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PART ONE: GERMANY

Section I. HOW THE GERMAN ARMY USES SMOKE IN COMBAT

1. INTRODUCTION

Up to a certain point, the Germans use smoke in combat much as we do. They believe that smoke should be supplementary to other weapons, rather than a weapon in itself. Incidentally, the German Army makes more extensive use of smoke candles than does the U. S. Army. Although German doctrine covering the effect of weather, wind, and terrain on smoke screens is almost identical with our own, the enemy theory of ground attack under cover of area smoke, discussed in paragraph 3 of this section, differs from U. S. methods.

It should be noted that as yet the Germans have not used white phosphorus smoke, which not only is a highly effective screening agent, but one which causes casualties, as well. Also, it must be remembered that

if gas warfare should break out, the enemy may use screening smoke to mask barrages of poison gas. The purpose of such a procedure would be to force our




Figure 1.

troops to put on gas masks whenever smoke is used against them.

This section is based entirely on German Army documents, which the U. S. Army Chemical Warfare Service has translated and recommended for publication.¹

2. SMOKE SCREENS

a. In the Defense

The following examples of German tactical use of smoke are representative.




Figure 2.

(1) The advance guard in figure 1 must find out whether the group of houses in the upper right is

¹ For supplementary notes on German use of smoke, see *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 5, pp. 15-20; Vol. I, No. 7, pp. 58-60; and Vol. II, No. 2, p. 31; also *Tactical and Technical Trends*, No. 24, pp. 8-11, and No. 38, pp. 14-20.

occupied by United Nations soldiers. If it draws fire from these houses and from the grove of saplings at the upper left, smoke candles are ignited, and the advance guard returns to the woods under cover of the smoke.

(2) In figure 2 a German heavy machine gun platoon is under fire of United Nations artillery. With




Figure 3.

the wind coming from the 1:30-o'clock direction, the German platoon sets down a line of smoke candles, which permits movement to a new position on the hill at the right. It will be noted that smoke is used to cover only that part of the terrain which offers no

concealment. The candles are of course placed with due regard for the direction of the wind.

(3) In figure 3 strong, well-spaced United Nations defenses have stopped the German attack at the entrance to a village. To prepare for further maneuvering later on, the Germans dig in under cover of




Figure 4.

smoke, taking advantage of all cover offered by the terrain.

(4) A German bicycle scout squad returning from reconnaissance suddenly receives flanking fire from the woods shown at the top of figure 4. The squad takes cover in a ditch, and ignites smoke candles. The

smoke allows the Germans to proceed under cover behind the hill at the left. Behind this hill they are out of the field of fire.




Figure 5.

(5) In figure 5 a German retrograde movement is taking place under cover of smoke. The withdrawal was begun as soon as the first screen was set up. Shortly afterward, the second screen was set up, to give the German unit time to reach the cover afforded by the woods shown at the bottom of figure 5. Plunging fire from machine guns on the flank is also covering the movement.

(6) In figure 6 German tanks are withdrawing while screened by their own smoke. The flank vehicles are screened by smoke from an artillery battery. It will be noted that this situation calls for quick realization by the artillery observation post of the tanks' predic-




Figure 6.

ment, and for a knowledge of how to use wind direction to achieve the proper secondary screen.

(7) *Antitank Defense.*—In at least one instance during the North African campaign, a German tank unit made simple but effective use of smoke. Part of a United Nations armored division was brought up to help stem a German advance. It succeeded in ambush-

ing a column of German tanks. Some damage was inflicted and the Germans withdrew, laying down a smoke screen. The commander of the United Nations force waited for the smoke to lift, thinking that it could not last long. But it persisted, and, since the terrain did not permit by-passing the screen, he gave orders for his tanks to proceed through it. As soon as the United Nations tanks were silhouetted on the other side, the Germans fired on them with everything they had, and inflicted a great deal of damage before retreating.

The Germans have also tried some interesting experiments to make tanks vulnerable. Their glass smoke grenades seem to be designed specifically for antitank use, but might also be used against pillboxes. The Germans believe that by breaking smoke grenades over air-intake openings, it is sometimes possible to force a crew to evacuate its tank, or at least to have great trouble in handling it. Also, the Germans have experimented with the trick of tying smoke grenades—probably with time fuzes—to each end of a 6- or 7-foot rope and throwing it across the barrel of the tank's gun.

b. In the Attack

The following examples of German tactical use of smoke in the attack are representative:

(1) There is a barricade of wire obstacles in front of the United Nations machine-gun nest in figure 7. Under cover of smoke, the Germans cut gaps in the wire. (If there is any likelihood of prolonged activ-

ity in dense smoke, the Germans put on gas masks.) By means of a few smoke candles, the screen is extended toward the machine-gun positions, since the direction of the wind permits this. Both flanks of the nest are attacked under the light screen. Also, a




Figure 7.

few smoke grenades are thrown in front of, and into, the nest.

For a large-scale attack on a United Nations line, the Germans are likely to follow a similar procedure. First, they may cover our centers of resistance with a heavy smoke blanket; then the attacking forces may try to envelop the positions from both flanks and reduce them from the rear.

(2) *Against Pillboxes*—The German technique of assaults against pillboxes is similar to that used against machine-gun positions [described in (1) above], with some interesting modifications. Usually the assault is preceded by concentrated artillery fire.




Figure 8.

One purpose of this is to make craters in which an advancing combat engineer detachment can take cover. When the assault detachment reaches wire obstacles surrounding the pillbox, a Very signal calls for all available artillery fire to be placed on the pillbox. Smoke screens are laid down by grenades or candles. Men with wire cutters or Bangalore torpedoes open gaps through the wire. Very signals call for artillery

fire against the pillbox to cease, and a flame-throwing detachment advances through the gaps in the wire and tries to get within 5 or 6 yards of the pillbox. These men are covered by machine-gun fire. As soon as their fuel is almost exhausted, they shout a warning, and men with pole charges advance to the embrasures of the pillbox and detonate the charges inside it. If the pillbox still holds out, smoke candles may be thrown inside it to make the air unbreathable, or an attempt may be made to blow in the roof with a heavy charge.

(3) In figure 8 a German attack is stopped by fire from a heavy machine gun on the left flank. Smoke




Figure 9.

is used to blind the machine gun, and the attack continues.

(4) During a German tank attack, a United Nations observation post and (suspected) antitank weapons (see fig. 9) are blinded by smoke from aircraft and artillery.

3. GROUND ATTACKS EMPLOYING AREA SMOKE

a. Definition

The term "area smoke," as defined by a German manual, means the use of smoke to achieve, over an extensive area, an effect much like that of thick natural fog. The Germans regard this as an important asset in an attack against forces prepared for defense along a stabilized front, in a field defensive position, or behind a water obstacle.

Area smoke creates a zone in which, and into which, observation and observed fire are either difficult or impossible, except at close range. It therefore favors close combat, with infantry playing an important part. The Germans regard surprise as especially useful in an attack under area smoke; this prevents the opposition from rearranging its defensive strategy so as to safeguard against penetration of its lines.

b. Preparations

Before the main attack, the Germans occupy suitable positions of readiness. Reconnaissance is performed and thorough preparations are made, before the area smoke is laid down. The attacking units

are given as clear a picture as possible of the nature of the terrain to be crossed, and details regarding the defensive capabilities of the opposing force.

The main objectives of the attack are the United Nations artillery positions. The Germans realize that if the main defensive zone is of great depth and strength, it may be necessary for them to decide upon intermediate objectives, which can be recognized easily in the smoke—that is, roads running at right angles to the advance, intersecting streams, and so on. This makes it possible to correlate the laying of the screen with the progress of the attack.

Before the smoke screen is laid down, the artillery places thorough destructive fire on the area to be attacked. High ground, suitable for observation posts in the vicinity of the battle zone, is blinded. The German intention is to neutralize United Nations artillery while the attacking forces are moving toward their preliminary positions, and to keep it neutralized throughout the battle.

Minefields are cleared beforehand and obstacles are dealt with, so that the attacking forces will be delayed as little as possible. The night before the attack is to begin, the first wave of attacking units is brought up near the positions of readiness. Roads and paths approaching the defensive zones are so marked that, even after smoke has begun to drift over these routes, there can be no possibility of error.

The attacking units come to the positions of readiness in open formation.

First light in the morning is regarded as the most favorable time for the attack to begin. The approach of the attacking units may be preceded by a fairly long area smoke bombardment on the hostile forward positions. Smoke- and high-explosive projectiles are fired together until the attacking German infantry approaches the area which is being smoke-screened. If possible, the hostile rear observation posts are blinded at this time.

c. Maintaining the Area Smoke Screen

The area smoke is laid down in zones 225 to 350 yards wide, across the axis of attack. Its rate of advance is governed by the difficulties that the Germans estimate they will encounter in the respective combat areas, and by the nature of the terrain; normally, the rate of advance averages about 225 yards in a 15-minute period. The Germans stipulate that once this screen has been set in motion, it must follow the timetable prepared in advance.

German units carry the attack forward under full cover of the smoke. At this stage, forward visibility is kept to hand-grenade range.

A head-on wind gives the attack the best smoke protection, the Germans believe. Also, a lateral wind has certain advantages, because it carries the smoke across sectors which are not being attacked—a useful deception. The Germans say that a wind blowing in

the direction of United Nations forces is unsuitable, since it prevents use of the screen for close combat. The Germans believe in extending a screen over the flanks of the combat area, as a ruse. During an attack the screen is supplemented by the smoke equipment of individual attacking units—that is, by smoke grenades and candles and by smoke shells from infantry guns. The Germans try to supply their units generously with these items, especially with the smoke candles.

d. How Units Are Coordinated

The division commander assigns objectives to the infantry commander, and also assigns missions to the artillery. Antiaircraft defense is provided while units are assembling. The area screen is laid down by smoke units and artillery, working together under the sole command of the artillery commander. This area screen is laid on the basis of a time schedule and a coverage outlined by the division commander.

The infantry regimental commander gives the battalions details regarding their attack and the objectives of the breakthrough. He puts under the command of the battalions such matériel as may be necessary to the fulfillment of their missions; this includes antitank guns, infantry guns, and aids to maintaining direction. Forces assigned to attack defensive works are augmented by combat engineer units with their special equipment, individual armored vehicles, and weapons for engaging pillboxes. The bat-

talion commander goes forward with the troops engaged in the breakthrough.

Radio apparatus is considered necessary, even for lateral communication, during the course of fighting in the smoke-covered area. Additional signal units are attached, to provide the necessary communication under these difficult circumstances.

Reconnaissance aircraft are employed to report the effectiveness of the screen, and to reconnoiter the terrain beyond it. Dive-bombing attacks are carried out against hostile battery positions, assembly areas, and moving columns of hostile reserves.

