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VOL. II NO. 9

MAY 1944

INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT • WASHINGTON, D. C.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

War Department

Washington 25, D. C.
May 1944

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PART ONE: JAPAN

Section I. JAPANESE POSITIONS IN THE DEFENSE

1. INTRODUCTION

The information in this section is largely supplemental to data on Japanese defense positions printed in the last three issues of the *Intelligence Bulletin* (Vol. II, Nos. 6, 7, and 8). Paragraph 2 summarizes information on enemy defense installations on the Marshall Islands, paragraph 3 describes the construction of Japanese bunkers or pillboxes in Burma, and paragraph 4 consists of paraphrases from enemy sources which deal with defensive positions.

2. AS SEEN ON THE MARSHALL ISLANDS

As a rule, the principal defensive installations on the beaches consisted of barbed wire strung on coconut-log posts, which were imbedded in the ground approximately along the line of the high water mark. The posts were inclined seaward at an angle of about 30 degrees to the vertical. Many of these logs were not firmly imbedded. Not more than four strands of wire were strung to these posts in any area. The strands were widely spaced and lightly attached to the posts. In several places wire had not been strung, but reels

of wire were found nearby, indicating that construction of defenses was underway just prior to the U. S. attack.

Immediately inland of the beach defenses were strong points which consisted of an intricate pattern of trenches and machine-gun and mortar positions. The Japanese used numerous 13-mm machine guns and small mortars, but no large artillery.

In a few areas, the barbed wire and the trenches were supplemented with a perimeter concrete wall, in sections. These sections, 3 to 4 feet high, were anywhere from 11½ to 40 feet in length. The space between adjacent sections was about 3 feet. The concrete wall probably was designed primarily as an antitank obstacle.

Located behind the wire obstacles in some areas were simple tank traps of the trench type. The trenches were about 8 feet wide and 6 feet deep with steep sides.

The Japanese used reinforced concrete extensively for storage structures, ammunition dumps, heavy gun emplacements, blockhouses, and power plants, and for protection of radio equipment.

On one of the Marshall Islands, there were numerous circular reinforced-concrete structures, about 7 feet high, which apparently were intended for use as pillboxes.

3. AS SEEN IN BURMA

Japanese pillboxes and bunkers found in the Burma theater of operations have varied considerably in size.

(Roughly speaking, bunkers are larger and more rectangular than pillboxes.) Some of the bunkers have been large enough to accommodate 40 men, approximately a platoon.

Bunkers are seldom located singly, but are generally found in groups of six or more, which are mutually supporting and form a strong defensive position. Following the usual principle of defense in depth, the Japanese generally locate their bunkers so that they can be supported by fire from the rear as well as from the sides. Heavy machine guns are often sited on the flanks for cross firing. The bunker positions are frequently surrounded by wire obstacles and booby traps. (Antipersonnel and antitank mines may also be utilized on occasion.)

A system of slit trenches and foxholes is almost always constructed close to the bunkers—and sometimes inside them. In utilizing these supporting positions, the Japanese are believed to vary their tactics. When the opposing fire power is light or moderate, they may fire from the outside positions, but when the opposing fire is heavy, they retire to the bunkers and fire light and heavy machine guns on fixed lines. However, especially when the bunkers are subjected to heavy artillery fire, the enemy may utilize the outside positions to meet an expected attack by opposing infantry troops.

Bunkers usually have four or more firing slits, which permit a comparatively wide field of fire. These slits measure 8 to 12 inches vertically and up to 4 feet

horizontally. Normally, the slits are just above ground level. The bunkers themselves generally project from 1 to 6 feet above the ground and are well camouflaged with natural vegetation.

The entrance to bunkers generally faces the rear, and connect to other bunkers or foxholes by means of communication trenches. The extent of these communication trenches depends largely on the length of time the position has been occupied.

Particularly if they are located some distance from a road, bunkers may frequently be stocked with large supplies of food and ammunition.

The Japanese have constructed bunkers on various types of terrain. However, such positions are usually located either in relatively flat jungle country containing rice-field clearings and comparatively good roads or in hilly jungle where roads and trails are few and narrow and generally follow the ridges.

4. ACCORDING TO ENEMY SOURCES

a. General

The information presented below on Japanese defensive positions has been paraphrased from enemy sources. This data apparently was prepared primarily for use in the South Pacific.

Our [Japanese] system of field fortifications are constructed on the principles of the Maginot Line. We stress defense in width and depth; we stress positions strong enough to withstand bombing and shell fire, and the necessity for adequate communication trenches or tunnels, alternate observation posts,

and suitable positions from which to launch counterattacks in case of temporary setbacks.

Positions are constructed so that whenever one emplacement or part of the setup is taken by hostile forces, we can counter-attack and retake it. Positions must also be constructed so that, regardless of the direction of attack, we can make good use of our firing power from supporting positions.

As pointed out in previous instructions, we must construct a number of dummy and alternate emplacements in order to deceive the hostile forces and cause them to disperse their fire over a wide area.

We must, as time permits, provide cover for such important places as machine-gun emplacements, observation posts, and so forth.

Living quarters should be set up behind and within the positions, but they must be far enough away from guard posts to prevent destruction by hostile fire. In some instances, it is advisable to set up installations to resemble native dwellings. The floors should be as high as possible.

Rather than build a small number of large air-raid trenches, it is better to construct many small ones. Take advantage of steep slopes as much as possible.

b. Two Squad Positions

Figure 1 is a sketch of a Japanese squad position for all-around defense. The individual "shelters" shown in the sketch are probably rifle pits, because an enemy instruction said: "Endeavor to build the shelters for firing while standing." They are supposed to be constructed more than 10 yards apart.

The "light shelters," each to be occupied by three men, are probably the small-type coconut-log pillboxes, which the Japanese have constructed frequently in the

South Pacific. According to an enemy source, these positions "are to be made as small as possible, and dispersed at intervals of about 20 yards."

The individual shelters or pits are connected by communication trenches.




Figure 1.—Japanese Squad Position.

According to a Japanese source considered fairly reliable, a squad of 10 men normally occupies each bunker in enemy positions in the Burma theater. Runners are used for communication between bunkers and with rear echelons. When hostile planes attack, all except sentries go into the bunkers. However, when hostile infantry attacks, most of the squad take up firing positions outside because rifle fire is limited inside the bunkers.

Several reports from the South Pacific relate the use of a "spider-trap" hole by the Japanese. Enemy pillboxes frequently have one of these holes located on each side, about 8 feet out. The holes have jungle cover and are 2 or 3 feet long. The enemy, equipped with individual two-power periscopes, crouch in these holes to observe the approach of hostile forces.

During recent action in the Solomon Islands, U. S. troops discovered that the Japanese were using their Model 99 light-armored shield to protect firing ports. These shields, which are casehardened, were described in *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 7, pages 14 and 15. They are $\frac{1}{4}$ inch thick instead of $\frac{1}{8}$ inch, as stated in No. 7.

c. A Platoon Position

A sketch of a Japanese platoon position for all-around defense is shown in figure 2. Japanese instructions stipulated that the position be constructed with a perimeter of 325 to 450 yards and a depth of 215 to 325 yards.

The instructions also stipulated that a field of fire be cleared for a distance of at least 50 yards outside the perimeter; that alternate positions be set up (so that a proper choice of position can be made to enable the heavy artillery weapons to fire over the widest possible range); that one or two lookouts be posted in the intervals between squads; and that numerous observation posts be prepared.




Figure 2.—Japanese Platoon Position.

d. Two Company Positions

Figure 3 is a Japanese sketch of an infantry company in an all-around defensive position. Apparently this company has three rifle platoons and a heavy-weapons platoon. (Although companies in most Japanese divisions have only three platoons and a headquarters squad, some also have a heavy-weapons platoon.)

It is interesting to note the typical Japanese method of defending a ravine or small valley, illustrated in figure 3. Also note how the enemy is utilizing other

terrain features in his all-around defense, and his plans for No. 4 platoon to counterattack.




Figure 3.—Japanese Company Position.

Figure 4 is another type of Japanese all-around defensive position "for a front-line infantry company." Note the extensive all-around use of obstacles by each platoon and the double row of abatis in front of the company position. Also, note how the positions are located in depth; the frontage is only slightly greater than the depth.




Figure 4.—Japanese Company Position.

The following Japanese instructions for an infantry company to follow in digging in during an attack may be worthy of study:

The authority for digging in during an attack rests with the company commander; the platoon commander may assume this authority only when the attack has bogged down.

In digging in, the light machine guns will be sent forward first, to a predetermined position, to construct earthworks.

During this time the other skirmishers will maintain a covering fire. When the light machine gunners have finished their earthworks, the skirmishers will advance under the covering fire of the light machine guns and begin constructing earthworks.

Against a strong hostile position, construct positions successively as you advance. Company commanders will carefully estimate the hostile situation, and will not advance too hastily.

Section II. JAPANESE DEFENSIVE TACTICS

1. GENERAL

A reliable Japanese source states that the two chief aims of defense consist of:

“a. Overcoming a numerical weakness of personnel by advantageous use of terrain, by establishing suitable fortifications, by making exhaustive battle preparations, and by

“b. Rushing the hostile forces by the simultaneous use of fire power and the counterattack.”

The primary function of fortifications, according to the same enemy source, is to enable the proper development of fire power and the accomplishment of other battle duties. The protection of personnel, weapons, and so forth from hostile fire is a “secondary” purpose of fortified positions.

Japanese stress on aggressiveness in defense was demonstrated on Betio Island. In numerous instances, Japanese soldiers, after having been driven from positions, returned to them after U. S. troops had failed to destroy the positions or to guard or occupy them.

