

Intelligence Bulletin

VOL III • NO 10
JUNE 1945



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION • WAR DEPARTMENT • WASHINGTON D. C.
FOR USE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ONLY • • • NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Have You Learned A Lesson About The Enemy?

The *Intelligence Bulletin* is anxious to obtain contributions from units and individuals, especially intelligence agencies, for publication. Articles that present lessons about enemy tactics, techniques, and matériel are particularly desired, and when it is consistent with security, credit will be given to the contributing agency or unit. Contributions may be sent directly to the Supervisor of Reports, Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington 25, D. C.

Readers are urged to comment on the use they are making of this publication and to forward suggestions for future issues. Reproduction of material published herein is encouraged, provided that (1) the source is stated, (2) the classification is not lowered, and (3) one copy of the publication in which the material is reproduced is forwarded to the Military Intelligence Service.

Requests for additional copies of the *Intelligence Bulletin* should be made through channels.

Notice

All material in Volumes I and II and Numbers 1, 2 and 3 of Volume III of the *Intelligence Bulletin* (September 1942 through November 1944) has been reclassified by authority of the A. C. of S. G-2, War Department, and is now unrestricted.

VOL. III NO. 10

JUNE 1945

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT • WASHINGTON, D. C.

DISTRIBUTION:

AAF (30); AGF (35); ASF (2); T of Opns (200) except IB (1,000); Base Comds (10); Island Comds (10); Depts (10); Arm & Sv Bd (2); Def Comd (10); Tech Sv (10) except QMG (65); CWS (12); SvC (10); Area A SvC (10); HD (10); PC&S (1); SEPE (200); HRPE (6); Repl Dep (65); Gen & Sp Sv Sch (100); USMA (100); ROTC (3); UTC (30); RTC (150); Ord Dist (10); A (10); CHQ (10); D (2); B (2); R (2); Bn (2); C (2); AF (2); W (2); G (2); S (2); F (2).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

JAPAN		Page
JAP DEFENSE OF A TOWN— <i>Tanks Join the Banzai Charge</i>		1
"THE OFFICERS ARE GETTING KNOCKED OFF".....		6
JAPANESE FIELD ARTILLERY METHODS.....		8
MINEFIELD PATTERNS IN THE DEFENSE OF IWO JIMA.....		15
KEMPEI— <i>The Japanese Military Police</i>		22
CLOSE COMBAT WITH TANKS.....		26
THE NEW JUKI.....		32
IN BRIEF		35
Jap Tactics—Australian Countermeasures		35
Machine-Gun Tricks		36
Jap Rifle Technique		37
Sock Booby Trap		38
Radio Deception		38
Fruit-Can Booby Trap		39
Burning Grass		40
Prefabricated Wooden Mine		40
Jap Tenacity		41
Tank Ambush in Burma		42
Improvised Incendiary Grenade		42
GERMANY		
"WHY WE LOST"— <i>A Post Mortem by a German Commander</i>		46
TACTICS OF A GERMAN PATROL.....		52
General Situation		52
Special Situation		53
Conclusion		56
CONCRETE STICK HAND GRENADE.....		57
IN BRIEF		60
Riegelmines Under Corduroy Roads.....		62
Add Booby Traps		62
"To See Ourselves——"		62
Sniper Score		63
UNITED NATIONS		
SOVIET INFILTRATION UNITS IN MOUNTAIN WARFARE.....		69
Cover Illustration—Japanese tanks used in the defense of San Manuel, Luzon, were moved in and out of prepared revetments, where they could be employed as pillboxes.....		





JAP DEFENSE OF A TOWN


Tanks Join the Banzai Charge

During the advance of U. S. Sixth Army units through the central plain of Luzon, much of the scattered enemy resistance was encountered in the small towns and barrios that dot the highways and road junctions of that corridor. Here, for the first time in the Pacific, American soldiers fought against Jap troops who were liberally supported by tanks.

This was particularly true along the left flank of the U. S. advance, where enemy tanks and infantry held the main road intersections to cover the route of withdrawal of enemy troops from the south into the northern hills of Luzon.

Throughout these operations the enemy delaying forces would hold key road junctions until they were nearly surrounded, and then would fall back during the night. However, when U. S. troops reached the village of San Manuel—known to be the operating base of a Jap tank brigade—they discovered that here the enemy determined to make a strong stand to deny the village to our troops and inflict the maximum possible casualties upon our attacking force.

At night the tank motors could be heard as the tanks moved from one emplacement to another, while foot troops moved to new strongpoints to meet the next day's anticipated attack.



Sketch of San Manuel Village showing the Japanese positions and fields of fire. Only key buildings have been indicated, and the ridge to the northwest of the town is not shown.

A typical Philippine town, San Manuel was fortified by a force of from 800 to 1,000 Japanese which included an infantry battalion, an artillery ^{company} battalion, and miscellaneous troops from a Jap tank division. Besides approximately 40 medium and five light tanks, the Jap defenders had six 105-mm howitzers with prime movers, seven 75-mm cannon, two 47-mm anti-tank guns, and many machine guns and mortars. Roughly square in shape, the town was bordered on the east by a steep-banked stream, and on the north and south by drainage ditches. A spur ridge abutted on the northwest corner of the town, but all approaches to the town were flat and open. This was particularly so on the west and southwest, where excellent fields of fire and observation existed. The perimeter of the town was marked by frequent clumps of vegetation.

Although the possession of San Manuel was of little strategic value, the Jap defense of the town was well conceived, tactically. The strongest defenses—established in depth—were located on the western and southern portions of the perimeter, although positions had been prepared for an all-around defense of the town. Field works were built for the artillery, but particularly significant were the positions built to permit the use of tanks as pillboxes. Emplacements just large enough to hold a medium tank had been dug throughout the village. Three sides were revetted to a height of about 30 inches, while the fourth side was left open to permit the tank to be moved in or out of the position. When the tank was in position, only the turret was exposed. The artillery pieces were emplaced in similar bunkers. These emplacements—approximately 75 in all—had been prepared for some time, and formed the backbone of the Jap defense. A machine gun and individual rifle pits supported each of the tank and artillery emplacements. All were well concealed, and most of the rifle pits were covered, as were the personnel shelters and dugouts in the area. All open areas

and empty building sites were well covered by fire. About one-third of the tanks were held as a mobile reserve in the southern part of the village. The only outstanding defect in the defensive plan was the failure of the Japanese to defend the spur ridge to the northwest with more than just the outpost platoon which occupied that terrain.

The San Manuel Defense Force, which was under the command of a Jap major general, had orders to defend the town to the death. This was done, with the usual suicidal tenacity made even more deadly by excellent fire discipline.

As our troops approached the village initially from the north and southwest, they drove in an outpost and were able to advance approximately 50 yards within the town before they were stopped by intense rifle and machine-gun cross fire. A counterattack supported by tanks then pushed the U. S. troops from the village.

On the second day, the U. S. infantrymen secured another foothold in the village. From then on, they fought for 4 days from house to house and emplacement to emplacement, gradually driving the Jap defenders toward the southern edge of the town. The enemy defense was very fluid, the foot troops moving about within the town to meet anticipated attacks. Except for sniping, the Japs would hold their fire until a worthwhile target was within 50 to 100 yards of their positions. When they expected harassing artillery fire, they would withdraw to cover in the northeast and southeast corners of the village.

During the daytime the defending Japanese either remained in position or kept their movements within the perimeter, completely concealed from observation. But at night the tank motors could be heard as the tanks moved from one emplacement to another, while the foot troops moved to new strongpoints to meet the next day's anticipated attack.

Infiltrating patrols were active in harassing the American forward positions; and suicide squads, equipped with lunge mines and magnetic mines, were a constant threat to the U. S. tanks, a number of which were destroyed.

Having been driven into the southern defenses of the village, the Japs on the last night reverted to form and launched a desperate *Banzai* attack. After much preliminary maneuvering, 13 tanks, each supported closely by infantry, launched an attack in waves of three. The combined fire of .50-caliber machine guns, bazookas, antitank guns, and artillery destroyed ten tanks, broke up the assault, and forced the survivors to withdraw. With this attack all major resistance ended, and the following day the American infantrymen mopped up and secured the village of San Manuel.





The *Intelligence Bulletin's* debt to its readers continues to grow. This month an enlisted man who has been fighting in the Philippines contributes several helpful observations about the Japanese and the problems of U. S. units who are combating them.

*"The officers are
getting knocked off!"*

"April 16

"The Philippines

"Dear Sirs:

"Right now I'm convalescing from a wound. I'm in the —th Divvy. At present they're battling for a strong objective. The officers up there are getting knocked off faster than they can be replaced. That's the reason for my letter—I would like to make a comment on why they're being cut down so fast:

"1. Many use the 'point' system in full view of the enemy.

