Name	Name	Type		Symbols	

NAVY DIVE BOMB RS (CONTD)

JUDY 11	Judy	1E-DB	Type 2 Carrier- borne bomber, also "Suisai" carrier- borne bomber, Model 11 (13 Experi- mental carrier- borne bomber)	D4Y1	See also "Navy Reconnaissance" It is still not known whoter this is, or was, intended to re- place VAL.
JUDY 12		1E-DB	"Suisai" Carrier- borne bomber, Model 12	D4Y2	
JUDY 13		1E-DB	"Suisai" Carrier- borne bomber, Model 13		
JUDY 21		1E-DB	"Suisai" Carrier- borne bomber, Model 21		Described as "Suisai Model 11, converted for catapult use."

NAVY BOMBERS

NELL 11	Nell Mk 1	2E-B	Type 96 land attack plane, Model 11	G3M1	Obsolete, See also "Navy Transports"
NELL 12	Nell Mk 1	2E-B	Type 96 land attack plane Model 21	G3M2A	Obsolete.
NELL 22	Nell Mk 2	2E-B	Type 96 land attack plane, Model 22	G3M2B	Obsolete.

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Current Allied Code Name	Former Code Name	Recogn- ition Type	Japanese		Comments
			Descrip- tion	Model Type Symbols	

NAVY BOMBERS (CONTD)

NELL 23	Nell Mk 3	2E-B	Type 96 land attack plane, Model 23	G3M3	Obsolescent. NELL is now used mainly for train- ing and trasport. Also listed as "G3M2 modified."
BETTY 11	Betty Mk 1	2E-B	Type 1 land attack plane, Model 11	G4M1	See also "Navy Transports". When used as a transport, model/type symbol is not given.
BETTY 22	Betty Mk 2	2E-B	Type 1 land attack plane, Model 22	G4M2	Formerly called "Model 12". In production. Overload weight 33,000 lbs.
BETTY 24		2E-B	Type 1 land attack plane, Model 24		
BETTY 25		2E-B	Type 1 land attack plane, Model 25		Formerly called "Model 14."
BETTY 34		2E-B	Type 1 land attack plane, Model 34	G4M3	Formerly called "Model 22". In production. Reported "com- pletely bullet proofed".
LIZ 11	Liz	4E-B	Type 2 land attack plane, Model 11 (13 Exper- imental land attack plane	G5M1	Believed un- successful. Redesigned by Nakajima as "G5N1".

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Current		Japanese		Model Type Symbols	Comments
Allied	Former	Recogni-	Descrip-		
Code	Code	tion	tion		
Name	Name	Type			

NAVY BOMBERS (CONTD)

LIZ 11	Liz	4E-B	Type 2 land attack plane, Model 11	G5N1	In production. Used as trans- port.
FRANCES * 11		2E-B	"Ginka" bomber (15 Exper imental land based bomber Y-20)	P1Y1	In production.
FRANCES * 11		2E-	"Kyokko" Experi- mental	P1Y1-S	"Ginka" con- verted for night flying

NAVY TRANSPORTS

TESS 11 (Trans)	Tess	2E- Trans	Type 0 transport plane, Model 11 (D-2 trans- port plane)	L2D2	Evolved from Douglas "D-C 2".
TESS 11 (Cargo)	Tess	2E- Trans	Type 0 cargo plane, Model 11 (D-2 cargo plane)	L2D2-L1	Not same as TESS transport or passenger transport.
TESS 11 (Pass)	Tess	2E- Trans	Type 0 passenger transport		
TABBY* 22 (Trans)	Tess	2E- Trans	Type 0 transport plane, Model 22		Evolved from Douglas "D-C 3".
TABBY* 22 (Cargo)	Tess	2E- Trans	Type 0 cargo plane, Model 22	L2D3	
TABBY* 32 (Pass)	Tess	2E- Trans	Type 0 passenger transport, Model 32		

* Denotes newly coded aircraft.

Current		Japanese			Comments
Allied	Former	Recogn-	Descrip-	Model	
Code	Code	ition	tion	Type	
Name	Name	Type		Symbols	

NAVY TRANSPORTS (CONTD)

NELL 11 (Trans)	Nell Trans- port	2E- Trans	Type 96 land transport, Model 11	L3Y1	Obsolete. See also "Navy Bombers". Also listed as "G3M1D".
NELL 21 (Trans)	Nell Trans- port	2E- Trans	Type 96 land transport, Model 21	L3Y2	Obsolete. Also listed as "G3M2-D special transport"
NELL 22 (Trans)	Nell Trans- port	2E- Trans	Type 96 land transport, Model 22		Obsolescent.
NELL 23 (Trans)	Nell Trans- port	2E- Trans	Type 96 land transport, Model 23		Obsolescent.
BETTY 11 (Trans)		2E- Trans	Type 1 land attack plane		Bomber modified to serve as transport.

NAVY FLYING BOATS

MAVIS 11	Mavis	4E-EB	Type 97 flying boat, Model 11	H6K2	Obsolete.
MAVIS 11	Mavis	4E-FB	Type 97 flying boat, Model 11	H6K3	"H6K3 is the commercial model".
MAVIS 11 (Trans)	Mavis Trans- port	4E-FB Trans	Type 97 Transport flying boat, Model 11	H6K3	Type 97 flying boat, model 11 modified.
MAVIS 22	Mavis	4E-FB	Type 97 flying boat, Model 22	H6K4	
MAVIS 23	Mavis	4E-FB	Type 97 flying boat, Model 23	H6K5	

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Current			Japanese		
Allied Code	Former Code	Recognition Type	Description	Model Type	Comments
Name	Name	Type		Symbols	

NAVY FLYING BOATS (CONTD)