2. USE OF FIRE POWER

During the height of operations in New Guinea, the

Japanese issued the following instructions regarding fields of fire:

Even if we have good positions for our weapons, we cannot use fire power effectively unless obstructions are removed from our field of fire. Obstructions must be removed, but bear in mind that too much clearing will expose our positions. Therefore, using discretion, clear away jungle grass, underbrush, and so forth only to the extent necessary for our weapons to fire effectively.

Disperse observation posts so that any hostile forces infiltrating into our lines will not escape us. Our observation of fire must be good, and we must never cease observation, even while under hostile fire.

Observers in the Burma theater of operations report that the Japanese seldom open fire from their defensive positions unless an assault is actually made against them. Individual enemy riflemen, in trees or under the roots of trees, are given the task of dealing with hostile reconnaissance patrols which approach close to the positions. The Japanese do nothing that would prematurely give away the location of an automatic weapon.

The enemy usually holds his fire until assaulting forces are from 30 to 50 yards from his positions.

3. COUNTERATTACK

Japanese counterattacks from defensive positions are usually made by small groups, and are preceded by a shower of grenade-discharger shells. The maximum personnel generally used are an officer and 12

men, and automatic weapons furnish most of the fire power. These attacks are launched within 10 minutes after our forces penetrate an enemy position. The Japanese either attack from the rear of a position our troops are assaulting or from a neighboring position—the latter is less likely. In any case, the effectiveness of the attack depends upon the speed and surprise with which it is made.

On a New Georgia front, Japanese forces launched a total of five counterattacks, one of which came at night. In the night attack, the enemy largely employed grenades, which possibly were fired from grenade dischargers held in an almost horizontal position. The daylight attacks were characterized by intense and sustained automatic fire, waist high. In one attack, after failing to locate any flank due to our all-around defense, the enemy used grenades and machine guns to clear the undergrowth sufficiently to reveal our positions.

4. ANTIPATROL MEASURES

A report from the Burma theater describes the following measures the Japanese have taken against opposing patrols:

a. The enemy sometimes dug positions, and left them empty (but covered by men hidden nearby) in the hope that hostile patrols would become curious.

b. The enemy often placed very fine trip wires across jungle tracks leading to his positions. These wires usually had tin-can alarms attached to them.

c. Japanese sentries, posted forward of positions, made a practice of withholding their fire at the approach of hostile reconnaissance patrols until they were certain of the situation. (Many such patrols, owing to this practice, were able to locate the Japanese positions and get away.)

Section III. HOW A FIJI PATROL GOT 47 JAPS WITHOUT LOSS

The details of how a Fiji patrol succeeded in killing at least 47 Japanese without suffering any losses are presented in this section. The patrol, consisting of one platoon, left its camp in Bougainville on the morning of 31 January 1944, and proceeded toward Pipipaia, a village about 2 miles inland from the coast, after receiving reports that Japanese were in that area. On the afternoon of 1 February, as the patrol approached Pipipaia, scouts were sent ahead to determine whether any enemy troops were in the village. The account of the action which followed is told in the words of the platoon commander:

“My scouts returned and reported that Pipipaia and the area beyond for 400 yards, up to a small hill, were clear of Japanese.

“I then moved the platoon through the village and slowly on down the trail, which followed a gradual slope for about 400 yards. This area, once planted in gardens, had plenty of brush and tall grass for cover. From there the trail led down a steep hill and onto a flat area which stretched for about 300 yards. There was plenty of cover on either side of the narrow trail, so the platoon headquarters moved down the hill behind

the point squad; the remaining two squads moved about 30 yards behind.

"The scouts had now moved about 150 yards along the flat area and were dispersing to the left and right side of the trail when a Jap sniper fired two shots from a tree. At the same time another sniper fired from a tree on the immediate right of myself and the platoon headquarters.

"The platoon immediately dived into cover and crawled into observation posts. The point squad and scouts observed two Jap snipers up two trees, and a third sniper who was a native Jap spy. The point squad immediately engaged these targets and killed all three snipers. Two fell out of the trees, but the third was tied to the tree.

"I then observed that we were now opposite a large Japanese bivouac area, which the scouts had not observed, or reported. The shooting of the first two Japs and the native alarmed the enemy who started moving out of the bivouac area.

"My platoon was now situated in a very good position, having crawled into good observation points overlooking the area where the Japs were. I then ordered the point squad to engage all targets as Japs were running in wild confusion. Some moved toward trees where there were sniper posts. I saw at least five Japs shot down while they were climbing trees, and I saw two shot in the same tree. Fifteen minutes after the first shot was fired, I had observed about 10 Japs shot by the point squad.

"I then moved back to my other two squads in order to get a better observation and appreciation of the situation. After reaching the second and third squads, which the sergeant had dispersed well in good positions for engaging targets which were still presenting themselves, I decided that it was not necessary at this point to advance forward or around any of the flanks. I ordered the whole platoon to keep engaging targets. Two Jap light machine guns then opened up, but a Bren gun from my squad quickly silenced them. Both were firing from the side of the trail under very little cover.

"At this moment I ordered the platoon to cease fire and observe. The Japs, apparently thinking that our force was retiring, began running out of cover, supposedly to better positions. My platoon then opened up again for about a further 15 minutes. One Bren gun also began peppering a large bivouac area, and hut, from which most of the Japs had come. It could not be ascertained what casualties, if any, were inflicted in this hut, but some Japs had looked out and had run back in.

"At this stage of the engagement, Jap voices could be heard calling out at points which seemed to stretch right back to the beach (estimated to be about 1 mile away). Jap rifles and machines guns (light) began shooting about half a mile to the left. Also some shooting was heard in the bushes on the right. None of my soldiers was in either of these areas.

“Two large shells, apparently from large mortars believed sited on a hill about 600 yards back from the Jap bivouac area, landed on a point about 300 yards behind my positions. Then more shells landed behind me, but they were not as accurate as the first and landed in the bushes. The first two shells had made direct hits on the trail down which I had advanced. It was then that I decided to withdraw my platoon back to Pipipaia, and establish an ambush there for possible enemy patrols coming forward.

“The platoon withdrew by squads, one crossing the other. There was very little firing coming from the enemy where the engagement had taken place, but there was still a large amount of firing coming from areas in the bushes about 600 yards out to the left and to the right.

“When I established my ambush at Pipipaia, I immediately got my noncoms together to check for casualties and, if possible, to estimate the number of enemy casualties.

“There were no casualties in my platoon. The estimate of Jap casualties was 47 plus three native scouts who were working for the enemy. This was a very conservative estimate, taking into account only those Japs shot by individual soldiers and not including any casualties inflicted by grenades thrown into the bivouacs.

“After the check was made, two more mortar shells were fired at us, but these did not explode. They were fired about 20 minutes after we had withdrawn, and

there were no enemy patrols coming forward. We then decided to withdraw onto the hill and post an ambush there.

“We remained there till 1730, approximately 3 hours after the engagement, but no Japs came forward.

“We then decided to withdraw to our former bivouac area, go into a defensive position, and await any possible Jap movement forward. We remained there till 1200 on 2 February. Seeing no signs of Jap patrols up to this time, we then moved back to camp again, arriving at 1530 hours.”

Section IV. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON ENEMY BOOBY TRAPS

1. INTRODUCTION

These supplemental notes on Japanese booby traps deal with six improvised types found in the South Pacific and on Kiska Island. For a more complete study of enemy booby traps, reference should be made to the introduction of "Two Booby Traps Devised by Japanese," *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 8, page 63.

Practically all of the comparatively few Japanese booby traps found to date have been improvised, and many of them have been crudely conceived. In all cases of actual booby traps found on Kiska, the cords and wires used were not concealed.

2. IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC

a. Grenade-discharger Shell and Grenade

This type of improvised Japanese booby trap, found in New Guinea, consists of a Model 97 hand grenade and a Model 89 grenade-discharger shell, wired together with the percussion fuze of the shell resting on the base of the grenade and the grenade fuze pointing downward. Apparently it works on the same principle as the enemy tube booby trap (*Intelligence Bulletin*,

Vol II, No. 8, pp. 64-67). The grenade-discharger shell apparently was added to the grenade to increase the effect (see fig. 5). However, it is doubtful if the detonation of the grenade would cause detonation of the shell. The whole idea probably was conceived by personnel inexperienced in the technical makeup and effectiveness of explosives.




Figure 5.—Japanese Booby Trap (combining grenade-discharger shell and grenade).

The grenade-discharger shell and hand grenade booby-trap combination is designed to utilize a cartridge case, or some sort of tube, as described for the tube booby trap, although no tube is shown in fig. 5. The suspension string for the booby-trap assembly apparently hangs on a suspension wire at the top of the tube or cartridge case, similar to the tube booby-trap arrangement. A trip wire is attached to the suspension wire.

Before operation of this booby trap, it is necessary to pull out the safety wire in the fuze of each weapon. Then the application of sufficient pressure against the trip wire pulls out the suspension wire and allows the entire assembly to fall, with the grenade striker hitting a hard surface. Explosion of the grenade depresses the fuze striker on the grenade-discharger shell and, theoretically, causes detonation.

The delay train (4 to 5 seconds) was not removed from the grenade which was used in the booby trap found in New Guinea.

If necessary to neutralize this type of booby trap, carefully replace the safety wires.

b. General-purpose Bombs

The Japanese utilized 30- and 50-kilogram general-purpose bombs at two places on New Georgia Island. These bombs were buried in vertical positions at probable landing points on beaches. The nose of each bomb pointed upward, and contained armed fuzes. Each of

the latter was covered with a board, which in turn was covered with a light layer of sand.