"2. They always place themselves third or fourth. By now the Nips know that our leaders follow the scouts. The scouts are seldom fired upon.

"3. They never fully orient the G. I. on what's what. Probably they don't get the same from higher-ups. And thus a lot of talking goes on during the patrol.

"4. Some still wear their bars. We still have to address them by rank except when in contact with the enemy. But the boys are so darn used to it, the change doesn't click in just a matter of seconds.

"In our company we have had ten different officers. Not one is an officer who originally started the campaign with us. We have had four different C. O.'s. We have had five noncoms commissioned; out of these five, only one is left in the lines. In the whole company now we have two officers.

"The Japs have a knack for getting the leader. He's zeroed in just as soon as the patrol is spotted, because of the aforementioned reasons.

"It's happening in all the outfits. The Jap officers are pretty damn smart. Without them, the Jap G. I. isn't worth a damn. They have the best fire discipline anyone could expect of an army.

"They seldom fire on small patrols. But us, we open fire with a machine gun on one Jap. I've seen that happen. When we take an objective, after running the Nips out, we take it for granted they're not coming back. Well, one time they came back with a strong counterattack supported by machine guns which had our automatics zeroed in. We were saved by mortars. A whole machine-gun crew (ours) was knocked out—one killed, three wounded.

"The Japs undoubtedly watched us digging in. We should have changed our machine-gun positions during the night.

"In my opinion there is a lot to be taught before we start hitting Tokyo.

"A G. I."



JAPANESE FIELD ARTILLERY METHODS

The Japanese Army has neglected to keep pace with other major armies in the development of modern artillery techniques. An insight to present Japanese field artillery methods is given here. However, this is no guarantee that the Japs will not improve their techniques in future operations.



Although field artillery support often has been a deciding factor in the outcome of a major engagement, thus far in World War II the Japanese have failed to take advantage of the full potentialities of this fighting arm. At best, they have resorted to World War I techniques, for in the past 3 years Japanese artillerymen who have opposed U. S. troops have not demonstrated an ability to mass fires rapidly on new targets.

It is true that, when given the time and opportunity to use their own methods, the Japanese have been able to deliver accurate fire with single guns, sections, or batteries. And, under the same conditions, they recently have proved themselves capable of delivering concentrated fire against such predetermined targets as beaches, or areas in front of long-established defenses. However, such targets are registered upon by each battery prior to an anticipated attack, and, once the battle is joined, fire control is decentralized to each battery—a battery usually firing in direct support of an infantry battalion.

This antiquated technique emphasizes the principle difference between U. S. and Japanese field artillery methods. To date there has been no evidence that the Japanese make use of the fire-direction center—a central command post which gives fire commands to all batteries of a battalion—for rapid registration of massed artillery units upon targets of opportunity.

The fact that they have been unable to use their field artillery in mass in a mobile situation may have influenced the Japanese to adopt a peculiar technique: The Japanese often detach a gun or a section from a battery and use it as a roving unit separated widely from other guns or sections. Frequently guns of different caliber are mixed within battalions, batteries, or sections, and, since most Japanese field artillery originally was horse-drawn, artillery units encountered in jungles and islands far from the Empire have been found without organic transportation for their guns. The recent enemy tendency, how-

ever, has been to rely more and more upon trucks and tractors as artillery transport.

Although the Japanese often have selected battery positions that are conventional by our standard, the frequent splitting of batteries sometimes emplaces sections as much as 300 to 1,000 yards apart. It is not unusual for the guns of these sections to be emplaced in depth within the section position. Although this dispersion of pieces helps to conceal and protect the guns, it further hinders rapid registration for mass fire. It also has led to field guns being emplaced in unusual positions—in caves and pillboxes, on ridge crests, and, during the battle for Manila, in the upper stories of buildings.

To all appearances the Japanese use observed fire methods almost exclusively, unobserved fire being used on the comparatively rare occasions when guns have been ranged previously by observation. There are indications that single batteries or sections may use a forward-observer method similar to U. S. practice, but, although experiments with air observation have been reported, there have been no known attempts by the Japs to conduct fire from planes.

A common Japanese practice, particularly during a defensive or static situation, has been the use of bilateral observation with an observation post established on the gun-target line, and one established to each flank. This permits the center observation post to adjust for deflection, while the flank observation posts adjust for range. This method is slow, but accurate. Single observation posts also are used—preferably situated on the gun-target line, as close as possible to the battery or section. Conventional observation techniques are used, but under the Japanese system only one battery at a time can be registered on a target.

With the exception of such instances as counter-landing fire—and the fire delivered in support of a land defense line, as was

done near Naha city on Okinawa Island—the Japanese usually fire only a few guns at a time in any one sector. Even in sectors occupied by an artillery battalion or regiment, fire may be delivered by no more than a single gun or section firing at any one time. Generally, volleys are not fired; instead, the guns of one section will salvo at a given rate. On occasion they may fire only one round each, and then cease fire for several minutes while other sections fire salvos in turn. Thus a steady harassing fire is kept up. Also, it is not unusual for the guns of a single battery to engage two or more targets at the same time—different fire missions having been allotted to different guns or sections. By our standards, relatively few rounds are expended on any one target, but those that are fired usually are accurate.

It is not unusual for the Japanese to attempt to keep gun positions concealed by withholding fire until the moment U. S. guns are fired. This common ruse also tends to mislead U. S. infantry troops into believing their own shells are falling within their own lines. The Japanese also may be expected to fire harassing missions by one battery to conceal the fact that another battery is registering simultaneously on a new target.

If Japanese artillery is to be used in close support of infantry during night operations, the guns usually will be registered during the preceding afternoon—unless, of course, range data has been determined previously by observed fire. Such support fire in advance of small-scale night or early dawn attacks may be expected to commence from 45 minutes to 1 hour before the assault.

Counterbattery fire apparently is undertaken by the first battery or section to locate the enemy's artillery positions. Because it is usually observed fire, it may be counted upon to be accurate during daylight—a typical counterbattery mission consisting of from 10 to 15 minutes of salvo fire. There has been

no indication that the Japanese reserve some guns solely for counterbattery missions. Counterbattery at night usually is based upon previous daylight observation.

In the Japanese artillery regiment or battalion, fire control duties during a battle fall principally upon the battery commanders. Control by the regimental or battalion commander is exercised before the engagement, and extends only to the giving of such orders as the fire support plan, method of observation, location of battery positions, and the method of displacement. Theoretically, the Japanese artillery battalion, like its U. S. equivalent, supports an infantry regiment in battle. But, because the Japanese do not make use of the fire-direction center, Japanese artillery support generally breaks down to the point where one battery supports one infantry battalion, and is not readily available to join a companion battery in rapidly adjusted mass fire upon a single target. Instead, each battery, or even each section, has its own observer and is concerned only with fire on targets appearing within its assigned sector.

Because the fire control of each battery is decentralized in this manner, the commander of a Japanese artillery battalion or regiment, in order to mass the fire of all his batteries on one target, must register each of his batteries independently on the target before firing for effect. This method is antiquated and slow, and eliminates the possibility of delivering mass fire by surprise.

By contrast, U. S. artillery technique—which encompasses modern artillery survey methods, the use of meteorological data, and good communications from observers and batteries to a central fire-direction center—permits the artillery battalion commander to register one gun or battery on a target and then, by means of computation, to issue fire orders to all his batteries. This method enables the fire of an entire battalion—or of an entire regiment or corps—to be delivered quickly by surprise in mass upon a single target.

Whereas liaison between U. S. infantry units and their supporting artillery is most complete, relations between Japanese infantry and artillery are not always harmonious. Because Japanese Army doctrine has placed so much emphasis upon the role of the individual infantryman and his bayonet, infantry commanders often are inclined to disregard the value of their artillery, or try to force their ideas of artillery employment upon their supporting arm. An enemy source indicates that artillery-infantry liaison in some Jap units consists of a "spare" junior artillery officer being sent to the infantry regimental command post, while noncoms are sent to each infantry battalion to represent their battery commanders.

Although Japanese artillery technique thus far has lagged behind our own methods, it would be wrong to underestimate the Jap artilleryman. When left to the efficient application of his own methods, he is capable of delivering accurate and deadly fire. Although Japanese use of massed fire has been limited to date, and restricted by out-moded techniques, it is entirely possible for the enemy to improve his methods, and, in the future, to adopt more modern practices.



Map of Iwo Jima—the dark areas indicate minefields which formed one of the strongest mine defense systems encountered in the Pacific.




