


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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

N-4398.1

JUN 21 1965



Classification changed to

RESTRICTED

by authority of AC of S. G. 2

by

A. J. KELLEHER

Maj., Inf.

Custodian

17 NOV 1947

DDO #10-319 FER - Aug 47

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648 ENGR TOP EN USAFPOA NO 1311-10
140-43951
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JUN 21 1965

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES
PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS
APO 958

JUN 21 1965

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

No. 5 - 1 Dec 1944

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Kendall J. Fielder

KENDALL J. FIELDER
Colonel, GSC
AC of S, G-2

COVER PAGE - Damage to U.S. light tank
from Japanese aerial bomb, planted to
act as an anti-tank mine.

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JAPANESE CIVILIAN DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL ATTACK
(From AC of S, G-2, HQ AGF, SAIPAN)

Actual sources of the following information are as follows: a former policeman of SAIPAN, a former Air Raid Warden of SAIPAN, a former First Aid member of SAIPAN, a former resident of TOKYO (moved to SAIPAN 1944), another former resident of TOKYO (moved to SAIPAN 43).

CIVILIAN MASKS - Two models are described: the SAIPAN, and the TOKYO mask. The former is called the "Fujikura, Type #2". It has a face piece of thin, very flexible material somewhat like the material used for US raincoats. Its cannister is a flat round can, with no tube between cannister and face piece. Civil officials, Wardens and First Aid men used a mask similar to the foregoing, except that it is made more durable. The TOKYO mask is apparently a later model. The face piece is made of rubber and the cannister of plastic. This mask is being distributed in TOKYO. Both types have an effective life of from four to five hours.

On SAIPAN, gas masks were purchased through Civil Government. The set price was six yen, but through reimbursements from local civic organizations, people were able to purchase them for about four yen. The purchase of a gas mask is not compulsory. Distribution averages about three per family on SAIPAN, and considerably less than that in TOKYO.

Gas masks, when purchased, are new. Reasonable care is taken of them. Gas masks are not carried around unless there is an air raid alert. No special gas masks are provided for infants. Gas masks for children are identical with those for adults except that they are smaller.

SHELTERS - The public is not provided with gas-proof shelters. Shelters in TOKYO and SAIPAN are built solely for protection from shrapnel. People are not encouraged to gas-proof their homes.

ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING - Each community and section of every city has its own air raid defense unit. These units are made up of blackout watchmen, fire extinguishers, first aiders, gas decontamination squads and civilian installations repair crews. They are generally composed of women, children and the Japanese equivalents of our 4-F draft classification.

There appears to be no set gas alarm system in JAPAN.

A publication, dated 3 Sept 1941, Bureau of Information, TOKYO, suggests the adoption of the following method:

Non-persistent gases

Drum or wooden clappers - beat in rapid succession.
When possible - notify orally.

Persistent gases

Drum or wooden clappers - series of three beats
When possible - notify orally.

All-Clear Signal

By word of mouth.

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JAPANESE CIVILIAN DEFENSE AGAINST CHEMICAL ATTACK (CONTD)

Method used on SAIPAN

Non-persistent gases

White flag plus word-of-mouth
Notification by messengers.

Persistent gases

Black flag, plus word-of-mouth
Notification by messengers

All-Clear Signal

By word-of-mouth.

At Night

By word-of-mouth only.

To indicate the direction of wind to civilians, poles with long strips of cloth were set up in every community. Civilians, with the aid of refugee directing squads, were instructed to flee upwind.

There were no specialized provisions of organization and training, except for the fact that there were decontamination squads.

Civilian hospital personnel and doctors make up the backbone of the first aid group. Gas victims are taken care of by them.

Lime mixtures are distributed to civilian defense organizations.

Gas defense training is given by demonstration groups and moving pictures.

The section leaders attend schools where methods of air raid warning, air raid defense, emergency treatments, gas detection, gas decontamination, etc., are taught. These section leaders in turn instruct the members of their section.

The Japanese as a whole seem to know that there is an international law prohibiting the use of gas. The government appears to be very strict on air defense but is not putting much emphasis on gas defense.

JAP AIR RAID COASTAL WARNING NET

(From OSS Bulletin, 24 October 1944)

NOTE: All information in this report is from a Japanese worker in the underground, who left TOKYO in April 1943, and it must be evaluated accordingly.

"The outer ring of the coastal air raid warning net is a string of small boats off the PACIFIC coast of JAPAN. Informant did not know how far out to sea these vessels were, but guessed that they were less than 200 kilometers (124.2 miles).

JAP AIR RAID COASTAL WARNING NET (CONTD)

"This outer ring consisted of a string of four small motor-powered boats (five to six man crew), then a larger boat (15 to 16 man crew), then four to five small boats, etc. Boats were about one mile apart. Large boats had radios, small boats did not, in the spring of 1943. Informant heard, however, that the small boats were scheduled to receive radios.

"On sighting a plane, small boats would signal (visually) to the nearest large boat, which would radio the report to the nearest land Air-Defense Shireibu, which would relay warning to the area seeming to be the objective of the raiding planes. Informant said that originally in air raid drills, the whole country was warned. This caused such a slow-down in work that the system was changed to warning only the areas likely to be affected.

"Informant understood that the string of coastal boats continued from NEMURO, Hokkaido, in the north, to the southern tip of the RYUKYU (LOO CHOO) Islands. He understood, but did not know for certain that there was no such warning system in the JAPAN SEA.

"The second line of coastal air raid warning was a series of coastal watchers, Military watchers (Army lookout stations), which were at strategic coastal areas near important military and war industrial areas. These watchers were equipped with sound locators. Civilian coastal air raid watchers were scattered between these at irregular intervals. Informant believed that these watchers were at close intervals in strategic areas, but very sparse at other coastal points.

"The second and final warning to workers and the public consisted of ten siren blasts in rapid succession. Informant did not know at what distance from the city the planes were supposed to be when the second and final warning was given.

"Workers were supposed to continue with their work after the first warning was sounded."

DESTRUCTION OF WOODEN HOUSES IN TOKYO

(From OSS Bulletin, 24 October 1944)

The Supreme Military Authorities of JAPAN have decided upon rapid and systematic destruction of a great number of districts and groups of wooden houses in TOKYO. These very severe measures were taken during the spring and summer of this year, and actually most of these places are now cleared of all construction. This is especially true of the areas surrounding SINBOU (sic) Station and several stations, palaces, ministries and governmental institutions. Very few wooden houses are left in TOKYO, and those remaining are further out of town in the suburbs, particularly in poor districts of secondary importance. This was done to protect the big buildings and luxurious houses from fire due to bombings and air attacks on TOKYO. The decisions were carried out with the apparent approval of the public. The government is desirous of continuing the war of resistance at any cost and neglects nothing - even making great sacrifices to ensure longer resistance.

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JAPANESE ACTIVITY ON THE CHINA COAST

(G-2, USAFPOA)

The USAFPOA, G-2 Intelligence Bulletin No. 3, 10 November 1944 carried a Newsmag of the CHINA coastal area. Japanese military activity during the month of October was indicated.

Since then, activity on the CHINA coast has continued to increase. On the facing page is shown Japanese activity for the same area, based on reports received during November.

ON THE JAPANESE HOME FRONT


(From OSS Bulletin, 24 October 1944)

From an individual recently returned from JAPAN emanates the report that since early spring, living conditions have become increasingly difficult, because of the greater scarcity of essential commodities. Rationing has been made more stringent and lack of foodstuffs has caused the black market to become poorer. Accustomed to privations, however, the populace is complaining very little and bears the increased burden stoically.