3. ON KISKA

a. Piece of Bamboo

This booby trap was constructed as follows: A piece of bamboo was sawed out to give a clothes-pin effect (see fig. 6). Single wires were run along the outer edges and taped securely. Nut and bolt contacts were screwed into the ends. Very slight pressure was required to make contact. The wires ran from contact to a dry-cell battery and on to a charge of explosive. In one instance this consisted of two *sake* (rice beer) bottles filled with loose picric acid and placed inside a 120-mm shell case. In another instance the explosive consisted of a metal-covered block of picric acid weighing $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 pounds. Electric blasting caps were used as initiators to set off the charges.

Two of these booby traps were found—both under boards at the entrance to caves. Little attempt was made to conceal the wiring.




Figure 6.—Japanese Booby Trap (using piece of bamboo).

b. Phonograph

In booby-trapping a phonograph, the Japanese arranged an electrical contact on the pick-up assembly in such a manner that moving of the phonograph arm to play a record (approx. $\frac{1}{2}$ inch at contact point) would connect the current and set off a charge. Both the charge and battery were under floor boards. No attempt was made to conceal wires leading from the phonograph to the charge. (See fig. 7.)




Figure 7.—Japanese Booby Trap (utilizing a phonograph).

c. Radio

In utilizing a radio for a booby trap, the Japanese removed all except one battery and filled the cavity with explosive blocks of picric acid. Electrical contact

wires went from the switch to the battery and to the charge.

d. Antitank Mines

Figure 8 shows how the Japanese booby-trapped a 75-mm field gun (Model 41) by using four Model 93 antitank mines. A mine was placed in front of, and behind, each wheel; under each mine, six blocks of picric acid were placed. The whole was covered neatly with earth.




Figure 8.—Japanese Booby Trap (using land mines and picric acid blocks).

4. IN BURMA

a. General

In a recent engagement in Burma, the Japanese used booby traps on a large scale for the first time. The enemy attempted to block off the approach to a center of resistance by booby-trapping a jungle-covered area 100 yards wide and 200 yards long, on a high and narrow mountain ridge. Within this area more than 100 booby traps had been laid.

The booby traps were all made with British No. 36 grenades, and were extremely simple in principle. The grenade was booby-trapped in two ways:

b. "Tin-can" Method

Figure 9a shows how part of the side of a tin can is cut to make it adaptable for use as a booby-trap




Figure 9.—Japanese Booby Traps (a. utilizing a tin can and British No. 36 hand grenade; b. using tree fork and grenade).

mechanism, and how the grenade is placed in the can. One end and a portion of the side of the can are cut away, and a hole is punched in the remaining end of the can for the purpose of attaching a trip wire inside.

In preparing the grenade for booby-trapping, the Japanese remove the safety pin, but hold the release handle down so that the grenade will not fire. Then they insert the grenade into the cut-out tin can so that the release handle is held inside the remaining circular portion of the can. Holding the can and grenade together, the enemy places them on the ground. The grenade functions when a pull on the trip wire draws the can away from the grenade and thereby allows the release handle to fly up. (Since the grenade is relatively heavy, it remains in place.)

As a variation of the "tin-can" method, the Japanese place the grenade in the can as outlined above, and then balance the can on a tree limb. When pressure is exerted on the trip wire, the can falls over, the grenade drops out (releasing the handle), and the grenade detonates.

c. "Tree-fork" Method

The "tree-fork" method works on the same principle as the variation of the "tin-can" method, just described (see fig. 9b). The space between the tree limbs serves the same function as the can. When the trip wire is pulled, the grenade falls out of the tree and explodes.

d. Trip Wires

The trip wires used in rigging the Japanese booby traps were strung loose in the heavy undergrowth, and were frequently attached to long vines and creepers. The enemy used ordinary telephone cable for trip wire, and made no attempt to camouflage either the wires or the grenades—other than the concealment afforded by the dense vegetation.

Section V. JAPANESE NIGHT ATTACKS

1. INTRODUCTION

Night attacks have been stressed by the Japanese. These are more likely to come at a time when the enemy's tactical situation is desperate, or when it is very favorable; however, such attacks may be anticipated at any time.

A Japanese treatise which gives some night-attack tactics not previously disseminated is presented below. In connection with this article, reference should be made to "Small-unit Tactics Used by Japanese at Night" (*Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 5, pp. 64-72).

2. THE TREATISE

All officers who will be engaged in the operations carry out a thorough reconnaissance during the afternoon of the night preceding the attack. From commanding ground or edge of a woods, they make a thorough study of the terrain, and lay out the plan of attack. The attack is ordered to follow well-defined terrain features which permit easy control and maintenance of direction in approaching hostile positions.

After dark, a reconnaissance patrol, consisting of three to five men under an officer or a clever sergeant major, is sent out to reconnoiter the routes of advance, mark the turns with bits of paper or white cloth, and determine the disposition of hostile troops. This reconnaissance is carried out as stealthily as possible to maintain surprise. While this reconnaissance is

going on, the attack units are moved forward of the Japanese main line into an advanced position from which previously selected routes of advance can be found easily. Generally, machine guns are not carried; firing is avoided, and reliance is placed upon the bayonet.

Initially, a night attack aims at hitting both flanks of a position at the same time. After the hostile flanks have been rolled back, the two attacking prongs continue on beyond and behind the hostile front lines and meet at a prearranged rendezvous point. The direction of attack of these two elements of the attacking force is generally at an angle to the opposing front line so they can meet. After effecting the rendezvous, the attacking forces reorganize, and launch another attack against the center of the hostile line, from the rear. If the attacking force is to seize and to hold the enemy's position, they dig in to await a counterattack. If the unit which sent out an attacking force is on the defensive, the attacking force retires to its own lines after inflicting as much damage as possible upon the opposing forces.

Squads assemble in one or two columns with each man close behind the man ahead. All elements of the attacking force try to maintain visual contact with adjacent units. Security to the front, rear, and flanks is sent out. These security elements also maintain visual contact with the main body. Security elements to the front of a platoon normally consist of an officer and two or three men. Individual soldiers provide flank and rear security.

Section VI. HOW THE JAPANESE MARK TRAILS FOR NIGHT USE

1. INTRODUCTION

To facilitate night movements in the jungle, the Japanese have made frequent use of phosphorescent wood, vines, and ropes. The phosphorescent wood and vines are plentiful in the jungles, while individual enemy soldiers usually carry a length of rope for a variety of purposes. How the Japanese use such material to aid their movements at night is explained in the enemy instructions given below.

2. THE INSTRUCTIONS

a. Materials for marking should be prepared during the daytime; however, luminous wooden markers will be prepared the night before.

b. The various types of route-marking materials are luminous wooden markers, vines, and ropes.

c. If luminous wooden markers are used, they should be placed higher than a man's head; if vines and ropes are used, they should be placed hip high.

d. Steep cliffs, holes, and other places of danger should be blocked off with vines and ropes, and also marked by luminous wooden markers.

e. Luminous wooden markers should always be tied to a tree. However, instead of being tied to a large tree, they can be

inserted between the thick vines, and so forth that surround the tree.

f. When the luminous wooden marker dries on account of the sun, the degree of illumination will decrease; therefore, it is necessary either to place it on moist ground during the daytime or dip it in water in the evening.

Section VII. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON JAPANESE CAMOUFLAGE

1. GENERAL

The information given in this section is largely supplemental to data carried in previous issues on Japanese camouflage (see "Camouflage Notes," *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II. No. 7, pp. 47-50).

Particularly in the jungle areas of the South Pacific, the Japanese have made excellent use of natural means to camouflage positions, weapons, equipment, and personnel. "Natural materials," states a Japanese source "are always used, and are complemented by artificial materials only when necessary."

2. ACCORDING TO JAPANESE SOURCES

The following notes on Japanese camouflage are paraphrased from enemy sources:

a. Nets

Camouflage nets are made with small string and wire, into which natural materials (such as Hera leaves and the inner bark of the Shinanoki tree) are interwoven.

The size of the mesh in the net depends on the material to be attached. In a net to which Hera leaves are attached, the mesh usually is $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{3}{4}$ inches in diameter.

Before attaching Hera leaves, string nets are immersed in astringent dyes, and wire nets are oxidized [heated in a fire] to eliminate gloss.

b. Screens

Screens used for camouflage purposes are of two types, portable and stationary. Portable screens usually are used for concealing personnel. They are made of light material, and therefore are easy to carry and to erect (see fig. 10). Such screens are generally covered with grass and nets.

c. Turf

Turf is used mainly for camouflaging earthworks. It must be placed on the required surface so that it resembles natural grass in every respect. The roots are buried well into the earth, and the spaces between are filled with loose soil.

When the season and time permit, sow seeds of fast-growing grass or legumes on the earthworks.




Figure 10.—Japanese Portable Camouflage Screen.

As far as possible, use only the turf taken from the earth where the position is located. In any case, seek grass of the same variety, density, shape, and height as the grass growing near the camouflaged position.

In order to avoid bending or breaking the stems and blades of grass in turf that has been collected, do not pile the blocks of turf on top of each other.

d. Coloring Materials

Paints and dyes are used as coloring materials. Paints are employed as often as possible in combination with other camouflage agents.

Tents made of coarse hemp or thick cotton cloth may, if necessary, be dyed or painted.

3. AS SEEN ON MAKIN ISLAND

a. Natural Cover

On Makin Island, the Japanese depended mainly on the thick natural cover of coconut trees and other vegetation for camouflage. This cover, used frequently in combination with transplantings, was employed to camouflage all defensive installations. For example, the enemy constructed a concrete pillbox under the fronds of a small palm tree, and placed turf on top of the structure and small pandanus trees around it.

The Japanese employed the same method in concealing beach defenses. They constructed rifle pits and machine-gun emplacements directly behind the beach under the fringe of coconut trees along the shore, and left intact the low undergrowth in front of the positions (see fig. 11).



Figure 11.—Japanese Camouflage (showing use of natural cover on Makin beach).