MINEFIELD PATTERNS IN THE DEFENSE OF IWO JIMA

When U. S. Marines stormed ashore on Iwo Jima, it was soon evident that this small island contained the strongest minefield defense yet encountered in the Pacific. The Japanese, who had anticipated the attack, had made extensive preparations to meet the assault. From the nature and condition of the minefields, it was clear that they were planned with much thought and permanently installed.

A study of the Japanese minefield technique used on Iwo indicates that in the last year the enemy has made substantial progress in the use of this method of modern warfare. It also discloses some significant minefield patterns and trends that may well be considered as a standard for other Jap minefields which may be encountered under similar circumstances in the future.

The most heavily mined areas on Iwo were, quite naturally, those adjacent to the southeast and southwest beaches—the logical landing sites. Parallel to the entire length of the southeast beach was buried a double row of 500-pound aerial bombs. To each bomb a yardstick mine had been lashed to act as a booster charge should its pressure fuze be actuated. This bomb-yardstick combination seemed to be a favorite with the defenders, since it was used extensively throughout the island.





A typical minefield of this type is diagramed in pattern B on page 16. In this case four rows of bombs were planted to form a minefield 60 feet deep and 300 feet long. The bombs within each row were spaced at 15-foot intervals. In adjacent rows, the bombs were staggered so as to cover the intervals between the mines of the neighboring rows.

On the southwest beaches, the only mines found were the standard hemispherical antiboat mines. However, the area immediately adjacent to, and the roads and logical routes from the beach, in general were thoroughly mined. Besides the bomb-yardstick combination, nearly all of the standard Japanese land mines were found in use in this area. Among these were the hemispherical antiboat mine, the conical antiboat mine, the yardstick mine, the tape-measure mine, the pottery mine, the magnetic antitank mine, and numerous wooden box mines—some improvised and some prefabricated.

Patterns A and C on page 16 are typical of minefields laid with the conical mines. Although it was by no means standard, the Japs seemed to have had a tendency to lay many of these mines at 15-foot intervals in rows, 15 feet between adjacent rows. The staggered pattern of the mines of one row covering the intervals in another is again repeated. However, in pattern A, the regularity of the minelaying is discontinued when tape-measure mines, which contain a smaller explosive charge, are used to finish the upper portion of the field.

In spite of the more regular minefields found, not all of the mines laid on Iwo conformed to a pattern. In many instances, mines were laid haphazardly with no pattern whatsoever. Roads were liable to be mined in spots—a typical case is illustrated in pattern E on page 18. Here an antisubmarine depth charge was planted in the road and fixed for pressure detonating. Yardstick mines were planted in the shoulders of the road.

Generally speaking, the mines on Iwo Jima were well buried



or concealed. Because the metallic soil prevented the use of standard mine detectors, it was necessary to construct passages through many fields by hand probing and removal methods. However, for the first time with any consistency the Japanese defenders had covered many of their minefields with protective fields of fire. A minefield covered in this manner is illustrated in pattern D on page 18. This defense was located on a portion of the southwest beach.

Of further significance is the fact that the Japanese used antipersonnel minefields for the first time in the Central Pacific. These minefields, constructed in irregular patterns, consisted of pottery mines fixed for detonation by pressure or tripwire. The mines were scattered in pairs, each pair from 6 to 8 feet apart. Many of these mine pairs were connected with trip wires of green gut stretched above ground. Antipersonnel mines of this type also were found in abandoned trenches.

To guard against the possibility of their own troops blundering into one of their own minefields, the Japanese garrison had marked plainly the extent of some of the fields. On the edge of some minefields, stakes had been driven at 35-yard intervals. Other fields were marked by a single strand of low wire, while in still another instance twigs had been stuck into the earth to mark the location of individual buried mines.

The standard factory-made land mines found on Iwo Jima are illustrated on pages 20 and 21.




Pottery mine.



Tape-measure mine.



Hemispherical antiboat mine.



(Left) Magnetic armor-piercing mine.



(Right) Conical anti-boat mine.



Yardstick mine.



KEMPEI

THE JAPANESE MILITARY POLICE

Few American soldiers fighting in the Pacific are aware of the position of military police in the Japanese military system. Actually the *Kempei*—which is Jap for “Military Police”—is a semi-independent organization one of whose most important functions is to provide counterintelligence for the Japanese intelligence organization.

The *Kempei* is a separate combat branch of the Japanese Army and operates under the command of a lieutenant general, who holds the post of Provost Marshal General. Charged with the main responsibility for the suppression of espionage and sabotage by foreign agents, and with the responsibility for coordinating civil and military security measures, the *Kempei* has established a police network throughout the Jap-held world.

Actually, the Japanese Military Police is composed of two parts—the Field Military Police and the Regular Military Police. Each has its own auxiliary branch of personnel, who act in a subordinate capacity as assistants.

The Field Military Police, who are organized only in war-time, are the upper strata of the *Kempei* organization. They are recruited chiefly from Japanese Foreign Office personnel, and Japanese embassy and consular police overseas. Most Field MP's are officers and warrant officers, and are better paid than regular MP's. They may wear civilian clothes or disguises,

which, with the necessary identification papers, permit them to move freely among native populations. Field MP's are assisted by auxiliary personnel recruited from civilian employees of the Special Service Organization—the intelligence collecting espionage branch of the Japanese G-2.

The Field Military Police may be regarded as the advance agents of the *Kempei*. Undoubtedly, many of these agents had operated in Far Eastern countries long before the arrival of invading Japanese troops. The Field MP's and the espionage agents of the Special Service Organization work in close coordination, and an MP section often is assigned to a Special Service Organization headquarters. Although the Field MP's are concerned primarily with counterintelligence operations, their work often overlaps that of the intelligence-collecting Special Service men. This overlap makes it possible to check the interpretation and evaluation of information, and it ensures that all phases of intelligence are covered by one group or the other. While working with the Special Service men, the Field MP's seem to be concerned chiefly with operations conducted among the local natives.

After an area has been occupied by the Japanese Army, the Field MP's continue, and undoubtedly expand, their counterintelligence activities among the population of the occupied country. Their authority also extends over the Jap troops, not only in counterintelligence and security matters, but in the normal duties which generally devolve upon MP's. Combat intelligence work also is engaged in, mainly through the use of native agents and native reconnaissance patrols. In this way, MP's frequently are able to secure information of operational value. Such information is supposed to be forwarded to the organization primarily concerned.

The Regular Military Police comprise most of the MP's on duty in Jap-occupied territory under military jurisdiction.

Their basic duties are very similar to those of our own MP's, and, in general, they do not take over from the Field MP's until the area concerned has been placed officially under garrison regulations. Although their duties are theoretically confined to police work, they are a combat arm of service. They also have an auxiliary corps, which provides deputies who have the same responsibilities and authority as the regular MP's.

In all areas in which the *Kempei* operates, the authority of the Regular and Field MP's exceeds that of the civilian police. Similarly, the Field MP's exceed the Regulars in authority.

The main duties of both branches of the *Kempei* are the maintenance of military discipline, the enforcement of security, the protection of vital military zones, the execution of conscription laws, the detection of crimes committed by Army personnel, the issue of travel permits, the suppression of subversive rumors, and the detection and arrest of fifth columnists. Such work as traffic control and the guarding of essential installations is carried out as an occasional duty, but usually line troops are used.

In combat zones and occupied areas, certain other duties have been assigned to the *Kempei*. These duties include the requisitioning of native foods and supplies, the recruiting of native labor, and the organization of native counterespionage. On occasion, MP units have been charged with maintaining espionage nets behind enemy lines.

Military Police control over native populations and foreign residents is exercised only so far as actual policing is concerned. However, such control includes the investigation of political sympathies, individual character and loyalty, suspicious acts, subversive activities, and mail censorship. Native agents, Jap civilian employees, and the intelligence personnel of other agencies assist the *Kempei* in this work. Files of information on all suspected persons are kept at MP headquarters,

and a double check on persons under suspicion is kept through liaison with the Special Service Organization and the local army headquarters.

Practically all members of the *Kempei* are volunteers—both commissioned and enlisted personnel—and the standards for admission to the organization are high. This is particularly true of the educational requirements. Since there are several different grades of MP's within the organization, the requirements for assignment differ, as do the limits to which members of each grade may advance.

A Jap who has been accepted for MP duty receives further education in the *Kempei* schools. An enemy source indicates that in one such school the curriculum included such subjects as law, the manual of arms, fencing, horsemanship, unarmed combat, languages, espionage, and counterespionage. •Specific attention was given in classrooms to such things as invisible writing, shadowing, methods of entering and leaving buildings, and similar tricks of the detective's trade.