New measures are being taken for the protection of industry. Factories, docks and installations are being camouflaged and steps are being taken to allow for the rapid transfer of industries from one location to another. Efforts are being concentrated on the manufacture of aircraft. Wooden buildings are being systematically razed to reduce hazards resulting from expected air raids. Foreign legations and embassies have been transferred from TOKYO to KARUIZAWA, HAKONE and other places in the vicinity of TOKYO, within a distance of 100 to 150 kilometers (62.1 to 93.1 miles).

According to the informant, the fact that MOSCOW continues its policy of neutrality; that the European War is lasting longer than expected; that friction exists between the Allies, all are encouraging morale factors for the Japanese. The resulting unexpected extension of time is very welcome. The Japanese Cabinet continues its preparations and evidence of this is strikingly apparent. Informant believes the Japanese will be able to continue the war for at least a year and a half following Germany's defeat; and that this period could be shortened only by RUSSIA's entering the war against JAPAN.

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~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED ORGANIZATION OF TANK DESTROYER UNIT

(From ATIS Bulletin No. 140, 8 Nov 1944)

The following are extracts from mimeographed file entitled "Training Reference for Close Combat with Tanks" dated 20 Aug 1942, Infantry School.

CHART OF MATERIALS TO BE SUPPLIED FOR CLOSE COMBAT WITH TANKS

Nomen- clature Various Forces	Ex- plosives	Hand Grena- ades	Smoke Cylin- ders	Flame Bottles (A)	Flame Bottles (B)	Notes
Div HQ	8	28	16	4	14	
Inf. Gp. HQ (2)	4	14	8	2	7	
Inf. Regt (4)	266	900	532	133	450	
Ron Regt.	84	168	96	24	84	
Arty Gp HQ	4	14	8	2	7	
Arty Regt	182	624	364	91	312	
MG Coy	10	34	20	5	17	
Eng Regt	36	126	72	18	63	
Sig Unit	16	56	32	8	28	
A/Gas Unit	6	20	12	3	10	
Trans Unit	50	168	100	25	84	
San Unit	34	114	68	17	57	
Fd Hosp (4)	6	20	12	3	10	
Water Pur Sec	6	20	12	3	10	
Sick Horse depot	6	20	12	3	10	
Ord Unit	6	20	12	3	10	
Total	1506	5120	3016	754	2560	

PARTICULARS:

1. Explosives are supplied two to each party, hand-grenades two to each man, smoke cylinders four to each party, flame-bottles (A) one to each party and flame-bottles (B) one to each man.

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ORGANIZATION OF TANK DESTROYER UNIT (CONTD)

2. An endeavor has been made to supply adhesive bombs but there has been a shortage for forces in the rear so they must be used in conjunction with anti-tank mines and hand grenades.

CHART OF STANDARD ORGANIZATION OF TANK DESTROYING UNIT (A)

Outline: The basic organization is the independent quick firing gun battalion and this is organized from one infantry company, one platoon and one MG platoon. Depending upon the circumstances, there are sometimes added one field artillery company, and one light armored car and engineer platoon.

DIVISIONS	ORGANIZATION	EQUIPMENT
HQ	Commanded by quick-firing gun battalion Co HQ of the same Battalion	Two charges, six hand-grenades, four smoke-cylinders, one flame-bottle (A), three flame-bottles (B)
No 1 Coy	One infantry company (minus one platoon)	8 charges, 24 hand-grenades, 16 smoke cylinders, 4 flame bottles (A) 12 flame bottles (B)
	MG platoon (four sections)	4 MG, 2 charges, 6 hand-grenades, 4 smoke cylinders, 1 flame bottle (a), 3 flame bottles (B)
No 2 Coy	One quick-firing Gun Company	6 quick-firing guns, 6 charges, 18 hand-grenades, 12 smoke-cylinders 3 flame bottles (A), 9 flame bottles (B)
	One infantry platoon	4 charges, 12 hand-grenades, 8 smoke-cylinders, 2 flame bottles (A), 6 flame-bottles (B)
No 3 Coy	Same as No 2 Coy	6 quick-firing guns, same as No 2 Coy.
Supply Squad	Wagon lines of a quick firing gun battalion.	4 charges, 12 hand-grenades, 8 smoke cylinders, 2 flame bottles (A), 6 flame bottles (B).

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ORGANIZATION OF TANK DESTROYER UNIT (CONTD)

CHART OF STANDARD ORGANIZATION OF TANK-DESTROYING UNIT (B)

Infantry Battalion HQ, infantry company and one platoon, one machine gun platoon, one quick-firing gun and automatic gun platoon and one independent quick-firing gun company form the organization.

According to circumstances, one field artillery company one light armored car platoon and an engineer platoon may be added.

DIVISIONS	ORGANIZATION	EQUIPMENT
HQ	Commanded by infantry battalion CO with infantry battalion HQ	4 charges, 12 hand-grenades, 8 smoke cylinders, 2 flame bottles (A), 6 flame bottles (B)
No 1 Coy	One infantry Company (minus one platoon)	8 charges, 24 hand-grenades, 16 smoke-cylinders, 4 flame bottles (A), 12 flame bottles (B)
	One machine-gun platoon, four sections.	4 machine-guns, 2 charges, 6 hand-grenades, 4 smoke cylinders, 1 flame bottle (A), 3 flame bottles (B).
No 2 Coy	One quick-firing gun company	6 quick-firing guns, 6 charges 18 hand-grenades, 12 smoke cylinders, 3 flame bottles (B), 6 flame bottles (B)
No. 3 Coy	Quick-firing gun platoon	3 quick-firing guns, 4 charges, 12 hand-grenades, 8 smoke cylinders, 2 flame bottles (A) 6 flame bottles (B)
	Automatic gun platoon	2 automatic guns, 2 charges, 6 hand-grenades, 4 smoke cylinders, 1 flame bottle (A) 3 flame bottles (B)
	One infantry platoon	4 charges, 12 hand-grenades 8 smoke-cylinders, 2 flame bottles (A), 6 flame bottles (B)

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JAP USE OF SAIPAN CAVES

(From Observer's Report USAFPOA, G-2)

The Japanese capacity for digging himself in and using for the purpose natural concealment and hiding places is well illustrated by his SAIPAN activity. The numerous caves afforded by the terrain there were exploited by him to the limit, not only for use as emplacements for guns, but for storage and living quarters. In most cases, it was the Jap military who used these natural quarters, though civilians who took to the hills upon our attack also holed up in these dens. An appreciation of the difficulty of storming positions of this nature is gained by the knowledge that drives are still being conducted on SAIPAN to clear them out.

From the very nature of them, they are almost impregnable, in many cases virtually inaccessible, and very difficult to detect, needing little or no camouflage other than that provided by nature.

On the facing and following page are reproduced photographs of some of these installations. Descriptions of them follow:


1. Exterior of cave used for food and ammunition storage.
2. Interior of same cave, showing piles of stored goods.
3. Another view of interior of same cave.
4. Partial cave reinforced, used by the Japs as a 70mm battalion Howitzer beach position near Cape OBIAM.
5. Cave used for living quarters near beach position on south end of SAIPAN.
6. SAIPAN cave used for storage.



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1.



2.