After the breakthrough, the regimental commander reorganizes those forces which have become scattered.

e. The Attack

The infantry are the first to enter the combat area. The Germans are likely to dispatch assault detachments against individual and especially formidable defensive positions on the near edge of the combat area; the purpose of this, of course, is to make penetration easier.

German assault troops are thrown in at points where the terrain and the character of defensive obstacles offer conditions most favorable for a thrust. During the battle these assault troops must rely on their own resources. The German theory is that such units should be strong enough to fight their way across the combat area, and reach the far edge still strong enough

to continue active fighting. It is a German principle that these assault units should advance simultaneously, no matter how great the variety of tasks that each unit must perform.

When the infantry is nearing the far edge of the hostile defenses, under cover of the smoke, the artillery begins its mission of providing the necessary fire cover for the spearhead of the attack, as it comes out of the smoke and within the view of United Nations forces. German artillery forward observers, with field telephone apparatus, accompany the forward elements of the attacking infantry, and communicate with the artillery liaison officers at battalion headquarters. During the advance through the smoke, the observers signal to field artillery observation personnel at pre-arranged times, to indicate which objectives have been attained. Vertical light signals, such as Very lights, are used for this purpose.

f. Aids to Maintaining Direction

The Germans consider it necessary for attacking units to be properly oriented at all times, so that there will be no confusion when vision is sharply reduced. The following devices are employed in maintaining direction:

- (1) The magnetic compass.

- (2) A radio beam sent out by a transmitter, with several receivers picking it up. The transmitter is set up at the line of departure, and lays a beam about 65 feet wide through the smoke, in the direction of the

objective. The men operating the receivers can tell at any time whether they are in the radio beam or have deviated to a flank. A special unit of the signal service, moving with the leading elements of the attacking forces, operates this equipment.

(3) "Direction shells," which scatter red, yellow, or blue powder, are issued to the infantry gun companies. Before the attack these rounds are so fired as to mark the path of attack with colored patches every 55 yards (approximately).

(4) Marking lines, each about 350 yards long, attached to rockets.

(5) The gyro-compass.

(6) Direction tapes in different colors mark the routes that staffs or units have taken through the smoke. These tapes facilitate courier traffic, the maintenance of contact, and the forward movement of units advancing later on. Numerals on the tapes tell men fighting within the screen how far they have penetrated from the line of departure.

g. Follow-up of Attack

When the attacking units reach the far edge of the screen, they reorganize so that an immediate attack can be launched against important objectives, which usually lie beyond the screened area. While the infantry is reorganizing, antitank guns provide protection. Also, tank units which have been held in readiness are brought through the newly captured area to attack hostile artillery positions and any hostile re-

serves which may have been brought up. German reserves exploit the breakthrough so that maximum strength can be applied against United Nations forces on the far side of the smoke screen.

h. Note on Area Screens Used with Water Obstacles

It is a German principle that, when hostile forces are defending themselves behind a water obstacle, an area screen is useful only if there is little or no current or if the stream is a narrow one. The first wave to be ferried over consists only of assault troops who are to engage the fieldworks on the opposite bank. The timetable for the area screen takes into account the requirement that units ferried across a stream must have time to assemble on the opposite bank before any thrust against extensive hostile defenses is attempted.

Section II HOW INFANTRY BATTALIONS DEVELOP FOR THE ATTACK

1. INTRODUCTION

The German theory of entrance into offensive combat is fairly usual, in that two distinct stages are involved. These are called *Entfaltung* and *Entwicklung*, which may best be translated into U. S. terminology as “development” and “deployment.” The first stage is evidently designed to permit more rapid deployment at the proper time, and to enable good control to be maintained until as late a moment as possible. Briefly, the first stage (*Entfaltung*) begins with the approach march, when the battalion changes from a route-march formation to one made up of several columns. The second stage (*Entwicklung*) covers what, in U. S. practice, is the deployment of platoons and squads. The following paragraphs outline the tactics involved in each stage, as they are taught to German infantry noncoms.

2. FIRST STAGE

Normally, the development of a regiment is by battalions (see fig. 10). If necessary, distances between battalions are increased.

When a high state of preparedness is necessary, the battalion itself may “shake out” into companies.

Companies proceed in the direction given them, employing the normal marching formation and, at the same time, making use of whatever cover and concealment are available. Commanders take into account the additional strain of marching across country.

Company transport remains with companies as long as possible, until the companies themselves must deploy.

The Germans believe that it is often advisable to have only one company forward, with the main strength of the battalion kept directly under the battalion commander as long as possible, ready to be employed in the direction most advantageous for an attack.

Support weapons are used to cover the development and the subsequent advance. These weapons are interspersed in the line of march, either between the companies or behind the battalion. If any alteration of intervals is caused by ground conditions or hostile fire, the original intervals are resumed at the earliest opportunity.

When the development takes place, the leading elements of the battalion may be ordered to seize tactically important terrain.

German training points out that deployment at night, and in woods, calls for stronger protection forward, for preparatory reconnaissance, and for the marking of routes. Intervals between units are shorter than by day.

FIG. 10
FIRST STAGE





FIG. 11
SECOND STAGE



The battalion commander's orders cover :

- a. Information regarding hostile and German units ;
- b. German intentions ;
- c. Reconnaissance ;
- d. Instructions for forward companies (including seizure of dominating terrain) ;
- e. Instructions for weapons supporting the advance ;
- f. Instructions for the companies comprising the main body (including reconnaissance on flanks and protection of flanks, if necessary) ;
- g. Rendezvous of company transport and battalion vehicles ;
- h. Battalion headquarters ; intercommunications.

At the time of the development, the battalion commander moves with the forward elements from one prominent terrain feature to another. He generally sends special reconnaissance patrols ahead, or reconnoiters the hostile position himself from a commanding terrain feature. Commanders of support weapons accompany him, reconnoitering for firing positions.

3. SECOND STAGE

As soon as any German company comes within range of observed hostile artillery fire, it disperses in depth (see fig. 11). The Germans consider that an advance in file is often desirable, inasmuch as it represents only a small target and one which is easily controlled ; they recognize, however, that it is highly vulnerable to enfilade fire.

If ground conditions and hostile fire make deployment necessary, the platoons may be dispersed in depth into squads. The Germans find that this splitting-up permits the ground to be exploited for cover during the advance, and that it hinders the effectiveness of hostile observation and fire. Reserves and support weapons also adopt open formations. They remain sufficiently far behind the forward elements to avoid coming under fire directed at these elements.

If the rifle companies are deployed, their elements normally move forward in narrow columns or single files, with irregular intervals, and make use of all available cover. The forward elements are not deployed as skirmishers until they are required to engage in a fire fight.

Section III. CAMOUFLAGE AGAINST GROUND OBSERVERS

1. GENERAL

German camouflage is excellent, experienced U. S. fighting men agree. The enemy's natural aptitude for painstaking craftsmanship seems to serve him in good stead when camouflage is to be undertaken. No matter whether the German is making use of natural or artificial camouflage, his work is resourceful and thorough. He is aware that in camouflage, it's the small touches that count—details that an impatient soldier, or a lazy one, might regard as unimportant.

The German Army does not consider camouflage an end in itself, but a vitally important preliminary to successful action. As the Germans frankly put it, "Camouflage enables us to achieve surprise." They try to use their own weapons and equipment for the utmost effect, while simultaneously preventing the hostile force from making exact calculations and employing its own resources to advantage.

"When time is short," the Germans say, "it is better to camouflage a few objects well than to camouflage everything badly. If a camouflage plan is linked with deception, such as the use of dummy matériel, it will be all the more effective. However, it must be remembered that a single blunder can ruin the success

of an entire plan. Noise and light discipline are part and parcel of an over-all camouflage layout, and it is every soldier's responsibility to help maintain the general scheme to perfection. The careless man endangers the lives of all his comrades."

2. USE OF NATURAL CONCEALMENT

German use of natural concealment is comparable to our own. However, a few outstanding German principles may be noted.

Since natural concealment can be put to use quickly, it is considered preferable to artificial camouflage. The importance of darkness, mist, and shadows, and of the "texture" of natural growth, is stressed. (It is a camouflage axiom that a "smooth-textured" surface, which reflects light, make a dangerous background; on the other hand, such "rough" surfaces as thickets, tall crops, and high grass absorb light and seem darker than they are, when viewed from a distance. Of primary importance in confusing the air observer, texture can also be used to deceive the ground observer.) The German Army emphasizes that darkness affords the best concealment of all, and stipulates that it be utilized extensively for the assembly and movement of troops, transportation of supplies, and work on positions. The importance of maintaining a total blackout is stressed.

The Germans believe in continuing normal daytime camouflage measures throughout the night, in case United Nations forces should try to break the darkness

by means of flares or any other light-producing device. German soldiers—especially the men of the Hermann Goering Division—have been taught to freeze in their tracks the moment their surroundings are unexpectedly illuminated.

German soldiers are taught that bad visibility, such as mist creates, affords much the same concealment as darkness, but are warned that mist often clears away so rapidly that it is dangerous for them not to be ready with some other type of concealment.

3. USE OF ARTIFICIAL CAMOUFLAGE

a. Employing Natural Material

The German Army makes liberal use of natural camouflage material. Often the outline of an object is broken, and its betraying shadow is changed, by the use of branches; this is a favorite way of disguising tanks and vehicles at the halt.

Grass, moss, and low bushes are frequently transplanted for use as camouflage. Turf is lifted in neat rectangular sections. Recognizing that cut grass, branches, and so on soon lose their original color, the Germans renew this type of garnish continually. They are aware that branches cut from trees last longer than those cut from shrubs, and that they will keep their original color even better if they are stuck into the ground or are wrapped in wet rags or moss.

On stabilized fronts the Germans often plant grass, grain, flowers, shrubs, and even trees, to complete camouflage schemes.

b. Employing Artificial Material

Artificial material is used only if natural material is insufficient, unsuitable, or not available at all. Tar-paulins, hemp or wire netting, clothing, old rags, paper, sheet iron, wire, cord, timber, sawdust, chips, shavings, ashes, and paint are among the many kinds of artificial material that the Germans use.

As a rule, units contrive their own artificial camouflage schemes.

Camouflage suits and jackets, with or without hoods, are often worn by patrols and observers. Helmets are camouflaged with netting and garnish. Small objects are often camouflaged with garnished canvas, and large objects with garnished netting. The Germans employ the familiar U. S. principle of thinning the garnish gradually from the center outward, so that the camouflage will merge with the surroundings.

To hide bridges, exposed stretches of roads, and tactically important areas, the Germans sometimes erect screens (see fig. 12). This measure is a precaution against observed fire. Such screens usually are constructed of leafy branches placed vertically and supported by wire stretched between trees or posts; they may be supplemented by garnished netting.

