


Combat Intell Lessons, Issue #11, 4

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Combat Intelligence Lessons provides a wide exchange of ideas and experiences, techniques and concepts affecting combat intelligence operations in the Republic of Vietnam. Particular attention is placed on lessons learned and battlefield hints.

It is hoped that the lessons already learned by one or more units will serve to promptly benefit other units still wrestling the problem already solved elsewhere.

To properly evaluate the overall success of this publication and previous issues, the determining factor will be the successful accomplishment of units' missions in an environment such as Vietnam. To this end, it is hoped that information contained in Combat Intelligence Lessons is distributed to the lowest level to assist not only those in combat situations but, also, those preparing for such assignments.

Source material for this publication has been gathered from unit Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, operational reports, intelligence summaries, and senior officer debriefing notes.

Due to the paucity of information available, Combat Intelligence Lessons was not published for 1st quarter fiscal year 72. The publication of Combat Intelligence Lessons is terminated with this issue.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Lawrence E. Honsowetz
L. HONSOWETZ
CPT. AGC.
Assistant Adjutant General

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STATEMENT OF A COMMANDER

"In counterinsurgency operations intelligence is at a premium. Though much has been accomplished in providing new equipment, significant effort is needed to formalize doctrine and design equipment which will integrate all aspects of intelligence.

"Ranger companies should be used primarily for intelligence collection purposes and can be controlled and trained best at Division level. Teams should be allocated to brigades on a mission basis. Ranger teams should be specifically trained for long-range reconnaissance patrols and not assigned normal combat patrol missions.

"There has been an overemphasis on Order of Battle to the virtual exclusion of other important aspects of intelligence about the enemy. It is critically important to learn also of his motivation, how he operates, how he lives, how he is trained, supplied, paid, fed, provided medical attention, etc. It is only through these kinds of data that we can devise appropriate responses and initiate actions to attack the enemy core." (MG Edward Bautz, Jr., formerly CG, 25th Inf Div)

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CHAPTER 1: VC/NVA OPERATIONS

SECTION I - TACTICS

(C) Use of Kites as Warning Devices (U)

Personnel on a National Police Field Force operation in Cau Ngang District, Vinh Binh Province, MR IV, noticed two red kites rise into the air, in the area, just as the operation began. Immediately following the sighting of the kites, a buzzing sound was also heard. The kites were subsequently discovered unattended and flying approximately 200 meters in the air. Upon examination of the kites, it was determined that each had a reed attached to it which created a buzzing sound when spun rapidly by the wind. The sound produced was audible at a range of 1 1/2 kilometers. District advisors reported that a few days earlier two kites were spotted as friendly forces began an operation east of Cau Ngang District Town. These are the first reports received of the enemy using kites as a probable signaling device to warn VC of friendly operations being run in the area. Either the sight of the kite or the sound produced by the reed could quickly warn enemy troops of the friendly operation and give them time to evacuate the area. This primitive, but effective device, demonstrates the VC ability to gain intelligence concerning friendly operations and to disseminate that intelligence on a timely basis. (DRAC)

(C) Diversionary Tactics Against Seawolf Strikes (U)

A report has described VC tactics used to divert Seawolf strikes from the main enemy attacking force. The VC attacking force sets up a three man automatic weapons position some distance from the main body of the attacking force, thereby drawing the Seawolf fire on themselves and allowing the main body to operate unhindered. The main body is under strict orders not to fire on the helicopters. According to the source, this tactic has been used successfully against the Seawolves on several occasions and has resulted in a large number of VC escaping Seawolf detection. This report tends to be verified by the first attack on Repair, Berthing and Messing Barge (YRBM) 21 in which an automatic weapons position was discovered during search operations some distance from the recoilless rifle position.