This policy of selection and education has produced in the Jap MP an individual of much higher caliber than the average Japanese soldier. But though the I. Q. of *Kempei* men is higher than that of the rest of the Jap Army, it in no way has decreased their cruelty, or their devotion to the Emperor, as the residents of Jap-occupied territory will certify.



CLOSE COMBAT WITH TANKS

The fire power and comparative invulnerability of U. S. tanks has driven the Japanese Army to rely more and more upon the suicide attack by individual Jap soldiers as a means of countering U. S. armor.

To all appearances, this tactic originated as a field expedient of frustrated Japanese troops who were among the first to meet the M-4 tank in jungle and atoll fighting. However, there now is evidence that suicide antitank fighting has attracted the attention of the Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo to such an extent that so-called "close-quarter combat tactics," as a principle means of combating tanks, may be standardized throughout the Japanese Army.


Several months ago a high-ranking committee of the Imperial Headquarters met under the chairmanship of General Ushiroku, Assistant Chief of Staff and second most important man in the Japanese Army, "to formulate a technique for the training of all operational armies in the methods of destroying enemy tanks by spirited, close-quarter combat, using explosives". Recent experiences of tank men in the Philippines and Southeast Asia, the advent of new suicide antitank explosives, and a large quantity of enemy information on recent Jap antitank training, make it expedient for tank men—and the infantry who must support them—to review this trend of Japanese tactics.

An organized method of close-quarter combat has been outlined by the Japanese Army Engineer School, which advocates coordinated attacks by trained close-quarter combat units. According to one source, such a unit will be composed of from six to nine men and a leader, and will be organized into three teams of two or three men each—a so-called neutralizing team, a track-attacking team, and a demolition team.

The Jap Engineer School has recommended that, besides a “cool and resolute mind with a firm belief in victory”, the close-combat soldier must be familiar with the characteristics and tactical employment of U. S. and British tanks. He must also know how to prepare and use his tank fighting weapons. Wherever possible, he must select assault positions in advance of anticipated tank attacks, but initiative in “taking advantage of shortcomings in the enemy situation” is also stressed.

Before engaging a tank, a Jap close-combat unit leader deploys his men in depth across as wide a front as possible. A typical disposition is an inverted “V” with the neutralization team facing an oncoming tank, the track-attacking team located to the right and rear, and the demolition team to the left rear. The unit leader takes his position in the center of this formation. A normal distance between groups is 30 yards.

A close-combat unit of this type opens its attack with the neutralizing team trying to impair the visibility of the tank crew. This may be attempted with smoke or flame, or both. The most commonly known Jap weapons of this type are the frangible smoke grenade, smoke pots, and Molotov cocktails. Against flame-throwing tanks, the use of smoke grenades fired from a grenade discharger is recommended. One enemy source makes reference to a “hand-thrown smoke tube” which will break when thrown onto the tank at close range, allowing the smoke chemical to adhere to the tank and envelop it. Flame throwers also are recommended. By such tactics, the neutraliz-



Diagrammatic sketch of a typical attack position for a close-combat unit, as advocated by the Japanese Engineer School.

ing team tries to blind the tank gunners and cause the tank driver to slacken speed. The neutralizing team also may throw conical hand mines¹ against the tank periscopes and guns, in an attempt to put them out of action.

At this point the track-attacking team approaches and, taking advantage of any slackening of speed and offensive reaction from the tank, will try to destroy one of the tank tracks. Usually one track only will be attacked, its destruction being sufficient to immobilize the vehicle. For this purpose the track-attacking team will be armed with explosives lashed to the end of a pole. Whereas any large pole charge can be used, the most suitable are standard pressure-detonated antitank mines—such as the model 93 “tape-measure” mine, the Model 3 “ceramic” mine, and the so-called “yardstick” mine. Any of these can be lashed easily to a pole.

The Japanese anticipate that once a U. S. tank has been stopped, it may still continue to fire until it has been destroyed and the crew killed. This is the mission of the demolition team.

As soon as the tank has been crippled, the demolition team moves in to make the kill. Specifically, its mission is to destroy the engine and to kill the tank crew. For this work the Japanese recently have developed a number of demolitions, most of them designed around the hollow-charge explosive principle of piercing armor plate. Some of these—for example, the “lunge mine”²—are pure suicide weapons. Other weapons, such as satchel charges, and the familiar Model 99 “magnetic” mine are actuated by delay igniters.

Since the advent of the lunge mine and the conical hand mine in Jap antitank fighting in the Philippines, there has been accumulating evidence of Jap developments in other hollow-charge antitank weapons designed specifically for close-combat units.

¹ See *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 7, pp. 68-69.

² See *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 7, pp. 64-65.

These are the 5-kilogram, hemispherical armor-piercing mine, and the 3-kilogram, cone-shaped armor-piercing charge.

The Japanese claim that the 5-kilogram, hemispherical armor-piercing mine is capable of penetrating 8 inches of armor plate, or of killing or injuring a tank crew by concussion alone. This charge resembles a small version of the hemispherical antiboat mine without the chemical horn detonators. It is actuated by the same type of delay fuze used in the Model 99 magnetic mine. According to the Jap Army Engineer School, demolition teams may use the 5-kilogram mine either as a pole charge or as a "suspension-type" mine. As a pole charge, the mine is lashed to a wooden handle so that it may be held or placed more easily against the side or top armor of the tank. When used as a suspension-type mine, the 5-kilogram mine is tied to the end of a rope, while a sandbag weight is tied to the other end. In this form the mine is used primarily in attacking the side armor of a tank. The demolition team soldier armed with a suspension mine approaches the tank, places the flat base of the mine against the side armor, and then slings the weighted rope across the top of the tank. The sandbag weight will then allow the mine to dangle against the tank side until the mine detonates.

The 3-kilogram, cone-shaped armor-piercing charge is reputed to be capable of penetrating armor 6 inches thick. This charge is built into a wire frame, and a circular wire grid is fastened to the bottom of the cone. This grid, which is larger in circumference than the base surface of the explosive, keeps the charge from tipping over when it is placed on the top or hung on the side armor of the tank. It is used in the same manner as the hemispherical mine.

Close-quarter antitank combat is hazardous, at best, but it is ineffective against tanks that operate with proper infantry or mutual support. The Japanese realize this, and specify that

close-quarter combat units should be aided by "fire directed to scatter the accompanying U. S. infantry and to force the tanks to close their vision ports". Every indication points toward the increased use of close-quarter combat units by the Japanese. A Jap infantry instructor, a Major Awajima, has summed up the Japanese predicament by saying, "Due to the recent strengthening of the enemy's tank armor and the difficulty of replenishing our supplies, it has become increasingly difficult for us to improve and increase our antitank weapons. Notwithstanding this difficulty, the intensity of anti-tank attacks should be increased. Regulations and reference books clearly explain the principles of close-quarter attack."



THE NEW JUKI


Weight Reduced by 52 Pounds

Soldiers who are familiar with the *Juki* —the rather cumbersome Model 92 (1932) standard heavy machine gun—will be interested to learn that the Japanese have produced a new, handier model of their heavy machine gun. The new weapon is designated the Model 01 (1941).

The outstanding features of the Model 01 are its removable barrel and the reduction made in weight over the *Juki*, for the Model 01 weighs nearly 50 percent less than the Model 92. The reduction in weight has been accomplished by a lightening of the weight of most component parts. In turn, reductions in the moving parts has produced a somewhat higher rate of fire than the Model 92's, but since the Model 01's barrel is shorter, it is believed that the newer gun has less range than the Model 92, which is practically a copy of the Model 3 (1914) Hotchkiss-type heavy machine gun.

The new gun is gas-operated and air-cooled, but dispenses with the very heavy barrel jacket which permits the Model 92 to maintain a steady rate of fire without excessive heating. The introduction of the removable barrel is supposed to compensate for the loss of barrel jacket. However, it is estimated that trained crews should require approximately 1 minute to effect the barrel change, for the barrel lock is definitely not of the quick-release type.

Though the *Juki* takes both rimmed and rimless caliber 7.7-mm ammunition, the new Model 01 (for reasons best known



The new Model 01 (1941) Japanese heavy machine gun.

to the Japanese) takes only rimless ammunition. This ammunition is fed from the left side in the usual 30-round metal strips. Fire is controlled by a thumbpiece-trigger, but the thumbpiece does not also serve as the safety. The safety device consists of a lever on the left side of the receiver.