Some of the new buildings were being constructed with large breadfruit trees growing within them (see fig. 12). The trees were not a part of the structure of the buildings, but were pruned, when necessary, so that their growth would continue unhampered. Such camouflage also provides shade for the buildings.

b. Cut Palm Fronds

The Japanese also extensively utilized cut palm fronds for camouflage on Makin. These were spread

over movable stores or new installations so that the covering blended with the surroundings. All oil-drum storage dumps were concealed in this manner (see fig. 13). In most cases, this method was advantageously combined with tree cover.

The Japanese also placed palm fronds on the roofs of a number of buildings, to conceal them and to protect the corrugated iron roofs from the direct rays of the sun.

The enemy placed palm-frond roofs on small build-



Figure 12.—Japanese Camouflage (showing use of growing tree to conceal building on Makin).



Figure 13.—Japanese Camouflage (showing use of cut palm fronds).

ings, either to conceal them from air observation or to make them resemble native structures.

c. Deceptive Painting

Deceptive painting, in various tones of red and gray, was also used on the roofs of some buildings to make them blend into the foliage. Many of the European-style buildings, constructed by the British before the Japanese occupation, were disruptively painted in this manner. Stripes, of greatly varying width, were usually painted roughly parallel to the length of the build-

ing. In cases where this type of painting was used, no palm fronds were placed on the roofs of the buildings.

All of the heavy guns on the island were disruptively painted with red, yellow, green, and blue colors.

d. Dummy Installations

Five dummy guns were found on the island. Three of these, on the west coast, were designed to resemble coast-defense guns. They were placed so that they "guarded" the best stretch of landing beach on the west side of the island.



Figure 14.—Japanese Dummy Gun Position (Makin).

The gun barrels consisted of coconut logs with burlap wrapped around the "muzzles." The mounts were also made of coconut logs, and were effectively wrapped with burlap. The three guns on the west coast were built in coral-stone revetments while the other two, on the southern shore of Ukiangong Point, were placed in positions constructed of coconut logs, which projected from 1 to 3½ feet out of the ground (see fig. 14).

Section VIII. SOME JAPANESE RUSES

1. INTRODUCTION

U. S. forces in combat against the Japanese have learned that it pays to be always on the alert against enemy ruses or tricks. Although the Japanese have used such tactics in numerous instances, they have been successful in only a relatively few cases. Frequently enemy ruses have been employed to make up for a lack of combat efficiency against U. S. troops. Certainly such tactics do not afford the Japanese any "super" advantages. It's a game that can be played by both sides, and our troops have quite often played it successfully against opposing forces.

2. EXAMPLES OF RUSES

a. Sandwiching in a few words of English occasionally, a group of Japanese screamed and yelled to give the impression that U. S. soldiers were being tortured. The idea was to attract U. S. troops to the scene for the purpose of mowing them down by enemy fire.

b. In two instances on the Burma front, the Japanese cut British telephone lines and then attempted to hide the breaks by binding the cut ends with insulating tape. The idea was to make it very difficult for line repair men to find where the wire had been cut.

c. On Betio Island, some Japanese pulled the old trick of playing dead. U. S. troops were on the alert, however, and little or no damage resulted from such tactics.

Section IX. JAPANESE EXPLANATION OF "DUTY" AND "SPIRIT"

1. INTRODUCTION

To acquaint U. S. troops as much as possible with their Japanese foes, the *Intelligence Bulletin* has included in previous issues a number of articles dealing with characteristics of the individual enemy soldier, his reaction in combat, and the factors of his environment that make him different from the average U. S. soldier. For a complete reference to these articles, see the introduction to "Japanese Characteristics and Reaction in Battle" (Vol. II, No. 8, p. 69).

In connection with the general subject above, a "morale lecture" by a Japanese lieutenant is reproduced in part below. This lecture, apparently very carefully prepared, gives a clear picture of Japanese thought on the subject of "duty" and "spirit" as it relates to combat in the present war. The lecture apparently was written before mid-1943.

It is believed that this lecture may be of particular value to officers in the preparation of orientation talks on enemy attitudes and psychology.

2. THE LECTURE

When we fight, we win. When we attack, we capture. The

results of our recent glorious battles are acknowledged by all. What induces these admirable military accomplishments? America, England, and China, whose natural resources, physical strength, and equipment are not inferior to ours, were routed miserably in battles with the Imperial Army. So we must assume that for some reason they have defects. If so, what are these defects?

Fundamentally, America and England are countries which traditionally value individualism. It is known from American and English literature and orations that the people regard the state as an assembly of individuals. Accordingly, the individual is of supreme importance and the state secondary. Thus, it is quite understandable that there is no disgrace in the individual sacrificing everything to save his life when endangered.

China is a country dominated by the family system. From ancient times the traditions of a perennial family have been observed and respected, but the people have little interest in changes in the constitution of the country. Their past history reveals 20 changes of dynasties. Among them were families, but nothing higher. With the Han, Tang, Sung, Ming, and Manchu dynasties, the country passed through different eras, but there was very little historical record of any spirit among the people with these changes. The Chinese still observe the family system, as of old. . . .

Then, what about Japan? It is a known fact that Japan is not an individualistic country. Nor is it a country of family systems. In Japan the family is stressed; blood ties are highly regarded, and ancestors are worshipped more than in China. But there is much more than this in Japan. There is the Imperial Family, unique in this world, that is over us. The Imperial Family is the light, the life, the pride of Japan. In truth, Japan is Japan and the Japanese are Japanese because of the Imperial Family. From this consciousness the Japanese spirit is born. A loyalty is born, which utterly disregards the safety of the home and family—even one's own life—for the

welfare of the Emperor and country. This special Japanese spirit is something peculiarly Japanese, quite different from anything American, English, or Chinese. When setting out to do things, we who possess this special Japanese spirit can accomplish our duty; but those who do not have it, perform only a superficial duty. . . .

Our great air raid on Pearl Harbor was an attack that satisfied our soldierly spirit, which stops at nothing short of total destruction. It affords an affirmative answer to whether this magnificent achievement was right or not. . . .

In our Imperial Army, we have graciously been permitted to witness and hear many loyal speeches, many instances rich in Japanese spirit, and many actions carried out with enthusiasm and power.

In times of peace when there was no danger of attack or fighting the enemy, officers and men, covered with dirt and sweat, silently and enthusiastically carried on their training, never relaxing their efforts for a moment. We could see all this for ourselves. This ardent peace-time training could not have continued if there were not the strong resolution to repay the Emperor's trust by acting as the bulwark of the Empire in time of emergency, and by taking the safety and dangers of the country on our shoulders. We thus assured the security of the state and fulfilled our duty as soldiers.

When we stop and reflect on those who have carried out their duties in the past, we find that they always discharged them with full determination and with the Japanese spirit. In this lies the strength of Japan.

Happily our forefathers have repaid the trust of His Majesty, the Emperor, by preserving tradition and discharging their duty in this way. We must not in the least defile the shining tradition bequeathed to us by them. On the contrary, for Emperor and country we must do all we can to add to its luster.

It is obvious that the road before us is not easy. We need

strong determination to establish the New Order in Greater East Asia. Governors and governed must unite purposes and push ahead fearlessly with a single object in mind. Here I want to raise my voice and declare: "Carry out your duty with the Japanese spirit."

The spirit of Bushido has been spoken of from olden times in these words: "Among flowers, the cherry; among men, the warrior." With this spirit hold your ground without yielding a step, no matter what wounds you may receive, and thus make your end glorious by carrying out your duty calmly.

Section X. JAPANESE ARMY RATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

Japanese Army rations have been found to be entirely edible, and ordinarily may be utilized by U. S. forces as supplementary rations when captured. If at all possible, such rations should be examined by a medical officer before being used.

Observers (including high-ranking combat officers) recommend that U. S. troop leaders be informed about the more common Japanese foods before going into battle, so that our troops may utilize captured enemy rations if they are needed. Under other conditions, an enterprising mess sergeant may often break the monotony of his unit's diet, and add to it an unusual touch, by employing some of the less common Japanese foods. He can also use the ever-present rice as a staple when it is captured in quantity.

2. STANDARD RATIONS¹

Contrary to the belief of some persons, the Japanese soldier does not live entirely on rice. To him, rice is a staple food, just as bread is to us; and, if he had only rice for his meal, he would be as displeased as we would be with only bread to eat. However, rice does constitute well over 50 percent of the Japanese soldier's diet.

¹ In connection with this section, reference should be made to a previous *Intelligence Bulletin* article, "Japanese Food" (Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 77-79).

Both polished and unpolished rice has been captured from the enemy. Polished rice is more common, probably because it can be preserved longer than unpolished rice. To increase the palatability of rice, the Japanese usually season it with a soy-bean sauce (*shoyu*) or *miso* paste, which is made of fermented soy beans and which is more commonly used for preparing soup.

U. S. rations weigh more and have a higher calorific value than the Japanese.

Although the Japanese have standard rations, they supplement these whenever possible with various foods obtained locally—even when standard rations are easily available. There have been many instances during the warfare in Pacific theaters when the enemy has run extremely low on rations, due to loss of shipping and successful United Nations attacks against the Japanese land forces.

As a general rule, the Japanese field ration in the South Pacific theaters of operations has not been standardized, but has varied from 2½ to 3½ pounds per man per day. Theoretically, the field ration is approximately 1.5 kilograms (3.3 lbs.). Two types of specially packed field rations, "A" and "B," have been noted frequently. The "A" ration normally consists of 30.7 ounces of rice, 5.3 ounces of meat or fish, and a small amount of seasoning and flavoring. The "B" ration normally consists of 24.4 ounces of hard biscuits in three paper bags (enough for three meals), 2.1 ounces of meat or fish, and a small amount of seasoning (salt and sugar).