Sometimes the German Army issues "camouflage umbrellas." These consist of a light metal frame and reversible netting, green on one side and buff on the other, so that local surroundings can readily be



Figure 12.

matched. Garnish is added. The umbrellas, which are easy to put up and take down, are used to camouflage heavy weapons, observation posts, and so on (see fig. 13).




Figure 13.

Dummy hillocks are constructed, sometimes over foxholes, by means of wooden or wire frames covered




Figure 14.

with materials of suitable texture and color (see fig. 14).

When the Germans use paint in camouflaging weapons, vehicles, and other metal equipment, they deliberately employ a color which is darker than the surroundings. Also, they add sand to roughen a flat surface and thus prevent reflection of light. The Germans may either remove the windshields of vehicles altogether, or smear them with gritty oil or paint, leaving only a narrow slit for vision.



Figure 15.

White horses are sprayed with a solution of about 10 percent permanganate of potash (see fig. 15). To obtain a darker color, the Germans strengthen the solution. The coloring is renewed every 8 to 10 weeks.

4. PRECAUTIONS REGARDING NOISE

The Germans are aware of the importance of silence as part of a camouflage scheme when a hostile force is in the vicinity. Accordingly, they take precautions to eliminate or lessen sounds which might indicate their presence.

Orders are given in a subdued tone, or are written. Hard ground is avoided as much as possible, and full use is made of soft ground.

The equipment of the individual soldier is so wrapped and fastened as to prevent clinking or scraping noises.

For short distances the wheels of horse-drawn vehicles are wrapped in rags or similar material, and horses' hooves are padded. Since horses which have a tendency to neigh are a liability, their mouths are tied. If they are standing still, they are given feed bags; this has a quieting effect.

Vehicles are loaded in such a way that the clatter of equipment is impossible, even on bad roads or when the vehicles are moving across country. Horns are disconnected, so that they will not be sounded by accident.

When conditions permit, vehicles take advantage of the sound of artillery fire or friendly aircraft overhead and move while the sound of their motors is drowned out by the louder noises.

To prevent United Nations forces from locating German gun positions by sound ranging, the Germans try to carry out their fire ranging by means of roving batteries and by means of roving guns brought up expressly for this purpose. If such a system cannot be employed, fire is restricted to close bursts or salvos. The Germans also use dummy batteries (equipped to imitate the sound of fire) to make sound ranging by United Nations forces more difficult.

Section IV. NEW HEAVY TANK: THE Pz. Kw. 5 (PANTHER)

When the Pz. Kw. 6 (Tiger) became standard, the Pz. Kw. 5 (Panther) was still in an experimental stage. Now that the Panther has joined the German tank series as a standard model, a general description of this newest "land battleship" can be made available to U. S. military personnel. Much of the data presented here comes from Russian sources, inasmuch as the Pz. Kw. 5 has thus far been used only on the Eastern Front.

The Panther (see fig. 16) is a fast, heavy, well-armored vehicle. It mounts a long 75-mm gun. Weighing 45 tons, the new tank appears to be of a type intermediate between the 22-ton Pz. Kw. 4 and the 56-ton Pz. Kw. 6.¹ The Panther has a speed of about 31 miles per hour. It corresponds roughly to our General Sherman, which the Germans have always greatly admired.

¹ With certain alterations the Pz. Kw. 6 may weigh as much as 62 tons. For an illustrated discussion of the Pz. Kw. 6, see *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 10, pp. 19-23.




Figure 1d.—New German Heavy Tank, the Pz. Kw. V (Panther)

The following table of information regarding the Pz. Kw. 5 will be of interest:

Weight-----	45 tons.
Width-----	11 ft 8 in (same as the Pz. Kw. 6).
Length-----	22 ft 8 in ($\frac{1}{2}$ ft longer than the Pz. Kw. 6).
Clearance----	1 ft 8 in (3.9 in more than the Pz. Kw. 6).
Motor-----	gasoline, 640 hp, in rear of tank (the gas tanks are on each side of the motor).
Cooling sys- tem-----	water.
Ignition-----	magneto.
Caterpillar section-----	drive sprockets at front rear idlers; 8 double rubber-tired bogie wheels, 33.5 in in diameter, on either side; torsion suspension system; hydraulic shock absorbers inside tank; metal caterpillar tread 25.6 in wide.
Armor-----	front of turret and cannon shield, 3.94 in; upper front plate, 3.45 in, 57° angle of slope; lower front plate, 2.95 in, 53° angle of slope.
Armament---	75-mm gun, long barrel; one 7.92-mm machine gun (MG 42).
Ammunition--	75 rounds (AP and HE).
Maximum speed-----	approx 31 mph.
Range-----	approx 105 mi.
Crew-----	5.

It is believed that the 75-mm gun is the Kw. K.² This tank gun is a straight-bore weapon with a muzzle brake, and has an over-all length of 18 feet 2 inches.

² *Kampfwagenkanone*—tank gun.

Although equipped with the same motor as the Tiger, the Panther has lighter armor and armament. For this reason it is capable of higher speed and greater maneuverability. The Panther is also provided with additional armor plate, 4- to 6-mm thick, (not shown in fig. 16) along the side, just above the suspension wheels and the sloping side armor plate.

When a flexible tube with a float is attached to the air intake, the Panther has no difficulty in fording fairly deep streams. There is a special fitting in the top of the tank for attaching this tube.

Like the Pz. Kw. 6's, the Pz. Kw. 5's are organized into separate tank battalions. During the summer of 1943, the Germans used many of these new tanks on the Russian front.

Although the Russians have found the Pz. Kw. 5 more maneuverable than the Pz. Kw. 6, they are convinced that the new tank is more easily knocked out. Fire from all types of rifles and machine guns directed against the peep holes, periscopes, and the base of the turret and gun shield will blind or jam the parts, the Russians say. High explosives and armor-piercing shells of 54-mm (2.12 inches) caliber, or higher, are effective against the turret at ranges of 875 yards or less. Large-caliber artillery and self-propelled cannon can put the Panther out of action at ordinary distances for effective fire. The vertical and sloping plates can be penetrated by armor-piercing shells of 45-mm (1.78 inches) caliber, or higher. Incendiary armor-piercing shells are said to be especially effec-

tive, not only against the gasoline tanks, but against the ammunition, which is located just to the rear of the driver.

The additional armor plate above the suspension wheels is provided to reduce the penetration of hollow-charge shells. According to the Russians, it is ineffective; antitank grenades, antitank mines, and Molotov cocktails are reported to be effective against the weak top and bottom plates and the cooling and ventilating openings on top of the tank, just above the motor.

However, it should definitely be stated that the Pz. Kw. 5 is a formidable weapon—a distinct asset of the German Army.

Section V. BRITISH COMMENTS ON GERMAN USE OF TANKS

In the *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 11, pp. 53-54, there appeared a translation of a Fifth Panzer Army order signed by Lt. Gen. Gustav von Vaerst, listing "ten commandments" for the employment of tanks. This month the *Intelligence Bulletin* again publishes a translation of these "commandments," and adds appropriate comments by GHQ, Middle East Forces, based on a report by an experienced armored force officer.

First, the German order:

1. The tank is a decisive combat weapon. Therefore, its employment should be limited to the "main effort" in suitable terrain.

2. The tank is not an individual fighting weapon. The smallest tank unit is the platoon, and, for more important missions, the company.

3. The tank is not an infantry support weapon. It breaks into, and through, the opposition's line, and the infantry follows it closely.

4. The tank can take and clear terrain, but it cannot hold it. The latter is the mission of the infantry, supported by infantry heavy weapons, antitank guns, and artillery.

5. The tank is not to be employed as artillery to fight the enemy from a single position for an extended period. While fighting, the tank is almost constantly in motion, halting briefly to fire.

6. The mission of the infantry is to neutralize hostile anti-tank weapons, and to follow the tank attack closely so as to exploit completely the force and morale effect of that attack.

7. The mission of the artillery is to support the tank attack by fire, to destroy hostile artillery, and to follow closely the rapidly advancing tank attack. The main task of the artillery support is continuous flank protection.

8. The task of the tank destroyers ("Ferdinands" or other self-propelled mounts equipped with high-velocity weapons) is to follow the tank attack closely, and to get into the battle promptly when tank fights tank.

9. The mission of the combat engineers is to open gaps in minefields—under tank, infantry, and artillery protection—and thereby enable the tank attack to continue.

10. At night, when tanks are blind and deaf, it is the mission of the infantry to protect them.

And now the comments by GHQ, British Middle East Forces:

It is considered that, with the exception of Nos. 2 and 3, these "commandments" are sound common sense, based on fundamental principles.

Number 2 is interesting, however, since it reflects the opinions of von Arnim, von Thoma, and Stumme (all now prisoners of war), who fought in Russia, where they acquired the habit of using their tanks in "penny packets." A platoon consists of five tanks, and a company consists of 17 Pz. Kw. 3's, 18 Pz. Kw. 4's, or 8 Pz. Kw. 6's. Rommell would never have agreed to the company being split, and would normally have preferred to use the battalion, or even the regiment, as the unit of attack, just as we [the British] ourselves would.

Number 3 is debatable. Against weak antitank defense and no mines, this method would be effective. However, the action at Medenine, in the Mareth line area, and all action after that, showed that we are as well equipped with antitank guns as the Germans are. Because of this, the Germans will be compelled to rewrite their No. 3 "commandment" and use their tanks much as our Eighth Army has been doing recently.

Section VI. GERMAN COMBAT TACTICS IN TOWNS AND CITIES

1. INTRODUCTION

Now that United Nations forces are fighting energetically on the soil of continental Europe, it must be expected that we shall engage the enemy in towns and cities with ever-increasing frequency. For this reason, it is most important for us to understand German doctrine regarding combat in populated places.

Often the size of a town is not the principal determining factor in a German commander's tactical plan; instead, a town's geographic or economic importance may be his first consideration. A very small village may be worth contesting fiercely if it commands the entrance to a mountain pass, for example, or if it possesses resources essential to the German war effort. A much larger town, on the other hand, may have far less value, and by no means be worth the same expenditure of men and matériel.

However, the Germans use the same basic tactics for towns and cities alike. These tactics are summarized in the following paragraphs, which are based on a German Army document.

2. IN THE ATTACK

The Germans attempt to outflank and encircle a town. If this move succeeds, they cut off the water, electricity, and gas supply. They find the most vulnerable spot in the area held by the hostile forces, and penetrate it. After cutting the hostile forces in two, the Germans then divide the opposition again and again so that it no longer is able to maneuver freely. German doctrine maintains that parallel attacks constitute the most advantageous method if a number of columns are available (see fig. 17a). Thrusts at an angle (see fig. 17b), and especially thrusts from opposite directions (see fig. 17c and d), are avoided. The Germans believe that such thrusts are likely to result in friendly troops getting under each other's fire, and that confusion is inevitable.