EMILY 11	Emily	4E-FB	Type 2 flying boat, Model 11	H8K1	7.7 MG in front and sides.
EMILY 12	Emily	4E-FB	Type 2 flying boat, Model 12	H8K2	Fuel tank armor increased weight by 900 kg; 20 mm cannon replace 7.7 MG.
EMILY 22	Emily	4E-FB	Type 2 flying boat, Model 22	H8K3	Model 12 "made bullet proof".
EMILY 32 (Trans)	Emily Trans-port	4E-FB	"Seiku" transport flying boat, Model 32	H8K1-L	In production 1943.
CHERRY 11	Cherry	2E-FB	Type 99 flying boat, Model 11		

ARMY FIGHTERS

NATE 1	Nato	1E-F	Type 97 fighter	Ki 27	Obsolete. Used as trainer.
OSCAR 1	Oscar Mk. 1	1E-F	Type 1 fighter Model 1	Ki 43	Obsolete
OSCAR 2	Oscar Mk. 2	1E-F	Type 1 fighter Model 2	Ki 432	
OSCAR 2 (Blunt wing version)		1E-F	Type 1 fighter Model 2?		Also reported from India with increased tankage.
TOJO 1	Tojo	1E-F	Type 2 fighter Model 1	Ki 44	

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Current Allied Code Name	Former Code Name	Recognition Type	Japanese Description		Model Type Symbols	Comments
<u>ARMY FIGHTERS (CONTD)</u>						
TOJO 2	Tojo	1E-F	Type 2 fighter Model 2	Ki 442		Apparently in use only in China, Burma theaters.
NICK 1	Nick	2E-F	Type 2 heavy fighter	Ki 45		
TONY 1	Tony	1E-F	Type 3 fighter Model 1	Ki 61		Engine appears to be based on DB 601 A
ROB * 1		1E-F	High-speed fighter	Ki 64		May replace "Tony". Engine may be based on later model Daimler Benz.
STEVE * 1		1E-F	Type 3 super-high-speed fighter	Ki 73		
PAT * 1		1E-F	Super-range high-speed fighter	Ki 74		
FRANK * 1		1E-F	Single-seater fighter	Ki 84		Possibly replacing "Oscar", may be in production, 4 blade prop reported.

ARMY RECONNAISSANCE AND LIGHT BOMBERS

MARY 1	Mary	1E-R	Type 98 light bomber	Ki 32	Obsolete
IDA 1	Ida	1E-R	Type 98 direct-cooperation plane	Ki 36	Obsolescent. Used as trainer.
SONIA 1	Sonia	1E-R	Type 99 'A' recon plane	Ki 51	Obsolescent.
SONIA 1	Sonia	1E-R	Type 99 'B' assault plane	Ki 51	Has been used for ground attack and mistaken for "Val".

* Denotes newly coded aircraft.

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Current Allied Code Name	Former Code Name	Recog- nition Type	Japanese		Comments
			Descrip- tion	Model Type Symbols	

ARMY RECONNAISSANCE AND LIGHT BOMBERS (CONTD)

DINAH 1	Dinah	2E-R	Type 100 HQ recce plane Model 1	Ki 46	Obsolete
DINAH 2	Dinah Mk. 2	2E-R	Type 100 HQ recce plane Model 2	Ki 462	Principal Recce plane. Used by both JAAF and JNAF.
DINAH 3	Dinah Mk. 3	2E-R	Type 100 HQ recce plane Model 3	Ki 463	In production.
CLARA* 1		2E-R	HQ recce plane	Ki 70	Possibly replac- ing "Dinah".
EDNA* 1		2E-R	HQ recce plane	Ki 71	

ARMY BOMBERS

SALLY 1	Sally Mk. 1	2E-B	Type 97 heavy bomber Model 1	Ki 21	Obsolete.
SALLY 2	Sally Mk. 2	2E-B	Type 97 heavy bomber Model 2	Ki 57?	Obsolescent.
SALLY 3	Sally Mk. 3	2E-B	Type 97 heavy bomber Model 3	Ki 57?	
LILY 1	Lily Mk. 1	2E-B	Type 99 Light Bomber	Ki 48	Obsolescent.
LILY 2	Lily Mk. 2	2E-B	Type 99 light bomber	Ki 482	Undergoing im- provement and development.
HELEN 1	Helen	2E-B	Type 100 heavy bomber Model 1	Ki 49	Obsolescent.

* Denotes newly coded aircraft.

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Current Allied Code Name	Former Code Name	Recogni- tion Type	Japanese		Comments
			Descrip- tion	Model Type Symbols	

ARMY BOMBERS (CONTD)

HELEN 2	Helen	2E-B	Type 100 heavy bomber Model 2	Ki 492	
HELEN 3	Helen	2E-B	Type 100 heavy bomber Model 3	Ki 493	Possibility - production status not known.
THORA 1	Thora	2E- Trans	Type 97 Trans- port plane	Ki 34	Evolved from the Nakajima "MT" Commercial.
THORA 2	Thora	2E- Trans	Type 97 Trans- port plane		
THELMA 1	Thelma	2E- Trans	Type 0 Trans- port plane	Ki 56	Evolved from the "Lockheed 14".
THELMA 1 (Cargo)	Thelma	2E- Trans	Type 0 Cargo transport plane	Ki 56	
TOPSY 1	Topsy	2E- Trans	Type 100 trans- port plane Model 1	Ki 57	Evolved from the Mitsubishi "MC 20" Commercial.
TOPSY 3	Topsy	2E- Trans	Type 1 trans- port plane Model 3		
THERESA 1	Theresa	2E- Trans	Type 1 trans- port plane	Ki 59	Evolved from the N.K.K. "T.K.3" Commercial.

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