In New Guinea (June, 1943) a Japanese table of ration allowances listed three separate categories of issue:

Basic: 1.3 Kilograms (when transportation is adequate)

"A": 1.13 Kilograms (when transportation is difficult)

"B": .86½ Kilogram (when transportation is very difficult)

Under the "A" ration, sweet potatoes, fresh vegetables, bananas, and papayas were to supplement deficiencies to the extent of .85 kilogram (524 calories), while under the "B" issue these local foods were to provide 1.8 kilograms (1,218 calories).

It is known that the Japanese use vitamin pills quite frequently as a part of their rations. Vitamin B is supplied in three forms: (1) tablets, (2) as a liquid, and (3) a tube of paste.

A "Polished Rice Combination Case" captured by U. S. forces on Bougainville Island contained 40 "portions" (mostly rice). The contents were packed loose in an air-tight tin case enclosed in a wooden crate. A single portion was calculated to include the following:

10½ oz. of polished rice

½ oz. of dehydrated *Miso* paste

Vitamin B supplementary food

Vitamins A and D tablets

Powdered tea (to supply vitamin C)

A portion of fuel and matches.

Small extra amounts of all items were included so that the rations could be stretched or slightly increased. The fuel was in 3-ounce cans, one can being intended to cook two portions of rice.

The daily ration per man for the Japanese garrison on Kolombangara from April to July, 1943, was approximately as follows:

Polished rice	1 lb. 7 oz.
Canned goods	2.8 oz.
Dehydrated food	2.8 oz.
Sugar	.7 oz.
Salt	.35 oz.
Pickles	.5 oz.
Soy-bean sauce	.07 pint

The garrison commander on Kolombangara in May issued an order which read: "Burdock, chopped seaweed, white kidney beans, sweet potatoes, and dried gourd shavings will be issued as dehydrated food. Canned goods will be issued mainly from broken boxes in order to get rid of the goods in the broken boxes. Since the fixed quantity of powdered soy-bean sauce and sugar is not available, they will be distributed proportionately from goods on hand."

Emergency air-crew rations found recently in a wrecked Japanese plane (New Guinea) included 20 ounces of unpolished rice and the following other items: puffed wheat, biscuits, a dried fish, two small bottles of concentrated wine (35 percent alcohol), some candy wrapped in colored cellophane, large salt tablets, and a portable water-purifying set. These items were divided among five transparent, water-proof bags.

Probably the most common type of Japanese canned food found to date in the South Pacific is compressed fish (principally salmon and bonito), which may some-

times require soaking and salting to make it palatable. Other items of Japanese food found included: pickled plums, dehydrated vegetables (beans, peas, cabbage, horseradish, burdock, seaweed), compressed barley cakes, rice cakes, canned oranges and tangerines, *sake* (rice beer), powdered tea leaves, slices of ginger, salted plum cake, canned beef, cooked whale meat, confections, and vitamin tablets.

On Makin Island, stored food found by U. S. troops consisted largely of rice, which was contained in heavy, woven rice-straw bags. It is interesting to note that after the bags were emptied they were filled with sand and used to protect underground shelters, defensive positions, and so forth. In addition to rice, our troops found considerable stores of canned fish (mostly salmon and sardines), meat, vegetables, fruit, and milk.

3. SUPPLEMENTARY RATIONS

The Japanese use a variety of methods to obtain supplementary rations, or food to meet emergencies. These methods include gardening, fishing (sometimes by use of dynamite), dealing with natives, and foraging by individuals and small groups.

The Japanese soldier has a fondness for sweets, which he usually gets in "comfort bags" sent from home. He also is issued sweets at certain times, along with a ration of *sake*. Such issues are usually made to coincide with a Japanese national festival or holiday.²

² See *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 3, for a list of Japanese festivals and holidays.

4. FOOD CONTAINERS

The packaging of Japanese rations has been varied and inconsistent. During the earlier stages of the South Pacific operations, the enemy lost a great deal of rice and dried food because these were improperly packed for tropical conditions.

To float rations ashore from ships or submarines, the Japanese have used 50-gallon drums, each of which held 120 rations, or enough for one company for one day. On top of each drum was a hole, 2 inches in diameter, which was closed by a water-tight screw cap while the drum was being floated to shore.

The Japanese (in New Guinea) also employed water-tight rubber containers, inclosed within water-proof canvas bags, to float food to shore. Each container accommodated about 130 pounds of rations. One full container was considered sufficient to supply one man with food for one month.

On Bougainville Island the rations for a Japanese landing force were carried in air-tight tin cases which were packed tightly into wooden crates (see par. 2, "Standard Rations").

The Japanese have frequently used sections of bamboo and burlap bags to pack food. For food drops by parachute, the enemy has employed 120-pound cardboard containers. A single light bomber is able to drop six of these containers per trip.

PART TWO: GERMANY

Section I. GERMAN FIELD DEFENSES OBSERVED IN ITALY

The German deliberate field fortifications' illustrated in this section are typical of many that U. S. troops are now encountering in Italy. An article in a previous issue of the *Intelligence Bulletin*, "A Prepared Defensive Position in Italy" (Vol. II, No. 7, pp. 57-60), discussed in some detail a number of German field fortifications of the types illustrated here, and may profitably be read in connection with the following material.

A German machine-gun position, which has received a direct hit by hostile artillery, is shown in figure 15. Coils of wire had been used as revetment, and to hold the camouflage in place. This position had a narrow mine and trip-wire belt to the front. The entrance to the position was from the rear (see fig. 16). The zig-zagged approach trench was shaded by low trees. It will be noted that, in addition to providing thick overhead cover, the Germans used an abundance of natural material in the camouflage scheme.

The entrance to a German dugout used for sleeping

¹"A hasty field fortification is one made quickly, when under fire or threat of immediate attack. A deliberate field fortification is made more slowly and carefully, when not in contact with the enemy."—TM 20-205.



Figure 15.—German Machine-gun Position (front view).

quarters is illustrated in figure 17. Tree shade was used to supplement the natural material with which the revetted dugout has been camouflaged. The debris scattered in the foreground is of course not characteristic of a German position in actual use. The enemy takes pains to hide discarded material of all kinds, even including such minor items as stray pieces of paper, so as not to attract hostile air observation. The Germans are well aware that a single gleaming bit of steel or a fragment of paper may reflect enough light to attract the attention of an air observer.



Figure 16.—German Machine-gun Position (rear entrance).

When the Germans prepare dugouts in hillsides and cliffs, they take every advantage of opportunities to secure ample overhead cover. A two-room dugout used as living quarters by the enemy is illustrated in figure 18. This dugout has more than 10 feet of overhead cover.

The large dugouts illustrated in figures 19 and 20 were constructed and occupied by the enemy in the vicinity of Le Cave.² The Germans use dugouts of this type for many different purposes—as living quarters,

² The equipment shown in figure 19 is our own.

vehicle shelters, command posts, and ammunition and supply dumps. The dugout shown in figure 20 was used as living quarters.

Experience has shown that the Germans are very likely to mine field fortifications of the types illustrated here before abandoning them.



Figure 17.—Entrance to German Dugout in Rolling Terrain.



Figure 18.—Entrance to German Two-room Dugout in a Hillside.



Figure 19.—German Dugout in the Side of a Cliff (used for storing supplies).



Figure 20.—Another German Dugout in the Side of a Cliff (used as living quarters).

Section II. COMMANDERS, OBSERVERS DISCUSS ENEMY TACTICS

The following comments on German combat methods in Italy have been made by U. S. Army unit commanders and experienced observers. Only those tactics which have been noted repeatedly are mentioned here, since occasional, isolated instances of German methods cannot be regarded as illustrative of standard enemy procedure.

When the Germans suspect that new troops are opposing them, enemy patrols become very active, to determine the identity and strength of the new troops.

The Germans have used artillery and some rocket guns to harass our forward areas and to interdict vital supply roads, but fire has decreased as soon as the enemy has lost dominant observation.

The enemy often restricts his movements entirely to those he can make under cover of darkness or during days when weather makes hostile air activity impossible. . . . The Germans do not pull out in daylight, even when they have practically been surrounded. They fight like tigers to hold a narrow escape corridor, through which they try to withdraw at night.

Enemy agents make every effort to infiltrate into civilian traffic and movement.

Long-range weapons are active mainly on clear days. No change has been noted in the German policy of continually changing positions and of employing a considerable number of single guns.

It is necessary to stress again and again that road craters are surrounded and lined with antipersonnel mines—often just over the lip of the crater, where they are harder to detect. The Germans have used a large number of abatis in Italy, most of which have been infested with antipersonnel devices.

During the first part of December, the German artillery had the commanding observation, and, as we advanced, the enemy's activity was definitely in proportion to the visibility and observation advantages remaining in his hands. The enemy adjusted by observation the major portion of his artillery fire. Subsequent night harassing missions (German) were based on this data. German counterbattery fire decreased considerably whenever the advance of friendly troops deprived the enemy of commanding heights. . . . The Germans are continuing the policy of seeking to neutralize an installation temporarily, rather than exploiting opportunities for damage when an increased use of ammunition would be involved. Fire of medium caliber has been decreasing, with a corresponding increase in light caliber, principally 105-mm guns.

The Germans will send out patrols to feign a night attack, or a daylight attack, just to locate your barrages so that they can side-step them when the real attack comes.

The German positions we have run into in the mountains have had very few riflemen in the front line. The forward element of the defense has consisted almost entirely of machine guns in rock bunkers; these bunkers are so cleverly blended into the terrain that they are extremely difficult to locate. In

the daytime the Germans seem to hold practically all their riflemen back about 200 yards. They depend on their machine guns, mortars, and artillery to stop your attack or to cause you such losses that a quick counterattack by the riflemen will throw you out. At night they put out listening posts manned by riflemen, but still hold back most of the riflemen.