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


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JAPANESE MK "I" LAND MINE

G-2, USAFPOA

A Japanese anti-personnel mine which is similar in its action to the German "S" mine, or "bouncing baby", is described in a captured mimeographed file of notes on ordnance captured at SARMI and published in ATIS SWPA Bulletin No. 1555. The document giving information on this mine was issued by the OTSU (1st ARMY) Group Ordnance Department.

Although the document is dated March, 1941, there is no evidence that this mine has ever been used by the Japanese. If this device were skillfully placed it should be a very effective anti-personnel weapon.

The fact that this mine has never been encountered by our forces in operations against the Japanese, coupled with the fact that at one place in the captured document the projectile of the mine is referred to as a "captured" 15cm Mortar projectile, suggests the possibility that this document may have been published for the purpose of instructing Japanese army personnel in the handling and use of a captured Mortar projectile, possibly Chinese or Russian, and its adaptation for use as an anti-personnel mine. However, the tenor of the document, with the exception of the use of the word "captured" in the single instance mentioned above, indicates that the mine is Japanese.

The mine is referred to as the MK "I" Land Mine. It is designed to be buried close to the surface of the ground and fired by remote control or by a trip wire. When the firing device is activated, a propellant charge is fired which throws the projectile approximately 3 feet above the surface of the ground at which point the projectile bursts. This mine depends on fragmentation for its casualty effect, whereas the German "S" mine scatters shrapnel. The effective radius of burst, according to the captured document, is 70 meters.

The mine consists of a projectile, a propellant container, propellant charge and firing devices. It is equipped with a safety device.

The projectile "is a captured 15cm Mortar projectile with the fuze and fins removed". It contains approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$ pounds of explosive, according to the document, although this seems a rather small amount for so large a shell. A blasting cap and pull type friction primer are inserted into the projectile in place of the fuze.

The propellant container consists of a cylinder resembling an artillery shell case. The propellant charge consists of black powder in a cotton bag. A pull type friction primer is fitted into the propellant container to fire the propellant charge. The projectile fits into the propellant container.

A chain approximately 5 feet long is connected between a hook in the propellant container and the friction primer in the projectile in such a manner that the bursting charge primer in the projectile will be ignited by tension on the chain.

In laying this mine a hole is dug deep enough so that the mine can be completely covered by earth. The bottom of the hole is filled with pebbles and packed down, and a board is placed on top of the pebbles. The mine is placed in the hole in a vertical position and a chain which is connected to the propellant firing device is extended out of a side of the hole which has been inclined for this purpose. The mine is then partially buried and the safety is removed, after which the mine is completely covered.

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JAPANESE MK "I" LAND MINE (CONTD)

The chain extending from the firing device is connected to the trip wire and the installation is completed.

When the trip wire is pulled the propellant charge is ignited, throwing the projectile into the air to the length of the chain connecting the projectile primer to the propellant container. At this point the chain becomes taut and the projectile primer is fired, igniting the cap which in turn ignites the bursting charge.

Although this device has never been employed by the Japs, the fact that a mine of this type was at one time contemplated or actually in existence is worthy of note.

JAPANESE MOBILE COUNTER LANDING UNIT

(G-2, USAFPOA)

During a storm on the night of the eighth and ninth of November, a party of Japs estimated at about two hundred effected a landing on NGEREGONG Island in the PALAU Group. This is a small island directly south of EIL MALK. Our forces were already ashore on NGEREGONG in patrol strength, and when the Japs landed were forced to withdraw from the island under cover of an LCI. This evacuation was accomplished without loss, DENGES Passage was closed by a US destroyer and two gunboats which proceeded to shell the newly landed Japs. Air bombardment of NGEREGONG also was accomplished shortly after.

Whatever tactical or strategic effect was gained or lost by the Japs by making such a landing is aside from the point in this discussion. Presumably, their purpose was to lend a greater degree of security to their northern PALAU holdings, including the KOROR area. Their landing, however, serves to remind us again that they are trained, equipped and prepared to make counterattack landings, even as they did on NEW GEORGIA, BIAK and SAIPAN.

In this connection, it is pertinent to consider various evidences of landing or sea transport facilities known to be available to the Japs. In the NAMPO SHOTO, for example, we have the following information from PI Report No. 40, 30 Oct, Com Shore Based AF for the period 11 Aug - 27 Oct:-

"The enemy is making every effort to supply its isolated south NAMPO SHOTO bases with a miscellaneous array of inter-island vessels, singly or in convoy with small escort vessels of the converted merchant type." it is also noted in this same report that "Auxiliary transports" (heavily armed LSM's) are being used for both cargo carrying and escorting. The largest traffic is directed at IWO JIMA.

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JAPANESE MOBILE COUNTER LANDING UNIT (CONTD)

At KITA IWO JIMA, sightings were nil, until the middle of October. Thereafter, barges and small vessels appeared off the coast in increasing numbers.

A large portion of the sightings have been of wooden hulled diesel trawlers or luggers, 60-90 feet long and 50-100 tons. Coastal cargo vessels, 100-200 feet, have frequently been sighted, although the 15 Oct sighting of a freighter-transport at HANA JIMA is the first evidence of the use of larger ships in the area. A few naval craft have been photographed, but no medium or large cargo vessels.

A more recent photo report of craft at IWO JIMA states there were, on 19 Nov, one LSM at anchor off the SW coast, 20 landing craft and lighters beached in the east boat yard, 13 landing craft beached in or adjacent to the west boat yard and 6 revetments under construction near the west boat yard for repairing or unloading landing craft. Roughly interpreted, this provides sufficient shipping to move and land approximately a reinforced battalion.

Although it is not known that the Japs who made the NGEREGONG landing were trained or organized as part of the KIDO KESSEN TAI, a reconsideration of that type of unit may be pertinent, in anticipation of increased Japanese activity of this nature.

The KIDO KESSEN TAI is literally "Mobile Decisive Action Unit" but perhaps best described as "Mobile Counter-landing Unit." In a captured training manual, a realization of the impossibility of garrisoning all points is portrayed, and the use of these units is presented as their answer to this problem. The manual stresses the fact that subordinate commanders must be fully conversant with the commander's plans, as, from the very nature of the formation, targets of opportunity must be dealt with immediately, to cause the greatest disorganization in the initial stages of the operation. A few extracts from the captured manual follow, as originally presented in ATIS Current Translation No. 131.

"Combat Manual for Sea-Borne Counter-Landing Unit- A part of the enemy forces (US) (usually with one regiment as the nucleus) lands on weakly held or undefended areas, and after the landing has been completed, their strength is successively increased and their foothold expanded on all sides, thus establishing a base for future offensive actions.

"Against such enemy tactics, it is extremely important to attack and destroy the enemy during the early phase of his landing, while his foothold is not securely held. However, owing to the terrain, conditions of the communication network, or troop dispositions, etc, a swift counterattack on land is often impossible.

"It is for this reason that the Sea-Borne Counter-landing Unit (KIDO KESSEN TAI), to be abbreviated to KESSEN TAI hereafter, has been formed for the purpose of counter-landing suddenly and in force in the rear of the enemy and destroying them during the initial phase of operation.

"Considering the psychology and character of the enemy, (sic!) it is not very difficult to imagine his fears and doubts when he dis-

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JAPANESE MOBILE COUNTER LANDING UNIT (CONTD)

covers that he has rushed headlong into our midst. With a firm esprit de corps and the will to win, we can strike powerful blows against the enemy and destroy him. If such tactics are successful, the enemy will lose courage and will be forced to cancel or alter his plans, resulting eventually in complete victory for our forces in the Southeast area.