The Model 01's tripod, though similar to that of its predecessor, is generally improved. It shows that consideration has been given to carefully calibrated indirect fire along fixed lines, if not for accurate searching fire. A telescopic sight may be fitted.

These figures compare the Model 01 and the Model 92:

	Model 01	Model 92 (<i>Juki</i>)
Weight of tripod.....	36.3 pounds	61 pounds
Weight of gun.....	33.6 pounds	61 pounds
Total weight	69.9 pounds	122 pounds
Length without flash hider.....	38 inches	45 inches
Length of barrel.....	23.9 inches	29.5 inches
Total traverse	45 degrees	33.5 degrees

Only one sample of a Model 01 has so far been encountered. This one was found on Luzon. Though it was numbered "Serial 1", the weapon was a production job, and not just an experimental item hand-made by some arsenal. It is not known whether the Japanese have produced the Model 01 in any quantity, or whether they consider it superior enough to the *Juki* to warrant replacement of the latter in spite of deterioration of production facilities and of increasing need for artillery, anti-tank, antiaircraft, and armored vehicles.



IN BRIEF

JAP TACTICS—AUSTRALIAN COUNTERMEASURES

Australian troops have been fighting the Japs for a long time. They grubbed their way through the jungles of New Guinea in the early days of the Pacific war, and they still are down in the Southwest Pacific, handling the unpleasant task of cleaning out the Japs that have been isolated in that area. A few Australian observations about Jap tactics, and about some of the countermeasures the Aussies use, are reprinted here.

1. The Japanese approach march is invariably made along terrain features, such as a ridge, in close formation.

Countermeasure: Lay artillery, heavy weapons, and ambush along ridge and stream lines leading into positions.

2. First element or wave of a Japanese attack is a silent group armed with bayonets, hand grenades and wire cutters. This is followed by a noisy echelon, flanked by noise or machine guns.

Countermeasure: Always dig in deep enough at every bivouac. (One officer suggests occupying a dummy position during the day to deceive Jap observers, and move into real positions

after dark.) Patrol vigorously and well out in front. Don't be fooled by noises. Make a point of seeing the enemy. Maintain silence and blackout.

3. Japanese infiltrate through our lines. They expect and intend that we will fall back.

Countermeasure: Don't fall back. Hold your line. If you fall back there will be no opportunity to reorganize your line. The Japanese may be in behind us, but we are also in behind them. When they fail to demoralize us, they don't know what to do next.

4. Japs place snipers and machine guns in trees and cover, and leave them there while we pass.

Countermeasure: Do the same, only better, and don't fall back or be demoralized by sniping. Keep a lookout to observe the enemy. He won't fire until he is on your flank or rear.

5. Japs hold to low spots and strips of jungle.

Countermeasure: Put plenty of artillery and heavy weapons on these jungle strips between ridges before moving into them. It is a mistake to rush over a grassy strip into a jungle draw.

6. Japs fire high.

Countermeasure: Stay down. Bullet marks on trees are mostly 21½ feet above ground.

7. Japs like hand-to-hand fighting with bayonets.

Countermeasure: Give it to them. They only like it when their opponents don't fight back.

8. Japs attack on a narrow front.

Countermeasure: When you have a target for heavy weapons use plenty of ammunition.

MACHINE-GUN TRICKS

A battalion commander in the Philippines has reported a machine-gun trick that the Japs recently used against his troops. The Jap machine gunners would emplace their guns on the crest or forward slope of a hill in such a way that the fire was

directed into the U. S. perimeter. When the Americans reacted with artillery, the Jap gunners retired to deep foxholes on the reverse slope of the hill, but continued to operate their guns by means of long strings tied from the triggers to the foxholes. On other occasions, the gunners would pin the U. S. soldiers in their foxholes, and then raise their fire enough to allow the Jap infantry to creep up on the perimeter. In this way they took astute advantage of the tendency a man has to keep his head down as long as lead is flying by overhead.



JAP RIFLE TECHNIQUE

The fire technique of some Jap riflemen has been reported by an infantry lieutenant who has fought on Guam and Leyte. He has observed that when the Japanese soldier entrenched himself in a foxhole, the Jap zeroed his rifle on a spot—such as a trail intersection or a patch leading out of the bush into a clearing—which was likely to be traversed by U. S. soldiers.

It is the lieutenant's opinion that the Jap did this because his foxhole was so small, and so well camouflaged, that only a


small hole was left through which his rifle could be sighted. The Japanese soldier would wait patiently for an American to walk in front of his sights. For this reason, the lieutenant said, it was dangerous for a man to run out and try to aid a wounded soldier. In one sector four of the lieutenant's men were shot in this manner when trying to aid a wounded comrade.

SOCK BOOBY TRAP

A U. S. Army captain returned from Saipan has told of a clever booby trap used by the Japanese to take advantage of souvenir-hunting soldiers. Some of the Japs on Saipan apparently carried their personal possessions around in a sock, and American soldiers overrunning a Jap bivouac area became accustomed to picking up these socks and shaking out the souvenirs. However, on some occasions—instead of chop sticks, a Jap flag, and ten-yen notes—a sock would contain a U. S. hand grenade with the safety pin pulled.

RADIO DECEPTION

The fact that many Japanese can speak and understand English was emphasized in one instance during the fighting on Saipan. At one place on the island, the U. S. troops established an ammunition dump in a defilade where it could not be seen from the Japanese positions. Despite this, and despite the fact that the Japs had no air observation, the dump was shelled with regularity twice a day for 4 days. Eventually, a Jap soldier equipped with a radio was captured in the area, and this man admitted that he had been directing the artillery fire—in English. If at any time his fire direction had been picked up through American receivers, it apparently had not been suspected, because the orders were given in English instead of Japanese.



FRUIT-CAN BOOBY TRAP

U. S. troops working in captured Japanese ration dumps should beware of a clever Jap booby trap designed to catch hungry and unwary soldiers. Known as the "fruit-can booby trap", this device has been reported both from the Philippines and Burma.

This booby trap consists of an ordinary tin can filled with explosive and fitted with a pull-type fuze which protrudes from the sides of the can. The nature of the can is cleverly disguised with an exact counterfeit of a U. S. canned fruit or canned jam label. These explosive-filled cans have been reported found in captured cases of bona-fide canned fruit—the pull fuze fixed to explode the charge when the cans were lifted from the cases. It is believed to be manufactured, and not a field expedient.

More booby traps of this, and other prefabricated types, may make their appearance as U. S. troops drive closer to Japan.



BURNING GRASS

An occasion when the Japanese in Burma turned burning grass into an offensive weapon has been reported recently. The incident occurred when the Japs, retreating from the northern combat area, used a gasoline-oil mixture to soak a grassy area, approximately 100 yards long, on the Jap-held side of a river. When Allied troops crossed the river and advanced into the grassy area, they were met with a hail of fire from tracer and incendiary ammunition. The oil-soaked grass was ignited, and some casualties occurred before the area could be cleared.

PREFABRICATED WOODEN MINE

Although Japanese improvised wooden box mines have been encountered on occasion in the Philippines, the capture of Iwo Jima has revealed the development of a factory-made wooden land mine manufactured to standard specifications by the Japs. Approximately 7 inches square and 5 inches deep, the mine is filled with $4\frac{1}{2}$ pounds of explosive encased in a rubber bag. This mine is fuzeed with the combination pressure or trip-wire fuze used in the Model 3 pottery land mine¹. The threaded

¹ See *Intelligence Bulletin*. Vol. III, No. 4, p. 4.

rubber fuze seat is nailed to the underside of the wooden cover, and a hole is bored through the cover to permit the fuze to be inserted into the seat. The cover is fastened onto the wooden box by eight screws. The sides of the box are dovetailed, and are nailed together by six nails at each corner. The 37 nails and eight screws contained in the whole mine will probably permit detection by mine detectors. When prepared for shipment, ten mines are packaged in a wooden shipping case. The fuzes are packed separately.

JAP TENACITY

Japanese soldiers must be watched as carefully as a dangerous, hunted animal. This has been emphasized in an incident which occurred at Kohima, Assam:

After Allied troops had cleared the enemy from Kohima and had destroyed many bunker positions, three of our men, who were passing some of these wrecked positions, noticed a slight movement in one of them. When they paused to investigate, they saw the point of a bayonet protruding from the debris. Gradually the bayonet enlarged a hole, out of which came the head and shoulders of a Jap officer. The soldiers were confident of a good capture. But as the Jap came out of the bunker—where he must have been buried for several hours—he attempted to throw a grenade and was promptly blown to bits.