The Germans group their units as attack columns and mopping-up columns. Advance by limited sectors is the rule. Commanders do not plan too far ahead. After taking a block, a commander reassembles his men and issues further instructions.

It is a German axiom that "he who commands the heights also commands the depths." The Germans strive for dominating positions, although in defense they may site their machine guns in much lower positions.

While an advance is being made in a street, a simultaneous advance is made along the roofs if the houses adjoin each other. In the streets an advance is made




Figure 17.—German Attack Tactics in Towns and Cities.

by single files edging forward close to the houses on each side. From front to rear, marksmen are detailed to observe danger points on the opposite side of the street; that is, a man may be ordered to observe all roofs or all the windows on a given floor, and so on.

Side alleys and entrances to side streets are blocked as rapidly as possible. After this, searching parties are detailed to investigate all buildings in the block, and then close them. Entrances to cellars and first floors are guarded until all houses in the block have been searched. All windows are closed and shuttered.

The Germans attach importance to constant and effective cooperation with artillery. Light guns (man-handled) advance along the street and combat nests of resistance with direct fire. The Germans believe that, aside from air bombardment, only 150-mm to 210-mm pieces are effective in destroying the larger buildings. Tanks, they maintain, are not very successful in assaults on houses.

When attacking a town, the Germans do not employ motor vehicles or horses. As much gear as possible is sacrificed in favor of axes, crowbars, wire-cutters, saws, ropes and rope ladders, flashlights, prepared charges, hand grenades, smoke candles and grenades, and maps and air photographs of the locality.

3. IN THE DEFENSE

In organizing the defense of a town, the Germans prepare a reserve of drinking water, rations, ammunition, and medical supplies. Some of this is stored in

various cellars, since the Germans are aware that these are tactically useful places, from which the advance of a hostile force can be hindered considerably. Searchlights are kept ready to illuminate the target area at night. Preparation is made for defense by sectors. Mines and booby traps are kept ready for use.

So that the main line of resistance will not be discovered by the hostile forces, the Germans place it within the town proper and make it irregular. Only individual centers of resistance are established in the outskirts. These are used for flanking purposes. Important buildings are defended, not from their own walls, but from advance positions.

The Germans try to maintain a strong mobile reserve.

Every attempt is made to trap hostile units in dead-end streets and to cut off, by sudden flanking movements, hostile units which advance too recklessly.

Emergency barriers are kept ready in the entrances to buildings. These barriers can be placed across the streets on extremely short notice.

Low machine-gun positions are prepared to cover all possible approach routes.

Good telephone communication is maintained.

Command posts remain constantly on guard against surprise attacks.

The windows of all buildings are kept open at all times, so that the attackers will have difficulty in detecting from which windows fire is being delivered.

German soldiers are instructed not to fire from window sills, but from positions well within the rooms. Snipers continually move from room to room. Individual roof tiles are removed to provide loopholes. On rooftops, firing positions behind chimneys are considered desirable, provided that the chimneys are below the roof ridges.

Important doors leading to the street are guarded, and doors which are not to be used are blocked. Holes are pierced through the walls of adjoining houses to afford communication channels.

The Germans regard the entire matter of defense merely as a preliminary to surprise counterattacks.

Section VII. GERMAN STAKE MINE

The German concrete antipersonnel mine known as the *Stockmine* (stake mine) is now standard. The stake mine, which must not be confused with the Italian picket mine, apparently represents a German effort to economize on strategic materials; nevertheless it deserves to be treated with as much respect as any other antipersonnel device. It has been reported that the stake mine may be fatal up to a radius of 66 yards.




Figure 18.—German Stake Mine (antipersonnel).

The mine consists of a concrete casing, a high explosive cartridge, an igniter, and a detonator, and is used with a stake. The mine (see fig. 18) is about

6 inches high and about $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter, and weighs approximately $4\frac{1}{2}$ pounds; the stake (see fig. 18) is about 1 foot 4 inches long and $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches in diameter. The Germans assemble these parts in the following manner:

- a. The stake is driven into the ground until it projects about 5 inches.
- b. The cartridge is placed inside the casing. When the Germans use a smaller commercial cartridge, they wedge it into place with bits of wood.
- c. The igniter, together with a detonator, is screwed into the top of the mine.
- d. The mine is placed on the stake.
- e. If necessary, the top and bottom of the mine are sealed with wax to keep out moisture.

The ways in which the Germans lay the stake mine depend on the terrain, especially on the type of soil and the vegetation. Figures 19a, 19b, and 19c illustrate methods of laying the mine with the German Z. Z. 42 igniter. If a German Z. Z. 35 igniter is used, a pull at a right angle to the igniter will not fire it. For this reason, a stake with its top cut off at a 45-degree angle is driven into the ground until it projects about $1\frac{1}{2}$ feet, and the mine is placed beside it; the trip wire is led from the igniter over two nails which have been driven crosswise into the top of the stake, as shown in figure 19d. (This last precaution is designed to keep the wire from snagging.) The enemy may also use two trip wires, at an angle of 180 degrees to each other (see fig. 19e); both are at-




Figure 19.—Methods of Laying the German Stake Mine.

tached to the eye in the releasing mechanism of a Z. Z. 35 igniter, and two guide stakes are used. The Germans stipulate that trip wires not longer than 50 feet be used, as a rule. If longer trip wires (up to 65 feet) are used, they are supported at a height of 8 to 10 inches above the ground by stakes carefully aligned 15 feet apart. Also, the mine without the stake may be tied to trees or telephone poles (see fig. 19c). When this is done, the hole in the bottom of the mine is plugged to keep the cartridge in position. In loose sand, boggy ground, or snow, extra-long stakes are used. The Germans recommend that white paint be used as camouflage when there is snow on the ground.

The Germans say that stake mines should be laid and armed only by highly skilled men working in pairs. One man holds the mine and the igniter while the other arranges the trip wire. German soldiers are warned that the wire must never be stretched tight.

The enemy is likely to lay stake mines in depth in narrow country paths, and in defiles and ravines. The mines may also be laid in staggered rows to form mine belts. For example, such a belt might consist of 150 mines laid in three rows, each about 3,200 feet long, with the mines 65 feet apart.

In neutralizing the stake mine, the Germans first identify the type of igniter. If it is a Z. Z. 42, one man holds the safety pin firmly in position while a second man cuts the trip wire. If the pin of the Z. Z. 42 has been partly withdrawn, the mine is destroyed

on the spot. If the igniter is a Z. Z. 35, the safety pin or a nail is placed in the safety-pin hole. As an added precaution, the pin may be secured with adhesive tape.

To disarm the stake mine, the Germans unscrew the igniter, remove the charge and the detonator, and then pack each of these three parts in separate boxes for future use.

PART TWO: JAPAN

Section I. ENEMY BAYONET TECHNIQUE

1. INTRODUCTION

Japanese training regulations dealing with the technique of using the bayonet are presented below. Although reports to date from theaters of operations show that, as a rule, the individual Japanese soldier has not been very adept at bayonet fighting,¹ all our intelligence sources indicate that the Japanese place considerable emphasis on bayonet training.

2. THE JAPANESE REGULATIONS

a. Guard Position

The regulations give the following specific instructions for this position:

Face the opponent and look into his eyes. With the toes of the right foot pointing to the right, take a half step with the left foot, toes pointing toward the opponent; bend the knees slightly and keep the body straight (see figure 20). At the same time, throw the rifle with the right hand so that its weight leans toward the left and drops forward. With the left hand held a trifle above the belt line, grasp the rifle just in front of the lower band. With the right hand, palm to the left, grasp the small of

¹ See *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 64.




Figure 20.—Guard Position.

the stock, keeping the protruding part between the forefinger and the middle finger. Hold the right fist against the side of the hip. Hold both arms in a natural manner, slightly bent. Point the bayonet at the opponent's eyes.

(1) *While Moving Forward.*—Press lightly with the toes of the rear foot and advance forward with the front foot, following quickly with the rear foot.

(2) *While Moving Backward.*—Execute in exactly the opposite manner from the forward.

The advantages of these movements are that: (a) balance can be maintained easily, with the soldier ready for instant movement in any direction; (b) the knees are not strained; and (c) both feet are moved close to the ground, and the toes are always in contact with the ground.

b. Basic Thrust

The basic thrust is a movement executed by driving the bayonet in a straight line to any opening in the body from a crossing position of the rifles, opponents facing each other (see fig. 21).




Figure 21.—Position for Basic Thrust.

The instructor gives the command of "Rear Left" from the crossing position, and the thrust is executed by carrying out the following instructions:

Execute the thrust from the "On Guard" position by stepping firmly with the right foot and then quickly advancing the left foot. At the same time, with both hands grasping the rifle firmly, raise the right hand to the lower front part of the right breast, raise the left hand forward and a little higher than the right, and bend the waist a trifle; during this movement,

drive the bayonet forcefully, with the left hand extended, in a straight line at the opening of the instructor's body. While both legs move forward close to the ground, step with the left foot flat so that it will carry the weight of the body, and quickly move the right leg to the proper position. After executing the thrust, return swiftly to "On Guard."

When the bayonet fighter executes his thrust, the instructor will move his left hand slightly to the left from the crossing position. He moves backward with the thrust and receives it on his body. Then he returns immediately to "On Guard."

Successive basic thrusts are movements in which the thrust is executed several times in succession. In executing these movements, the instructor will give a command of "Rear Left" from the crossing position.

Successive thrusts are executed swiftly. After each thrust, the bayonet fighter retreats, but recovers immediately. Even if he believes that the distance and timing are not just right, the fighter must always try to thrust with determination. If the thrust cannot be executed immediately, he should not give his opponent an advantage. The fighter should be alert for distance and timing, and, at the opportune moment, he should thrust with determination.

The instructor, in order to comply with the main points of teaching the thrust, will move backward swiftly with each thrust, according to the skillfulness of the thrust, and allow the bayonet fighter to thrust his body. Then, as the bayonet fighter becomes more competent, the instructor should vary and lengthen the timing and distance so as to give the fighter practice.

c. Other Types of Thrusts

In executing movements of the bayonet, the different types of thrusts are: side-step thrust, low body thrust, body-contact thrust, knock-off thrust, and parry thrust.

(1) *Execution of Side-step Thrust.*—To execute the side-step thrust, place the bayonet on the right or left of the opponent's bayonet. Lower the bayonet point by bending both knees and, at the same time, move to the right or left, step in quickly, and drive the bayonet forcefully into the opponent's throat or upper body. Guide the bayonet to the target through the upper part of the opponent's left hand.