On Hill 769 one of our companies got up close to the German bunkers. The company could not move in daylight because of the lack of cover, so a night attack was decided upon. Since there would be moonlight, it was decided to place smoke on the bunkers at the time of attack. This was done, but, as soon as the smoke screen was formed, the Germans left their bunkers, moved their right front and left front to the edge of the smoke screen nearest our positions, and placed machine-pistol fire on our attacking unit's flank.

The outstanding feature of mountainous country in Italy is that a village is almost invariably on the dominating ground, or on ground vital to the attacker to secure his line of communication. Such villages consist of closely packed houses with narrow streets between them. The houses themselves have thick walls and are immune to shellfire, except in the case of a direct hit. The enemy realizes this and makes full use of them as strong points, firing from windows and improvised loopholes. Such villages are also covered by machine-gun and mortar fire from either flank. In some cases houses are scattered on dominating features, and the enemy often uses them as machine-gun posts, covering the approaches by means of snipers and additional machine guns in adjacent houses.

In front of organized German positions, we have found mines only in the natural avenues of approach. These avenues are also covered with machine-gun and mortar fire. Thus the Germans are better prepared to deal with an opposing force

using draws or gullies than one which is working its way along the sides of ridges. On the ridges and less jagged mountains, the Germans often dispose their strength on the reverse slopes in order to bring heavy fire on our forces as they cross over the crests.

Strong stone bunkers are continually being encountered in mountainous terrain. Although it is reported that grenades and rockets will not penetrate the walls of such bunkers, it has been found that both grenades and rockets are effective when exploded close to the slits, which are near ground level. The occupants are at least stunned. As a U. S. sergeant who has had considerable experience with both weapons recently expressed it, "If you close in fast after using them on bunkers, you will find the Germans either knocked cold or goofy." Another noncom observes, "Grenades exploding within 3 feet or so of the slit will get the Germans if they are looking out."

In town fighting, buildings and strong points occupied by the Germans have proved vulnerable both to the grenade and rocket launcher.

The German soldier does not like to fight at night, and does not fight as well at night as he does during the day. In several instances German security at night has been found to be lacking. A number of instances have also shown that the German soldier, when surprised at night, has become confused and has been an easy victim of an opponent well trained in night fighting.

When patrols are sent out to locate the German defensive positions,¹ the Germans do not fire on these patrols if they can avoid it, but let them go on through. German prisoners have stated that they were ordered not to fire except in case of a

¹ This commander is speaking of heavy stone bunkers.

major attack. They have also recited instances of seeing our patrols go by their positions at a given time on a certain night. Checking back, we have found that our patrols were there at the stated time.

On the other hand, if one of our patrols stumbles into a German position, the Germans try to destroy the patrol to the last man, to keep the information from getting back to our units.

Repeatedly, when an entire patrol has returned to report that a hill is unoccupied or that a bridge has not been blown, some unit moves forward and finds the hill alive with Germans, who smother the unit with fire from machine pistols, light machine guns, and mortars—or, in the case of a bridge, the unit will find that the Germans have demolished it in the meantime. In other words, the Germans are quick to exploit the situation if an opposing force fails to seize and hold ground until stronger elements have been brought up to hold it in force.

Experience has shown that the Germans will almost invariably launch a counterattack to break up an attack made by small infantry units. You can expect such a counterattack, usually by 10 to 20 men, not more than 5 minutes after you get close to the German positions. They are usually well armed with light machine guns and machine pistols, and counterattack by fire and movement. They keep up a heavy fire while small details, even individuals, alternately push forward. The Germans almost always attack your flank. They seldom close in with the bayonet, but try to drive you out by fire. . . .

The Germans keep a sharp lookout for radio antennas, and shell every one they see.

The enemy is skillful at radio intercept, and tries to draw a great deal of information by inference. He notes the peculiarities of individual radio operators, which can easily become a dead give-away to the location of units.

Section III. GERMAN MINE WARFARE AND BOOBY TRAPS (ITALY)

1. GENERAL

The terrain fought over in Italy has been especially well suited to the employment of mines as delaying and casualty weapons. The limited road net; the mountainous, close country, with few trails and secondary roads; the terrain conformation and nature of available approaches to objectives; and the numerous bridge sites and by-passes—all these have all presented good opportunities for the employment of various types of mines. The element of rapid withdrawal and pursuit which characterized the fighting in Sicily has not been present in the Italian Campaign thus far. For this reason the laying of mines and the preparation of booby traps has not been hurried. It has been deliberate, thorough, and widespread.

The general pattern of minelaying in Italy has fairly well paralleled that encountered in Sicily. The nature of the terrain has generally prevented the use of extensive minefields, such as those encountered in southern Tunisia. As in Sicily, the most heavily mined areas have been roads, valleys, natural approaches to objectives, trails, suitable bivouac areas, and demolitions. Abandoned towns and villages have been thickly mined

and booby-trapped. In his withdrawal, the enemy has had the advantage of knowing the most likely sites for artillery positions, and these have nearly always been thickly strewn with mines and booby traps. There have been no mined dry river and stream beds to cross, as was the case in Sicily. On the other hand, mined river banks have had to be negotiated in the several river crossing operations during the campaign.

2. TYPES OF MINES ENCOUNTERED

A number of different types of mines have been encountered in Italy, and some of these have been new. The different models of the Tellermine have been freely used by the enemy, and there has been an increased use of wooden mines, of both German and Italian design. In recent phases of the campaign, the wooden-type mines have largely exceeded the number of standard metal Tellermines used. A high-ranking U. S. Engineer officer has made the following comments on the mines encountered:

. . . The Germans are now using mainly wooden box and S-mines. S-mines have been encountered lately in quantities never seen before. We are now running into increasing numbers of Italian wooden box mines equipped with German bakelite igniters set for pressure, pull, and release. They are often in fields, but not necessarily scattered at random. For example, a whole olive grove will be mined and booby trapped with S-mines or wooden box mines, or both. Since the landing at Salerno, about 20 percent of all mines encountered have been of the wooden-box type.¹ The German wooden box type is

¹In late January it was reported that wooden mines represented about 40 percent of all mines cleared during that month.

about 12 inches square by 5 inches thick, and contains about 10 pounds of Triton or a similar explosive. The Italian ones are not quite so big.

In some areas newer types of improvised concrete antipersonnel mines have been discovered. One type is a spherical concrete case, 10 inches in diameter, enclosing standard German and Italian explosive charges equipped with standard types of igniters. Shrapnel has been used as aggregate in these concrete mines. Another type is a spherical concrete mine, 13 inches in diameter, cast in two halves, which are bolted together with steel rods. These have contained about 9 pounds of explosive, and have been equipped to receive detonating devices.

3. NOTES ON NEW ENEMY METHODS

a. Smoke-warning Booby Trap

The Germans are using a new type of booby trap, which consists of a German smoke canister, an incendiary detonator, a ZZ35 pull-igniter, and a trip wire.

The smoke canister is a cylinder, $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter and $5\frac{1}{2}$ inches high, which is painted green with two white bands around the outside. It is marked "Nb. K-S-39B." A threaded hole in the top will take a detonator and ordinary German booby-trap mechanisms. The detonators used are of a special incendiary type, and may be identified by a green band, $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch wide, around the closed end.

This booby trap has no morale or casualty effect.

However, if it is tripped during daylight hours, it will reveal the fact that movement is taking place. Presumably the German theory is that while the detonation of an S-mine or some other explosive charge may pass unnoticed by the defenders if considerable firing is in progress, the smoke from the booby trap will provide an unmistakable visual warning.

b. New Trip-wire Arrangement

Recently a new trip-wire system has been employed by the enemy. The trip wires are so arranged that German soldiers may trip over the wires without suffering casualties, whereas if advancing British or American soldiers trip over the wire, the detonation of the firing device may cause casualties to other men




Figure 21.—New German Trip-wire Arrangement.

advancing behind them. This new method of arranging trip wires is illustrated in figure 21.

c. Booby-trapping Telephone Wire

Recently a German patrol operating at night came across an artillery observation post telephone line, cut it, and booby-trapped the loose ends of the wire in the following manner. The enemy buried two S-mines about 10 yards apart, so that in each case about an inch of the detonator showed above the ground. Each of the loose ends of the telephone wire was attached to one of the S-mines with a 12-inch length of fine strong thread. It was the German intention that a linesman would carelessly pick up what he would assume to be merely a loose end of wire, and thus detonate an S-mine.

At the place where this booby-trapping was done, the telephone line ran quite close to an unimproved road. Four Tellermines were laid in the road, evidently for the purpose of destroying any maintenance truck which might be brought up. The Tellermines were not actually buried, but were covered with mud. The Germans probably realized that neither part of this ruse would offer much danger in daylight, but hoped that it would prove effective during the night if prompt maintenance of the line were attempted.

d. Laying Tellermines

As the enemy has been forced back in Italy, he has seized every possible opportunity to mine the most suitable artillery position areas in the terrain he has aban-

done. Numerous Tellermines, wooden box mines, anti-personnel mines, and various types of booby traps have been found in these positions. In one position no fewer than 32 Tellermines were removed from the ground on which a single gun was subsequently emplaced. The commander of a howitzer group recently reported, "In one battery position, a Tellermine was located by a detector. When the usual precautions were taken to disarm and remove the mine, a wire was found which led to 18 cases of dynamite buried in the position area. Each case contained 25 kilograms of explosive."


In many instances the terrain has definitely canalized tank movement, and has enabled the Germans to mine specific routes with every expectation that these would be traversed by tanks and other vehicles.