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SECTION II - TECHNIQUES

(C) Deception Techniques by NVA Forces (U)

Interrogation reports have revealed deception techniques used by NVA forces in southern Laos. A NVA company commander, who rallied to Lao Irregulars, revealed that NVA forces always encrypt their radio messages and only use voice broadcasts when they want to deceive opposing forces who are monitoring their frequencies. He has also revealed methods used by the NVA to deceive local villagers as to the actual strength and location of NVA forces. A favorite method was for a company of NVA to request a guide from a village and when the company reached its destination, allow the guide to return home. When the guide had gone, the company returned to the same village and requested another guide to the same area that the original guide had led them to. This was repeated several times to deceive the villagers as to the actual strength of the NVA force. Another method used by the NVA was to forbid the villagers from entering certain areas where the villagers were told large concentrations of NVA troops were located. The rallier said the NVA realizes that this information will get back to Government forces and will give an inaccurate picture of the actual strength of the NVA forces in the area. The rallier provided additional information on NVA deception techniques. He stated that prior to an attack, the NVA constructs fighting positions in areas it does not intend to occupy. These areas will be at least 500 meters from where the NVA forces will be located during the attack. He also stated that explosives were placed in the dummy areas and detonated during air strikes to deceive pilots into thinking they were getting secondary explosions. (MACV)

(C) Employment of Anti-Personnel Mines (U)

A mine dog alerted his handler to an anti-tank mine buried in a roadway. The dog handler moved forward to the dog's alert position and detonated an anti-personnel mine buried near the anti-tank mine. The tactic of burying small anti-personnel mines near large anti-tank mines is not common and may be a new enemy tactic to confuse mine dogs. Dogs normally respond to the strongest odor present; therefore, a mine dog may pass an anti-personnel mine in favor of the stronger odor of the anti-tank mine. Units utilizing dogs should caution all personnel, particularly handlers, not to move forward to the dog's position prematurely. The entire area from the dog handler's location to where the dog alerts must be checked with mine detectors. (MACV)

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CHAPTER 2: VC/NVA MATERIEL

SECTION I - MINES AND BOOBY TRAPS

(C) Employment of Pressure Influence Watermines (U)

Two pressure influence watermines recovered on 6 November 1970 and 13 March 1971 in MR 4 were initially examined by COMNAVFORV personnel. Both actuators are identical in basic construction to those pressure influence watermines recovered along the Cua Viet River in MR 1. Their uniqueness lies in the method of employment and the fact that this is the first time the enemy has employed the device outside MR 1. Both mines were apparently rigged for remote arming. The weathered condition of the water soluble washer delay housing on the Can Gao recovery (6 November 1970) and the sealed housing on the Cai Nhap recovery (13 March 1971) has indicated that the enemy resorted to remote arming as the only means available for safe emplacement. While safety of his own personnel may have been the primary motive, the extension of lead wires and power supply also afforded the enemy some degree of selectivity regarding the target to be mined. Instead of remaining in the vicinity to detonate a watermine, the enemy could make his escape after remotely arming the mine when the approach of Allied craft was noted. He would thereby be relieved of having to defend his firing position and not be subjected to intense suppressive fire of accompanying craft. One of the features of the NVA pressure influence watermine actuator, revealed in field tests on the Cua Viet River and through stateside laboratory analysis, is its ability to distinguish between various sizes of craft. The accompanying explosive charge is detonated upon the passage of a craft which produces the desired negative pressure required for contact between the bellows plate and firing post. The firing post, which is simply a screw setting, determines the distance the bellows plate must rise before contact is made; the greater the distance, the larger the craft targeted, and the less sensitive the mechanism. For contact to take place, a negative pressure must occur around the actuator, resulting in the rising of the bellows. If detonation does not occur, the bellows returns to its pre-firing position. (COMNAVFORV)

(C) New Model Pressure Influence Watermine (U)

A report from the US Navy Research and Development Unit, Vietnam (NRDU-V), provides the following information concerning the new model pressure influence

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watermine recovered from the Cua Viet River on 26 April 1971. Basically, the device is distinguished from earlier models by the following characteristics:

- a. Shorter dimensions of both upper and lower chamber housing sections.
- b. Smoother finish, and general overall indications of more sophistication in component manufacturing techniques.
- c. Vietnamese stenciling on the casing which translates into "SAFE TIME 143 HOURS".
- d. Two electrolytic metal decay timing fuses connected in parallel in the firing circuit, apparently intended either as an arming or self-destruct device.
- e. A two foot long, one-half inch diameter three conductor cable leading from the casing to the booster cap.