Common errors: (a) the tendency to lower the bayonet point too much; and (b) the tendency to withdraw the rifle—a move which gives the opponent an advantage.

(2) *Execution of Low Body Thrust.*—Execute this thrust in the same manner as the side-step thrust, except that your target is the lower part of the body and you guide the bayonet to the target through the lower part of the opponent's left hand.

Common errors: (a) a scooping-up motion accompanying the thrust, preventing a straightforward penetration; (b) loss of balance, caused by too long a step or improper movement (rear foot not following properly); and (c) giving away your intentions before the thrust.

(3) *Body-contact Thrust.*—This movement, executed with great speed and power, unbalances the opponent through body contact. Without losing balance or advantage, the bayonet fighter, in executing this thrust, holds the rifle close to his body, with the bayonet point facing slightly to the right; presses his right foot firmly on the ground, and, with his abdomen strained firmly, thrusts upward to the opponent's body.

Common errors: (a) loss of balance and (b) slow recovery.

(4) *Knock-off Thrust.*—This is an offensive blow designed to create an opening by knocking the opponent's bayonet out of the way. The bayonet fighter makes a movement which is both forward and lateral. He hits his opponent near the left fist to knock his bayonet to the right, left, or downward. When an opening is created, he executes his thrust.

Common errors: (a) too much strength put in the left hand, thereby making it difficult to execute a continuous thrust; and (b) failure in the lateral movement to move first the foot on the shifting side.

(5) *Parry Thrust*.—This is an offensive blow, delivered while in the crossing position and designed to create an opening by pushing away the opponent's bayonet. It is executed in the same manner as the knock-off thrust.

(6) *Execution of Counterthrust to Parries*.—Counter the opponent's parries by parrying his bayonet to the right or left, and create an opening for a counterthrust.

(7) *Execution of Counterattack*.—To counter an enemy executing a thrust, follow the direction given for the knock-off thrust, beat the opponent's bayonet out of the way, and execute the counterthrust.

To counter an opponent who is trying to knock off or parry, follow the direction given for the side-step thrust. Just at the moment the opponent executes a thrust, evade it quickly and counterthrust.

d. Close Combat

The purpose of close combat training is to learn the main points of close-in fighting, thereby gaining self-confidence. Securing the initiative by attacking suddenly is the secret of success in this phase of fighting.

(1) *Vulnerable Parts of the Body*.—When hitting the opponent with the rifle, the most vulnerable parts of the body are the elbows, fists, feet, knees, face, head, solar plexus, sides of the body, testicles, and shin.

(2) *Execution of Rifle Blows*.—Hit the opponent's head and face by swinging the rifle up and driving home the blow (see fig. 22a) or, by following the direction given for the body-contact

thrust, drive the butt forward and upward, and smash the face or head (see fig. 22b).




Figure 22.—Executing Blows with Rifle.

When the opponent attempts to drive home a blow, advance and block the opponent's rifle with the left arm; at the same time, counter with the right fist or right knee (see fig. 22c).

(3) *Execution of Butt Stroke.*—To execute the butt stroke from the guard position, step in with the right foot or step back with the left foot, so that the body is sideways to the opponent; at the same time, draw in the left hand, extend the right hand, and drive the butt diagonally upward through an arc to the opponent's face or the side of his body (see fig. 23).



Figure 23.

To counter the butt stroke, step in quickly to block the stroke, and, at the same time, hit the opponent with your fist or knee.

(4) *Execution of Right Punch.*—To deliver the right punch, release the rifle from the right hand; at the same time, step in

with the left foot forward, and punch the opponent in any vital opening of his body (see fig. 24).




Figure 24.

To counter the right punch, follow the direction given for countering rifle blows—see subparagraph d (2).

(5) *Instructions for Hitting with the Foot or Knee.*—To hit the opponent with the foot or knee, hold the rifle with both hands, and unbalance the opponent by pushing or blocking; at

the same time, knee him or kick him in the groin or testicles (see fig. 25).



Figure 25.

To counter such tactics, turn the body sideways, with the right foot forward, and counter with the butt stroke.

(6) *Execution of Short Thrust to the Throat.*—To execute this movement, grasp the rifle near the muzzle with both hands—the

right hand just above the belt line, and the left hand just above the right—and thrust at the opponent's throat (see fig. 26).



Figure 26.

To counter this thrust, carry the rifle forward and upward with both hands, and counter with the butt stroke to the face or head.

Section II. SMALL-UNIT TACTICS USED BY JAPANESE AT NIGHT

1. INTRODUCTION

Tactics used by Japanese companies and smaller units in night attacks are described below. This information, based on enemy sources, appears to be a fairly complete summary. An earlier discussion of Japanese night operations appeared in *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. I, No. 3, pages 44-51.

In the paraphrased Japanese manual which follows, particular attention should be paid to the enemy's reconnaissance methods, his massing of forces (the main body) in the approach march and during the early stages of the assault, and his reliance upon the bayonet in rushing hostile positions.

2. THE MANUAL

a. Preparations

Upon receiving orders for a night attack, company commanders acquaint their platoon leaders with the major points of the plan. Preparations are begun, with special emphasis placed on gaining a thorough knowledge of the terrain and on the disposition of hostile forces.

The thoroughness of preparations will depend upon the situation. If there is an interval of several days between the formation of plans and the actual attack, successive patrols will be sent out—at least one of them during darkness.

b. Reconnaissance

Knowledge of the terrain and of hostile dispositions is normally gained by reconnaissance patrols, each of which consists of five or six men (never more than ten). A reconnaissance by a small patrol led by an officer is considered highly desirable before a night attack.

Forward lookout posts are then established for the purpose of observing new developments. If necessary, these are investigated, in turn, by additional officer-led patrols. The company commander also makes forward observations, and his headquarters personnel maintains a continuous lookout.

In reconnoitering, our patrols get as close as possible to the hostile positions, and try to induce the opposing forces to fire or to attack, so that they will reveal their strength and their positions. If possible, our patrols fix the exact location of these positions by measuring their distance and direction from some easily recognized terrain feature.

The reconnaissance also determines the type, strength, and location of obstacles to be met in the night attack. Outguards, flanking machine-gun positions, and illumination methods are noted. Nearby terrain is inspected. Subordinate leaders familiarize themselves, under night conditions, with the hostile positions and the terrain involved. If possible, the entire unit which is to take part in the attack is given the opportunity to view, from a vantage point, the terrain over which the attack will move.

Normally, soon after dusk on the night of the attack, a patrol goes out to lay out the approach route, which, to the greatest possible extent, follows continuous terrain features in the desired direction. Roads, railroads, telegraph lines, and ridge lines, or

other topographical features are thus used to maintain direction at night. The approach route is usually marked with pieces of white paper or cloth, or personnel may be stationed as markers. Ropes may be stretched along the route, and distances paced off.

c. The Approach

In the approach march, the company advances in a line of columns, but other formations are used freely to cope with special situations. Within the company, the squads move in a very close formation, with the minimum distance between men. The men may advance with a hand on the shoulder of the soldier in front. Also, they may advance at a crouching walk.

When the company is attacking independently, patrols provide all-around protection. They usually are 30 to 50 yards from the main force, depending on visibility and on the nature of the terrain. If the company is advancing as part of a battalion, patrols are sent out to assigned sectors to the front (see fig. 27). They are instructed to rush small groups of hostile forces, such as sentries and outpost personnel. Groups which the patrols cannot handle are dealt with by a small advance force, previously designated for such emergencies. Meanwhile, the main body of the company continues its advance and takes no part in these preliminary actions.

The company maintains liaison with battalion headquarters by means of runners, but it also takes individual responsibility for maintaining the direction of advance necessary to reach its objective, even if contact with the battalion is lost. To maintain proper contact and direction, the company uses connecting files between the advance guard and the main body. Figure 28, another example of a formation for the approach march, illustrates the use of these connecting files.

In addition to the various methods of maintaining direction which are outlined before the attack, compasses and stars are used for orientation. Flares of different colors may be fired




Figure 27.




Figure 28.

at times and places designated in advance. Pairs of lights may be set out to the rear; when these lights are lined up, they indicate the correct direction. As a rule, some of the personnel of the patrols used in earlier reconnaissance serve as guides (the others accompany the main force), and show the way by flashing signals to the rear, with a shaded flashlight.

The company commander moves at the head of his force, giving orders by signal (flags or white cloths). Heavy weapons advance behind the company, since they are rarely used for

the attack, but are needed in defending captured positions. Sometimes these weapons are used to fire on hostile illuminating equipment. Light machine guns are kept well to the rear of each squad. Automatic guns (antitank rifles) are usually left in the rear, since tanks are not likely to be encountered at night. Pack horses for the automatic guns and for the heavy weapons usually remain with the ammunition platoon.

The company reserve, usually a platoon, is kept in readiness to counter any enemy [United Nations] attempt to surround our attacking forces, or else the reserve may execute a flank attack on the objective if the frontal assault by the main force bogs down.

The approach march ends at a previously selected point, and the company pauses briefly to complete preparations for the final assault. This point is as close as possible to the hostile forces—usually about 300 yards on ordinary terrain. Here, final contact with forward patrols is made, final details regarding demolitions are decided upon, and final dispositions for the assault are carried out.

Absolute secrecy and quiet are enforced prior to an attack. Commands are given by signal only. Lights are concealed, and are used only for signaling purposes. Camouflage is used even after dark, and precautions against hostile patrols or spies are redoubled. Personnel usually wear white cloths for identification, and the countersigns are drilled into every man.

d. Demolitions

Detailed plans for demolishing obstacles are worked out on the basis of information obtained by reconnaissance and observation.

For ordinary demolitions, such as the task of cutting a gap in barbed wire, a few men from each platoon are designated. If sturdy obstructions, such as pillboxes, must be overcome, a detachment of engineers (about 15 men) will be assigned to perform the task, under the direction of the company com-

mander. These engineers are demolition experts, equipped with Bangalore torpedoes and mines.

Points where gaps in wire entanglements are to be cut usually are in areas easy to approach, or in areas difficult for the opposition to cover with fire. In any case, the selection of these points is dictated chiefly by the plans for the attack. Gaps for night attacks are normally at closer intervals than those for day attacks.

Demolitions are completed just before the assault. Premature demolitions, which might reveal the attack plans and allow time for repairs, are avoided; however, allowance is made in time schedules for possible hostile interference.

Demolitions are executed as secretly as possible. Force is employed only when time is too short or hostile interference too great. If necessary, patrols are dispatched to protect demolition teams or to capture the points selected for demolition.