In one area the Germans had prepared a field of about 200 Tellermines, laying them in a variety of ways. There were no booby traps in this field, but 90 percent of the mines were double Tellermines (one mine laid on top of another), 4 percent were triple, and the remainder single. In all instances of double and triple laying, the mines were placed in close contact with each other, and only the top mine was primed. The purpose of this laying apparently was to increase the size and effect of the charge, which the Germans hoped would destroy entire tanks instead of tracks and bogie wheels alone.


In the case of another field of Tellermines, the Germans went in for triple laying, burying the mines at depths of 6 inches, 2 feet, and 4 feet, respectively. This

method evidently was adopted with the expectation that, after the top mine had been located and removed, the others would not be detected.

The Germans have also laid double Tellermines in dirt roads and trails, working from the outside edge of a bank, as illustrated in figure 22a. The enemy intention is that, after a number of tanks have used the road, the slope of the bank will be squeezed over and a rut



a



b

Figure 22.—German Method of Laying Tellermines in Dirt Roads and Trails.

eventually be worn down to the level of the top mine (see figure 22b).

e. Laying S-Mines

S-mines have been found in all kinds of locations, and in quantities varying from a few scattered mines to extensive fields containing as many as 300 mines. One of the many German practices in this respect is the laying of long, narrow antipersonnel mine belts in front of defensive positions. Although mine belts vary greatly in pattern, the following example is a good specimen of enemy procedure. The belt in question consisted of 50 push-igniter "S" mines and 50 pull-igniter "S" mines. The mines were laid in four rows, with the rows $5\frac{1}{2}$ yards apart and with the mines in each row 22 yards apart. The whole belt was bordered on each side by a fence consisting of a single strand supported by pickets 18 inches high.

Figure 23 illustrates the layout of the belt.

The stakes for pull-igniters were very noticeable, as were the trip wires. It is interesting to note that the "S" mines set with push-igniters were in outer rows, and "covered" the trip-wire stakes. Many of the push-igniter mines were completely buried.

Recently a detachment of Engineers lifted many S-mines which had been placed in tracks left in the earth by automobile tires. Apparently a vehicle had been driven over the place chosen for the S-mines, and, once the mines had been laid, they were camouflaged by




Figure 23.—A German Antipersonnel Mine Belt.

means of a carefully simulated tire impression which restored the pattern of the original track. The important point to note about this German ruse is that it should dispel any erroneous idea that a vehicle track is sure to be safe. The enemy technique discussed at the end of subparagraph d above gives further evidence that the mere presence of existing tracks is far from being a guarantee of safety.

In Sicily U. S. soldiers encountered large quantities of S-mines, often very cleverly hidden. A U. S. infantry officer, discussing this subject, said, "The Germans would cover the three prongs of the detonators with loose twigs and grass, so that you couldn't see them at all. At times they laid S-mines by the hundreds in dry stream beds, and covered the prongs with small pebbles, so that it was impossible for us to know they were there, inasmuch as the whole area was a mass of pebbles. The Germans also prepared booby traps by interlacing the trip wires in the branches and suckers of blackberry bushes. The average soldier would not have suspected the presence of wires at all."

Section IV. GERMAN SOLDIER TELLS OF THE BATTLE FOR AGIRA

1. INTRODUCTION

On 27 July 1943, after overcoming strong German resistance, British and American troops reached positions overlooking the town of Agira in Sicily. The following day the United Nations forces continued to bring pressure to bear from the northeast and northwest. In the evening of 28 July, Agira was captured. A substantial number of prisoners was taken, and many German dead were found.

On the 29th a private first class of a Panzer Grenadier unit, which had retreated from Agira to a new position several kilometers away, wrote a brief summary of the action at Agira. U. S. junior officers and enlisted men should find this narrative informative and useful, since it discusses the engagement from the point of view of an enemy infantryman.

2. ACTION AT AGIRA, AS A GERMAN SAW IT

For the past two weeks we have been fighting on Sicilian soil. The battle we fight here against British and American troops is tough. Since the fighting is taking place in mountainous, semi-tropical country, we are experiencing special conditions of terrain and climate to which we are not accustomed.

A few days ago, we were still in position on a tactically important height in front of the town of Agira. From this height the road to Agira could be controlled. The town itself had not yet been subjected to fire. However, the British and Americans realized the importance of this town, and made every effort to defeat us in order to occupy it.

Although we were able to hold our position for several days, we were not strong enough to resist indefinitely. Also, the hostile forces had at their disposal an unexpectedly large number of heavy weapons, which assaulted us day and night. With this support, the enemy succeeded in penetrating our positions at certain points during the night and crushing the front line. We then withdrew to the town of Agira, in order to preserve our strength and avoid unnecessary casualties.

There we were able to reorganize and make ready for further defense. Positions were prepared, manned, and improved. We of course expected a new attack by the hostile forces; however, for the time being, the enemy sent out only small forces for reconnaissance. He was being rather careful, and perhaps did not want to sacrifice troops unnecessarily. During this period each side tried to find out as much as possible about the other's positions and strength. Every so often, heavy weapons participated.

Only after some time did our patrols discover that the British and Americans, exploiting favorable approach possibilities under cover of darkness, had occupied several hills close to the town. Our forces staged counterattacks . . . but not until it was too late did we discover that it was the opposition's intention to bypass the town and block the routes of approach. Here and there, hostile tanks suddenly appeared, light personnel carriers came forward, and hostile artillery placed its "magic fire" [*Feuerzauber*] closer and closer to our positions. Our casualties and weapon losses increased, and our situation became more and more critical. Since our supply routes were under the steady fire of heavy artillery, we were able to bring

up rations and ammunition only in greatly reduced quantities and under cover of darkness.

The situation grew still worse when the hostile forces attacked the battalion echeloned on our right, and forced it back close to the town. The most severe fighting therefore took place near the western entrance to the town, where the attacking forces were strongest. The opposition was able to gain successes at certain points, although suffering losses.

Our defensive line was still intact. We had hoped that we might be able to break contact with the hostile forces after delaying them by house-to-house fighting. Unfortunately, we were prevented from using these tactics, inasmuch as we received an order to the effect that the town must be held for another 24 hours. Now the word was "Hold at any cost." We realized that the coming night would bring the crisis, upon which everything would depend. It came and passed—more quietly and better than any of us had expected. The British and Americans had penetrated only into the western part of the town, evidently moving with caution, and had established themselves there. We moved around the town, and occupied the northern entrance at dawn. The enemy tried to interfere with this tactical undertaking, but we placed sufficient fire on the attackers to force a withdrawal. We anxiously waited for night to fall. It was our intention to lose contact with the opposition after dark, since our delaying mission had been completed. All day long, every one of us wondered whether the opposition would remain inactive until nightfall and how everything would develop.

At dusk we made our preparations. Evacuating Agira as silently as possible, we made a night march of several kilometers, under very uncomfortable conditions, and took up a new position, where we are at present. It is on a steep hill, and is roughly opposite the same town for which we were fighting so bitterly only yesterday. Looking at it, we have only one thought and hope: to halt, weaken, and defeat the advancing enemy.

Section V. ORGANIZATION OF GERMAN TANK-HUNTING DETACHMENTS

The weapons and tactics of German tank hunters, who attempt to blind, halt, and destroy tanks and other armored vehicles in close-range combat, were discussed in *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 12, pages 19-32. At that time it was stated that details of four or more specially trained tank hunters undertake such missions, but that a number of such details may be combined when a need arises. Recent information reveals that the Germans have been organizing and equipping tank-hunting detachments in a somewhat different manner.

1. DETACHMENTS OF 10 MEN

Tank-hunting detachments of 10 soldiers (a leader, who is usually a non-com, and nine men) have been organized and equipped as follows:

- a. Leader (equipped with a machine pistol, a signal pistol, and two hand grenades).
- b. Covering detail of two men (equipped with a machine gun and a rifle, blue or violet signal ammunition, and a blinker signalling apparatus; also five hand grenades and two smoke grenades for each man).
- c. Smoke detail of two men (each equipped with a

rifle, two smoke candles, three smoke grenades, a glass smoke grenade, and two hand grenades).

d. Demolition detail of five men (each equipped with a pistol or rifle, a smoke candle, a pole charge, a magnetic hollow charge, and a sliding mine [*Gleitmine*]).¹




Figure 24.—Typical German Disposition of a 10-man Tank-hunting Detachment in Foxholes.

Figure 24 illustrates a typical German disposition of a 10-man tank-hunting detachment in foxholes. The

¹ See *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 12, p. 28 for an illustrated discussion of sliding mines and their tactical use. A typical sliding mine is shown on the next page.

foxholes are likely to be 4 feet long, 1½ feet wide, and chest-deep.

2. DETACHMENTS OF 13 MEN

Tank-hunting detachments of 13 soldiers (a leader who is usually a non-com, and 12 men) have been organized and equipped in the following manner:

a. Forward obstacle detail of two men (equipped with three or four pressure bars² or sliding mines; a rifle, three hand grenades, and a pole charge for each man).

b. Smoke detail of one man (equipped with a rifle, three smoke candles, four smoke grenades, and two hand grenades).

c. Covering detail, consisting of the leader and two men (the leader equipped with a machine pistol, and each of the two men equipped with a rifle and three hand grenades).




Figure 25.—German Sliding Mine.

² To make certain that the wheels of United Nations vehicles will not pass between Tellermine, the Germans often connect the mines by means of boards or bars laid over the firing devices of the mines. For this purpose the enemy has developed a standard metal pressure bar (see fig. 26).




Figure 26.—German Pressure Bar.

d. Demolition detail of two men (equipped with a pistol, a magnetic hollow charge, two pole charges, two




Figure 27.—Typical German Disposition of a 13-man Tank-hunting Detachment along a Road.