The most significant change is in the circuitry of the firing train. The electric power is provided by a 4.5 volt battery which was modified to provide two independent power sources: 1.5 volts to the electrolytic cells and 3 volts to the firing circuit. The mine is armed upon activation of a water soluble washer arming delay. When the mine becomes armed, electric current from the 1.5 volt battery flows through the parallel electrolytic chemical delay cells. This permits electrolysis of a metal washer, and after approximately 143 hours, the washer is eaten away, thus allowing the closure of a spring loaded switch which short circuits the firing train and detonates the booster. The circuitry, as actually found in the mine, had apparently been miswired, since the electrolytic cell switches served no function other than short circuiting the 1.5 volt battery. It is NRDU-V's opinion that the electrolytic chemical delay switches are intended as a self-destruct device for the following reasons:

- a. The long safetime of 143 hours (six days).
- b. The minor circuit change necessary to install correctly the switches for that purpose.
- c. The placing of the switches in such a way that electrolysis does not begin until the water soluble washer arming delay is activated.

(COMNAVFORV)

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(C) Shaped Charge Limpet Mine (U)

Analysis by the Combined Material Exploitation Center (CMEC) has revealed details of the construction of a shaped charge limpet mine which is a modification of the PGN-60 Polish Rifle Grenade. The limpet mine is only eight and one-half inches long and has a body diameter of two and one-half inches. The ring of small magnets which comprise the head of the mine is two and three-quarter inches in diameter; the tail of the mine tapers to a one inch threaded opening at which point the fuse is attached. Because of its light weight, small size, and the magnetic attachment, this mine is a convenient weapon for sappers. The size of the mine is misleading, however, since it is capable of penetrating three inches of steel. The shaped charge mine was recovered after the attack against the Quang Tri Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) on 22 June 1971. Markings on the mine revealed that it was manufactured in NVN and had a lot number date of 1 March 1971. The fuses on the mines used in the ASP attack were of the pencil type chemical delay and have a maximum delay of five hours. Tests of these fuses revealed, depending on the strength of the chemical, that they can be preset for varying times between twenty minutes and five hours. Other types of fuses could also be used. The new type mine represents an advancement in mine technology which enables a sapper to emplace charges more quickly, effectively, and in less obvious places than previously used satchel charges. The mine is water tight and could easily be incorporated into the water sapper's arsenal for use against steel hulled boats. (COMNAVFORV)

SECTION II - MUNITIONS AND WEAPONS

(C) Soviet 122mm Rocket (U)

Recently there has been some misunderstanding concerning the capabilities of the Soviet 122mm ~~fin~~-stabilized HE rocket. Provided below are significant facts derived from exploitation of the rocket at Aberdeen Proving Ground during the period March 1969 to March 1970.

a. The Soviet model DKZ-B fuse, used with the 122mm rocket, is a point detonating fuse. It has a built-in screw type selector which gives the following optional settings with average delay times as indicated: Super-quick - 0.52 milliseconds; Short Delay - 8.93 milliseconds; and Long Delay - 19.03 milliseconds.

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b. Effectiveness tests proved that the minimum amount of material (armor plate) capable of defeating optional delay settings of the fuse, by causing functioning with reduced delay time, was one-half inch thick rolled homogeneous armor plate or five-eighths inch thick mild steel plate. When fired against similar material of lesser thickness, the rocket penetrated the target and exploded inside of the log barricade backing.

c. The 122mm rocket is a highly accurate, barrage type weapon. A well trained crew, using the Soviet tube type launcher, firing at the optimum range of 8,500 meters, maximum range of 11,000 meters, can place ninety-five percent of all rounds fired into an area of 70,650 meters, that is, a circular area having a radius of 150 meters. When field expedients, such as crossed sticks or earthen mounds, are employed instead of the tube launcher, the circular error probable (CEP) is not significantly increased because the rocket is fin-stabilized and the same fire control instruments are normally used.