"General Rules - The Sea-Borne Counter-landing Unit dares to land right at the landing point of the enemy to launch a surprise attack on the enemy landing party and take the enemy strongpoint. Therefore, the unit must build up a strong unity pivoted on the commander. It must be permeated by the highest loyalty and sincerity, and its morale raised to the highest pitch of fighting spirit, endurance and indomitable resolution. Uniform training, under simulated conditions of the utmost difficulty and under the severest military discipline, will develop the offensive spirit. A firm belief in victory will lead to perfection in duty.

"The Sea-Borne Counter-landing Unit must act immediately to carry out counter-landing operations whenever the enemy attempts to establish a beachhead, even before gaining a complete picture of the situation.

"The Sea-Borne Counter-landing Unit will proceed at once in naval craft or fast boats and under air and sea protection to the coast where the enemy has landed. The unit will make a landing with the purpose of making a surprise attack immediately after the enemy has landed, not later than the night of the enemy's landing or the night after. Co-operation with air and naval units operating in the area is vital.

"Preparations for Landing Operations - In order to make the attack decisive, the full strength of the unit must be employed in the front line. A part of the engineer and signal units will be attached to each company so that they can carry on independently. Each company must be equipped with the necessary explosives and incendiaries. The problems of maneuvering landing craft at night and the coastal terrain will influence choice of the landing point, but no rigid rules can be laid down, and attempts to control all details of each elements landing will cause confusion.

"It is especially important to practice and improve commands and movements by night. The items set out below must be practiced in basic training.

1. Landing preparations on board the destroyer.
2. Launching the boats from the destroyer, transshipping, navigating (particularly maintaining the course), attacking from the ship and fighting against torpedo-boats.
3. Landing, particularly in fighting at the water's edge, and subsequent fighting.
4. Fighting in the jungle and at night time.
5. Raiding the enemy and making surprise attacks with units of inferior strength.
6. The method of blowing up important objectives as artillery, boats, tanks, bridges and military stores.
7. Signalling, air-ground communication and liaison under difficult war conditions.
8. Utilizing captured enemy material and weapons particularly hand grenades, mortars and automatic rifles.
9. Maintaining direction in jungle and unknown terrain.

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JAPANESE DIVISIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS

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(From Australian Military Forces Weekly Intelligence
Review, No 117)

Contained in the Japanese Army Mobilization Plans for 1944 are details of the regular organization of 28 Japanese divisions. No strengths are included in the documents, and in all cases figures have had to be estimated solely from the Tables of Ordnance given with the plans.

There are three main types of division listed - Standard Division (A), Standard Division (B), and the Specially Established Division but many variations of strength occur within the component units of each type. As an example, the different Field Artillery Regiments of the Standard Divisions (A) have strengths of 3,217, 3,085 and 2,863, while the equipment varies from 75mm Field or Mountain Guns to 15cm Howitzers.

The Japanese system of nomenclature must not be confused with our adopted system of classifying the divisions into A (Strengthened), B (Standard) or C (Special), because although coincidentally, the classifications are similar in name, the types of divisions which come under these headings are quite different. NOTE: - In attempting to draw parallels between Jap nomenclature and our own, it can be stated quite generally that the Jap Standard A and Standard B Divisions appear to approximate what we term Strengthened Triangular Divisions, and the Jap Specially Established Division appears to approximate what we term the Standard Triangular Division.

The chief differences between the types of divisions as given in the Mobilization Plans occur not in the strengths, which in the A and B types may be approximately similar, but in the inclusion of certain units within the division. Thus the Standard Division (B) is similar to the Standard Division (A) except that the Anti-Gas Unit is excluded, and the Specially Established Division lacks both an Anti-Gas Unit and an Artillery Group Headquarters.

The Mobilization Plans are of interest chiefly because for the first time complete details on a number of regular divisional establishments have been obtained. Unfortunately, the information is incomplete, as only 28 of JAPAN's estimated some 85 divisions are mentioned. Moreover, of the divisions listed, it is known that a number are now operating with an entirely different organization from that listed in the documents, proving that, although a set paper establishment exists for each division, due to operational conditions, divisions organized on their official and regular basis may not be encountered. Even when the general framework of the division has remained practically unchanged, as in the case of 51st Division in NEW GUINEA, minor organizational and strength variations have occurred.


It is understandable that many modifications would have to be made to fit divisions previously located in JAPAN, MANCHURIA or CHINA, for service in jungle areas, and it is possible that, as Allied forces advance nearer to the Japanese mainland, divisions may be encountered which still retain their official organization as set out in the Army Mobilization Plans.

The divisions which are listed in the Mobilization Plans are as follows: 2 Guards, 1-12, 14, 16, 19, 20, 23-25, 28, and 51-57 Divisions.

In the following tables, (a) shows the general organization of the divisions, (b), gives details of divisional strengths and equipment and (c) is a staff table for the different types of infantry regiments.

Organization of:

(a) STANDARD DIVISION (A)



STANDARD DIVISION (B)

Same as Standard Division (A), less Anti-Gas Unit

SPECIALLY ESTABLISHED DIVISION

Same as Standard Division (A), less Anti-Gas Unit and Artillery Group Headquarters.

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Division	Total Strength	Div HQ	Inf Gp HQ	3 Inf Regts (each)	Anti-Gas Unit	Recce Regt	Cav Regt	Arty Gp HQ	Fd Arty Regt	Mtn Arty Regt	Engr Regt	Signal Unit	Tpt Regt	Ord Duty Unit	Med Unit	3 Fd Hqsps (each)	Hyg & Water Pur Sec	Vet Hosp
<u>STANDARD DIVISION (A)</u>																		
(i) 1,8,10,12,14,16 & 24 Divs	23,998	350	96	4519	222	600		170	3216		953	236	1820	112	1110	400	236	120
(ii) 2 Gds,4,5 & 20 Divs	23,867	350	96	4519	222	600		170	3085		953	236	1820	112	1110	400	236	120
(iii) 7 & 19 Divs	24,478	350	96	4519	222	600		170		3696	953	236	1820	112	1110	400	236	120
(iv) 28 Div	24,867	350	96	4519	222		918	170		3767	953	236	1820	112	1110	400	236	120
(v) 23 Div	25,985	350	96	5573	184	653		170	2863		953	236	989	112	1110	400	236	120
(vi) 9,11 & 25 Divs	28,144	350	96	5043	222		918	170		*3696	953	236	3596	112	1110	400	236	120
<u>STANDARD DIVISION (B)</u>																		
(i) 51,53,54 & 56 Divs	20,982	350	96	3961		600		170	2097		953	236	1831	112	1104	400	236	114
(ii) 55 Div	22,685	350	96	4391			918	170		3482	953	236	1831	112	1104	400	236	114
(iii) 52 Div	24,992	350	96	4391			918	170		3482	953	236	2848	112	1104	400	236	114
<u>SPECIALLY ESTABLISHED DIVISION</u>																		
(i) 2 Div	18,521	350	96	3400		600			2298		953	236	1022	112	1104	400	236	114
(ii) 3 & 6 Divs	18,349	350	96	3400			822		1904		953	236	1022	112	1104	400	236	114
(iii) 57 Div(possibly)	19,805	350	96	3828		600			*2998		953	236	1022	112	1104	400	236	114