On another occasion, when Jap soldiers in a large, deep dugout refused to surrender, pole charges were used to collapse the dugout and bury its occupants. Two days later Allied soldiers opened this dugout to look for maps or other useful papers. They found the “bodies” of 12 officers and men. While these “bodies” were being removed, two of them came to life, and in spite of their weakness and exhaustion, these Japs also tried to throw grenades.



TANK AMBUSH IN BURMA

During the fighting in northern Burma, the Jap antitank gunners consistently used an unusual tank ambush. A very narrow fire lane was cut through the jungle, and at right angles to a road or trail. At the end of this lane—some 25 to 30 yards from the road—an antitank gun was emplaced behind a log revetment. As a tank approached along the road, the gun was not traversed, but fired point-blank as the tank crossed the lane of fire. A hit at this range usually disabled the tank, which had to be abandoned by the crew. Then, at night, the Japs would burn any such tanks left disabled on the road.

IMPROVISED INCENDIARY GRENADE

Improvised frangible incendiary grenades, made from materials easily obtained in the field, may figure prominently as a Japanese emergency weapon in the future, and variations may

even be used by Japanese civilians in any last-ditch stand. Here is an example of such a grenade—one intended primarily for use against Allied armored vehicles and fortifications. The Japanese believe that this weapon is capable of such substantial results as setting tank engines and pillbox interiors on fire, and impeding their use.


The grenade consists of inflammable paper and a bottle containing an inflammable substance. For several grenades, a single container bag is provided. If a typical Japanese cider bottle is used, the weight of the grenade is about $1\frac{3}{4}$ pounds.

A bottle is cleaned and completely dried. Fifty grams of sulphuric acid are put into the bottle, and then gasoline is poured in until the bottle is 80 percent full. Also, to extend the burning time, some waste oil or creosote may be added. After this, the bottle is plugged tight.

The Japanese are instructed to be particularly careful in filling the bottle, for if the sulphuric acid is poured into a bottle which still contains moisture, heat will be generated and damage may ensue. Furthermore, if the bottle is completely filled with gasoline, the vaporization pressure will cause the bottle to break.

For the plug the Japanese try to select a material that will not become permeated by the gasoline and sulphuric acid. When the grenades are not to be used for a long period, the Japanese may close the bottle by forcing a wooden plug into the mouth and then sealing it with wax or parafin.

The explosive agent is a sheet of paper, chemically treated, which is wrapped around the bottle before the grenade is thrown. In preparing this paper, the Japanese mix approximately equal amounts of potassium chlorate and charcoal powder—adding some sulphur and sugar, if possible. Small quantities of this mixture are placed on a sheet of paper, about 1 foot square, as shown in the drawing. Paste is spread on another sheet of paper in such a manner as not to come in contact with the mix-



Japanese soldiers may improvise frangible incendiary grenades from materials readily available in the field.

ture when the second sheet is laid over the first. Thus, when the two sheets are pressed together, the mixture is sealed into a number of small pockets. Paste is spread along one end of either of the sheets, and the sheets are rolled into a single cylinder and sealed. Each cylinder is made so that a bottle can be slipped into it without undue forcing. A "good fit" is the objective. The cylinders are stored in packages of 50.

Enemy soldiers are warned that in mixing the potassium chlorate, charcoal powder, and sugar, particular care must be taken to avoid injuries, since the procedure is comparable to that used in making black powder.

The principle of the ignition of the frangible incendiary grenade is the utilization of the propensity of potassium chlorate to explode when it is heated by an acid. The charcoal powder, sugar, and sulphur facilitate ignition.

The Japanese soldier is warned that unless he takes certain precautions, the frangible incendiary grenade may not ignite when he throws it. The primary cause of faulty ignition, Japanese instructions point out, is the failure of the sulphuric acid to come into contact with the chemical mixture sealed into the prepared wrapper. Therefore, the enemy soldier is told to make sure that the wrapper fits the bottle snugly enough to keep the two parts from separating in mid-air. The grenade is supposed to be thrown against a target at very short range so that the bottle will be shattered completely. The accompanying sketch shows how the Jap soldier grasps the grenade when he is ready to throw it.



"Why We Lost"

A Post Mortem by a German Commander

A Panzer Grenadier regiment on the Italian Front launched an attack which proved a complete failure. Afterward, the regimental commander prepared a detailed analysis of the battle conduct of the units in his command, sparing no one in his criticism. Two factors are significant. The first is that the most elementary mistakes were made by company officers and noncoms, a reflection on the training and experience of those leaders. The second, and even more important, is that the commander acted vigorously to prevent a recurrence of the mistakes.

"The regiment was unable to gain any ground of importance," the commander pointed out. "We suffered severe and bloody casualties, and became so disorganized that about 12 hours were necessary for us to regroup. This might have enabled a more energetic opponent to break through and threaten [a key town] from the rear, if not actually to capture the town, and

bring about the annihilation of our regiment. Allied casualties were not heavy. It must be recognized that the enemy has retained his fighting spirit, and undoubtedly will continue his attempts to break through."

The commander then outlined what he considered the specific reasons for the failure of the attack.

Companies, he said, were not given enough time to fit themselves adequately into the tactical picture—"and, in fact, never *did* get into it."

Proper time schedules were not established, or, if they were, they were not adhered to.

Companies allowed themselves to become scattered as a result of Allied artillery fire. They were drawn off into a flanking sector, and then attacked where they had no business to be.

Scattered elements pushed ahead without bothering to maintain contact and communication with their unit commanders, or else they stayed where they were and attempted no further action, thus permitting themselves to become targets for artillery and heavy infantry weapons.

Company commanders failed to designate contact platoons—"if, in fact, they gave any orders at all," the regimental commander added. As a result, considerable sorting-out was necessary.

Light machine guns were not so sited as to enable the attack to follow through.

No Very lights were sent up. As a result, battalion commanders, artillery, and support units did not know the whereabouts of forward troops.

Company commanders failed to rally their assault squads after these had become disorganized; or, at any rate, the commanders did not muster the remaining elements for further attack, but wandered about without any apparent plan or objective.

Battalion commanders went forward in the proper way to try to remedy the confusion; however they left behind some of the most essential means by which their commands might have been carried out, and at the same time deprived their companies of radio sections and light machine guns. Battalion commanders neglected to order "Hang on—dig in—regroup, until fresh positions have been prepared." To a certain extent, the regimental commander commented, they were prevented from doing this by the breakdown of forward communications.

Battalion commanders changed their headquarters "far too soon, and far too often" with the result that subsequent action by the artillery and self-propelled weapons lacked order and coordination.

Officers commanding heavy companies were not at battalion headquarters to ensure coordination of fire at all times, and to take command in the absence of the battalion commander.

Insufficient use was made of the artillery. Forward observers were not forward at all, but were back at battalion headquarters. Also, individual forward observers had failed to exchange frequencies.

Executives either had been given no clues at all regarding their commanders' intentions, or were deprived of communication with the commanders, and could not report, take action, or even get into contact with companies.

Communication nets were poorly organized and generally inadequate.

Troops often ran straight into Allied fire without even trying to deliver fire from their own weapons.

Owing to the bad state of communications, the heavy weapons were unable either to concentrate their fire or to support individual forward thrusts.

Because of inadequate means of intercommunication, direct and indirect fire were in no way related to each other.

Companies which were echeloned to the rear came forward into the outpost lines much too soon, and without orders from the battalion commander. As a result, battalion commanders had nothing in hand and were obliged to commit their assault platoons prematurely, to achieve even the slightest gains.

Defense areas in front of the two objectives had not been decided upon beforehand in conference and made known to the gunners and supporting infantry, as a protection against counterattacks. When supporting fire was being given, these areas were not engaged at all.

One battalion reported over and over again that the second objective had been reached. These erroneous statements were based entirely on observation through binoculars, and not on actual reports from companies. As a matter of fact, the battalion in question had not yet firmly secured the first objective, but was merely scattered over that general area.

At no time was a report made when a prearranged report line had been reached or passed.

"Neither battalion executive nor company commanders, let alone platoon commanders or squad leaders, can read a map," the regimental commander stated flatly. "At best, only a rough or an incorrect check is made on the ground, but generally none at all. In this way, reporting, which in any case is poor enough, becomes damnably inaccurate."

Where there was no line communication, battalion and company commanders did not avail themselves of the lateral radio link, but instead, made inquiries first at higher headquarters. The regimental commander added, "Many an officer is without a clue as to the technical aids at his disposal, their capabilities, and their potentialities. This ignorance is detrimental to combat efficiency."

He concluded with regret that only in the most exceptional cases could his unit commanders be called genuine leaders, and

observed that, at best, they were to be found "stuck out in front," in dangerously exposed positions.