There is no evidence of any new model 122mm rocket or fuse being used within RVN. (MACV)

(C) Soviet MBU-1800 Antisubmarine Rocket (U)

On 11 December 1970, elements of the 1st ARVN Infantry Division located a rocket in Dong Ha District. The rocket was identified as a Soviet MBU-1800 Antisubmarine Rocket (Figure 1). On 10 March 1971, an element of the 101st Airborne Division (AMB) captured four MBU-1800s. The rocket is constructed of three seam-welded, sheet-steel sections: the warhead, the motor, and the shroud assembly. The warhead section is threaded internally at the front to house the fuse. The lower end of the warhead has a threaded collar to receive the rocket motor. The warhead houses the main charge and the fuse mechanism. The rocket section houses an electrically-initiated rocket motor. The shroud assembly consists of a circular shroud with four vertical fins butt-welded to its diameter. The shroud provides some stabilization to the rocket while in flight, but is primarily used to provide the rocket with a rail launching capability and is, therefore, the same diameter as the warhead. Characteristics of this Antisubmarine Rocket are:

Type	Blast
Case Material	Steel, sheet-steel

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Weight Minus Fuse and Booster	64 kilograms
Length	123.2 centimeters
Explosive	TNT
Explosive Weight	29.5 kilograms
Diameters: Warhead	25.4 centimeters
Rocket Section	14 centimeters
Shroud	25.2 centimeters

(MACV)

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MBU 1800 ANTISUBMARINE ROCKET (USSR)




Figure 1

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SECTION III - OTHER MATERIEL

(C) NVA Bangalore Torpedo (U)

On 12 April 1971, CMEC received two bangalore torpedoes from CMEC Field Team #2 in Phu Bai. This NVA bangalore torpedo (Figure 2) is of a conventional design and consists of a one meter long, black, steel tube section filled with a high explosive (TNT). The torpedo employs a tetryl booster. Connecting couplings are threaded for the assembly of multiple sections. This torpedo comes in a galvanized packing case, two sections per case, and may be used for breaching mine fields or destroying barbed wire obstacles or entanglements. This bangalore torpedo resembles the Soviet UZ-1 and may be fired either electrically or non-electrically. Characteristics of the bangalore torpedo are:

Length	1 meter
Diameter	4.3 centimeters
Weight	5.22 kilograms
Explosive Weight (TNT)	1.6 kilograms
Booster Weight (Tetryl)	50 grams
Packing case	Galvanized sheet metal
Length	134 centimeters
Width	14 centimeters
Depth	7.6 centimeters
Packing Plate Markings	
BACAN 70	
BLO	Bangalore
2 oun - 16 kg	

(MACV)

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BANGALORE TORPEDO (NVA)




Figure 2

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(C) Shaped Charge (NVA) (U)

On 27 March 1971, the 2/506th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (AMB) recovered a shaped charge depicted in Figure 3. This is the first known appearance of this item in the RVN. This shaped charge is of NVA origin, factory manufactured, simple in design, and well constructed. All connections are threaded or lap rolled for waterproofing. This shaped charge consists of three major components: the fuse body section, the main body section, and the stand-off section. The fuse body is a cylindrical steel tube threaded at both ends, and has a hinged metal wire-arm protruding from the side of the fuse body to hold the fuse in a secure position. Also contained in the fuse well is the primer and a booster cup, which is threaded to the main body. The main body section consists of a bell-shaped, cylindrical, steel housing that is threaded internally at its upper end to receive the fuse body section. The main body houses the main explosive charge and a copper cone, which gives it the shaped charge effect. Located at the lower end is a metal dish-shaped, waterproof disk, which is lap rolled to the outer diameter for protection of the copper cone cavity and main explosive charge. The stand-off section consists of a circular metal band and three high-tensile wire legs. The metal band, with three legs attached, is placed over the outer diameter of the main body and rests on top of the waterproof disk. The three legs are constructed so they contain preset recesses for maximum standoff. To set the charge, the proper standoff is first selected. The fuse and detonator are then placed in the fuse well and secured by the fuse retaining wire loop. This charge can be fired several ways: 1) with a mechanical device, such as the Soviet MUV; or 2) with a chemical pencil, such as the MY-8; or 3) electrically. Characteristics of this shaped charge are:

Type	Blast
Case Material	Steel
Color	Olive drab
Height: Overall	14.35 centimeters
Maximum Standoff	4.65 centimeters
Minimum Standoff	1.25 centimeters