The time element involved in executing demolitions should be noted. Making a gap in barbed-wire entanglements 6 yards deep requires from 2 to 3 hours when the work is done by one man, and from 1½ to 2½ hours when it is done by two men.

e. Assault

From the position where the approach march has ended, the company moves out in a body, as secretly as possible, to within rushing distance of the opposing forces—crawling, if necessary. The company commander usually moves at the head of his unit, directing its full force and controlling his subordinates with positiveness. The rush is made with great energy, silently and without fire. The objective is taken by use of the bayonet.

If hostile forces are encountered before the main objective is reached, they are dealt with by a detachment from the main body. A detachment may also be used to neutralize important pillboxes or other points of resistance to the attack (see fig. 29).




Figure 29.

Although effective hostile fire may stop our advance momentarily, our forces determinedly try to continue—creeping or crawling, and utilizing shadows. If our forces are near, they may close with the bayonet immediately after receiving fire. If they are too far away, they keep moving forward independently until close enough for the final rush.

[Observer's comment: The Japanese are especially afraid of being caught by fire while passing through the breeches in the wire. They probably are prepared either to cover this phase with smoke, or to send patrols ahead to cover the main body while traversing the wire. If it appears necessary to reduce troublesome pillboxes, or to repel small counterattacks during the final assault, units are designated to take care of these tasks.

In dealing with pillboxes, the Japs stress surprise and deception, and employ varied and original ideas for the latter. Smoke, dummy soldiers, gun flashes, or small forces operating in the opposite direction from the attack are standard stratagems. To overcome the defenders, assault from the rear is preferred.

Under some circumstances, the Japanese may be expected to use only a part of the company to seize the objective, afterwards holding it with the whole force. When opposition at the objective is small, and when there is likelihood of hostile fire from outside the defended position, it is not considered advantageous to expose the entire company unnecessarily. And

where some terrain feature makes possible a surprise attack and breakthrough by a smaller group, it is thought better to hold back the main force, whose movements might be hampered by this same terrain. In every case the company commander leads the attacking force in person.]

f. Reorganization

Once the objective has been gained, the company halts and reorganizes. Patrols are dispatched immediately to pursue the hostile forces and reconnoiter their rear positions and the terrain to the rear. Dispositions are made to repel counterattacks, and fire power is sited for close-range use. However, hand-to-hand fighting is preferred wherever possible, and weapons are not loaded without orders from the company commander. Platoons automatically send out all-around security patrols. If the ground is to be held permanently, they may change positions before daybreak to limit damage from hostile air and artillery attack.

Any hostile forces remaining in the vicinity are mopped up. If necessary, the whole company is used for this task. Dispositions for defense and security measures are supervised by the company commander himself.

Section III. COMMENTS BY OBSERVERS ON FIGHTING IN BURMA

1. INTRODUCTION

This section consists chiefly of comments by individual British officers on combat against the Japanese in the western Burma area. Since these comments are based on actual fighting experience in rugged jungle terrain, they should prove helpful to U. S. officers and enlisted men who will participate in jungle warfare. However, it must be borne in mind that the comments are not official British doctrine. The names of the British officers are omitted.

2. ENEMY REACTION DURING COMBAT

The following comments deal with various reactions of the Japanese during combat:

“Catch the Jap off guard and he is never ready to fight. When surprised, he literally goes into a panic, screams, and runs. Commence firing, and wipe out the enemy as soon as possible. However, once the

Jap makes a stand, he is not a coward, but a courageous fighter.

“We consider the Jap a very bad marksman, particularly when he is moving. He is a better shot when well organized and static. However, his positions and camouflage are excellent.”

“The Jap hates the British artillery, and is literally afraid of it. We found that we could easily make him jittery by fake attacks. Our troops would yell, stamp their feet, fire everything, lay a smoke screen, and, in general, make all the noise possible. As a result, the Jap would fire all arms, thus giving away all his positions.

“The word ‘halt’ should never be used. It is unnecessary, and its use often gives the enemy time to decide on a quick plan of action. Our soldiers should not be too trusting at night, and should not take too much for granted. They must treat every man as an enemy until he has proved himself.

“In many instances, the Japs learned the names of our units and used them frequently for ‘pin-pointing’ positions while patrolling at night. Anyone not able to give the password at night must be shot. The password should be changed every night.

“The Jap has difficulty in pronouncing the letter ‘L,’ so use passwords which have several L’s. Patrols going out for several days should be given the password for each day until their return.”

3. NOTES ON ENEMY TACTICS

The following comments deal with various tactics used by the Japanese:

"The Japs seemed to prefer the 'circular tour' method of patrolling. Whether they were able to gather much information by this method is doubtful.

"As in all previous campaigns, the enemy has depended a great deal on infiltrations through our lines or movements around our flanks. If a flanking movement was started against him, he would reply by a wider movement of his own. He has a passion for high ground and thick cover.

"We should protect our lines of communication by holding the high points which would be a menace if held by the enemy. All roads are essential because of our extensive use of motor transport."

"The Japs usually slept during the day and moved at night. During the day, while they were in defensive positions, they rarely attempted to fire on any of our forces.

"The enemy forces often would throw lighted firecrackers 15 to 20 yards off to their side. Some of our less experienced soldiers fell for this ruse at first, and fired in the direction of the exploding firecrackers. The Japs, having determined our positions, would then fire on us from the flanks."

"Snipers are a part of the Japanese defensive system. They attacked our forward troops as the

latter advanced ahead of large British forces. However, it is believed that the snipers' major mission is to collect information. We seldom heard of them firing on an individual soldier. Snipers sometimes took up positions near road blocks along lines of communication.

"About the only way to combat Jap snipers is to use stalker-snipers, who shoot the Japs as soon as they are located. The stalker-snipers nearly always work in pairs, making full use of camouflage. While moving, they must be completely under cover. If trails are unavailable, about the only way they can get about in the Burma jungle is along dry stream beds and gullies. The British are now trained to crawl (frequently on their stomachs) long distances if necessary . . . The stalker-snipers who move along the banks of dry stream beds and gullies communicate by word of mouth. Along these avenues of travel there are always places where the gullies and dry stream beds converge. Thus, the snipers can hold prearranged meetings under complete cover. When the snipers meet, they discuss the situation and make future plans."

4. NOTES ON COMBAT PREPARATIONS

A high-ranking British officer has outlined the following preparatory steps for combat against the Japanese:

"a. Training must be hard and realistic.

"b. Each man must be an expert with his weapon, and must be able to use every weapon.

“c. Every man must consider the jungle a friendly place, in which he can move, live, and fight with complete confidence.

“d. Every man must know, and be able to take advantage of, the Jap’s weaknesses. He must realize that Jap successes thus far have been largely due to our own errors and omissions rather than to any inherent superiority of the Jap soldier.

“e. Every man must achieve absolute physical fitness—nothing less will do in jungle warfare. He must be able not only to march long distances, but to climb hills, overcome obstacles, and put up with grueling conditions of heat and thirst.

“f. Every man (especially officers and noncoms) must be able to move freely and confidently about the jungle, to stalk and hide, and to use his weapon under all conditions and in all positions.

“g. Every man must be able to move as freely, and with as much confidence, at night as during the day.

“h. Every man must have tenacity in defense, skill and boldness in the approach, and the will—as well as the skill—to close with the Jap and kill him in the attack.

“i. The value of communications must be fully realized.

“j. Cooperation between infantry and artillery must be fully and realistically practiced.

“k. Field artillery regiments and mountain batteries must be trained in jungle methods.

“l. Bad or indifferent leaders must be weeded out.

“m. Training must be carried out in real jungles and under conditions that are as realistic as possible. Man must be pitted against man, squad against squad, and platoon against platoon. Slit trenches must always be dug; concealment must be practiced at all times; sleep must be disturbed frequently; and minor and major exercises must last four or more days.

“n. We must cease to be road-bound and motor-transport minded.

“o. Greater use must be made of pack transportation. Local labor must be impressed as guides, porters, and interpreters.

“p. Half-trained replacements lacking jungle experience must not be sent to join units in the field.

“q. Greater use should be made of planes for dropping supplies and as ambulances.”

“The only way you can defend a place in the Burma jungles is to attack. This should feature infiltrations—not mass frontal attacks against strongly defended positions. Keep the Japs guessing. . . .

“The theory that if you hold the high ground you will win does not hold true in jungle warfare because the density of the lower jungle terrain obstructs observation. You must combine holding the high ground with holding the dry stream beds, gullies, and clefts in hills. Clefts in hills are the natural lines of travel and are more easily traversed than low jungle terrain. When all the important parts of the terrain

cannot be held because of a lack of men, it is necessary to use offensive patrols.”

“The use of camouflage in fighting the Jap is most important. Be sure that spoil from trenches is properly disposed of, that motor transport is well camouflaged during the day, and that each individual is properly camouflaged. . . .

“Security precautions should be taken with regard to the natives. On several occasions we found ammunition and arms in baskets carried by coolies who had passed through our lines en route to rice fields.

“Arrangements must be made for dealing with refugees as well as with the natives. Neither should be permitted to approach our positions at any time. Very often natives will have to be evacuated from villages that we wish to occupy. . . . Officers and men must be careful not to allow Jap spies to enter camp disguised as natives offering their services. Often an illiterate-looking native may understand English very well, but not give you the slightest indication of the fact.

“We believe that the natives have done a lot of signaling at night by means of fires. They must have fires, of course, but we have noticed that sometimes these have been very large and have burned well into the night—unusual occurrences in the native villages. Reconnaissance planes flying overhead, or patrols from the hills, can easily gather information from fire signals.”

Section IV. "THREE JEERS FOR THE SOUVENIR SAP"

1. GENERAL

Intelligence reports from various theaters of operations continue to emphasize the shortsighted behaviour of souvenir-hunting U. S. soldiers.¹ These men frequently risk their lives by pulling or prying off parts of matériel which sometimes have booby traps attached to them, or by picking up small items of enemy equipment.

Besides the immediate personal dangers involved in collecting souvenirs, this practice greatly handicaps the collection of intelligence regarding enemy matériel and equipment. An Ordnance intelligence officer who recently returned from a major theater of operations stated without reservation that the proper collection of intelligence data had been delayed for weeks, and even months, by soldiers who were guilty of the following offenses:

¹ In connection with this section, reference should be made to *Intelligence Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 72-74, "Souvenir Hunters Cause Needless Loss of Lives."

- a. Taking nameplates off enemy tanks and other equipment;
- b. Stripping the motors of enemy vehicles of various types;
- c. Removing parts from enemy radios and transmitting and receiving sets; and
- d. Firing at captured tanks to exhibit marksman-ship prowess.