(b)(2) EQUIPMENT TABLE

Division	Strength	Pistols	Rifles	GDs	LMGs	HMGs	20mm Auto Guns	81mm Mortars	37mm A Tk Guns	70mm Inf Guns	75mm Fd or Mtn Guns	10cm Hows	15cm Hows	Lt Tks or Lt Armd Cars	Trucks	Carts
<u>STANDARD DIVISION (A)</u>																
(i) 1,8,10,12,14,16 & 24 Divs	23,998	1578	11181	350	363	114	18		14	18	24	24	12	12	273	2097
(ii) 2 Gds,4,5 & 20 Divs	23,867	1570	11098	350	362	114	18		14	18	36	24		12	232	2133
(iii) 7 & 19 Divs	24,478	1524	11195	350	363	114	18		14	18	48			12	232	2368
(iv) 28 Div	24,867	1526	11280	350	369	114	18		14	18	36	12			184	2369
(v) 23 Div	25,985	1921	13084	350	363	114	72		38	36	48		12	14	584	1207
(vi) 9,11 & 25 Divs	28,144	1576	11480	353	372	114	18	36	14		48				104	1940
<u>STANDARD DIVISION (B)</u>																
(i) 51,53,54 & 56 Divs	20,982	1321	10800	350	363	78			8	18	30	12		12	232	1831
(ii) 55 Div	22,685	1348	10994	350	368	78			8	18	42				184	2169
(iii) 52 Div	24,992	1321	10987	350	370	78		36	8		42				104	1885
<u>SPECIALLY ESTABLISHED DIVISION</u>																
(i) 2 Div	18,521	1214	8879	269	279	78			8	18	24		9	12	223	1446
(ii) 3 & 6 Divs	18,349	1194	8849	265	279	78			8	18	33				175	1419
(iii) 57 Div(possibly)	19,805	1253	8897	269	279	78		36	8		24		9	12	226	930

*Corrected figure contained in AMF, WHP No. 118

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(c) STAFF TABLE - INFANTRY REGIMENTS

Division	Regt Strength	Pistols	Rifles	GDs	LMGs	HMGs	20mm Auto Guns	81mm Mor-tars	37mm A Tk Guns	70mm Inf Guns	75mm Mtn Guns
<u>STANDARD DIVISION (A)</u>											
(i) 2 Gds, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 19, 20, 24 and 28 Divs Infantry Regiment - Total	4519	247	2414	112	111	36	6		4	6	4
Regimental Headquarters	207	12	51	1							
Regimental Mounted Platoon	38	1	28		3						
Regimental Signal Company	143	3	132						4		4
Regimental Inf Gun Battalion	309	27	73								
Inf Gun Bn Headquarters	49	5	23								
Inf Gun Company	155	11	30						4		4
A Tk Gun Company	105	11	20								
3 Infantry Battalions (each)	1274	68	710	37	36	12	2			2	
Battalion Headquarters	223	10	48	1							
4 Rifle Companies (each)	190	5	153	9	9						
Machine Gun Company	222	33	30			12	2				
Infantry Gun Platoon	69	5	20							2	
(ii) 23 Div Infantry Regiment - Total	5573	345	2792	112	111	36	24		12	12	4
Regimental Headquarters	300	12	97	1							
Regimental Mounted Platoon	38	1	28		3						
Regimental Signal Company	143	3	130								
Regimental Inf Gun Company	155	11	40								4
Regimental A Tk Gun Battalion	368	39	73						12		
A Tk Gun Battalion Headquarters	50	6	13								
3 Companies (each)	106	11	20						4		
3 Infantry Battalions (each)	1523	93	808	37	36	12	8			4	
Battalion Headquarters	265	11	42	1							
4 Rifle Companies (each)	260	15	179	9	9	2	2				
Machine Gun Company	82	11	20			4					
Battalion Gun Company	136	11	30							4	
(iii) 9, 11 and 25 Divs Infantry Regiment - Total	5043	262	2442	113	111	36	6	12	4		4
Regimental Headquarters	425	12	65	1							
Regimental Mounted Platoon	38	1	28		3						
Regimental Signal Company	142	3	130								
Regimental Inf Gun Battalion	415	27	77	1					4		4
Inf Gun Battalion Headquarters	102	5	17	1							
Inf Gun Company	187	11	40								4
A Tk Gun Company	126	11	20						4		
3 Infantry Battalions (each)	1341	73	714	37	36	12	2	4			
Battalion Headquarters	290	11	52	1							
4 Rifle Companies	190	5	153	9	9						
Machine Gun Company	222	33	30			12	2				
Infantry Gun Platoon	69	9	20					4			
<u>STANDARD DIVISION (B)</u>											
(i) 51, 53-56 Divs Infantry Regiment - Total	3961	196	2392	112	111	24			2	6	2
Regimental Headquarters	195	12	69	1							
Regimental Mounted Platoon	38	1	28		3						
Regimental Signal Company	141	3	130								
Regimental Inf Gun Company	137	12	56						2		2
3 Infantry Battalions (each)	1150	56	703	37	36	8					
Battalion Headquarters	179	11	41	1							
4 Rifle Companies	190	5	153	9	9						
Machine Gun Company	142	20	30			8					
Infantry Gun Platoon	69	5	20							2	

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Division	Regt Strength	Pistols	Rifles	GDs	LMGs	HMGs	20mm Auto Guns	81mm Mor-tars	37mm A Tk Guns	70mm Inf Guns	75mm Mtn Guns
<u>STANDARD DIVISION (B) Contd</u>											
(ii) 52 Div Infantry Regiment - Total	4391	195	2398	112	111	24		12	2		2
Regimental Headquarters	339	12	59	1							
Regimental Mounted Platoon	38	1	28		3						
Regimental Signal Company	185	3	130								
Regimental Gun Company	142	11	42						2		2
3 Infantry Battalions (each)	1229	56	713	37	36	8		4			
Battalion Headquarters	256	10	46	1							
4 Rifle Companies (each)	190	5	153	9	9						
Machine Gun Company	144	21	35			8					
Infantry Gun Platoon	69	5	20					4			
<u>SPECIALLY ESTABLISHED DIVISION</u>											
(i) 2,3 and 6 Divs Infantry Regiment - Total	3400	180	1891	85	84	24			2	6	2
Regimental Headquarters	196	12	41	1							
Regimental Mounted Platoon	38	1	28		3						
Regimental Signal Company	141	3	130								
Regimental Inf Gun Company	136	11	21						2		2
3 Infantry Battalions (each)	963	51	557	28	27	8				2	
Battalion Headquarters	181	10	43	1							
3 Rifle Companies (each)	190	5	153	9	9						
Machine Gun Company	143	21	35			8					
Infantry Gun Platoon	69	5	20							2	
(ii) 57 Div Infantry Regiment - Total	3828	193	1897	85	84	24		12	2		2
Regimental Headquarters	341	12	50	1							
Regimental Mounted Platoon	38	1	28		3						
Regimental Signal Company	142	3	130								
Regimental Inf Gun Company	187	12	27						2		2
3 Infantry Battalions (each)	1040	55	554	28	27	8		4			
Battalion Headquarters	258	10	45	1							
3 Rifle Companies (each)	190	5	153	9	9						
Machine Gun Company	143	21	30			8					
Infantry Gun Platoon	69	9	20					4			

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MEDIUM ARTILLERY REGIMENTS

(From Australian Military Forces
Wkly Intelligence Review No 118)

The Japanese have been able to make only limited use of their medium artillery in the campaigns in the SWPA. The nature of the terrain generally has prevented the movement of guns and the adequate supply of ammunition, and the army has relied mainly on 75mm mountain guns which break down into manageable loads. A comparatively small number of 15cm and 10cm Howitzers have been employed in operations in the SOLOMONS, and several medium artillery units are known to be located at RABAU. However, now that the area of operations includes terrain more suited to the employment of medium guns, it is probable that this type of artillery will be encountered in greater strength than heretofore.