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Diameter: Base	5.55 centimeters
Body	4.55 centimeters
Weight	418 grams
Main Charge (Comp B)	100 grams
Booster (Tetryl)	8 grams
Primer	11 grams
Cone	Copper
Angle of Cavity	85 degrees
Maximum and minimum penetration	Not tested
Markings: Min Lom Mli	Shape Charge
Th 50/50	TNT and RDX (Comp B)
LO 2.12 69.Y	Lot, Month, Year, Factory

(MACV)

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SHAPED CHARGE (NVA)




Figure 3

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CHAPTER 3: ALLIED OPERATIONS

SECTION I - OFFENSIVE TACTICS

(C) Cache Detection (U)

Five reports from agent sources in Dinh Tuong Province, MR IV, revealed that the VC are using tombs and grave sites as cache areas. These reports have been substantiated by several military operations. During a 2 July 1971 operation, a weapons cache was uncovered in a tomb; and on a 28 August 1971 operation, another weapons cache was uncovered in a grave site. This cache method was effective as most people are hesitant about examining graves. The use of a metal detector in searches prevents the disturbance of bonafide grave sites. (COMNAVFORV)

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CHAPTER 4: MANAGEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES

SECTION I - INTEGRATED RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

(C) Integrating Intelligence Assets (U)

The following procedures were established to enhance intelligence collection efforts from aerial reconnaissance and to provide for timely dissemination and integration of other intelligence sources:

a. Aerial observations were reported to the Brigade TOC as brief and concise inflight reports to facilitate rapid dissemination to reaction units. Additionally, a debriefing team was organized and situated at the Air Cavalry Troop's Operations Center and the Brigade S-2 Air's Office for the purpose of conducting a thorough debriefing of pilots and crews upon completion of each mission. The Imagery Interpretation Section of the 517th MID provided the Brigade with a hand-held photographic capability while aerial observers carried 35mm cameras for utilization on significant targets. Film processing arrangements were contracted with the 298th Signal Photo Lab on a priority basis.

b. All radar, observer sightings, sensor activations, and sniffer hotspots were reported to the Brigade TOC for dissemination to the FSCC, the Brigade's direct support aerial assets, and the ground element in whose area the activity had occurred.

c. Brigade targeting meetings were held daily, at which time significant observations, ground activity, photography, and other intelligence for the 24-hour period were summarized and evaluated. Tactical air strikes on pre-determined target areas, priorities of artillery fire, and visual reconnaissance areas were established and coordinated for the forthcoming day's operations.

The revamping and integration of intelligence gathering assets assisted in predicting the enemy's offensive intentions in the Da Krong Valley, in the Mai Loc/Sarge-Camp Carroll area, and in the FB Fuller area during the period 22 June through 10 July 1971. This information on the enemy's offensive operations was given to the ARVN and it was suggested that a Vietnamese Marine Brigade be inserted to counter the threat. Additionally, the employment of ARC LIGHT strikes against the 66, 84, 52, and 9 NVA Regiments during the period 22 June through 10 July 1971 destroyed parts of these units, their base camps and definitely preempted a successful summer campaign. (Senior Officer Debriefing Report - BG Dunwoody, Formerly CG, 1st Bde, 5th Inf Div (Mech))

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CHAPTER 5: SPECIAL TIPS

(C) Document Exploitation (U)

Translation of a document captured five kilometers west of Tien Can determined that it was a circular prepared by TV-LS AKA TV-K6 (possibly the Current Affairs Committee, VC MR-3). The circular, dated 23 December 1970, notified subordinate units concerning the threat of sensor devices and directed them to conduct training courses to increase the vigilance of their personnel. One countermeasure was to follow Allied aircraft until they are out of sight and to watch closely for objects being air-dropped. If any objects are spotted being dropped, the incident is to be reported to local units which will search them out and immediately remove the batteries. The document stated that it was not known how the devices worked, but that they were used in transmitting the location of VC/NVA troop movements and that they provided information for attacks. One device the circular warned against was described as being ten centimeters in diameter, fifty centimeters in height, painted green and which looked very similar to "Gai Mai" grass. All agencies and units were requested to follow Allied espionage activities and submit reports to TV-K6 so that prompt countermeasures can be prescribed. (CDEC)