From this chronicle of mistakes the regimental commander drew the following lessons, and ordered that they be used as a guide in all subsequent actions.

"The shorter the time allowed for the preparation of an attack or other operation, and the weaker the forces at your disposal, the more painstaking the briefing must be, and the more carefully the preparatory orders must be given and executed.

"From the old main line of resistance, all commanders must acquaint themselves with the terrain over which they are to attack. At the same time, definite bearings must be taken for finding direction, and check points must be selected. Meticulous orientation must be carried out beforehand by each company commander. Should there not be time for this, exact points for direction finding and reference points should be worked out from the most up-to-date maps available.

"Routes to the objectives or report lines must be outlined by battalions, and must take into consideration the opposition that may be expected and the difficulties that are likely to be encountered in covering the ground. Regimental objectives and report lines should be disclosed only to battalions, and not to companies. Battalions should then judge from company reports when regimental objectives and report lines have been reached.

"Orders must make quite clear just what action, if any, is to be taken when (1) companies run into Allied defenses, (2) Allied fire is opened from the flank, (3) an Allied counter-attack is mounted, (4) objectives are reached, (5) companies appear to be scattering, and (6) part of a company pushes too far or gets held up.

"For each expected phase of the battle, a fire concentration and coordination of heavy infantry weapons and artillery must be planned beforehand.

“Weapons must be detailed to deal with hostile flanking fire—that is to say, the heavy machine guns of the rearmost company and some of the mortars or heavy mortars.

“In accordance with the anticipated extent of Allied resistance, a fire plan must be agreed upon, to assist the advance of companies and assault squads. In the event of the battle taking an unforeseen turn—such as the right platoon of the forward company advancing more rapidly than the left platoon—weapons (including heavy weapons) must be sufficiently ready and manageable so that they can switch their fire immediately.

“Contact companies and platoons must be detailed.

“Detailed orders will be given for companies to employ Very lights in case communications break down.

“It must be made known beforehand exactly where the heavy weapons company commander can be found, and only in exceptional circumstances will he *not* be at battalion headquarters.”



Noting similarities between German patrol tactics described in a *Bulletin* article¹ and those observed by a troop in his outfit, Capt. Ted F. Douthitt, S-2 of the 104th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron (M), wrote the following account especially for our readers.

TACTICS OF A GERMAN PATROL

GENERAL SITUATION

"Captain Stouffer's Troop 'C' was employed on a line in contact with the enemy (see accompanying map). Platoons occupied outpost and dugout positions with mutual fire support, but extremely poor observation. (Hedgerows and orchards were profuse.) Communications depended strictly upon line-wire telephones, with radios in reserve for emergency use.

"The main obstacle was a canal ('No Man's Land'), 15 to 20 yards wide, which ran from northwest to southeast through the Troop's sector.

"Enemy 'feeler' patrols, consisting of from five to ten men, had been reconnoitering troop 'C's' area nightly for approximately 5 to 6 days after this unit had relieved the unit previously in the line.

"Up to the time of the special situation, enemy artillery and infantry activity had been considered normal for this particular sector."


¹ "A Raid on A U. S. Outpost," *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. III, No. 6, pp. 37-39 (February, 1945).

SPECIAL SITUATION

"An enemy patrol, later determined to have consisted of approximately 50 to 60 men with a 40-man reserve, crossed the canal at the bridge sometime between 2158 and 2330. Continuous flares and lights were reported in Troop 'C's' area throughout the night. (It should be noted that enemy patrols use flashlights to draw fire, and thus disclose the location of dugouts and strongpoints.) Possible movement of 20-mm cannon was reported at 0201 and 0225 from the vicinity of the canal.

"Enemy action started about 0500 with diversionary shelling of the infantry on our left flank. At 0559 the enemy artillery shifted its fire into Captain Stouffer's area, and laid a heavy barrage for approximately 5 to 10 minutes. After the barrage lifted, the enemy patrol moved from its assembly point, and split into segments, as indicated on the accompanying map. Twenty to 25 men, equipped with automatic weapons and five light machine guns, established a base of fire. Twelve to 15 men, equipped with automatic weapons and a 20-mm cannon on a hand carriage mount, constituted the left flank patrol. (Later the 20-mm cannon was discovered to be a 20-mm *Flak 38* converted to the ground mount.) Twelve to 15 men, with automatic weapons and bazookas, constituted the right flank patrol. Before these elements moved into their positions, they proved extremely proficient at disarming American booby traps, both the prefabricated and the improvised types.

"Upon moving into position, the enemy patrols opened small-arms and machine-gun fire on suspected dugout positions. When positive identification of one of our strongpoints had been established, they shifted to solid tracer fire from their automatic weapons. This tracer fire was targeted on our positions, and then was raised until the tracers were streaming into the sky, making a perfect X. Two or 3 minutes later, enemy artillery



would open up on the area where the tracers had crossed. When artillery had registered on one point, the patrols then selected another dugout or strongpoint, again selected targets by the use of tracers, and again adjusted for the enemy artillery on the south side of the canal.

“Another method of bringing fire upon our strongpoints was to have one man from the enemy patrol place flares, much like our railroad flares, on the spot where he wanted fire, and within a few minutes enemy artillery was registered on that spot.

“The patrol on the right flank was equipped with bazookas. It fired at our dugouts simultaneously with the enemy artillery, and then quickly moved into alternate positions to fire with the next salvo.

“During the action of designating targets with tracer fire, a machine gun, which had been left on the north side of the canal, provided liaison and adjustment for the right-flank and left-flank machine guns. If this machine gun picked out a target, it would fire solid tracer into the area and designate targets, or adjust for the machine guns of the enemy’s right and left flank patrols.

“At 0615 our artillery opened fire on the enemy patrols, firing time bursts. This fire, together with that of the enemy artillery, caused the patrols to become disorganized and to retreat south of the canal. Our artillery swept the canal from left to right for 200 yards for possible crossing points.

“At 0710 and 0730, spasmodic fire from the enemy’s automatic weapons covered his retreat across the canal. At 0710 a 40-man patrol was seen moving south from the town of X. It was assumed that this patrol was a reserve for the one which had infiltrated into Troop ‘C’s’ area, and that if the previous patrol had been successful it would have moved across the canal

to consolidate its positions and gains. Our artillery opened fire on the fresh reserve patrol, and caused it to disperse. As the patrol crossed the canal under our artillery fire, the leader of the patrol fired a single red flare, and enemy artillery ceased firing."

CONCLUSION

"A *resumé* of the situation revealed that we had only one man wounded, with the others rather shaken up. At a final estimate it was found that the enemy artillery had dropped approximately 400 rounds into the sector, and that friendly artillery had fired over 300 rounds into the same area.

"The enemy patrols suffered two dead and from 10 to 15 wounded. That afternoon, we sent three special patrols down to the canal, to investigate the area for crossing points. These patrols found two white flags stuck into the ground; the enemy seemingly had used these flags as markers during the night, when they returned to the canal.

"Upon inspection of the bodies of the two dead Germans, it was found that their *Soldbuchs* were missing. Either these had been removed from the dead men's pockets by their comrades, or else it was a policy not to carry these paybooks while on patrol. No unit identifications were obtained.

"While German patrols pull every kind of crazy stunt to draw our fire, their night-patrol operations indicate careful planning, excellent cooperation, and precise execution.

Although this one U. S. Troop has experienced 765 rounds of artillery fire in 11 days, its personnel have sustained only four superficial wounds. (This artillery fire has included 10 to 20 rounds of 240-mm projectiles.) The unit's careful consideration of experiences related by others in the *Intelligence Bulletin* accounts for its success to date both in repelling raiding parties and in escaping serious casualties."




CONCRETE STICK HAND GRENADE

Large quantities of German concrete stick, or “potato masher”, grenades have been recovered in various areas of the European Theater. Although it formerly had been supposed that such grenades were local improvisations, evidence now suggests that their design has been accorded official recognition. Two types have been found.

Type 1 consists of a wooden handle, rectangular in cross-section, with a $\frac{3}{8}$ -inch-square groove running the length of the handle. A length of cord, attached to a pull fuze, operates through this groove. Often the other end of the cord is tied to a small piece of wood, which serves as a pull knob. This is wired to the end of the handle with soft, easily broken shear wire.

The forward end of the wooden handle is slotted to form two prongs similar to those of a tuning fork. Iron wire is wrapped around these prongs, partly to strengthen the concrete, but chiefly to secure the concrete head to the handle. The head has a hollow core to accommodate a standard stick TNT demolition charge, $1\frac{1}{4}$ inches in diameter. Two metal inserts above the wooden prongs reinforce the cavity, and permit the insertion of the standard stick charge.