2. SPECIFIC CASES

a. Private (signal company)

This private suffered hand wounds and lacerations of his face and eyes when the propelling charge of a Japanese Model 97 hand grenade was accidentally detonated. His story:

"While passing through antiaircraft positions near an engineer dump on Kiska, I noticed several copper tubes scattered around a case of hand grenades. They caught my eye as possible souvenirs, and I picked one up and put it in my pocket. Later, in our tent, I took it out and examined it near the stove. Apparently the heat from the stove caused the charge to dentonate. Here I am [in the hospital], and I wouldn't recommend souvenir hunting to anyone."

b. Second Lieutenant (AA artillery)

This lieutenant lost two fingers of his right hand and suffered lacerations of his face, eyes, and body when the detonator of a Japanese 20-mm (?) shell exploded. His story:

“I had picked up the shell as a souvenir and had removed the detonator. Like a damn fool, I was trying to pick the detonator clean with a steel tool. I think scraping caused the explosion.”

c. Private (engineer company)

Although this is not an instance of souvenir hunting, it is presented here because gross carelessness was involved. The private suffered a wound in his thigh from steel splinters of a shell which exploded when it was tossed into a campfire. His story:

“We were working on the beach and had carelessly built a fire near a large quantity of enemy ammunition. It was buried in the ground and lying around loose on the top. Someone threw a round into the fire and I got hurt.”

PART THREE: UNITED NATIONS

Section I. **THE INFANTRY LIEUTENANT AND HIS PLATOON**

1. INTRODUCTION

The following discussion about the infantry lieutenant and his platoon is reproduced from a British Army training memorandum which was published in India. Although this article was prepared primarily for junior officers who have faced, or will face, the Japanese, it may be read with profit by officers in other theaters.

The article is written in an informal style, and is not intended to represent official British doctrine. Because its contents are highly informative and interesting, it is reproduced here substantially in its original form. The British title for the article was "What an Infantry Subaltern (lieutenant) Really Is."

2. THE ARTICLE

a. General

In the bad old past, it was a common practice to assign to the infantry all those officers and enlisted men for whom no "better"

employment could be found. "You don't need anything special for the infantry" and "Anyone can be made an infantryman" were typical of phrases frequently heard. The result was that many unsuitable officers found their way into the infantry. Subsequent events have proved the fallacy of this policy, and the infantry is now being recognized, not as an insignificant and even contemptible "poor relation," but as a skilled and essential partner on the battlefield.

The purifying flame of battle has wrought many changes in all officer ranks of the infantry, and those men who are temporarily unsuited for exacting duties of infantry work are being removed. The task of developing competent infantry officers also has been greatly aided by the School of Infantry [England], where today's young officer was taught his trade, a trade so exacting, so varied, and so thrilling that it began to attract, not the unwanted, but men with the spirit of adventure, men with a desire to lead their fellow countrymen into battle, and men with a thirst to avenge themselves on our enemies.

In battle the responsibility of the infantry lieutenant is very great indeed. He must draw on his common sense, cool courage, and determination; on his ingenuity, his cunning, and his patience. If he fails, and the enemy breaks through, he has failed those who were dependent on him. If he destroys the enemy, he has done his job properly.

b. Officer Qualifications

In the infantry there can be no such thing as an officer who is "all right, but—" or "a decent chap, but—" or "he'll be all right in action, but—." There is no such thing as a second- or third-rate infantry officer. There can only be the first-class officer who looks after his men, loves his weapons and his job, and is proud of his platoon and its skill, as well as of his own.

To reach this standard must be a matter of training and psychology, each of which plays an equally important part in

the life of the lieutenant and enables him to bring his men to a perfect pitch to support him in his craft.

c. Basic Training

There is no room here to deal fully with basic training; however, three aspects must be emphasized—"Weapon Training," "Fieldcraft," and "Waiting." The men must be so trained that, tired or fresh, asleep or awake, they still will handle their weapons with accuracy and speed. In this they must never fail, because close-quarter jungle fighting does not permit second chances. "Fieldcraft" and "Waiting" go hand-in-hand with "Weapon Training." The former instills the ability to move or be still without being seen or heard. "Waiting" is the corollary of both, and this is where the necessity for perfect discipline comes in. Hold your fire until a kill is a certainty. Dead men tell no tales. Those Japanese soldiers who have just appeared out of cover over there, 600 yards away—can you guarantee to kill all of them before they get back to cover? No? Then, wait, wait, and wait. Even at 300, 200, or 100 yards, one of them might get away. At 50 yards the kill is a certainty.

Fire opened too soon is a miss, and a miss discloses your position. This, then, is the third vital point in basic training: the tight discipline which keeps your men calmly waiting for the approach of the enemy.

Much that you must teach will be found in the printed word, and the officer necessarily must read and pass on to his men the knowledge he has gained. But there are many more things unprinted, at least not in standard text books, which should be part of the infantry officer's stock in trade. For example, memorizing maps is an essential to night work of any sort, and night work is a vital part of your training. Patrols, occupation of positions under the enemy's nose, ration and ammunition parties, and reliefs are all night operations. So night-mindedness is essential, but to teach it to your men will require constant and patient practice.

Train your men to conceal themselves. A located position can be a death trap for the men in it. Have your alternate position and your dummy position, and, if you must show yourself, do so at the dummy position. Don't forget those tracks. If they must be there, let them lead past your real position to your dummy. When going into the real position, see that the men step clear off the trail and make no mark at all. It will pay in the end, and the platoon commander who ignores this elementary bit of battle discipline will probably have the lives of three or four men on his conscience, and be rather more than a fool! If he observes it, he will be cunning, which is just as it should be. Therefore train, train, and train again until it is automatic.

"Hey, you! What's going on over there?" Are you in the habit of saying this? Why not climb that tree, or go and have a look over that crest, or, if you like, send two or three reliable men to a point from which they can see? They will be able to signal back. By the way, do they know the Morse code? Well, you will never regret having taught it to as many men as possible. Information will reach you more promptly, and you won't have to spend so much of your time running about the countryside.

"That was rather a fast one!" Yes, but you must be ready for the fast ones. So train against surprise. The enemy relies on it. If you aren't surprised, you've stolen a lead on him. When your platoon is on the march during an exercise, think what you would do if you were a Jap—and then do it. Ambush your men on the road, and have them attacked from the air and by armored-force vehicles. Set a day when all rations are to be cut off, and work out impromptu messing. Designate casualties, and see how much your platoon knows about first aid and whether assistant squad leaders are really fit to take the place of squad leaders. If you and your men have practiced together, you will automatically react to an emergency, and not become disorganized by it.

Map-reading and terrain estimation are vitally important. When you read a map, you must be able to visualize the entire countryside at a glance.

It is impossible to stress marksmanship too much. Practice and practice!

Another point to remember is patience. The Jap will do everything he can to make you open fire so that he can locate your position. Don't let your men fire whenever they see the enemy—in other words, don't let them hand him a map of your position. You, too, want to know what the enemy is up to, so wait—wait and watch his plan develop, until he is so close that you are certain of killing him and all his friends. Wait, too, with your automatics. Wait until you have a really good target before firing anything except single rounds. Remember that the Jap observer is waiting for that rat-a-tat-tat to pin-point those light machine guns of yours.

d. Administration

What is the use of training your men to be killers, if they can't be brought to the fight and maintained there? Never rely entirely on others to wet-nurse you. The platoon commander must know exactly what his duties are in looking after his platoon. The soldier gets, and expects to get, a lot—therefore, you must train for your job.

Never take "No" for an answer in the case of your vehicles or equipment, if you know the answer to be "Yes." Be merciless with men who abuse or neglect them. Remember that neglect of clothing and equipment now may mean the loss of lives in battle later on. Therefore, make regular equipment inspections. One day you will have great need for this equipment, this vehicle, and this mule, and if they break down, or are missing at a crucial moment, have a look at the man who was responsible—examine yourself in a mirror.

Don't be helpless if the rations don't turn up. Always have something up your sleeve. It may be some chocolate or cocoa or even some biscuits. It may not be much, but something is better than going into action with an empty belly. What about getting a goat? or even some bananas? or can you shoot a deer?

Don't be afraid to give your men raw food to prepare, if the normal supply fails. You have taught them to cook in their mess tins, or, if you haven't, you should have. So give them a lump of meat and tell them to cook it. They may not know much about it, but they will get a move on if they are hungry. Train yourself to know what to do, so that you can tell them. Don't forget that dried cow manure, if available, is as good as coal, and that the inside of a dead bough is usually dry, even in the wettest weather. Never be in the unenviable position of facing your hungry men with "I'm afraid we shall have to wait until the rations come up."

Don't let the medical officer off until he has taught two men in a squad and one in your platoon headquarters the rudiments of first aid, and until he has taught you advanced first aid. A wounded man will look to you, and expect you to help save his life. You must know what to do, and how to do it confidently. You will never forgive yourself if you lose a man through neglecting your chances to learn. Make up a first-aid kit with bandages, linen, absorbent cotton, iodine, safety pins, and other essentials. Don't take "No" from the medical officer when you ask for these items.

Later you may scrap some of these points in favor of still better ones that you have thought out for yourself. When you do this, you are beginning to be a good administrator.

e. Psychology

This is a frightening word, but few words mean more to the fighting soldier, although he probably doesn't realize it. All training is valueless unless the spirit is in it, and the young officer who can get behind his soldiers' minds is a winner all along

the line. So stir them up. They are fighting infantry, aren't they? Breed pride among them in being "the first in action"—"the spearhead of the Army." Write a platoon or company song to a tune that all the men know, one that has a good swing to it. Make your men realize what their job means. Make them realize, and be proud of the fact, that they are the most essential service in the Army, and that the success of the battle depends on them. Make them feel that they are the toughest, most cunning, most skillful killers in the world. When the time comes, they will be just that.

f. Getting Ready and on the Way

When the orders come for your move, you will have plenty to think about. Are your men completely ready as to clothing and equipment? Are their shoes in good condition? If not, get them repaired or get new ones. What about the things that afford comfort and pleasure? Find out. Have you got men trained in purifying water? If not, take decisive action to get it settled. What about a postal address for the future? Ask for one.

Vaccination and inoculation? Any doubtful medical cases or dental or eye cases? All these are a matter for the doctor again, and need immediate attention.

Find out all about your destination, once you have been told where it is, and describe the country to your men, as well as any tricks of fighting peculiar to that area. Practice them, and keep your men absolutely up-to-date with their weapons.

Your men know that from now on anyone who absents himself or contracts a preventible disease deserves a name unfit to print.

Before you will have had time to think, your unit will be on its way by sea, rail, or road. Now is the time to tell your men still more about the country and the people they will see. Tell them all you know about the enemy they are going to meet, what his methods and weaknesses are, what

we can do to him, and what we will do. Remember to tell them how to behave toward local inhabitants. Every soldier is judged as a representative of his country, and a country judged by its representatives. One ill-behaved soldier can turn doubt and hesitation into open hostility.