(C) Enemy's Method of Rendering Sensor Devices Ineffective (U)

The following C-6 evaluated 525th MI Group Intelligence Report concerns the VC knowledge of sensors and infra-red devices and the tactics the VC use to render these devices ineffective. According to the report, the VC call the sensor "May Thu Phat", or receiver-dispatcher machine. The VC believe the sensor can detect movement and sound, and transmit voices. The VC know that the sensors are dropped by helicopters and other types of aircraft into areas suspected of containing VC installations, troop locations, meeting sites, commo-liaison routes and areas in which the aircraft can strike without fear of killing civilians. The sensors are believed to be dropped both day and night, usually after the aircraft has circled the area to find a specific spot. The VC also believe the sensors are dropped three to five at a time but that only one or two are real sensors and the rest are dummies. Each VC installation and unit has a member of its security force who is in charge of aircraft spotting and sensor spotting. When an aircraft is sighted, all activity ceases and everyone watches that aircraft in an effort to count the number of sensors dropped. If sensors are dropped, all personnel of the unit remain inactive while the spotter and a small select group (size unknown) search for the sensors.

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If the amount recovered is the same as the amount seen being dropped, the unit will resume normal activities. If the amount of sensors recovered is less than the number of sensors being dropped, the unit will quickly leave the area and will not return until the remaining sensors have been found. When sensors are discovered, they are burned or sunk in a large stream or river as soon as possible. The VC are also aware that a percentage of the aircraft flown at night are equipped with infra-red scopes and, therefore, have developed methods to avoid detection by the infra-red scopes. When troops are moving in a tree line or jungle, and an aircraft is heard or observed, the troops are ordered to stop and stand very close to a large tree trunk. If the troops are moving through an open area at night and an aircraft is observed or heard, the troops are trained so that the first trooper bends at the waist with his knees slightly bent while the next trooper places his left arm and head on the buttocks of the man in front and holds his rifle horizontal in his right hand. The troops are ordered to remain motionless until the aircraft has disappeared and to keep in a line along the footpath, dike or on whatever they were following, so that the aircraft crew cannot distinguish them from the terrain. (525th MI Group)

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2 - Cmdt, USAADS, Ft Bliss, TX 79916
2 - Cmdt, USA Jungle Warfare Sch, Canal Zone, APO NY 09834
2 - Cmdt, USACEWS/TC, Ft Huachuca, AZ 85613
5 - Cmdt, USAARMS, Ft Knox, KY 40121
20 - CG 18th MP Bde, ATTN: S2
25 - USARV, TSH, ATTN: S2
5 - CO 23d Arty Gp, ATTN: S2
10 - CO 34th Gen Spt Gp, ATTN: S2
5 - CO 108th Arty Gp, ATTN: S2
5 - CO 164th Combat Avn Gp, APO 96215
2 - CO 507th Trans Gp, ATTN: S2
25 - CO 509th RR Gp
20 - CO 525th MI Gp
5 - CO LBN Post, ATTN: SPO
1 - CO HQ Area Cmd, ATTN: SPO
10 - CO 1st MI Bn (ARS)
15 - CO USASAPAC, Helemano, Hawaii
10 - CO HQ Task Force South, ATTN: S2, APO 96317
1 - CO 73d Avn Co (AS), APO 96315
1 - CO MI CO (ARS), APO 96308
1 - CO 225th Avn Co (AS), APO 96316
2 - CO USASATC & S, Ft Devens, MA 01433
5 - CO 702d MID
5 - CO USACDCINTA, Ft Holabird, MD 21219
2 - CO Dept of Security Police Training, Lackland AFB, TX 78236
10 - Ch Intel Adv Office, Project MASSTER, Ft Hood, TX 76544
2 - Dir Defense Communications Planning Gp, ATTN: Code 200A, Bldg 5G,
US Naval Observatory, Wash, DC 20305
1 - US Dir, Combined Intel Center, RVN
2 - Defense Intelligence Agency, US Naval Station, Anacostia School,
Wash, DC 20390
2 - 35th Security Police Squadron, APO 96321

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