At the base of the concrete head is a small square of translucent waterproof paper over a cardboard square of equal size. There is a hole $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch in diameter in the center of the cardboard, to admit the igniter to the bursting charge. This hole is aligned with the square groove in the handle.



German concrete stick hand grenade, Type 1, with stick TNT inserted in the cavity.



German concrete stick hand grenade, Type 2, with stick TNT embedded in the concrete.

Type 2 resembles Type 1, but is much simpler. Instead of a hollow in the head of the wooden handle to hold the stick charge, a semicircular cavity is milled into the wood, the explosive charge is placed in this cavity, and the whole assembly then is centered in the concrete mold. It will be noted that in the case

of Type 2 the charge is actually molded into the concrete, and projects about $\frac{3}{8}$ inch on the end toward the handle.

In both types the explosive charge is the stick TNT demolition charge, *Bohrpatrone 28*, containing about $3\frac{1}{2}$ ounces of explosive and coated with waxed paper. The stick is 4 inches long, slightly more than an inch in diameter, and has a threaded aluminum insert cast into the explosive to accommodate standard German detonators. The usual detonator well is cast into the stick, and the cavity is sealed with a red sticker, which denotes the presence of TNT. The standard *B.Z. 24* friction pull fuze, having a delay element of 4 to 5 seconds, is used.



IN BRIEF

RIEGELMINES UNDER CORDUROY ROADS

German use of Riegelmines under corduroy roads has been reported. An instance of this new minelaying method is illustrated in the accompanying sketch.

A corduroy road, laid and extensively used by the Germans, had been mined with Riegelmines staggered so as to cover the entire width of the road. Two of the mines were detonated by an Allied vehicle, and the road subsequently was swept with mine detectors. When the three remaining mines were located, it was found that they had been laid under removable sections of timber, which had been cut in a special manner, as the sketch on page 63 shows.

It was evident that these sections had been cut out when the road was being laid, in preparation for minelaying later on. Since the road had become covered with mud, as a result of continual usage, the Germans no doubt found it a very easy matter to lay the mines, replace the sections of timber, and smear mud



German method of laying Riegelmines under a corduroy road.

for camouflage. The entire operation had been performed so efficiently that at first it was thought that whole lengths of timber had been removed to permit the minelaying.

No antilifting devices had been fitted. Under the circumstances this was rather surprising, inasmuch as the Germans could easily have inserted a pull fuze in each wire, and connected it to a removable section of timber by means of wire or cord. In the future, certainly, Allied troops who use corduroy roads in hostile areas should be on the lookout for this type of booby-trapping.

ADD BOOBY TRAPS

A U. S. platoon leader reports an unusual booby trap that the Germans had rigged in a building that the lieutenant's division subsequently used as a command post. The building was a wooden structure, with a tin roof. When rain began to fall, it was noticed that there was a small hole in the roof, which permitted the rain to leak into the building. A soldier was directed to go up on the roof and mend the leak. He found that a sheet of the tin roofing apparently had slipped out of place. When he drew the sheet back into place, he caused a pull-type booby trap to detonate, and suffered serious injury.

"TO SEE OURSELVES—"

Experienced German soldiers, recently taken prisoner in Italy, have criticized Allied soldiers for their habit of exposing themselves carelessly.

One group of Germans said that, when they surrendered, they still had pistols in their holsters and were carrying a loaded machine pistol. Two Allied sentries sprang out of the bushes, their weapons at their hips, and took the Germans prisoner. This was foolhardy behavior, commented the Germans, who pointed out that they themselves might have been part of a pre-arranged trap. "The sentries should have remained under cover, and ordered us to advance without our weapons," the Germans said. "The sentries should not have exposed themselves until the last minute. Even then, only one of them should have stepped forward, while the other kept us covered."

Prisoners criticize Allied soldiers in general on the score of being too carefree in the line. They accuse us of playing at soldiering. We seem to be incapable of realizing how deadly serious a game it is, they say, and add that they suppose this is why we still have not learned how to make proper use of cover and concealment.

Here are four pertinent comments from British company officers who have discovered the importance of remedying such negligence in their own units:

"Twenty-four hours after a battalion of the X Infantry Regiment had been relieved and brought back into reserve, a patrol approached a unit on the left flank of the relieving battalion. When challenged, the patrol leader called out that he was a major in the X Infantry, returning with a patrol. The party was wearing battle dress, and the sentry let them pass through. It was, of course, a Boche patrol."


"Men are likely to become astonishingly careless during lulls in operations. They use obvious roads and paths, even though these are within the enemy's view; they move in the open on the sunny side of a valley, even when the other side affords good shadow cover; and they rise up after napping in trenches, and stretch their arms."

"About 2 weeks ago I lost a darned good sergeant, and only because on that occasion he had neglected to darken his chevrons—that is, to scrub off the whitening. Officers and noncoms can't make themselves conspicuous in the front line, and expect to get away with it. They won't."

"More than once . . . I saw our troops give themselves away by moving around in their positions."

SNIPER SCORE

A German sniper working for a 7-day furlough, the reward for ten successful shots, accounted for five Americans before he was captured. Four of the five were shot from the same position, and all in one day. In each instance, the victim had carelessly left cover and stood still in the open. And in two cases the sniper had three bunched-up men from whom to choose his target.



No type of terrain is considered an obstacle, and full advantage is taken of routes over cliffs and other terrain features normally impassable.



SOVIET INFILTRATION UNITS IN MOUNTAIN WARFARE

For Soviet troops engaged in combat in mountainous and forested areas, the Red Army advocates the use of small units to infiltrate through mountain defenses and harass an enemy's lines of communication. Although this tactic is not new—the Japanese have used it extensively in jungle fighting—the Russians, unlike the Japs, employ infiltration units as carefully coordinated parts of a general offensive operation designed to encircle and destroy mountain strongpoints and their defending troops.

These infiltration units may vary in size, a typical unit being composed of an infantry section or an infantry platoon. Such a unit is heavily armed with submachine guns or automatic rifles, a mortar, and possibly a machine gun or more. It is not unusual for engineers to be attached to a unit, their function being the reduction of obstacles which might impede the advance of the unit.

The Red Army conception of mountain warfare envisages the employment of large masses of troops, despite terrain. An enemy line of mountain strongpoints is softened by powerful artillery and air bombardment. Then, under cover of its own mortars and direct fire weapons, an infantry assault is launched



A typical infiltration unit is heavily armed with submachine guns or automatic rifles, a mortar, and possibly a machine gun or more.

in an endeavor to pin down the enemy defenses and perhaps secure a breakthrough.

It is during this assault, when the enemy troops are fully occupied defending their positions, that the infiltration units take advantage of unguarded terrain, or move through the breakthrough to establish themselves deep in the enemy rear area. No type of terrain is considered an obstacle, and full advantage is taken of routes over cliffs and other terrain features normally considered by the enemy to be impassable. Several infiltration units may move independently through the same general area.

The mission of these small groups is to emerge eventually in a predesignated sector on the main supply and evacuation route in the enemy rear area. Here they occupy dominating terrain and endeavor to block all movement of supply and evacuation to and from the enemy mountain strongpoints. Small patrols



Small patrols roam over a wide area, harassing indiscriminate targets in an effort to create the impression that a much larger force has penetrated the enemy rear.



Infiltration units occupy dominating terrain, and main roads are interdicted with small-arms fire until the enemy is forced to use secondary roads or to cease all movement temporarily.

roam over a wide area harassing indiscriminate targets in an effort to create the impression that a much larger force had penetrated to the enemy rear. Vehicles are wrecked and used as road blocks, and main roads are interdicted with small-arms fire until the enemy is forced to use secondary roads for communication, or to cease temporarily all movement to and from his front.

However, the Red Army realizes that small units cannot count on remaining unmolested once their harassing tactics become a serious threat. Consequently every effort is made to reinforce the groups with the continual infiltration of other such units until the strength of the Soviet troops behind the enemy lines grows progressively to a company, then a battalion, and finally a regiment.

The Red Army has discovered that by the time the infiltration has reached this stage, enemy supply operations have been seriously hindered, and resistance to assault upon his strong-points has declined. It is then that an all-out Soviet assault must be launched, not only from the front and flanks of the positions, but from the rear by the now greatly reinforced infiltrated troops. Often, in such a situation, the enemy abandons his positions under the threat of encirclement. In such a case it is the mission of the infiltrated Soviet troops to attack and destroy retreating enemy groups. If the enemy stays to be encircled, the strongpoints are bypassed by the main strength of the assault, and are left to be liquidated by the encircling troops.