PRE-FABRICATED BOOBY TRAP

(From MID Intelligence Bulletin, Vol I #12)

In the ARAKAN area, the Japanese are using a small pre-fabricated booby trap device of very simple design, intended for use with a trip wire. The device consists of an ordinary tin can $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches high by $3\frac{7}{8}$ inches in diameter and believed to be filled with picric compound.

The firing mechanism is a pull-igniter with a brass tube body, threaded so that it can be screwed into the side of the container.

The report states that a loop of wire or stout cord leads into the tube and is attached to an igniter wire in a similar fashion to the Stick Type Grenade. The end of the igniter wire is embedded in a matchhead composition, in front of which are located the detonator and gainc. Any pull on the wire loop or cord will cause the igniter wire to be jerked out of the matchhead composition, providing a friction spark which fires the detonator, gainc and finally the main filling.

The Japanese may possibly decide to use this device extensively, either in its present or modified form, if successful results are obtained.

JAPANESE HOLLOW CHARGE AMMUNITION

(From 11 Army Group Wkly Intelligence
Review No 2. 13 Oct 44)

A Japanese Operation Order, captured in the KOHIMA area in May 1944, laid particular stress on the secrecy of a certain type of weapon and ammunition. The document stated that "Ta-dan" and "Ta-tcki" were special weapons that must not fall into enemy hands. It was eventually found that "Ta-dan" referred to Japanese Hollow Charge Ammunition, and "Ta-tcki" to the special Rifle Discharger Cup from which the Hollow Charge Rifle Grenade is fired.

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JAPANESE HOLLOW CHARGE AMMUNITION (CONTD)

The Japanese have developed Hollow Charge Ammunition for the following weapons:-

Standard Infantry Rifles - 30mm and 40mm Hollow Charge Rifle Grenades fired from a rifle discharger cup. The propellant cartridge is fitted with a wooden bullet.

Type 92 70mm Battalion Gun

Type 41 75mm Regimental Gun

Type 94 75mm Mountain Gun

Type 91 105mm Howitzer - Reduced charge is used in order to reduce muzzle velocity.

Comment:- Another low velocity weapon, which could be used to fire Hollow Charge Ammunition, is the Type 97 57mm Tank Gun. References in captured documents state that experiments are also being carried out with the object of incorporating the Hollow Charge principle into 15cm ammunition.

Armor penetration figures, using Hollow Charge Ammunition with the above weapons, have been extracted from captured documents and are reproduced below:-

30mm Rifle Grenade - Penetrates 30mm (1.18 in) armor.

40mm Rifle Grenade - Penetrates 50mm (1.97 in) armor.

Type 92, 70mm Battalion Gun - 80mm (3.15 in) armor at angle of 60 degrees, and 100mm (3.93 in) armor at 90 degrees.

Type 41, 75mm Regimental Gun - 75mm (2.95 in) armor at 1,500 meters.

Type 91, 105mm Howitzer - 120mm (4.7 in) armor at 1000 meters.

NOTE:- If the tank is protected by a metal grill or thin steel plates, the Hollow Charge Shell is ineffective.

Conclusions:- The Japanese appear to lay great stress on this type of ammunition as a means of destroying and disabling armor.

The Hollow Charge, having a soft nose, is not so likely to ricochet as Armor Piercing or HE ammunition.

The Hollow Charge Rifle Grenade has not, however, proved effective against our tanks at present being used in BURMA.

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WHEN WE OCCUPY FORMOSA

(From OSS Report No. 32453 B, distributed 18 Oct 1944)

The bulk of the Chinese population of FORMOSA is of AMOY stock. Some of the influential business men are Hakkas and a smaller number are Cantonese. The older Formosan Chinese are generally hostile to the Japanese but their hostility is submerged and passive. They have been too long under the Japanese Army to dare plan any action against it so long as the Japanese are in control.

In 1941 there was fairly widespread resentment among the older group to the systematic Japanese drive to prevail on or coerce the Chinese to change their traditional food, dress and customs to the Japanese. Perhaps the most resentful group is the peasantry, which has systematically been dispossessed of its land and often made to grow crops or change from one kind to another, to suit Japanese military and civilian requirements, regardless of loss or profit.

Japanese military strength in FORMOSA and a vivid experience of Japanese "justice" in her colonies are more than sufficient to prevent any anti-Japanese action or direct or indirect assistance to enemies of JAPAN.

It is important to avoid underestimating the hold JAPAN has obtained on the young Formosan Chinese. For many years they have been impregnated with the doctrine of Nipponism and it is important to recognize the emotional hold which citizenship in such a mighty nation holds over them. The dazzling panorama of an oriental power of their own color, has unfolded before them as JAPAN gradually mastered all the occidental powers in its neighborhood, and extended its sway. The reverse side of this picture they have not seen, having been cut off from any teaching but that of JAPAN. This devotion to Nipponism is so firmly ingrained in them that the Allies cannot expect the Chinese youth of FORMOSA to greet them sympathetically.

In 1941 the Formosan Independence League had little strength on the island. Its membership was chiefly made up of exiles without influence in FORMOSA.

Aborigines are chiefly to be found in the mountainous interior, mainly in the central and south-eastern massif. It may be stated that the aborigines regard the Formosan Chinese as their traditional enemies. They have also acquired resentment of the Japanese since the latter attempted to force them to abandon their natural way of life for organized agriculture and regular routine. They regard neither Chinese nor Japanese as friends, and the mountainous areas have never been truly pacified. The removal of Japanese control would result in raids on the Chinese, unless they were certain law and order would still be enforced.

The Japanese on the whole regard FORMOSA as a field for exploitation, for their personal benefit and that of JAPAN. There is probably no Japanese in FORMOSA who would rejoice if the island passed from Japanese control. There have always been certain Japanese who regarded the Formosans with paternal sympathy, and a few identified themselves with the Formosan student movements which rashly and ineffectively attempted to assert themselves. Had it not been for the military, the number of supporters might have been greater. Their motives were not to wish harm for JAPAN, but a higher conception of the ruler's moral obligations towards the ruled.

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WHEN WE OCCUPY FORMOSA (CONTD)

Probable Reactions to Military Operations (Contd)

JAPANESE:

The Japanese police would not be usable whether JAPAN were still resisting or had capitulated. There is no real Japanese local patriotism as distinct from Empire patriotism, and the attitude of the Japanese on occupation would not be sympathetic if JAPAN had not already capitulated.

KOREANS:

Provided the Koreans on Formosa were sure of the victory of the United Nations, many of them, within the limits of personal safety would cooperate with the forces of the United Nations.

The AMOY group, although less mentally agile than the Hakkas and the Cantonese, is numerically much larger than the others, and would have a prior claim to consideration. To all intents and purposes they are the Formosans of FORMOSA.