Alert, clean-looking, disciplined soldiers, who are cheerful, courteous, and well-behaved, are the best ambassadors in the world.

g. Arrival and Preparation for Action

You have done everything in your power, and more than you thought you could, to prepare yourself and your men for action. Now you are preparing to reap what you have sown. If it was a good sowing, yours will be rich harvest. You will have realized what your responsibilities are in administration and training for battle. As opportunities occur, you must continue that training, adapting it to the country in which you find yourself.

Now for your job in the forthcoming operations. Whip around and meet the artillerymen, the engineers, and the tank officers—if any—with whom you will be fighting. Get to know them really well, and see that they get to know you better and that they trust you. Listen to their points of view and don't force your own. Although you know the real facts, they all will think that their own job is the most important one, and will continue to think so until they see you in action and realize how much you have done to help them. Remember that you will want supporting fire from the artillery, and that the engineer will get you that bit of wire or those mines. And what about that young antitank gunner? You may have to rely on him a great deal one day. Don't show off—that's fatal. Be confident, not "cocky". Leave that until after the battle. When you have stopped all the Japs, you can indulge yourself a little if you wish.

That is the junior officer's personal preparation for battle.

Now go back to your men. Don't leave them too long just before their first battle. Tell them what grand chaps the artillerymen are and how they are going to help, and how you are going to protect the antitank gunners and the heavy machine gunners. Tell them what the show is all about. Tell them absolutely everything that isn't a breach of security, such as the sort of things the Japs have been doing, what division or regiment they belong to, and the best way of killing them; describe to them the operation and how it probably will be carried out; tell them where and when the operation will start, the part they will play in it, and who will support them.

You must not forget these points. Your chaps are about to meet the enemy, possibly for the first time. No sane man would ask his soldiers to fight blindly, not knowing what it was all about.

h. In Action

Your company commander has given his last word; the company's second-in-command has said his piece about administration, and you are waiting for the fight to begin. You are frightened, but not in the accepted sense. Every healthy man on the eve of his first battle is afraid—not of wounds or death, but afraid of being afraid.

Don't worry. You won't be yellow. You are trained, and so are your men. You will be nervous to a degree before it starts, but once it has started, you won't have the time to be anything but cool and efficient.

Now you are in action. You have placed your squads. You have seen that each man has got an arc of fire and observation. You have given your mortar a task to do. You have camouflaged all your men so that they are completely hidden. You have told them all about the forthcoming battle, where they are, what they are doing, and with whom. They are in the ring, waiting. Now you think of your battlefield discipline. You

must dispel the boredom of waiting and the fear of battle. You must keep up the men's morale, as well as your own.

Quite possibly you may be dive-bombed while you are waiting—a particularly unpleasant nuisance. However, it's surprising how few men get hurt, if your battle discipline is right. The bombers probably haven't seen you, and are only bombing an area. Anyway, noise can't kill you—the chances of a direct hit are 1 in 10,000, and if you can't take a bet on that, you shouldn't be a soldier. You have already been told not to let your men move about in their squad positions—remember it—it is battle discipline.

You will be shelled—you will hear the dull thud of the artillery or the hollow pop of the mortar, the whine of the shell getting nearer and nearer, increasing to a roar—and then the colossal burst! You are being shelled, and there will be a lot more of it, so look out.

Whether you are first attacked by bombs, mortars, machine guns, or what have you, you can be sure of one thing: when it comes, you are not an individual at all—you are a commander of soldiers. You can be sure that every man will look straight to you for guidance. Now is the time, once and for all, to make your name. Grin like hell and go on grinning. Don't be too funny; say something casual, or even absurd—anything for a laugh. If you can do this when your men are strained, you are over your biggest hurdle.

Cultivate your platoon "funny man"; he can be a gold mine.

If you are not fighting, take cover. Your men will follow your example.

When you have taken care of your men, you can be an individual again, and think of yourself. Light a cigarette or your pipe; it's a great steadier; but when you are doing it, turn your back to your soldiers because, without knowing it, you will be a little nervous, and your hands will destroy any impression of nonchalance that the men may have gained. While you are smoking, think whether anything you have done, or have failed to do, has been responsible

for your being fired on, and, if so, correct it at once—shift to your alternate position unless you are quite satisfied that it was general harassing fire, and not observed fire, to which you were being treated.

You may not always be as lucky as we're assuming you were in your very first experience of being under fire. Later, by sheer bad luck, you will see men killed or badly wounded. Then your men will turn to you not only to see how you take it, but to see what you are going to do about it. It's a grim business; some of your best friends in the platoon are lying dead or maimed. But you have a man's job to do. After you have attended to the wounded, remove the dead from the position. You know first aid because you have been trained—apply it. If some of the wounded are noisy, try to quiet them; if they won't be quiet, remove them to a point where they can't be heard. Nothing is more demoralizing to the survivors' morale than listening to a moaning casualty. The dead you can bury yourself. If no chaplain is available, take his place. Mark the grave, take the map reference accurately, and send all documents and the identity disk [dog tag] to company headquarters. Later, you will, of course, write to his wife or mother.

Without knowing it, you have changed—and your men have changed. You came into action a highly trained and efficient team, but really it was only a job of work to become trained, and destroying the enemy was a vague sort of intention behind it all—but now the enemy has killed or wounded some of your best friends. You are a team awaiting revenge. You are perfect soldiers.

Section II. NOTES ON PATROLLING IN JUNGLES OF BURMA

1. INTRODUCTION

British forces in the jungle areas of Burma are emphasizing the importance of patrolling in their combat against the Japanese. The following notes on patrolling summarize conclusions drawn by British officers, or by units, from their combat experiences in the western Burma area. These conclusions, while not official British doctrine, should prove a helpful stimulus to U. S. thought on the subject of patrolling.

2. PREPARATIONS

A British officer recently stated that, for jungle fighting, a soldier can hardly have too much training in patrolling. The improperly trained soldier, he continued, is completely lost when he gets off paths or trails in the jungle. "He must learn to find his way about in the jungle, and not be afraid of it. The jungle is totally new to our farm-bred soldiers as well as to our city-bred soldiers, since it bears no

similarity to either environment. The jungle can be a friend and protector to you, as soon as you know how to utilize it.

"You cannot utilize the jungle very well unless you are a well-trained observer. You must know all the means of detecting the presence or passage of the enemy—such as fires, ashes, cartridges, broken undergrowth, footprints, misplaced foliage, and so forth.

"When fired upon in the jungle, patrols should pause momentarily to observe and formulate plans. These should be executed promptly—the patrols must keep moving, and not pin themselves to the ground. They must be trained to get rid of obstacles quickly or to avoid them, depending on their mission."

Another British officer said, "In the past, lack of clear orders has been responsible for more bad patrolling than any other factor." He added that orders should be "crystal clear and not beyond the ability of the patrol to execute."

A large group of British officers submitted the following points for consideration in connection with giving orders to patrols.

"(1) Give the patrol leader all available information about the enemy.

"(2) Give him full information about other friendly patrols which are operating, or which may operate, in the neighborhood of this area before he returns.

"(3) State his mission in clear and unmistakable terms.

“(4) State, in general terms, the route the patrol will follow.

“(5) State the time by which the patrol is required to return, and the place to which it should endeavor to return.

“(6) Give the recognition signal for challenging friendly patrols.

“(7) State clearly what action the patrol leader will take if he meets the enemy before completing his mission, or after completing it. For instance, should he attack, withdraw, or remain in observation?

“After stating the mission to the patrol leader, have him repeat the main points.

“Don’t send out more men than are necessary for accomplishing the mission. Every unnecessary man in a patrol is a hindrance and increases the chance that the patrol may be discovered.”

Another group of British officers had this to say:

“A company is not a patrol, not even a large fighting patrol, but it provides the element from which patrols are produced. Whether a whole company is sent out depends upon the distance patrols will have to cover in order to carry out a mission. If the situation calls for use of a company, the latter will provide the necessary patrols and the remainder of the unit will form a mobile base from which the patrols can, if necessary, be assisted and a base to which the patrols can withdraw after completing their missions.

“It is important that the remainder of the company not take up a static position, where it can be pinned down; therefore, it must operate in a specified area, with a place of assembly having been determined in advance, in case of enemy action which necessitates its use.

“Another way in which a company may be employed in this type of warfare is to carry out an ambush based on information gained by patrols.”

These officers considered the Bren gun too heavy for patrols which were to stay out more than two days. The rifle, Tommy gun, and grenade were considered the best weapons for patrolling.

During the daytime, the officers said, Japanese patrols almost invariably consisted of two or three men, who generally were led by a native guide.

3. COMMENTS ON TACTICS

A high-ranking British officer stated that the major slogan for jungle warfare against the Japanese is “Patrol! Patrol! Patrol!” A patrol, he said, must avoid taking up a static defense; it must be “offensive” in its tactics. It should stay out two or three days, sometimes up to six days, and it should be self-sufficient.

“You must outfox the Jap,” this officer explained. “The main point is to confuse him as to what you are doing; then you have an even chance of inflicting casualties.

“The Japs watch and listen all the time. They attempt all sorts of ruses to deceive our patrols. We soon caught on to the enemy’s tricks, and he appeared to be foxed completely. . . .

“You can frequently catch the Jap on the loose—swimming, eating, resting, playing, and so forth. Usually when he is caught under such circumstances, he is absolutely unprotected. Once, during a recent campaign, one of our platoons caught more than 100 Japs completely off guard; the platoon killed 30 of the enemy while the others fled in confusion.

“The British patrols usually moved by day, and frequently caught the Japs unaware. At night the patrols generally hid out, away from streams, watering places, and trails.”

A group of British officers made the following suggestions for getting better results from patrolling:

“a. Avoid the ‘circular tour’ tactics by patrols; use a larger number of smaller patrols to deal with a larger number of smaller areas.

“b. If possible, avoid entering villages or being seen by local inhabitants. More reliance should be placed on silent observation at close range.

“c. If it is impossible to avoid being seen, employ the maximum guile to conceal the route and intentions of the patrol. For example, the patrol leader might tell local inhabitants of a village that his destination is a certain place. The patrol would actually

start for the place named, but later would either return close to its starting point and watch the village for, say, 24 hours, or cut through the jungle to another route.

“d. Seek to complete the mission of the patrol. The patrol must not turn away because of resistance. If its route is barred, the patrol must probe the enemy front until it finds a suitable approach route, or it must try to maneuver around a flank.

“e. Use cunning, regardless of whether the patrol's mission is to fight or strictly to reconnoiter.

“f. Patrol deep enough to get the desired information.”