Molotov cocktails, two flares, and three or four hand grenades for each man).

e. Rear obstacle detail of one man (equipped with a rifle, two hand grenades, and a pressure bar).

f. Antitank rifle detail of two men (equipped with an antitank rifle, a rifle, and a pole charge).

g. Machine-gun detail of two men (equipped with a machine gun and hand grenades).

Figure 27 illustrates a typical German disposition of a 13-man tank-hunting detachment along a road.

Section VI. GERMAN EFFORTS TO BREAK UNITED NATIONS SECURITY

1. INTRODUCTION

When the Germans capture a hostile soldier, their primary interest is in documents or personal papers that he may be carrying. Experience has taught the Germans that United Nations prisoners are security-conscious, and that interrogators approaching them to gain information must implement the questioning with as much background knowledge as possible about the prisoner and his previous activities. In this connection the value, to the German interrogator, of all documents and personal papers—even those which are seemingly trivial and of no military importance—must not be underestimated. Although the intelligent soldier avoids carrying into battle areas any document which, to however slight a degree, might help an enemy interrogator in his job, German staff officers wait hopefully for the capture of that soldier who will prove an exception. Even then, the German enlisted man's fondness for acquiring souvenirs may upset the established procedure of German intelligence officers.

2. ENEMY USE OF CAPTURED PAPERS

It is important to remember that not even the small-

est scrap of information—whether written or oral—should be allowed to reach the enemy. A special order issued in November 1943 by the operations officer of a Panzer Grenadier division illustrates the enemy's recognition of the possible importance of every source of information, however slight:

In the past few days there have been numerous instances of forward troops delivering United Nations prisoners to the POW collecting point minus all documents and personal belongings. According to the statements of the prisoners, the forward troops took all these things from them immediately after their capture.

Apart from the fact that plundering of prisoners is unworthy of a German soldier, such conduct greatly increases the difficulties of interrogation and, with it, the procuring of important data for our own command and troops.

Because of the extreme stubbornness of British and American soldiers in divulging information, the papers and other articles that a prisoner carries on his person often provides the only background for an interrogator to open up a conversation with the prisoner. Moreover, almost all letters and papers can provide information which, when pieced together, will furnish details about a prisoner's unit. They also constitute an effective means, during interrogation, of verifying a prisoner's statements and sometimes of surprising him by catching him in a lie.

Troops are therefore definitely instructed that under no circumstances are any articles or papers to be removed from prisoners.

Strict surveillance is maintained, however, as a precaution against any attempt by prisoners to destroy items in their possession.

3. PROBLEM OF GERMAN INTERROGATION

In a special order, Major General von Ziehlberg, formerly commanding the German 65th Infantry Division, commented on some of the difficulties experienced by German interrogators. He said in part:

I myself have witnessed the interrogation of British soldiers who have received excellent training in security. Although threatened with the death penalty, they gave nothing away under interrogation. To all questions they replied simply, "My orders are to give only my name, rank, and number," and often added, "A German soldier in my position would not answer these questions either."

Thorough training must be given to our own soldiers to insure the same attitude on their part.

Section VII. GERMAN VIEWS ON USE OF THE MG 42

1. INTRODUCTION

The cyclic rate of fire of the German MG 42 is 25 rounds per second. Most of the disadvantages, as well as the advantages, of the gun can be attributed to this single characteristic. As a result of the high rate of fire, the gun has a marked tendency to "throw off," so that its fire stays on the target for a much briefer time than does that of the MG 34, which can fire only 15 rounds per second.

This section summarizes the German Army views as to the length of bursts to be used against hostile forces when the MG 42 is employed as a light machine gun or as a heavy machine gun.

2. AS A LIGHT MACHINE GUN

The Germans are instructed to fire bursts of from 5 to 7 rounds when they employ the MG 42 as a light machine gun, since an operator cannot hold his gun on the target for a longer period. The gun must be re-aimed after each burst. To enable the bursts to fall in as rapid a succession as possible, the Germans try to cut the aiming time to a minimum.

Under battle conditions the MG 42 can fire about 22

bursts per minute—that is, about 154 rounds. Under the same conditions, the MG 34 is capable only of about 15 bursts per minute, at a rate of 7 to 10 rounds per burst, totalling about 150 rounds. Thus the MG 42, used as a light machine gun, requires a slightly higher ammunition expenditure. Although the Germans believe that when the weapon is properly employed, the compactness and density of its fire pattern justify the higher expenditure, recent German Army orders have increasingly stressed the need of withholding machine-gun fire until the best possible effect is assured. Although the German defensive trick of “lying in wait” has been adopted partly to gain the tactical advantage of surprise, it also fits in with recent German efforts to conserve, not only ammunition, but all other matériel manufactured by the hard-pressed industries of the Reich and the occupied countries.

3. AS A HEAVY MACHINE GUN

German soldiers are instructed that when the MG 42 is employed as a heavy machine gun, sustained fire must be avoided at all costs. The German Army has ruled that the results of sustained fire are disappointing and that the expenditure of ammunition involved is “intolerable.”

This, and the following German observations, do not apply, however, to fire placed on large targets at short range.

The Germans believe that if the compact beaten zone of the MG 42 is on the target, a burst of 50 rounds

should be effective. If the burst is not on the target, the Germans are instructed to re-aim the gun and, if necessary, to adjust the sights.

The enemy considers it wrong to fire long bursts before fire for adjustment has been undertaken and observed. At a range of 2,000 yards, for example, the time of flight is 4.7 seconds. This means that the point of impact cannot satisfactorily be observed under 6 seconds. Six seconds of sustained fire results in an expenditure of 150 rounds. The German Army tells its soldiers that if they will wait to observe the point of impact in firing for adjustment, a burst of 50 rounds should then prove adequate.

While U. S. soldiers have expressed a healthy respect for the MG 42's high rate of fire, they agree that the gun's dispersion is very small—so small in fact, that they have frequently been able to make successful dashes out of the field of fire.

Section VIII. GERMAN TRIP-WIRE ALARM

The Germans have a trip-wire alarm device (*Alarm-schussgerät*) which gives warning of movement by patrols or individuals in areas where the Germans have erected wire defenses. This device (see fig. 28) consists of a box (1) into which an alarm cartridge (2) fits. Through the bottom passes a striker with a T-shaped head (3). By means of this head, the striker may be pulled down against a spring, for cocking.

A spring-equipped, right-angle lever (4), pivoted at the top (5), is forked on the horizontal part which passes beneath the box and holds the striker pin in the cocked position. A clamp (6) is fastened to the center of this lever; the jaws of this clamp grip the wire that is to serve as a trip wire. This may be a strand of an existing wire obstacle, a single wire erected for this particular purpose, or one of the wires used in binding together such obstacles as road blocks.¹

The alarm cartridge (2) is of the signal-cartridge type, 83-mm ($3\frac{1}{4}$ inches) long and 27-mm ($1\frac{1}{16}$ inches) in diameter. It weighs $2\frac{1}{2}$ ounces. The body is painted black. At night it is easy to identify the cartridge by touch, since its sealing disk (7) extends

¹ See *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 1, pp. 40-46, for a discussion of German barbed-wire obstacles.

over the edge, and since the rim (8) of the base is half smooth and half grooved.

This alarm device is not difficult to set up. A picket (9) is driven into the ground near the wire. The device is well lubricated, and then is slipped over the picket, to which it is fastened by clamps (10). By adjusting the position of the retaining ring (11), it is possible to keep the device in place at a proper height for the jaws of the clamp (6) to grip the trip wire easily. The wire must be locked in such a position that it is not under any tension and therefore does not tend to move the lever. Slight pulling or pushing of the wire, however, should be enough to operate the device.

The alarm is tested by cocking. To do this, pull down the T-shaped head (3) until the cocking stop engages the fork of the lever (4). Then, if the wire is moved slightly, the striker pin should rise.

To load, pull down the retaining spring and side wall (12), and slide the alarm cartridge in from the front, over the striker pin. The device is then cocked as before. Now, however, the trip wire should not be touched.

When the alarm cartridge is fired, a flame about 6 feet high is produced. This flame will last for about 10 seconds, and will illuminate the surroundings within a radius of about 50 feet.

[Safety Note: The alarm cartridge, although closely resembling the signal cartridge fired from the standard German signal pistol, must on no account be used with that weapon.]

Section IX. STICK GRENADE, MODEL 24, AS A DEFENSIVE WEAPON

In Italy the German Army has been issuing the stick hand grenade, model 24, with a removable "shrapnel ring" fitted over the thin iron or steel casing, or head, of the grenade. This addition permits the German soldier to employ the grenade as a defensive weapon. The stick hand grenade with a shrapnel ring (labeled *Stielhandgranate 24 mit Splitterring*) is illustrated in figure 29.¹

It should be remembered that all the hand grenades used by the German Army are normally of the "offensive" type; that is, they have a thin metal casing with a high proportion of explosive filler. Since they are of this type, they depend on blast effect, instead of on fragmentation of the casing, as in the U. S. "defensive-type" Mills grenade. The normal German hand grenades can be used safely by men advancing erect in the open, because they can be thrown a distance greater than their effective bursting radius.

On the other hand, the German stick hand grenade with a shrapnel ring is intended solely for use as a

¹ There continues to be an urgent need for all military personnel to turn over captured material and documents to the proper authorities. In the case of the *Stielhandgranate mit Splitterring*, for example, prompt action taken by Pvt. Jerry S. Hardy, A.S.N. 19002098, was of great value to intelligence officers.




Figure 29.—German Stick Hand Grenade with Shrapnel Ring Added.

defensive weapon. Enemy instructions state that soldiers are to use it only when they are protected by good cover, since the shrapnel is effective up to a radius of 30 meters (about 32½ yards). Without the ring, the grenade may be used in the usual manner.

These grenades are packed in boxes of five.

DISTRIBUTION: C and H (2).

(For explanation of symbols see FM 21-6.)