The Formosan Chinese are not so much concerned with the nation which should govern them as with a form of government which will enable them to work in peace, to eat the food they grow and to make a reasonable profit. The more thoughtful desire to see the abundant riches of the island methodically developed for the benefit of the islanders themselves.

In 1941, many of the intelligentsia seemed to desire something in the nature of an Anglo-American protectorate, which would devote itself disinterestedly to the development of the island's resources for the island's benefit, open up the country and its splendors to visitors who would spend money on the island, and prepare the people for eventual self-government, either as an independent territory or as an autonomous unit in a suitable federation.

The island's experience of former corrupt, chaotic, cruel Chinese rule, with no security for life or property, still lives in the memory of the older people and makes them reluctant to trust themselves to Chinese rule. In 1941 there seemed to be very few Formosans who approved of the Kuomintang Government in CHUNGKING. The position may have changed since then. Certainly dislike of the Japanese will have been spread and intensified by JAPAN'S increasingly stringent mobilization of FORMOSA for her own ends. The fear of being governed as a remote and forgotten province of a far-away Chinese Government may be less widely held than it was.

Chinese leaders in FORMOSA would in all probability not accept the orders of representatives of the CHUNGKING government during active warfare on the island, unless they were backed by CHUNGKING troops.

Among the Chinese, Christianity had worked wonders on FORMOSA and will work more, if it is not used for political ends or with ulterior motives, but allowed to develop independently by its own strength.

There are probably many Japanese settlers who feel so permanently identified with FORMOSA that they would be happy nowhere else. However, it is unlikely that any of them would wish, if he could, to remain there under non-Japanese sovereignty.

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WHEN WE OCCUPY FORMOSA (CONTD)

The Koreans are sympathetic neither to the Chinese nor the Japanese. However, when a choice between Chinese and Japanese occurs, they feel themselves racially and culturally closer to the Chinese, and would prefer Chinese rule.

Probable Reactions to Military Operations

CHINESE:

It is not probable that the Chinese would massacre Japanese civilians unless certain this could be done with impunity. This is therefore unlikely since there would presumably be no interval between Japanese control and control by the forces of the United Nations. It is highly improbable that they would attempt to sabotage Japanese military activity. The most likely development is that until the issue is decided, they will do their best to avoid any involvement in operations on either side.

After their lifelong experience of the consequences of attempting the slightest self-assertion, the Formosan Chinese would probably stand aloof in the large majority of cases. It is not probable that any group of Formosan Chinese would be able to function as a local government after United Nations' occupation.

Quick recruiting of police from the Formosan Chinese might be possible, but they would need lengthy training and would have to have experienced superintendents. There is a fair proportion of Chinese in the police force, but all are in the lower grades.

Technicians and administrators are lacking. None of the important industries is in the hands of Formosan Chinese, and it is doubtful whether any Formosans would be immediately available for technical and administrative work. The most likely material would be found among the men formerly educated in the Mission Schools. Although scope was denied them by the Japanese, many of them showed definite promise. They would almost certainly welcome the forces of the United Nations and would probably prove the most valuable assistants and liaison men in the early stages of occupation.

Mission-trained Chinese would have to be used with caution to avoid exciting fears that a Christian administration was being imposed by force of arms. Nothing arouses so much opposition among Formosans as an attempt to impose a forcible change in their established customs.

ABORIGINES:

It would be wise to assure the aborigines that one of the aims of the occupying authorities is to see that everyone has justice and better treatment. It is important that the customs of the Aborigines be respected and their women left unmolested. They should not be enrolled for labor service against their will, nor forcibly removed from their native habitat, provided they live peaceably. It must be remembered that strong liquor has a disastrous effect upon them.

The Aborigines have seen few Europeans, although there were one or two exceptional men whom they trusted implicitly, and who could travel unescorted among them. In general the Aborigines regard all intrusion as unwelcome.

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MORE ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

(From Civilian Internee Interrogation
Report HQ, 27th Division, G-2 Section)

In the USAFPOA Intelligence Bulletin No. 4, 16 Nov 44 was presented a treatment of psychological warfare in various of its aspects, as encountered during our MARIANAS operations. Additional bits of information continue to add to the total sum of knowledge about the Japanese mind, both military and civilian. As it is felt that this kind of "pen-warfare" will assume more and more significance as the war in the PACIFIC progresses, information of this kind is more than interesting knowledge of the Japanese; it is another weapon or tool which may prove highly instrumental in the eventual defeat of JAPAN and the Japanese. Though askance may be looked at this type of warfare by many military men, and though the extent of its effectiveness perhaps has yet to be demonstrated, psychological warfare has one outstanding virtue; it saves lives. More important than that, it saves lives of troops on the side which uses it most effectively.

The following ideas on propaganda were contributed by Suekichi Komura, a bookkeeper for the South Seas Development Company on SAIPAN. He is a graduate of the Keio University in TOKYO, and was taken into custody by the 27th Division.

When the CI (Civilian Internee) was asked what his principal reasons were for not giving himself up early in the operation, he replied that the group of intelligent people to which he belonged did not surrender because:

1. They felt that they owed it to the Emperor, the soldiers, and their fellow men to remain in hiding and that by so doing, they displayed their loyalty to the Emperor. The suffering they endured along with the soldiers, even though they took no active part in the battle, added to this feeling.
2. They always had the hope that aid would come to them and that the Japanese fleet would come to their assistance. Komura himself lost this hope early in the campaign as he had decided that SAIPAN had become secondary in importance to JAPAN and that JAPAN therefore intended to leave it to the American forces. On this point, he did say that the first rumors in the caves were to the effect that the combined Japanese fleet had surrounded SAIPAN. Later, the rumors changed to the story that the PHILIPPINE fleet had been defeated.
3. The third and principal reason is fear.

Komura suggested as propaganda that might be effective in overcoming those feelings of the civilians, the dropping of photographs. He also thought that leaflets might have some effect. He said that in them we should definitely state our desire for world peace and that it is of vital importance that at the present time, we make it clear to the Japanese that we do not intend to change their form of government or remove the Emperor from his palace in JAPAN. He felt that leaflets setting forth these principles and stating that no drastic changes were contemplated in the Japanese way of life or in the Japanese government would be effective.

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Only indirectly should we state our intentions to keep the Emperor in his supreme position. The Emperor's name should never be mentioned directly because of its stimulating effect on the spirits of the people.

Another point which he stated should be brought out relative to post-war promises to JAPAN is a statement in the leaflets that we recognize JAPAN's need for expansion and that their population is too large for the land area of the Japanese mainland. Komura said that along this line, we should state our intentions regarding KOREA, namely whether she will be given her independence or not. Along with KOREA, he mentioned several other places that JAPAN has taken which he felt should be placed in the same category.

As far as individuals are concerned our leaflets should definitely tell the Japanese that they will be permitted to return to their old life and that we have no intention of harming them. He felt that the promise to permit civilians to go back to pre-war professions or trades is most effective. He cited as an example the fact that in the civilian internment camp, this was being done and was having a great influence on the happiness of the occupants of the camp.

It should be noted that Komura, as have most of the internees questioned, felt that most propaganda or leaflets would not be very effective until the battle for that particular area has commenced. Japanese are accustomed to being propagandized and therefore recognize it as such. In addition, they definitely feel that they cannot give up without fighting as hard as possible.

Despite this fact, he did say that any leaflets dropped before our landing should not state that we will give food and water to the civilians, adding that there probably will be plenty available. However, after the operation has progressed and it is obvious that the Japanese are losing and are running short of food and water, it would then be effective to tell them that we will furnish these supplies.

Komura thought that dropping American newspapers among the Japanese civilians would be effective. These could be dropped not only before, but after the attack has been made. He felt that there always would be some person who could translate these papers. Such a method would be particularly effective after the battle has commenced because then all news sources are cut off from the Japanese fugitives. Along this line, we should drop leaflets a number of times during the operation in which we should set forth the exact progress of the fighting, showing the civilians that their cause is hopeless. It is at this time that we can also mention food, water, and medical supplies as, unlike the Japanese soldier, the civilians would not feel they were being made the recipient of charity if we promised them these things.

This internee felt that our propaganda should stress the idea that the people should live for the reconstruction of JAPAN, as this fits into the Japanese way of thinking.

Komura had never heard any broadcasts over the public address system, but had heard that they were ineffective because the people did not trust them. He suggested that if possible a civilian who had already been taken might talk over the public address system with some effect. He thought it best to have some civilian who had already been taken actually go into the hiding places and believed that if the person carried letters with him, they too would be effective.

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Komura felt that radio propaganda would be effective only when the Japanese realize that defeat is inevitable. For instance, he stated that any radio broadcasts to SAIPAN prior to our attack would have been ineffective because the people definitely felt that SAIPAN couldn't fall. When questioned as to the best radio program, he could give no positive answer. His only suggestion was that we should confine our broadcasts to news stories, as any Japanese music would be listed as strictly propaganda. He did say, however, that it might be advisable to broadcast transcriptions over the public address system to the Japanese civilians hiding in caves during the mop-up. These people, having had no opportunity to listen to music for a long time, might be induced to feel more friendly towards us for broadcasting it to them.

Other thoughts expressed by Komura, of a miscellaneous nature, but significant, are that the majority of the people in JAPAN hate the American people for 1. The Exclusion Act prohibiting Japanese from entering the US and HAWAII. 2. Widespread feeling among the Japanese that we have mistreated them economically. He believed that if any harm came to the Emperor, either accidentally or from a determined purpose, the entire Japanese population would go into GYOKU SAI (Die in Honor). In fact, it was his statement that even those presently interned by our forces would feel it necessary to die.

Another Civilian Internec questioned by 27th Division G-2 was Taro Yanagita, who had been a Judge in CARAPAN, and was a graduate of the Imperial College. He gave the following three reasons as the primary ones for the failure of the majority of the civilians to give themselves up earlier. He added that these reasons were not his own but rather that he had gathered them from talks with others and from hearing of their experiences.

1. The basic desire not to surrender as long as there was hope of help or that the Japanese would win.
2. Fear.
3. The soldiers prevented the civilians from doing so.

He states his own reasons for not surrendering as:

1. Basic animal fear.
2. The Japanese soldiers were putting up such a glorious fight that he felt he owed it to them to refrain from coming out and permitting himself to enjoy the relative luxury of capture.
3. Feeling of disgrace and the fact that there is nothing glorious in capture.
4. He knew nothing of the progress of the battle and therefore was always hopeful that the Japanese would win.

He stated that this last reason was very prevalent among the civilians, as they were told that help would come and it was a long time before this hope was eradicated from their minds. NOTE:- Civilians picked up as late as 1 Sept still believed that the Japanese fleet was coming, and even then they did not know the progress of the battle.

He suggested that one method to use in taking into custody civilians still in hiding is to send out a civilian internec familiar with

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the ground. That person should remain at a water hole from which those in hiding obtain water, and when the fugitives come out, he can talk them into giving themselves up. He thought that this was better than sending our soldiers to find the caves and seal them up, or to attempt to rout out the fugitives.

In discussing the question of leaflets, the Judge stated that he had read two of our leaflets, one on 20 June and one early in July. He said that the trouble with them was that they were not specific enough. The Japanese are rational (sic) and when they read them they ask themselves, "Why is it safe to come out?" He said that we should go into detail about this but he himself could offer no specific suggestion for this improvement. Our every effort must be towards convincing the Japanese that they can believe what the leaflets say. The judge thought it advisable for us to mention giving food, water, and medical care but made the additional statement "To us the American stomach is cold. You promise a lot of things, but we think you do not mean all you say. You are a hard, cold people." Along this line he stated that even he, an intelligent man, thought of us as barbarians who would torture him.

His principal contribution was the statement that our leaflets should be addressed to the military commander of the area which we intend to attack. These leaflets should request him to evacuate the civilians to areas which he could select. We should then drop leaflets written more or less in the nature of a letter in which we tell the civilians what we have done and directing them to go to the area selected and that when we are informed of its locality, we will make every effort not to bomb or shell it. He felt that the effectiveness of this will depend on the military commander's personality and that if we direct the civilians to a certain area we should make every attempt to keep our promise not to bomb or shell it. The internee recognized the tactical significance of this but said that a true high ranking Japanese military man would honor this request and make an attempt to save civilian lives. In fact he said his belief was that the army would be willing to give the order to the civilians to evacuate to a certain area.

An additional item that could be included in leaflets, according to the Judge, is a statement concerning our plans for the future treatment of JAPAN and its people at the conclusion of the war. They should be set forth in leaflets and every effort made to overcome the universal feeling held by the Japanese that we will mistreat them economically. NOTE: - the reiteration of this point by educated Japanese highlights its importance. It is doubtful however, whether leaflets in the field provide the most suitable medium for the transmission of this idea. It involves long-range strategic propagandizing. The more immediate, tactical problem still appears to be the overcoming of Fear.

The Judge pointed out that we must consider propaganda to counteract that propaganda which the Japanese government is giving its people. He also said that the other Axis countries had been propagandizing the Japanese people and we must be prepared to counteract that. He believes that we might gain something by dropping leaflets on an area over a long period of time although he admitted that by doing so we could lose the element of tactical surprise. NOTE:- It should be noted that all during this and other civilian interrogations it was necessary to convince the civilian that our purpose is to save civilians' lives and that it was not primarily military. One of the things stressed was that as far as our soldiers are concerned, in a great many cases, it is easier for them to kill the civilians than to attempt to take them into custody.

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When the internee was told this he stated that he recognized it as a fact. He then told a story of a Japanese boy who was shot by an American soldier when he came out with hands raised. The Judge personally saw the incident and realized perfectly that the American soldier thought the boy had a hand grenade and intended to throw it. He also recognized that this incident could be cited by the Japanese people as an example of our intent to kill civilians needlessly unless all the facts are clearly presented. He was in complete sympathy with our treatment of the Japanese and in this case pointed out that after the boy was shot, his mother kept asking the American soldiers "why?" A few minutes later the soldier who had shot the boy came up to the woman and explained through an interpreter his reasons for shooting and apologized for the act. In the Judge's opinion, this deed of the American soldier raised tremendously the Japanese opinion of the US forces, as he admitted that no Japanese would have the manliness to do the same thing.

Still another internee, Yukio Omine, a reporter for the South Sea Daily had comment to make on propaganda. He felt that in all leaflets we should distinguish and draw a careful line between civilians and the military in order to impress on the civilians that they will be treated differently by us. We should tell the civilians that we have no animosity towards them and that it is the soldiers whom we are fighting. In addition, we should warn the civilians to keep away from the soldiers and that if they do so, we will do our best not to harm them; but if they mingle with the military it will be impossible to avoid endangering them.

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